



## **Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series**

**FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy  
Document Revision: 1.0**

**H/W version: MZWLL1T9HAJQ-000H9, MZWLL1T9HAJQ-00AH9,  
MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9, MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9,  
MZWLL7T6HMLA-000H9, MZWLL7T6HMLA-00AH9,  
MZWLL15THMLA-000H9 and MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9**

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## Revision History

<b>Author(s)</b>	<b>Version</b>	<b>Updates</b>
Seungjae Lee	1.0	Initial Version

## Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	5
1.1. Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary .....	6
1.2. Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary.....	15
2. Acronym .....	16
3. Security Level Specification.....	17
4. Cryptographic Functionality .....	18
4.1. Approve algorithms .....	18
4.2. Non-Approved Algorithm .....	19
4.3. Critical Security Parameters .....	20
4.4. Public Security Parameters.....	21
5. Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces.....	22
6. Roles, Services and Authentication .....	23
6.1. Roles .....	23
6.2. Authentication .....	24
6.3. Services.....	25
6.3.1. Authenticated Services .....	25
Unauthenticated Services.....	26
7. Physical security policy .....	27
8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC).....	31
9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy.....	32
10. Security rules .....	33
10.1. Secure Installation.....	33
10.2. Operational description of Module.....	34
10.3. Power-on Self-Tests.....	35

## 1. Introduction

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Samsung”) NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series, herein after referred to as a “cryptographic module” or “module”, SSD (Solid State Drive), satisfies all applicable FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements, supporting TCG Opal SSC based SED (Self-Encrypting Drive) features, designed to protect unauthorized access to the user data stored in its NAND Flash memories. The built-in AES HW engines in the cryptographic module’s controller provide on-the-fly encryption and decryption of the user data without performance loss. The SED’s nature also provides instantaneous sanitization of the user data via cryptographic erase.

Module Name	Hardware Version	Firmware Version	Drive Capacity
Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series	MZWLL1T9HAJQ-000H9, MZWLL1T9HAJQ-00AH9	P101 and 3P01	1.92TB
	MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9, MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9		3.84TB
	MZWLL7T6HMLA-000H9, MZWLL7T6HMLA-00AH9		7.68TB
	MZWLL15THMLA-000H9, MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9		15.3TB

**Exhibit 1 – Versions of Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series.**

### 1.1. Hardware and Physical Cryptographic Boundary


The following photographs show the cryptographic module's top and bottom views. The multiple-chip standalone cryptographic module consists of hardware and firmware components that are all enclosed in two aluminum alloy cases, which serve as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The top and bottom cases are assembled by screws and the tamper-evident labels are applied for the detection of any opening of the cases. No security relevant component can be seen within the visible spectrum through the opaque enclosure. New firmware versions within the scope of this validation must be validated through the FIPS 140-2 CMVP. Any other firmware loaded into this module is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.




***Exhibit 2 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL1T9HAJQ-000H9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).***



**Exhibit 3 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL1T9HAJQ-00AH9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).**



**Exhibit 4 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).**





**Exhibit 5 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).**



**Exhibit 6 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL7T6HMLA-000H9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).**



***Exhibit 7 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL7T6HMLA-00AH9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).***




**Exhibit 8 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL15THMLA-000H9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).**



**Exhibit 9 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9 Cryptographic Boundary (From top to bottom – Left to right: top side, bottom side, front side, back side, left side, and right side).**

## 1.2. Firmware and Logical Cryptographic Boundary

The PM1723b series use a single ship controller with a NVMe interface on the system side and Samsung NAND flash internally. The following figure depicts the Module operational environment.



