



IBM z/OS Version 2 Release 3 ICSF PKCS #11 Cryptographic Module

FIPS 140-2

Non-Proprietary Security Policy

Version 5.0

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1 Scope of Document

This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the IBM® z/OS® Version 2 Release 3 ICSF PKCS #11 Cryptographic Module, and was prepared as part of the requirements for conformance to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2, Level 1 Software-Hybrid Module.

This document describes the services that the z/OS Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility PKCS #11 module (“ICSF PKCS #11” or “module”) provides to security officers and end users, and the policy governing access to those services. It complements official product documentation, which concentrates on application programming interface (API) level usage and environmental setup [1].

The software component in which the z/OS ICSF PKCS #11 module is shipped consists of a set of loadable software objects (binary programs and auxiliary files). The deployed version consists of the following objects:

Table 1: ICSF PKCS #11 Module – Software Component

Core	Auxiliary			
CSFINPV2	CSFINPVT	CSFPPRF	CSFPHMV	CSFDLL64
	CSFPDVK	CSFPPKV	CSFPWPK	CSNPCA3X
	CSFPDMK	CSFPSKD	CSNPCAPI	CSNPCI3X
	CSFPHMG	CSFPSKE	CSNPCINT	CSNPCU3X
	CSFPGKP	CSFPSAV	CSNPCUTL	CSFDLL3X
	CSFPGSK	CSFPTRC	CSFDLL	Header Files
	CSFPGAV	CSFPTRD	CSNPCA64	Side Decks
	CSFPOWH	CSFPTRL	CSNPCI64	Sample Application
	CSFPPKS	CSFPUWK	CSNPCU64	

The z/OS ICSF PKCS #11 install package consists of the core program (CSFINPV2) that is utilized while operating in FIPS 140-2 mode, as well as some auxiliary programs and files. The auxiliary programs provide functionality that is not cryptographically relevant (i.e., pass-through support). The remaining files consist of headers, side decks, sample application, and sample configuration scripts.

2 Cryptographic Module Specification

The z/OS ICSF PKCS #11 module is classified as a *multi-chip standalone software-hybrid module* for **FIPS Pub 140-2** purposes. The actual cryptographic boundary for this FIPS 140-2 module validation includes the ICSF PKCS #11 module running in configurations supplemented by hardware cryptography. The ICSF PKCS #11 module consists of software-based cryptographic algorithms as well as symmetric, hashing, true, and deterministic random number generation algorithms provided by the CP Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF), and optionally one IBM Cryptographic Coprocessor configured as an accelerator for RSA clear key modular cryptography. The accelerator can be one IBM 4767 Cryptographic Coprocessor (CEX5S) configured as an accelerator (CEX5A) or one IBM 4768 Cryptographic Coprocessor (CEX6S) configured as an accelerator (CEX6A).

The CEX5A or CEX6A accelerator is accessed through auxiliary program CSFINPVT. The ICSF PKCS #11 module interfaces with CSFINPVT which acts as a “pipe” between ICSF PKCS #11 and the cryptographic cards.

The ICSF PKCS #11 module uses the z/OS Version 2 Release 3 Security Server RACF® Signature Verification (hereafter referred to as “IRRPVERS”) with FIPS 140-2 Validation #2691 for module integrity checking services.

ICSF PKCS #11 testing was performed using the z/OS Version 2 Release 3 operating system with the following platform configurations:

1. IBM z14™ with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (Base GPC)
2. IBM z14™ with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (Base GPC) and IBM 4767 Cryptographic Coprocessor configured as a Crypto Express5 accelerator (CEX5A)
3. IBM z14™ with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (Base GPC) and IBM 4768 Cryptographic Coprocessor configured as a Crypto Express6 accelerator (CEX6A).

The module running on the above platforms met all **FIPS Pub 140-2** Level 1 security requirements.

In addition to the configurations tested by the laboratory, vendor-affirmed testing was performed on the following platforms and operating system levels:

1. IBM z13® with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (Base GPC)
2. IBM z13® with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 and Crypto Express5 accelerator (CEX5A)
3. IBM z13® with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 and Crypto Express5 coprocessor (CEX5C).

Security level This document describes the security policy for the z/OS ICSF PKCS #11 with Level 1 overall security as defined in **FIPS Pub 140-2** [2].

Figure 1 below shows the physical boundary of the System z machine as well as the logical boundary of the module. A more detailed view is shown in the Operational Environment section.

Figure 1: ICSF PKCS #11 Cryptographic Module Physical and Logical Boundaries




Table 2 lists the module's software and supplementing hardware components and details the versions required and associated documentation.

Table 2: ICSF PKCS #11 Module Components

Type / Names	Version
Software components ICSF CSFINPV2	ICSF level HCR77C0 with APAR OA56129
Hardware components CPACF	Firmware – CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 (aka FC3863) with System Driver Level 32L Hardware – COP chips integrated within processor unit
Crypto Express5 (CEX5S),(4767-002)	Firmware – CCA 5.3.20z Hardware – P/N 00LV498
Crypto Express6 (CEX6S),(4768-001)	Firmware – CCA 6.0.8z Hardware – P/N 01PP167
Documentation	<p>SC14-7506-06 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Administrator's Guide</i> SC14-7508-06 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Application Programmer's Guide</i> SC14-7509-05 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Messages</i> SC14-7505-06 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Overview</i> SC14-7508-07 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF System Programmer's Guide</i> SC14-7511-07 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF TKE Workstation User's Guide</i> SC14-7510-04 <i>z/OS Cryptographic Services ICSF Writing PKCS #11 Applications</i> IBM Z14 Hardware Management Console online help for the Hardware Management Console</p>

3 Cryptographic Module Security Level

The module is intended to meet requirements of Security Level 1 overall, with certain categories of security requirements not applicable (Table 3).

Table 3: Module Security Level Specification

Security Requirements Section	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	1
Module Ports and Interfaces	1
Roles, Services and Authentication	1
Finite State Model	1
Physical Security	1
Operational Environment	1
Cryptographic Key Management	1
EMI/EMC	1
Self-Tests	1
Design Assurance	1
Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
Overall	1

4 Ports and Interfaces

As a multi-chip standalone module, the ICSF PKCS #11 physical interfaces are the boundaries of the host running ICSF PKCS #11 module code. The underlying logical interfaces of the module are the PKCS #11 callable services documented in the *z/OS Cryptographic Services Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility Application Programmer's Guide* and the ICSF internal API to the Crypto Express Accelerators known as the ICSF Adjunct Processor Service Interface (APSI).

Table 4: Data input, data output, control input and status output

FIPS 140-2 Interface	Logical Interface	Description
Data Input	ICSF PKCS #11 API, Key data sets, ICSF internal API APSI	Input variables are passed on the ICSF PKCS #11 API. Existing keys may be input from key stores (key data sets). Input data is passed via the ICSF internal API APSI to the Crypto Express Card(s).
Data Output	ICSF PKCS #11 API, Key data sets, ICSF internal API APSI	Output results are passed back through the ICSF PKCS #11 API. New keys may be stored back into the key data sets. Output data from the Crypto Express Card(s) is passed to the ICSF PKCS #11 functions via the ICSF internal API APSI.
Control Input	ICSF PKCS #11 API, Options data set	Control inputs, which control the mode of the module, are provided through the FIPSMODE ICSF startup option and a vendor defined PKCS #11 key attribute, CKA_IBM_FIPS140
Status Output	API	Status output is provided in return and reason codes and through messages
Power	Power Supply, Batteries	Batteries are a backup power source for the Crypto Express5 and Crypto Express6 processors

The documentation for the API lists the return and reason codes. A complete list of all return and reason codes returned by the APIs within the ICSF PKCS #11 module is provided in the ICSF PKCS #11 reference manual, *z/OS Cryptographic Services Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility Application Programmer's Guide*.

Cryptographic bypass capability is not supported by ICSF PKCS #11.

4.1 Module Status

The ICSF PKCS #11 module communicates any error status synchronously through the use of its documented return and reason codes. It is the responsibility of the calling application to handle exceptional conditions in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner.

ICSF PKCS #11 is optimized for library use and does not contain any terminating assertions or exceptions. Any internal error detected by ICSF PKCS #11 and not induced by user data will be reflected back to the application with appropriate return and reason codes. The calling application must examine the return and reason codes and act in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner to such failures and reflect this error in a fashion consistent with this application.

User-induced or internal errors do not reveal any sensitive material to callers. Return and reason codes and error conditions are fully documented in the product's programming documentation.

5 Roles, Services and Authentication

5.1 Roles

The module supports the definition of multiple virtual PKCS #11 tokens. For each token, the module supports a User role – handling requests submitted by either the PKCS #11 Security Officer¹ (SO) or the end-user application (USER). The module implicitly supports a Crypto Officer role as well (see Table 5). Role assumption is implied by the service being requested and the parameters specified. The module does not support explicit user authentication, but does query the operating system to check the user's permissions prior to granting access to the service.

Table 5: Token Role Descriptions and Authentication Mechanisms

Role	Purpose / Permitted Actions	Type of Authentication	Authentication Data	Strength of Mechanism
User (USER or SO)	Request the cryptographic algorithms listed in tables 6 and 7	Implicit (module checks user's permissions)	None	N/A
Crypto Officer	Module installation and configuration and for setting the token permissions. This role does not involve the use of cryptographic services.	Implicit ²	N/A	N/A

5.2 Services

The module provides commands (algorithms, tables 6 – 8) and queries (Table 9). Queries return status of commands or command groups; commands exercise cryptographic functions. Crypto Officers perform queries; Security Officers and Users may perform both queries (as permitted by Table 9) and commands.

Services are accessed through documented API interfaces from the calling application. For a list of API services available in the ICSF PKCS #11 module, see Table 11.

Additional services are provided by bound module IRRPVERS. This module utilizes the module integrity checking service provided by IRRPVERS.

Table 6: Approved Algorithms in FIPS-Approved mode of operation

Algorithm	Use	Standard	CSPs / Caveat	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Mode / Method	Access	CAVS Cert #
Software							
Symmetric Key Algorithms							
AES	Data Encryption / Decryption	SP800-38A-addendum	AES Key	128, 192, or 256 bits	AES-CBC-CS1 (Ciphertext Stealing)	read / write / execute	(vendor affirmed)
		SP800-38D			GCM		C 424

¹ See the PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface Base Specification Version 2.40 [7] for a description of the PKCS #11 Security Officer. For the purposes of this Security Policy, the PKCS #11 Security Officer falls under the module's User role.

² The Crypto Officer role is not explicitly authenticated but assumed implicitly on implementation of the module's installation and usage sections defined in the security rules section.

Algorithm	Use	Standard	CSPs / Caveat	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Mode / Method	Access	CAVS Cert #
	Key wrapping (when encrypted using the GCM mode of AES)	SP 800-38F			GCM		
Public Key Algorithms							
DSA	DSA Parameter Generation	FIPS 186-4	None	L=2048 N=256	N/A	read / write / execute	C 424
	DSA Key Generation		DSA Asymmetric private key	L=2048 N=224			
	Digital Signature generation		DSA Asymmetric private key	L=2048 N=256			
	Digital Signature verification		None	L=1024, N=224 L=2048 N=224 L=2048 N=256		read / execute	
RSA	RSA Key Generation	FIPS 186-4	RSA Asymmetric private key	2048 and 3072 bits	N/A	read / write / execute	C 424
	Digital Signature generation (PKCS#1 v1.5)			2048, 3072 and 4096 bits			
	Digital Signature verification (PKCS#1 v1.5)		None	1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits		read / execute	
	Digital Signature generation (PSS)	IETF RFC 3447	RSA Asymmetric private key	2048, 3072 and 4096 bits	N/A	read / execute	C 424
	Digital Signature Verification (PSS)		None	1024, 2048 and 3072 bits		read / execute	
ECDSA	ECDSA Key Generation	FIPS 186-4	ECDSA Asymmetric private key	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	N/A	read / write / execute	C 424
	Digital Signature generation						
	Digital Signature verification		None	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 ²		read / execute	
Diffie- Hellman	Shared secret computation	SP 800-56A	Diffie-Hellman parameters and keys	2048 bits	N/A	read / write / execute	C 424
EC Diffie- Hellman	Shared secret computation	SP 800-56A	EC Diffie- Hellman keys	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	N/A	read / write / execute	C 424
Hash Functions							
SHS	Message Digest	FIPS 180-4	None	N/A	SHA-1 ² SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512	read / write / execute	C 424
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)							

Algorithm	Use	Standard	CSPs / Caveat	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Mode / Method	Access	CAVS Cert #
HMAC	Message Authentication	FIPS 198-1	HMAC key	Key sizes greater or equal to ½ the output hash size ¹	HMAC with SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512	read / write / execute	C 424
AES	Message Authentication	SP 800-38D	AES Symmetric key	128, 192 or 256 bits	GMAC	read / write / execute	C 424
Random Number Generation							
DRBG	Random Bit Generation (only used if CPACF Driver 32L not present)	SP 800-90A	Entropy input, Seed, V, C. Only used if CPACF driver 32L not present.	N/A	SHA-512 Hash DRBG	read / write / execute	C 424
CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions							
Symmetric Algorithms							
AES	Data Encryption / Decryption	FIPS 197 SP 800-38A SP 800-38D	AES Symmetric key	128, 192 or 256 bits	CBC, ECB, CTR, GCM	read / write / execute	C 79
AES	Key wrapping when encrypted using the GCM mode of AES, or encrypted with an approved (but unauthenticated) mode of AES and then authenticated with an HMAC or GMAC	SP 800-38F	AES symmetric key	128, 192 or 256 bits	any AES block chaining mode with GMAC or HMAC	read / write / execute	C 79 C 424
Triple-DES	Data Encryption / Decryption	SP 800-67	Triple DES Symmetric key	192 bits	CBC, ECB	read / write / execute	C 79
Hash Functions							
SHS	Message Digest	FIPS 180-4	None	N/A	SHA-1 ² SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512	read / write / execute	C 79
Random Number Generation							