**Exhibit 10 – Block Diagram for Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series.**

## 2. Acronym

Acronym	Description
CTRL	EPiC2 Controller (SAMSUNG EPiC2 NVMe TLC/MLC SSD Controller)
NVMe I/F	Non-Volatile Memory Express Interface
CPU	Central Processing Unit (ARM-based)
DRAM I/F	Dynamic Random Access Memory Interface
ECC	Error Correcting Code
SRAM	Static Random Access Memory
NAND I/F	NAND Flash Interface
PMIC	Power Management Integrated Circuit
ROM	Read-only Memory
DRAM	Dynamic Random Access Memory
NAND	NAND Flash Memory
LBA	Logical Block Address
MEK	Media Encryption Key
MSID	Manufactured SID(Security Identifier)

**Exhibit 11 – Acronym and Descriptions for Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series.**

### 3. Security Level Specification

Security Requirements Area	Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services, and Authentication	2
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	3
Self-tests	2
Design Assurance	2
Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A

**Exhibit 12 – Security Level Table.**

## 4. Cryptographic Functionality

### 4.1. Approve algorithms

The cryptographic module supports the following Approved algorithms for secure data storage:

CAVP Cert.	Algorithm	Standard	Mode / Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
5007	AES	FIPS 197 SP 800-38E	XTS	256-bit	Data Encryption / Decryption  <i>Note: AES-ECB is the pre-requisite for AES-XTS; AES-ECB alone is NOT supported by the cryptographic module in FIPS Mode.</i>
Vendor Affirmed	CKG	SP800-133			Cryptographic Key Generation
1845	DRBG	SP 800-90A Revision 1	Hash_ DRBG (SHA-256)		Deterministic Random Bit Generation
1288	ECDSA	FIPS 186-4	SigVer	P-224	Digital Signature Verification
4072	SHS	FIPS 180-4	SHA-256		Message Digest

### ***Exhibit 13 - Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series Approved Algorithms.***

NOTE 1: This module supports AES-XTS which is only approved for storage applications.

#### 4.2. Non-Approved Algorithm

The cryptographic module supports the following non-Approved but allowed algorithms:

Algorithm	Use
NDRNG	Non-deterministic Random Number Generator (only used for generating seed materials for the Approved DRBG) NDRNG provides a minimum of 440 bits of entropy for DRBG seed

***Exhibit 14 - Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series non-Approved but allowed algorithms.***

### 4.3. Critical Security Parameters

The cryptographic module contains the following Keys and CSPs:

CSPs	Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods
DRBG Internal State  Note: The values of V and C are the “secret values” of the internal state.	Generation: SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG (SHA-256) Storage: Plaintext in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data”, “Change the Password” and “Zeroize” service
DRBG Seed	Generation: NDRNG Storage: Plaintext in DRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data”, “Change the Password” and “Zeroize” service
DRBG Entropy Input String	Generation: NDRNG Storage: Plaintext in DRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data”, “Change the Password” and “Zeroize” service
CO Password	Generation: N/A Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Change the Password” and “Zeroize” service
User Password	Generation: N/A Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization” service, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data” and “Zeroize” service
MEK	Generation: SP 800-90A HASH_DRBG (SHA-256)  As per SP 800-133 Section 7.1, key generation is performed as per the "Direct Generation: of Symmetric Keys" which is an Approved key generation method  Key Type: AES-XTS 256 Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: via “Initialization”, “Lock an LBA Range”, “Erase an LBA Range’s Data” and “Zeroize” service

**Exhibit 15– CSPs and details on Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods.**

NOTE 2: In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation (CKG) as per SP 800-133 (Vendor Affirmed). The resulting generated symmetric key is the unmodified output from SP 800-90A DRBG.