Algorithm	Use	Standard	CSPs / Caveat	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Mode / Method	Access	CAVS Cert #
DRBG	Random Bit Generation (if CPACF driver 32L not present, used for seeding the software DRBG only)	SP 800-90A	Entropy input, Seed	N/A	SHA-512 Hash DRBG	read / write / execute	C 436
4767-002 (CEX5A) and 4768-001(CEX6A)							
Public Key Algorithms							
Diffie-Hellman (CVL)	Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement	SP 800-56A, Revision 2	Diffie-Hellman Asymmetric private key	2048 prime	FFC	read / write / execute	C 507 C 508
RSA	Digital Signature generation	FIPS 186-4	RSA Asymmetric private key	2048, 3072 and 4096 bits ³	N/A	read / write / execute	C 507 C 508
RSA	Digital Signature verification	FIPS 186-4	None	1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096 bits ³	N/A	read / execute	C 507 C 508
Bound IRRPVERS Module							
RSA	Digital Signature verification	FIPS 186-4	None	2048 bits	N/A	read / execute	C 219

Notes:

1. Per FIPS 198-1 and SP 800-107, keys less than 112 bits in length are not approved for HMAC generation.
2. Use of SHA1 for digital signature generation is deprecated and should not be used.
3. PKCS #1 block formatting performed in software. CEX5A/CEX6A used for RSA acceleration only.

Table 7: Allowed Algorithms in FIPS-Approved mode of operation

Algorithm	Use	Standard	CSPs	Access	Caveat
Software					
Symmetric Algorithms					
AES	Key unwrapping	N/A	AES key	read / write / execute	128, 192, or 256-bit AES w/CBC PAD
Triple-DES	Key unwrapping	N/A	Triple-DES key	read / write / execute	3-key Triple-DES w/CBC PAD
Public Key Algorithms					
RSA	Key wrapping	N/A	RSA private key	read / write / execute	key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength; non-compliant less than 112 bits of encryption strength The modulus size at least 2048 bits and up to 4096 bits

Algorithm	Use	Standard	CSPs	Access	Caveat
Random Number Generation					
NDRNG	Seeding for the DRBGs	N/A	Noise source	read / write / execute	Implicitly driven
Message Authentication Codes (MACs)					
HMAC	Message Authentication	IETF RFC 2104	HMAC key	read / write / execute	HMAC with MD5 (when used in the context of the TLS protocol)

Table 8: Non-approved Algorithms (deprecated by NIST SP 800-131A or non-compliant) in non-FIPS-Approved mode of operation

Algorithm	Use	Notes
CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions		
AES	Key wrapping	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A
Triple-DES	Key Wrapping	SP 800-67, SP 800-38A
Software		
Public Key Algorithms		
RSA	Key generation / Digital signature generation	Key bit sizes less than 2048 not approved
	Key Wrapping	Key bit sizes less than 2048 not approved
DSA	Parameter generation / Key generation / Digital signature generation	Key parameters L=1024, N=160 not approved
Diffie-Hellman	Parameter generation / Key generation / Shared secret computation	Prime bit sizes less than 2048 not approved
EC Diffie-Hellman	Shared secret computation	Curve P-192 not approved Brainpool curves (224, 256, 384, 512 bits)
ECDSA	Key generation / Digital signature generation	Curve P-192 not approved Brainpool curves (224, 256, 384, 512 bits)
	Digital signature verification	Brainpool curves (224, 256, 384, 512 bits)
4767-002 (CEX5A) and 4768-001(CEX6A)		
Public Key Algorithms		
RSA	Digital signature generation	Key sizes less than 2048 not approved
	Key Wrapping	Key sizes less than 2048 not approved
Diffie-Hellman	Shared secret computation	Key sizes less than 2048 not approved

Table 9: Queries

Service	Notes	Access	Roles	
Module Status			Crypto Officer	User
Query mode	Check which FIPS 140-2 mode ICSF is running in (CCVTFIPS and CCVTFIPS_COMPAT)	read	Yes	Yes
Integrity Checks				
Power-up Tests	Automatic before first use	read / execute	Yes	No

Self-Tests	CSFINPV2 self-test requires restarting ICSF	read / execute	Yes	n/a
Operational Correctness Checks				
NDRNG Tests	Continuously performed (automatic)	read / execute	n/a	Yes
Pair-wise consistency	Continuously performed (automatic)	read / execute	n/a	Yes

6 Operational Environment

6.1 Installation and Invocation

ICSF level HCR77C0 is installed as part of the z/OS Version 2 Release 3 ServerPac. In addition, it is also shipped as a web deliverable, which may be obtained from the z/OS Downloads web site, <http://www.ibm.com/systems/z/os/zos/downloads/>. The evaluated configuration requires the installation of additional service provided through APAR OA56129 and is bound to the IRRPVERS module.

After installation, ICSF must be started to make the ICSF PKCS #11 module available. The Crypto Officer must specify the desired FIPSMODE option in the ICSF options data set which is used at ICSF start up or for the SETICSF OPTIONS, RERESH command:

FIPSMODE can be changed to YES or COMPAT only if the ICSF PKCS#11 Startup Self-Tests passed and the Conditional Self-Testing has passed.

FIPSMODE(YES,FAIL(YES|NO))

- FIPS standard mode – Provides full FIPS support. All applications must adhere to the FIPS restrictions that were in effect circa 2009 (prior to SP 800-131A Revision 1 [6]). These are henceforth known as the heritage FIPS restrictions. All heritage FIPS restrictions are enforced. Any request for a disallowed heritage cryptographic function is denied.

FIPSMODE(COMPAT,FAIL(YES|NO))

- FIPS compatibility mode – Provides FIPS support for select applications. Applications that are not “FIPS Exempt” must adhere to heritage FIPS restrictions. Any request for a disallowed heritage cryptographic function using a FIPS only key or requested by a non-FIPS Exempt application is denied.

FIPSMODE(NO,FAIL(YES|NO))

- FIPS no enforcement mode, also known as FIPS On-Demand Mode – Provides FIPS support for applications that explicitly request FIPS adherence. Any request for a disallowed heritage cryptographic function by an application explicitly requesting FIPS adherence or using a FIPS only key is denied. This is the default mode.

These options are fully described in the programming documentation.

Note: *Whenever ICSF is enforcing the heritage (prior to SP 800-131A Revision 1) FIPS restrictions, it is considered to be running “FIPS restricted.” FIPS restrictions prior to SP 800-131A Revision 1 are enforced by ICSF. Nevertheless, FIPS restricted is not the same as FIPS-Approved mode of operation. Since 2009, the CMVP has disallowed more algorithms and key lengths through SP 800-131A and its subsequent two revisions. The FIPS-Approved mode of operation is defined by Service Tables 6 and 7 in section 5.2 of this Security Policy (known as “enforced by policy). Invoking a FIPS-Approved or Allowed service will make the module enter the FIPS-Approved mode of operation, whereas invoking a non-Approved and non-Allowed service will make the module enter the non-FIPS Approved mode of operation. This is irrespective of which FIPSMODE was selected for the module.*

The cryptographic module is invoked via the APIs, as documented in the programming documentation.

The CPACF Enablement Feature 3863 must be installed prior to starting ICSF. This feature code may be ordered from IBM then downloaded through RETAIN and installed using the Hardware Management Console (HMC).

The hardware accelerator(CEX5A or CEX6A) is optionally installed and configured by an IBM customer engineer (CE) in accordance with the card's manual and installation procedures. The customer uses the HMC

to assign it to the logical partition where ICSF is residing. The mode of operation as an accelerator (vs a coprocessor) is configured using the HMC.

Note, if a CEX5A or CEX6A is to be used, there must be only one CEX5A or one CEX6A assigned to the partition where ICSF resides. Furthermore, the single accelerator in use must be configured online prior to starting ICSF and it must not be reconfigured while ICSF is running.

Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module's certificate is out of scope of this validation, and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

6.2 Module Operation

The ICSF PKCS#11 module is intended to operate within z/OS Version 2, Release 3 in a single-user mode of operation.

Using z/OS ICSF PKCS #11 in a FIPS 140-2 approved manner assumes that the following defined criteria are followed:

- The Operating System enforces authentication method(s) to prevent unauthorized access to Module services.
- All host system components that can contain sensitive cryptographic data (main memory, system bus, disk storage) must be located within a secure environment.
- The unauthorized reading, writing or modification of the ICSF started task is not allowed.
- The ICSF PKCS #11 setup procedures documented in the programming documentation must be followed and setup done correctly. This includes the setting of the cryptographic module's name as outlined in the *z/OS Cryptographic Services Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility System Programmer's Guide*, Chapter 2, Steps to customize SYS1.PARMLIB.
- ICSF must operate FIPS restricted for all applications requiring FIPS adherence.
- Applications requiring FIPS adherence must follow the recommendations found in SP 800-131A Revision 1.

This module implements both approved and non-approved services. The calling application controls the invocation of the services and the cryptographic material being supplied or used by the services. When operating FIPS restricted, the module will not allow heritage (prior to SP 800-131A Revision 1) non-approved algorithms to be used. The module also offers non-approved but allowed RSA key establishment and exchange services even when operating FIPS restricted. Operating FIPS restricted automatically inhibits parameter combinations that are technically possible, but not permitted by heritage FIPS 140-2 restrictions.

Note that the module does not enforce the more recent restrictions introduced by SP 800-131A Revision 1, even when operating FIPS restricted. In some cases, it is not possible for ICSF to do the enforcement since the context of the request is not known. Therefore, all applications requiring FIPS adherence must explicitly follow the recommendations found in SP 800-131A Revision 1.

The ICSF PKCS #11 module (CSFINPV2), ICSF AP Service Interface (APSI), CPACF, and one optional Crypto Express card configured as an accelerator (CEX5A or CEX6A) represent the logical boundary of the module. The physical cryptographic boundary for the module is defined as the enclosure of the host on which the cryptographic module is to be executed.

Although the ICSF APSI is part of the logical cryptographic boundary, it is not deemed as cryptographically relevant to the cryptographic boundary. The ICSF APSI is being treated as a "pipe" between the ICSF PKCS #11 module and the Crypto Express5 or Crypto Express6 accelerator. No cryptographic operations are being performed on the data being provided by the ICSF PKCS #11 module until it arrives at the Crypto Express5 or Crypto Express6 accelerator.


Conversely, the CPACF Interface does perform cryptographically relevant function and, thus, is physically part of the CSFINPV2 signed program object.

The RACF Signature Verification module (IRRPVERS) is shipped as part of the Security Server RACF FMID. IRRPVERS is bound by this module in order to validate the signature on CSFINPV2. It is not considered part of the cryptographic boundary of this module.

PKCS #11 keys are stored in a dedicated VSAM data set in the clear. Consequently, this keystore and its I/O functions are not considered part of the cryptographic boundary.

As shown in figure 2, ICSF PKCS #11 cryptographic module software components are completely contained within the ICSF started task address space. The CEX5A, CEX6A and CPACF hardware components reside below the LPAR / VM virtualization layer. (The CEX5P and CEX6P, if installed, must be deactivated.) The CEX5C and CEX6C, if installed, are not used by the PKCS #11 cryptographic module when FIPS restrictions are being enforced. ICSF Callable Service stubs, instantiated in the caller's address space, exist for each callable service provided by ICSF, both for CCA and PKCS #11. These stubs are merely glue routines that provide no cryptographically relevant function. ICSF also provides a set of DLLs in support of the PKCS #11 standard API. Like the stubs, these DLLs are instantiated in the callers address space and provide no cryptographically relevant function.

Figure 2: ICSF PKCS #11 Cryptographic Module




As shown in figure 3, ICSF PKCS #11 cryptographic module may be deployed in a high availability environment where ICSF and other applications may be in effect instantiated on multiple z/OS system instances configured in a "clustered" environment known as a parallel sysplex. A parallel sysplex enables these systems behave like a single, logical computing facility. The underlying structure of the parallel sysplex remains virtually transparent to users, networks, applications, and even operations. If the cryptographic module is configured to run in sysplex mode, ICSF utilizes a

secure communication channel provided by the z/OS operating environment to communicate with other instances of ICSF executing on other systems in the sysplex environment.

In a sysplex environment, ICSF synchronizes keys between the individual systems in the sysplex by utilizing z/OS Sysplex Communications. Whenever a key or key attribute is added/deleted/updated on a source system, the target systems are notified of the change via sysplex communications.

Note, that the sysplex secure channel is not considered part of the logical cryptographic boundary as it is just an extension of ICSF's keystore function. However, being that all systems in a sysplex behave like a single, logical computing facility, the physical and logical cryptographic boundaries are extended to include all systems in the sysplex when ICSF is operating in sysplex mode.

Figure 3: ICSF PKCS #11 Cryptographic Module in a z/OS Sysplex Environment



7 Key Management

7.1 Key Storage

The ICSF PKCS #11 module provides key generation, import and export services to applications such that key material can be used in conjunction with cryptographic services. It is the responsibility of applications using these services to ensure that these services are used in a FIPS 140-2 compliant manner. In particular, see Table 8 and the footnotes of Table 6 for information on deprecated key sizes/usages.

Keys managed or generated by applications or libraries may be passed from applications to the module in the clear, provided that the sending application or module exists within the physical boundary of the host computer. The module retains such key material within the ICSF address space memory. In addition, persistent keys are stored in key store data sets (disk storage). The disk storage is outside the logical boundary.

7.2 Clear Key Generation

Clear key generation uses random bytes produced by an approved RNG algorithm (specified in **NIST SP 800-90A**) which is known as Hash_DRBG (DRBG). The DRBG is hardware (CPACF) based and is a SHA-512 Hash DRBG with a security strength of 256 bits.

The DRBG is seeded by hardware based (CPACF) TRNG.

Note that in the case of the Vendor Affirmed configurations, a combination software and hardware based DRBG is used.

The Key Generation methods implemented in the module for Approved services in FIPS mode is compliant with Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) for asymmetric keys as per [SP800-133] (vendor affirmed). Symmetric key generation uses the DRBG directly to produce the key material.