#### 4.4. Public Security Parameters

Public Keys	Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods
FW Verification Key (ECDSA Public Key)	Generation: N/A Key Type: ECDSA P-224 Storage: Plaintext in Flash Memory and used in SRAM Zeroization: N/A

**Exhibit 16 – Public Keys and details on Generation, Storage and Zeroization Methods**

## 5. Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces

Physical Port	Logical Interface
NVMe Connector	Data Input/Output Control Input Status Output Power Input

***Exhibit 17 – Specification of the Samsung NVMe TCG Opal SSC SEDs PM1723b Series Cryptographic Module Physical Ports and Logical Interfaces.***

## 6. Roles, Services and Authentication

### 6.1. Roles

The following table defines the roles, type of authentication, and associated authenticated data types supported by the cryptographic module:

Role	Authentication Data
CO Role	Password
User Role	Password
FW Loader	ECDSA

***Exhibit 18 - Roles and Required Identification and Authentication (FIPS 140-2 Table C1).***

## 6.2. Authentication

The authentication mechanism allows a minimum 6-byte length or longer (32-byte) Password, where each byte can be any of 0x00 to 0xFF, for every Cryptographic Officer and User role supported by the module, which means a single random attempt can succeed with the probability of  $1/2^{48}$  or lower.

Each Password authentication attempt takes at least 5ms and the number of attempts is limited to TryLimit, a configurable parameter which is set to 5 in manufacturing time. Since the module takes at least 4 seconds to be ready after power-on and 5 authentication failures require a power-cycle, it would take a total of 4025ms((5ms \*5) + 4000ms) for every 5<sup>th</sup> authentication attempt. Therefore the number of attempts possible in a minute period is limited to only 75 attempts, 14 full power cycles and 5 more attempts, this power cycle will exceed 1 minute.(60000ms == (5ms\*5 attempts + 4000ms)\*14 + (5ms \* 5 attempts) + 3625).

Therefore, the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is  $75 / 2^{48}$ , which is much less than the FIPS 140-2 requirement 1/100,000.

The authentication mechanism for FW Loader role is ECDSA P-224 with SHA256 digital signature verification, which means a single random attempt, can succeed with the probability of  $1/2^{112}$ .

Each ECDSA Signature Verification authentication attempt takes at least 600ms. Since the module takes at least 4 seconds to be ready after power-on, it would take a total of 4600ms for every FW download attempt. This enforces the maximum number of attempts to be no more than 13 attempts (60000ms/4600ms) in a minute period. Therefore, the probability of multiple random attempts to succeed in one minute is  $13/2^{112}$ , which is much less than the FIPS 140-2 requirement 1/100,000.

Authentication Mechanism	Strength of Mechanism
Password (Min: 6 bytes, Max: 32 bytes) Authentication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Probability of <math>1/2^{48}</math> in a single random attempt</li> <li>- Probability of <math>75/2^{48}</math> in multiple random attempts in a minute</li> </ul>
ECDSA Signature Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Probability of <math>1/2^{112}</math> in a single random attempt</li> <li>- Probability of <math>13/2^{112}</math> in multiple random attempts in a minute</li> </ul>

**Exhibit 19 - Strengths of Authentication Mechanisms (FIPS 140-2 Table C2).**

### 6.3. Services

#### 6.3.1. Authenticated Services

The following table lists roles, services, cryptographic keys, CSPs and Public Keys and the types of access that are available to each of the authorized roles via the corresponding services:

\* Type(s) of Access indicated using “O” marker.

Role	Service	Cryptographic Keys, CSPs and Public Keys	Type(s) of Access			
			R= Read	W= Write	G= Generate	Z= Zeroize
Cryptographic Officer	Initialization	DRBG Internal State	O		O	O
		DRBG Seed	O		O	O
		DRBG Entropy Input String	O		O	O
		CO Password		O		O
		MEK			O	O
	Drive Extended Status	N/A	N/A			
	Admin/User Authority Enable/Disable	N/A	N/A			
	Lock an LBA Range	MEK				O
	Unlock an LBA Range	MEK	O			
	Configure an LBA Range	N/A	N/A			
	Erase an LBA Range's Data	DRBG Internal State	O		O	O
		DRBG Seed	O		O	O
		DRBG Entropy Input String	O		O	O
		MEK			O	O
Change the Password.	CO Password		O		O	
User	Unlock an LBA Range	MEK	O			
	Set User Password	User Password		O		
	Lock an LBA Range	MEK				O
	Configure an LBA Range	N/A	N/A			
FW Loader	Update the firmware	FW Verification Key	O			

**Exhibit 20 – Services Authorized for Roles, Access Rights within Services (FIPS 140-2 Table C3, Table C4).**

### Unauthenticated Services

The following table lists the unauthenticated services:

\* Type(s) of Access indicated using “O” marker.

Role	Unauthenticated Service	Cryptographic Keys & CSPs	Type(s) of Access			
			R= Read	W= Write	G= Generate	Z= Zeroize
Cryptographic Officer, User and FW Loader	Zeroize	DRBG Internal State				O
		DRBG Seed				O
		DRBG Entropy Input String				O
		CO Password				O
		User Password				O
		MEK				O
Cryptographic Officer, User and FW Loader	Get Random Number	DRBG Internal State	O		O	O
		DRBG Seed	O		O	O
		DRBG Entropy Input String	O		O	O
Cryptographic Officer, User and FW Loader	Get MSID	N/A	N/A			
Cryptographic Officer, User and FW Loader	Show Status	N/A	N/A			
Cryptographic Officer, User and FW Loader	Self-test	N/A	N/A			

**Exhibit 21 – Unauthenticated Service, Cryptographic Keys & CSPs and Type(s) of Access.**

## 7. Physical security policy


The following physical security mechanisms are implemented in a cryptographic module:

- The Module consists of production-grade components enclosed in an aluminum alloy enclosure, which is opaque within the visible spectrum. The top panel of the enclosure can be removed by unscrewing screws. However, the module is sealed with tamper-evident labels in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Physical Security requirements so that tampering is easily detected when the top and bottom cases are detached.
- 2 tamper-evident labels are applied over both top and bottom cases of the module at the factory. The tamper-evident labels are not removed and reapplied without tamper evidence.


The following table summarizes the actions required by the Cryptographic Officer Role to ensure that physical security is maintained:

<b>Physical Security Mechanisms</b>	<b>Recommended Frequency of Inspection/Test</b>	<b>Inspection/Test Guidance Details</b>
Production grade cases	As often as feasible	Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found.
Tamper-evident Sealing Labels		Inspect the sealing labels for scratches, gouges, cuts and other signs of tampering. Remove from service if tampering found.

***Exhibit 22 - Inspection/Testing of Physical Security Mechanisms  
(FIPS 140-2 Table C5)***



**Exhibit 23 – Tamper Evident Label Placement**



**Exhibit 24 – Example of Signs of Tamper**

NOTE 3: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd has excluded the following components as per AS01.09:

Items	BOM code	Applicable to Hardware Versions(s)
Capacitor	2203-009819	MZWLL1T9HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL1T9HAJQ-00AH9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9 MZWLL7T6HMLA-000H9 MZWLL7T6HMLA-00AH9 MZWLL15THMLA-000H9 MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9
Capacitor	2203-009821	MZWLL1T9HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL1T9HAJQ-00AH9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9 MZWLL7T6HMLA-000H9 MZWLL7T6HMLA-00AH9 MZWLL15THMLA-000H9 MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9
Inductor	2703-004649	MZWLL1T9HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL1T9HAJQ-00AH9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9 MZWLL7T6HMLA-000H9

		MZWLL7T6HMLA-00AH9 MZWLL15THMLA-000H9 MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9
NAND Flash	K9OMGY8H5A-C###	MZWLL3T8HAJQ-000H9 MZWLL3T8HAJQ-00AH9
NAND Flash	K9DVGB8J1M-E###	MZWLL15THMLA-000H9 MZWLL15THMLA-00AH9

**Exhibit 25 – Excluded components**

The components do not process any CSPs, Plaintext data, or other information that if misused could lead to compromise.