DSA and ECDSA key generation is done according to FIPS Pub 186-4 [3]. When FIPS restricted, RSA key generation implements only the FIPS Pub 186-4 key generation method. A non-compliant RSA key generation method is also present, which allows for the generation of RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits (FIPS Pub 186-4 does not permit generation of shorter keys), but the module does not permit the generation of such short keys when FIPS restricted. Diffie-Hellman key generation is similar to DSA key generation. EC Diffie-Hellman key generation is similar ECDSA key generation. For generating RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys the module implements asymmetric key generation services compliant with [FIPS186-4] and [SP800-90A]. A seed (i.e. the random value) used in asymmetric key generation is directly obtained from the [SP800-90A] DRBG.

7.3 Key Entry and Key Output

The module does not support manual key entry or intermediate key generation key output.

Applications may export keys, if desired. Such keys may be exported in-the-clear if the keys are not marked as sensitive. Keys marked sensitive and extractable may be exported in a wrapped (encrypted) format. Private keys may be wrapped using AES-GCM with 128, 192, or 256-bit AES keys, or any approved AES block chaining mode with HMAC or GMAC. Symmetric keys may be wrapped with RSA PKCS #1 v1.5, using any RSA key size ranging from 2048 to 4096 bits.

Keys may be unwrapped using AES-GCM with 128, 192, or 256-bit AES keys, or any AES approved block chaining mode with HMAC or GMAC, 3-key Triple-DES w/CBC PAD; 128, 192, 256-bit AES w/CBC PAD, or RSA PKCS #1 v1.5, using any RSA key size ranging from 1024 to 4096 bits.

Note: The unwrapping of keys using AES or Triple-DES is allowed according to IG D.9 (01/19/2018 version).

For **FIPS Pub 140-2**:

1. It is the application's responsibility to choose a wrapping key that is of equal or greater strength than the key being wrapped.
2. It is recommended that applications always mark private and secret keys as sensitive.

7.4 Key Establishment

The module provides support for asymmetric key establishment methods as allowed by Annex D in the **FIPS Pub 140-2**. The supported asymmetric key establishment methods are RSA Key Wrapping, Diffie-Hellman, and EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation.

When using Diffie-Hellman while operating FIPS restricted, the module allows key lengths of 2048 bits which provides 112 bits of encryption strength. Use of a prime length less than 2048 bits is not allowed as per NIST SP 800-131A. Applications requiring FIPS adherence must not use prime lengths less than 2048 bits.

When using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman while operating FIPS restricted, the module allowed curves are P-224, P-256, P-384, and P-521 which provide between 112 and 256 bits of encryption strength. Use of the P-192 curve is not allowed as per NIST SP 800-131A for signature generation. Applications requiring FIPS adherence must not use curve P-192.

When using RSA Key Wrapping while operating FIPS restricted, the allowed modulus lengths must be between 2048 and 4096 bits which provides between 112 and 150 bits of encryption strength. Use of a modulus length less than 2048 bits is not allowed as per NIST SP 800-131A. Applications requiring FIPS adherence must not use modulus lengths less than 2048 bits.

7.5 Key Protection

To enforce compliance with **FIPS Pub 140-2** key management requirements on the ICSF PKCS #11 module, code issuing calls must manage keys in a **FIPS Pub 140-2** compliant method. Keys managed or generated by applications may be passed from the application to the module in the clear in the **FIPS Pub 140-2** validated configuration.

The management and allocation of memory is the responsibility of the operating system. With z/OS, a unique address space is allocated for each started task, such as ICSF. z/OS and the underlying hardware control access to such address spaces. The PKCS #11 module relies on such address space separation to maintain confidentiality of secrets.

Module services and key record storage on disk are protected by z/OS (RACF) access control. The PKCS #11 module relies on this access control to protect against the unauthorized modification, substitution, and use of keys, including public keys.

All keys are associated with the User role. It is the responsibility of application program developers to protect keys exported from the ICSF PKCS #11 module.

7.6 Key Destruction

ICSF PKCS #11 objects, when released on behalf of a caller are zeroized by ICSF. Local copies of all secret and private key object material made by ICSF are zeroized when they are no longer needed. In addition, z/OS ensures that the real storage frames that once backed the storage released are zeroed before the frames are reallocated to another caller. For persistent key objects stored in DASD key stores, the module's Crypto Officer may initiate the zeroization of those persistent key objects with the following procedure:

Delete the key store data sets. Installations must activate the erase-on-scratch feature to ensure that the DASD storage that backs the key stores is physically erased.

It is the calling application's responsibility to destroy any key objects and similar sensitive information it manages, when no longer needed using **FIPS Pub 140-2** compliant procedures.

7.7 Key/CSP Management Table

Table 10: Key/CSP Management Table

Key/CSP	Generation	Entry/output	Zeroization	Storage
---------	------------	--------------	-------------	---------

AES key	CKM_AES_KEY_GEN (using the output of the SP800-90A DRBG)	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
Triple-DES key	CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN (using the output of a SP800-90A DRBG)	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
HMAC key	CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN (using the output of a SP800-90A DRBG)	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
DRBG Internal State (C, K, V values)	NDRNG and derived internal state values based on SP800-90A DRBG	N/A	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
RSA private key	CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
DSA private key	CKM_DSA_KEY_GEN	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
ECDSA private key	CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
Diffie-Hellman private key	CKM_DH_KEY_GEN	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory
EC Diffie-Hellman private key	CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN	Passed to and from the calling application	Zeroized when the cipher context is released	Persistent keys are stored in a key store (outside the module's boundary) ICSF address space memory

8 Physical Security

The ICSF PKCS #11 installation inherits the physical characteristics of the host running it. The ICSF PKCS #11 module has no physical security characteristics of its own. Figure 4 illustrates an IBM z14 mainframe computer.

CEX5A and CEX6A are the terms used to refer to IBM 4767/Crypto Express5S and IBM 4768/Crypto Express 6S hardware devices when configured on an IBM Z® server as hardware cryptographic accelerators.

The CP Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF) (see Figure 6) is also a hardware device – part of the Co-Processor Unit (CoP). It offers the full complement of the Triple-DES algorithm, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), the AES-GCM algorithm, a true random-number generation function (TRNG/NDRNG), and SHA-512 deterministic random-number generation (DRNG/DBRG) function. Security Level 1 is satisfied by the device (CoP) being included within the physical boundary of the module and the device being made of commercial-grade components.

CPACF Physical Design: Each microprocessor (core) on the 8-core chip has its own dedicated CoP, which implements the crypto instructions and also provides the hardware compression function. The compression unit is integrated with the CP Assist for Cryptographic Function (CPACF), benefiting from combining (sharing) the use of buffers and interfaces.


Figure 4: IBM System z14 Mainframe Computer



Figure 5: Crypto Express6 Card



Figure 6: Processor Unit with CPACF COP



9 EMI/EMC

Systems utilizing the module's services have their overall EMI/EMC ratings determined by the host system, which includes the CPACF. The validation environments meet the requirements of 47 CFR FCC PART 15, Subpart B, Class A (Business use).

EMI/EMC requirements for the Crypto Express5 and Crypto Express6 cards are met by the card's FCC Class B rating.