## **8. Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)**

The cryptographic module conforms to the EMI/EMC requirements specified by 47 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 15, Subpart B, Unintentional Radiators, Digital Devices, Class B.

## 9. Mitigation of Other Attacks Policy

The cryptographic module has not been designed to mitigate any specific attacks beyond the scope of FIPS 140-2.

Other Attacks	Mitigation Mechanism	Specific Limitations
N/A	N/A	N/A

**Exhibit 26 - Mitigation of Other Attacks (FIPS 140-2 Table C6)**

## 10. Security rules

The following specifies the security rules under which the cryptographic module shall operate in accordance with FIPS 140-2:

- The cryptographic module operates always in FIPS Mode once shipped from the vendor's manufacturing site.
- The steps necessary for the secure installation, initialization and start-up of the cryptographic module as per FIPS 140-2 VE10.03.01 are as follows:

### 10.1. Secure Installation

- Step1. User should examine the tamper evidence
  - Inspect the entire perimeter for cracks, gouges, lack of screw(s) and other signs of tampering including the tamper evident sealing label.
  - If there is any sign of tampering, do not use the product and contact Samsung.
- Step2. Identify the firmware version in the device
  - Confirm that the firmware version is equivalent to the version(s) listed in this document via NVM express Identify Controller command.
- Step3. Take the drive's ownership
  - Disable Admin SP's Admin1 authority
  - Change SID's PIN by setting a new PIN
  - Activate the Locking SP by using the Activate method.
  - Change LockingSP Admin1~4's PIN by setting a new PIN.
  - Configure the Locking Global Range by setting ReadLockEnabled and WriteLockEnabled columns to True.
  - Don't change LockOnReset column in Locking Table so that the drive always gets locked after a power cycle
- Step4. Periodically examine the tamper evidence
  - If there is any sign of tampering, stop using the product to avoid a potential security hazard or information leakage.

## 10.2. Operational description of Module

- The cryptographic module shall maintain logical separation of data input, data output, control input, status output, and power.
- The cryptographic module shall not output CSPs in any form.
- The cryptographic module shall use the Approved DRBG for generating all cryptographic keys.
- The cryptographic module shall enforce role-based authentication for security relevant services.
- The cryptographic module shall enforce a limited operational environment by the secure firmware load test using ECDSA P-224 with SHA-256.
- The cryptographic module shall provide a production-grade, opaque, and tamper-evident cryptographic boundary.
- The cryptographic module enters the error state upon failure of Self-tests. All commands from the Host (General Purpose Computer (GPC) outside the cryptographic boundary) are rejected in the error state and the cryptographic module returns an Internal Error (SC=0x6, SCT=0x0) defined in NVMe specification via the status output. Cryptographic services and data output are explicitly inhibited when in the error state.
- The error state will be cleared if the module is power cycled and passes all Self-tests. If a Self-test fails, the module will reenter the error state.
- The cryptographic module satisfies the requirements of FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 (i.e.  $key\_1 \neq key\_2$ )
- The module generates at a minimum 256 bits of entropy for use in key generation.

**10.3. Power-on Self-Tests**

<b>11. Algorithm</b>	<b>Test</b>
AES	Encrypt KAT and Decrypt KAT for AES-256-XTS at power-on
SHS	KAT for SHA-256 at power-on
DRBG	KAT for Hash_DRBG (SHA-256) at power-on
ECDSA	KAT for ECDSA P-224 SHA-256 signature verification at power-on

**Exhibit 27 – Power-on Self-tests.**

- F/W integrity check
  - F/W integrity check is performed by using 106-bit error detection code at power-on
  
- Conditional Self-tests
  - Pairwise consistency: N/A
  - Bypass Test: N/A
  - Manual key entry test: N/A
  - F/W load test
    - F/W load test is performed by using ECDSA algorithm with P-224 and SHA-256
  - Continuous random number generator test on Approved DRBG
  - Continuous random number generator test on NDRNG