10 Self-Tests

10.1 ICSF PKCS #11 Module

The ICSF PKCS #11 module implements a number of self-tests to check proper functioning of the module including power-up self-tests and conditional self-tests. Conditional tests are performed when the DRBG is used and when asymmetric keys are generated. These tests include a continuous random number generator test and pair-wise consistency tests of the generated DSA, ECDSA or RSA keys.

10.2 Startup Self-Tests

“Power-up” self-tests consist of software integrity test(s) and known-answer tests of algorithm implementations. The module integrity test is automatically performed during loading. The known-answer tests are performed after the loading is complete, during module initialization. If either of these tests fail, the module either terminates or is rendered unusable (all cryptographic services return an error return code).

The integrity of the module is verified by checking an RSA/SHA-256-based digital signature of each module binary prior to being utilized in FIPS 140-2 compliant mode. Initialization will only succeed if all utilized module signatures are verified successfully. Module signatures are generated during the final phase of the build process. The integrity verification starts with bound module IRRPVERS verifying its own digital signature. Once verified, IRRPVERS verifies the digital signature of CSFINPV2.

Algorithm known answer tests are performed by the module. The tests are performed prior to any cryptographic algorithms being executed. All output from the module is inhibited until the self-tests have completed.

The module tests the following cryptographic algorithms:

CPACF – AES (encrypt/decrypt), Triple-DES (encrypt/decrypt), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, and the Hash_DRBG.

Software – AES (encrypt/decrypt), SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, RSA (2048-bit key sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt), DSA (2048-bit prime sign/verify), ECDSA (P-256 sign/verify), Diffie-Hellman primitive (2048-bit prime), EC Diffie-Hellman primitive (P-256), HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512, AES-GCM (encrypt/decrypt), and the Hash_DRBG.

CEX5A and CEX6A – RSA (2048-bit key sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt) and Diffie-Hellman primitive (2048-bit prime). Only tested if present.

Self-tests are performed in logical order, verifying module integrity incrementally:

- Integrity test on module, using RSA/SHA-256 (Performed by IRRPVERS when the module is loaded)
- Known-answer tests on all Approved algorithms except DSA and ECDSA
- Pairwise consistency test for DSA and ECDSA.

Once the startup self-tests are complete (and successful), the module will issue console message CSFM015I. It will also set CCVTFIPS or CCVTFIPS_COMPAT depending on the startup option requested.

Startup Recovery If any of the startup self-tests fail, ICSF PKCS #11 will terminate FIPS 140-2 processing.

Conditional Self-Testing - Pair-wise Consistency Checks This test is run whenever the module generates a DSA, ECDSA, or RSA public/private key-pair.

If the pair-wise consistency check fails, the module enters an error state and returns an error status code. The calling application must recognize this error and handle it in a FIPS 140-2 appropriate manner, for example, by restarting ICSF.

Invoking FIPS 140-2 self-tests on demand. If a user can access ICSF PKCS #11 services, the module has passed its integrity and power-up self-tests. The module does not provide a method to drive the self-test on demand, short of restarting ICSF.

10.3 Crypto Express5 and Crypto Express6 (CEX5 and CEX6)

The IBM Crypto Express5 and Crypto Express 6 features executes the following self-tests upon every startup:

A configuration integrity test verifies firmware flash memory modules and code integrity. The initial and continuous checks are basically identical, verifying memory checksums when required. The initial checks verify integrity once before data is used for the first time. Non-modifiable firmware is checked for integrity through embedded checksums. In case of checksum mismatch, the code halts itself or is not even permitted to execute. This code is executed only at startup.

Functional integrity of hardware components is tested through a selected set of known answer tests, covering all programmable components. The programmable devices verify their own code integrity, external tests verify proper connectivity. CPU integrity is verified as part of power on self-test before execution continues to load the embedded operating system. These checks verify fundamental functionality, such as proper execution control, load/store operations, register functions, integrity of basic logical and arithmetic operations, and so forth. Once the CPU tests pass, CPU failures are monitored using other error-checking mechanisms (such as parity checks of the PCI bus etc.).

FPGA integrity (communications firmware) is checked by the FPGA itself, through a checksum embedded in the image, upon loading. If the test fails, the FPGA does not activate, and the card remains inaccessible.

After initialization, FPGA interfaces and internals are covered through parity checks internally, and external end-to-end checks at higher logical levels. Crypto ASIC integrity is verified by comprehensive known-answer tests at startup, covering all possible control modes. These tests implicitly cover FPGA transport as well, since tests are performed using both available internal interfaces. During regular operations, the crypto ASIC covers all traffic through combinations of redundant implementations, CRCs, and parity checks, in a way specific to each crypto engine. Any failure is indicated as a hardware failure, to the module CPU and the host.

Modular math engine self-tests cover all possible control modes, and different sizes of modular arithmetic. The modular math primitives' testing covers only modular arithmetic, up to full exponentiation, but not algorithm level (i.e., RSA or DSA protocols).

Interactive communications tests verify that the card PCI-X bus is functioning properly. As part of automatic self-tests, critical functions tests cover the module CPU cache control logic (data and instruction), processor registers, and instruction set; PCI-X bus transport integrity (including communication mailboxes), and RAM module integrity.

In addition to startup tests, the Crypto Express5 and Crypto Express 6 conditional data tests that are applicable to their use in this security policy are continuous integrity checks on modular math arithmetic (including RSA and DSA operations), implemented in hardware.

The Crypto Express5 and Crypto Express6 cards will be left offline if any of the startup self-tests fail. The ICSF PKCS #11 module is unaffected by this action.

To execute the self-tests on demand, the Crypto Express5 cards required a reboot from the hardware management console.

11 Operational Requirements (Officer/User Guidance)

11.1 Module Configuration for FIPS 140-2 Compliance

To ensure FIPS 140-2 compliant usage, the following requirements must be observed:

- Crypto Officers and users of ICSF PKCS #11 must verify that the correct Security Manager Profiles have been defined to ensure that startup integrity tests are performed. Each executable (IRRPVERS and CSFINPV2) contains an RSA/SHA-256 signature. The startup integrity tests ensure that the signatures match the expected value.
- Applications and libraries using ICSF PKCS #11 features must observe **FIPS Pub 140-2** rules for key management and provide their own self-tests.

For proper operations, the Crypto Officer or user must verify that applications comply with this requirement. While details of these application requirements are outside the scope of this policy, they are mentioned here for completeness.

- The Operating System (OS) hosting the module must be set up in accordance with **FIPS Pub 140-2** rules. It must provide sufficient separation between processes to prevent inadvertent access to data of different processes. (This requirement was met for all platforms tested during validation.)
- Applications using ICSF PKCS #11 services must verify that key ownership is not compromised and keys are not shared between different users of the calling application.

Note that this requirement is not enforced by the ICSF PKCS #11 module itself, but by the application providing the keys to ICSF PKCS #11.

- Applications utilizing ICSF PKCS #11 services must avoid using non-approved algorithms or modes of operation. If not feasible, the applications must indicate that they use non-approved cryptographic services. Applications must also comply with the key size and algorithm requirements specified in the latest revision of NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 1.
- Operating with an active Crypto Express coprocessor configured as a secure key PKCS #11 coprocessor (CEX5P or CEX6P) is not an approved platform configuration. The user or Crypto Officer must ensure that there are no active CEX5Ps or CEX6Ps configured.
- To be in FIPS 140-2 mode, the ICSF PKCS #11 installation must run on a host with commercial grade components and must be physically protected as prudent in an enterprise environment.
- The module complies with scenario 3 of IG A.5. If any application will use PKCS #11 objects for AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) encryption or GMAC generation, and will have ICSF generate the initialization vectors, then you need to set ECVTSPLX (sysplex name) or CVTSNAME (system name if not in a sysplex) to a unique value. A unique value requires that the first four bytes of the sysplex name or system name are unique.

In case the module's power is lost and then restored, a new key and IV for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

- **Physical assumptions**
 - The module is intended for application use in user areas that have physical control and monitoring. It is assumed that the following physical conditions will exist:
 - **LOCATION**
 - The processing resources of the module will be located within controlled access facilities that will prevent unauthorized physical access.
 - **PROTECTION**

- The module hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
 - Any sysplex communications shall be configured so that unauthorized physical access is prevented.
- **Personnel assumptions**
 - It is assumed that the following personnel conditions will exist:
 - **MANAGE**
 - There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the module and the security of the information it contains.
 - **NO EVIL CRYPTO OFFICER**
 - The system administrative personnel are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the Crypto Officer documentation.
 - **CO-OPERATION**
 - Authorized users possess the necessary authorization to access at least some of the information managed by the module and are expected to act in a cooperative manner in a benign environment.

11.2 Determining the Mode of Operation

The ICSF PKCS #11 module offers both FIPS approved and non-approved modes. To ensure FIPS mode operations, user applications must explicitly request FIPS adherence and must only use services (algorithms) defined in tables 6 and 7. The module will temporarily enter non-approved mode when a non-approved algorithm is requested. Thus the mode of operation can be determined by examining the parameters used on the service requests.

Additionally, even if adhering to the requirements for FIPS approved mode, running on a platform configuration that includes an active CEX5P or CEX6P invalidates the mode. The user or Crypto Officer may check for, and potentially correct, the configuration using the ICSF Coprocessor Management ISPF panel (option 1 from the ICSF main panel). Figure 7 shows a rendering of the panel:

Figure 7: Coprocessor Management Panel

```

----- ICSF Coprocessor Management ----- Row 1 to 3 of 3
COMMAND ==> _                               SCROLL ==> PAGE

Select the cryptographic features to be processed and press ENTER.
Action characters are: A, D, E, K, R, S and V. See the help panel for details.

  CRYPTO   SERIAL   STATUS   AES   DES   ECC   RSA   P11
  FEATURE  NUMBER          -----
-----
  5C05     99EA6073   Active
  6P06     97006074   Active
  6H14     N/A         Active
  ***** Bottom of data *****

```

Look for a CRYPTO FEATURE with the prefix “SP” that has a STATUS of “Active.” If found, this is a non-approved configuration. The configuration may be corrected by deactivating the coprocessor. This is done by entering a “D” in the left most field on the row and pressing “Enter” key.

Users (applications) utilizing services must enforce key management compliant with **FIPS Pub 140-2** requirements. This should be indicated in an application-specific way that is directly observable by Crypto Officers and end-users.

While such application-specific details are outside the scope of the validation, they are mentioned here for completeness.

The user application is responsible for ensuring that only FIPS approved algorithms and key sizes are utilized. User applications must also comply with the key size and algorithm requirements specified in the NIST Special Publication 800-131A Revision 2.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Mitigation of Other attacks security section of FIPS 140-2 is not applicable to the ICSF PKCS #11 cryptographic module.

13 Cryptographic Module Configuration Diagrams

The following diagrams illustrate the different validated configurations. These validated configurations can consist of a single z/OS System instance or multiple z/OS System instances.

Figure 8 illustrates the IBM z14 with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 and CPACF System Driver Level 32L configuration (Base GPC).

Figure 8: Validated Configuration with CPACF only





Figure 9 illustrates the IBM z14 with CP Assist for Cryptographic Functions DES/TDES Enablement Feature 3863 and CPACF System Driver Level 32L and Crypto Express cards (Accelerator (CEX5A or CEX6A)) configuration.

Figure 9: Validated Configuration with CPACF and CEX5A/CEX6A



14 Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)

The following Services (APIs) in Table 11 can be executed by the User role. The approved/allowed services used by the APIs are:

- Triple-DES, AES
- SHA-1, SHA2 (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)
- HMAC-SHA, HMAC-SHA2 (SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512)
- RSA sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt, key generation
- DSA sign/verify, key parameter and key generation
- ECDSA sign/verify, key parameter and key generation
- Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation, key parameter and key generation
- EC Diffie-Hellman shared secret computation and key generation
- DRBG.

Table 11: ICSF PKCS #11 Module Services (APIs)

Verb	Service Name	Description	Called By
CSFPDMK	PKCS #11 Derive multiple keys	Generate multiple secret key objects and protocol dependent keying material from an existing secret key object Supports mechanisms: CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE Additional vendor mechanisms for IPSec	C_DeriveKey
CSFPDVK	PKCS #11 Derive key	Generate a new secret key object from an existing key object Supports mechanisms: CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, and CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE Additional vendor mechanisms for IPSec	C_DeriveKey
CSFPHMG	PKCS #11 Generate HMAC	Generate a hashed message authentication code (MAC) Supports mechanisms: CKM_MD5_HMAC, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, CKM_SHA224_HMAC, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC, and CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC	C_Sign, C_SignUpdate, C_SignFinal
CSFPGKP	PKCS #11 Generate key pair	Generate an RSA, DSA, Elliptic Curve, or Diffie-Hellman key pair Supports mechanisms: CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, and CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN	C_GenerateKeyPair

CSFPGSK	PKCS #11 Generate secret key	Generate a secret key or set of domain parameters Supports mechanisms: CKM_DES_KEY_GEN, CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN, CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN, CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN, CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN, CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN, CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN, and CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN	C_GenerateKey
CSFPGAV	PKCS #11 Get attribute value	List the attributes of a PKCS11 object. For token/object management only, provides no cryptographically relevant function	C_GetAttributeValue
CSFPOWH	PKCS #11 One-way hash, sign or verify	Generate a one-way hash on specified text or sign or verify specified text Supports mechanisms: CKM_MD2, CKM_MD5, CKM_SHA_1, CKM_SHA224, CKM_SHA256, CKM_SHA384, CKM_SHA512, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS, CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS, CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS, CKM_DSA_SHA1, CKM_DSA_SHA224, CKM_DSA_SHA256, CKM_DSA_SHA384, CKM_DSA_SHA512, CKM_ECDSA_SHA1, CKM_ECDSA_SHA224, CKM_ECDSA_SHA256, CKM_ECDSA_SHA384, and CKM_ECDSA_SHA512	C_Digest, C_DigestUpdate, C_DigestFinal, C_Sign, C_SignUpdate, C_SignFinal, C_Verify, C_VerifyUpdate, C_VerifyFinal
CSFPPKS	PKCS #11 Private key sign	Decrypt or sign data using an RSA private key using zero-pad or PKCS #1 1.5 formatting. Sign data using a DSA private key. Sign data using an Elliptic Curve private key in combination with DSA Supports mechanisms: CKM_RSA_X_509, CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_DSA, and CKM_ECDSA	C_Sign, C_SignFinal, C_Decrypt
CSFPPS2	PKCS #11 Private key structure sign	Sign data using an RSA private key structure using PKCS #1 1.5 formatting.	Direct application call
CSFPPD2	PKCS #11 Private key structure decrypt	Decrypt data using an RSA private key structure using PKCS #1 1.5 formatting.	Direct application call
CSFPPRF	PKCS #11 Pseudo- random function	Generate pseudo-random output of arbitrary length	C_DeriveKey, C_GenerateRandom

CSFPPKV	PKCS #11 Public key verify	Encrypt or verify data using an RSA public key using zero-pad or PKCS #1 1.5 formatting. Verify a signature using a DSA public key. Verify a signature using an Elliptic Curve public key in combination with DSA. Supports mechanisms: CKM_RSA_X_509, CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_DSA, and CKM_ECDSA	C_Verify, C_VerifyFinal, C_Encrypt
CSFPPV2	PKCS #11 Public key structure verify	Verify data using an RSA public key structure using PKCS #1 1.5 formatting.	Direct application call
CSFPPE2	PKCS #11 Public key structure encrypt	Encrypt data using an RSA public key structure using PKCS #1 1.5 formatting.	Direct application call
CSFPSKD	PKCS #11 Secret key decrypt	Decipher data using a clear symmetric key Supports mechanisms: CKM_DES_ECB, CKM_DES_CBC, CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DES3_ECB, CKM_DES3_CBC, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_AES_GCM, CKM_AES_CTS, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, and CKM_RC4, (Plus CTR rule)	C_Decrypt, C_DecryptUpdate, C_DecryptFinal
CSFPSKE	PKCS #11 Secret key encrypt	Encipher data using a clear symmetric key Supports mechanisms: CKM_DES_ECB, CKM_DES_CBC, CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DES3_ECB, CKM_DES3_CBC, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_AES_GCM, CKM_AES_CTS, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, and CKM_RC4, (Plus CTR rule)	C_Encrypt, C_EncryptUpdate, C_EncryptFinal
CSFPSAV	PKCS #11 Set attribute value	Update the attributes of a PKCS11 object. For token/object management only, provides no cryptographically relevant function	C_GetAttributeValue
CSFPTRC	PKCS #11 Token record create	Initialize or re-initialize a z/OS PKCS #11 token, creates or copies a token object in the token data set and creates or copies a session object for the current PKCS #11 session. For token/object management only, provides no cryptographically relevant function	C_CreateObject, C_CopyObject, C_InitToken
CSFPTRD	PKCS #11 Token record delete	Delete a z/OS PKCS #11 token, token object, or session object. For token/object management only, provides no cryptographically relevant function	C_DestroyObject, C_InitToken
CSFPTRL	PKCS #11 Token record list	Obtain a list of z/OS PKCS #11 tokens. The caller must have SAF authority to the token. Also obtains a list of token and session objects for a token. Use a search template to restrict the search for specific attributes. For token/object management only, provides no cryptographically relevant function	C_Initialize, C_GetSlotList

CSFPUWK	PKCS #11 Unwrap key	Unwrap and create a key object using another key Supports mechanisms: CKM_RSA_PKCS, CKM_DES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, and CKM_AES_CBC_PAD	C_UnwrapKey
CSFPHMV	PKCS #11 Verify HMAC	Verify a hash message authentication code (MAC) Supports mechanisms: CKM_MD5_HMAC, CKM_SHA_1_HMAC, CKM_SHA224_HMAC, CKM_SHA256_HMAC, CKM_SHA384_HMAC, CKM_SHA512_HMAC, CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC, and CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC	C_Verify, C_VerifyUpdate, C_VerifyFinal
CSFPWPK	PKCS #11 Wrap key	Wrap a key with another key Supports mechanisms: CKM_RSA_PKCS and CKM_AES_CBC_PAD	C_WrapKey

Note: CKM_RC4, CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN, CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC and CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN are not usable when the module is configured as specified in section 11.

Note: The AES key wrap is compliant when encrypted with an approved (but unauthenticated) mode of AES and then authenticated with an HMAC or GMAC.

15 Glossary

Address space	A set of contiguous virtual addresses available to a program and its data. The address space is a container for enclaves and processes. [4] [5]
API	Application Programming Interface
CCA	IBM's Common Cryptographic Architecture, a standard for performing cryptographic functions.
CEX5S	Crypto Express5S, the IBM Z mainframe server name for the IBM 4767 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor 5 hardware security module (HSM).
CEX5A	Crypto Express5 Accelerator, a CEX5S configured as an accelerator.
CEX5C	Crypto Express5 Coprocessor, a CEX5S configured as coprocessor supporting the IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture.
CEX5P	Crypto Express5 Enterprise PKCS #11 secure key Coprocessor, a CEX5S configured as a coprocessor supporting the PKCS #11 standard.
CEX6S	Crypto Express6S, the IBM Z mainframe server name for the IBM 4768 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor 6 hardware security module (HSM).
CEX6A	Crypto Express6 Accelerator, a CEX6S configured as an accelerator.
CEX6C	Crypto Express6 Coprocessor, a CEX6S configured as coprocessor supporting the IBM Common Cryptographic Architecture.
CEX6P	Crypto Express6 Enterprise PKCS #11 secure key Coprocessor, a CEX6S configured as a coprocessor supporting the PKCS #11 standard.
CP	Central Processor, aka CPU.
CPACF	CP Assist for Cryptographic Function, clear key on-chip accelerator integrated into mainframe processors. CPACF functionality is restricted to symmetric and hashing operations.
DLL	Dynamic Link Library, shared program library instantiated separately from binaries using it. FIPS 140-2 configurations of ICSF PKCS #11 DLLs are never statically linked.
DRBG	Deterministic Random Number Generator, a deterministic function expanding a "true random" seed to a pseudo-random sequence.
Enclave	In the z/OS Language Environment, a collection of routines, one of which is named as the main routine. The enclave contains at least one thread. Multiple enclaves may be contained within a process. [4] [5]
HMC	The Hardware Management Console is a feature on IBM z Systems that provides an interface to control and monitor the status of the IBM z system.
ICSF	Integrated Cryptographic Service Facility
KAT	Known Answer Test
OS	Operating System
Process	A collection of resources; both program code and data, consisting of at least one enclave. [4] [5]
RETAIN	IBM database system shared by IBM and its customers
ServerPac	Prepackaged version of the z/OS Operating System
Side deck	The functions and variables that can be imported by DLL applications.

- Thread** An execution construct that consists of synchronous invocations and terminations of routines. The thread is the basic run_time path within the z/OS Language Environment program management model, and is dispatched by the operating system with its own run-time stack, instruction counter and registers. Thread may exist concurrently with other threads within an address space. [4] [5]
- TRNG/NDRNG** True Random Number Generator (or Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator), a service that extracts cryptographically-useful random bits from non-deterministic (physical) sources. The “random seed” bits are post-processed by a DRBG.

16 References

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