





# FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

## FortiGate-6301F/6501F



FortiGate-6301F/6501F FIPS 140-2 Security Policy			
<b>Document Version:</b>	2.2		
<b>Publication Date:</b>	Wednesday, May 6, 2020		
<b>Description:</b>	Documents FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Security Policy issues, compliancy and requirements for FIPS compliant operation.		
<b>Firmware Version:</b>	FortiOS 5.6, build4265,190820		
<b>Hardware Version:</b>	FortiGate-6301F (C1AG85)	Tamper Evident Seal Kit: FIPS-SEAL-RED	
	FortiGate-6501F (C1AG83)		

## **FORTINET DOCUMENT LIBRARY**

<https://docs.fortinet.com>

## **FORTINET VIDEO GUIDE**

<https://video.fortinet.com>

## **FORTINET KNOWLEDGE BASE**

<http://kb.fortinet.com>

## **FORTINET BLOG**

<https://blog.fortinet.com>

## **CUSTOMER SERVICE & SUPPORT**

<https://www.fortinet.com/support/contact.html>

## **FORTINET NSE INSTITUTE (TRAINING)**

<https://training.fortinet.com/>

## **FORTIGUARD CENTER**

<https://fortiguard.com>

## **FORTICAST**

<http://forticast.fortinet.com>

## **END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT AND PRIVACY POLICY**

<https://www.fortinet.com/doc/legal/EULA.pdf>

<https://www.fortinet.com/corporate/about-us/privacy.html>

## **FEEDBACK**

Email: [techdoc@fortinet.com](mailto:techdoc@fortinet.com)



Wednesday, May 6, 2020

FortiGate-6301F/6501F FIPS 140-2 Security Policy

01-567-560407-20190719

This document may be freely reproduced and distributed whole and intact when including the copyright notice found on the last page of this document.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Overview</b> .....	<b>4</b>
References.....	4
<b>Introduction</b> .....	<b>5</b>
<b>Security Level Summary</b> .....	<b>6</b>
<b>Module Descriptions</b> .....	<b>7</b>
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces.....	7
FortiGate-6301F and 6501F.....	8
Web-Based Manager.....	10
Command Line Interface.....	10
Roles, Services and Authentication.....	11
Roles.....	11
FIPS Approved Services.....	11
Non-FIPS Approved Services.....	14
Authentication.....	14
Physical Security.....	15
Operational Environment.....	16
Cryptographic Key Management.....	16
Random Number Generation.....	16
Entropy.....	16
Key Zeroization.....	17
Algorithms.....	17
Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters.....	19
Alternating Bypass Feature.....	23
Key Archiving.....	24
Mitigation of Other Attacks.....	24
<b>Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)</b> .....	<b>26</b>
<b>FIPS 140-2 Compliant Operation</b> .....	<b>27</b>
Enabling FIPS-CC mode.....	28
<b>Self-Tests</b> .....	<b>29</b>
Startup and Initialization Self-tests.....	29
Conditional Self-tests.....	29
Critical Function Self-tests.....	30
Error State.....	30

## Overview

This document is a FIPS 140-2 Security Policy for Fortinet's FortiGate-6301F and 6501F. This policy describes how the FortiGate-6301F and 6501F (hereafter referred to as the 'modules') meet the FIPS 140-2 security requirements and how to operate the modules in a FIPS compliant manner. This policy was created as part of the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation of the modules.

The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 - *Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules* (FIPS 140-2) details the United States Federal Government requirements for cryptographic modules. Detailed information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) website at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html>.

## References

This policy deals specifically with operation and implementation of the modules in the technical terms of the FIPS 140-2 standard and the associated validation program. Other Fortinet product manuals, guides and technical notes can be found at the Fortinet technical documentation website at <https://docs.fortinet.com>.

Additional information on the entire Fortinet product line can be obtained from the following sources:

- Find general product information in the product section of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortinet.com/products>.
- Find on-line product support for registered products in the technical support section of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortinet.com/support>.
- Find contact information for technical or sales related questions in the contacts section of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortinet.com/contact>.
- Find security information and bulletins in the FortiGuard Center of the Fortinet corporate website at <https://www.fortiguard.com>.

## Introduction

The FortiGate product family spans the full range of network environments, from SOHO to service provider, offering cost effective systems for any size of application. FortiGate appliances detect and eliminate the most damaging, content-based threats from email and Web traffic such as viruses, worms, intrusions, inappropriate Web content and more in real time — without degrading network performance. In addition to providing application level firewall protection, FortiGate appliances deliver a full range of network-level services — VPN, intrusion prevention, web filtering, antivirus, antispam and traffic shaping — in dedicated, easily managed platforms.

All FortiGate appliances employ Fortinet's unique FortiASIC content processing chip and the powerful, secure, FortiOS firmware achieve breakthrough price/performance. The unique, ASIC-based architecture analyzes content and behavior in real time, enabling key applications to be deployed right at the network edge where they are most effective at protecting enterprise networks. They can be easily configured to provide antivirus protection, antispam protection and content filtering in conjunction with existing firewall, VPN, and related devices, or as complete network protection systems. The modules support High Availability (HA) in both Active-Active (AA) and Active-Passive (AP) configurations.

FortiGate appliances support the IPsec industry standard for VPN, allowing VPNs to be configured between a FortiGate appliance and any client or gateway/firewall that supports IPsec VPN. FortiGate appliances also provide SSL VPN services using TLS 1.1 and 1.2.

# Security Level Summary

The modules meet the overall requirements for a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validation.

**Table 1: Summary of FIPS security requirements and compliance levels**

Security Requirement	Compliance Level
Cryptographic Module Specification	2
Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	2
Roles, Services and Authentication	3
Finite State Model	2
Physical Security	2
Operational Environment	N/A
Cryptographic Key Management	2
EMI/EMC	2
Self-Tests	2
Design Assurance	3
Mitigation of Other Attacks	2

# Module Descriptions

The FortiGate-6301F and 6501F are multiple chip, standalone cryptographic modules consisting of production grade components contained in a physically protected enclosure in accordance with FIPS 140-2 Level 2 requirements. The extent of the cryptographic boundary for all modules is the outer metal chassis.

The FortiGate-6301F and 6501F both have 33 network interfaces with status LEDs for each network interface (2x 10/100/1000 Base-T, 24x 10/25GB SFP28, 4x40/100GB QSFP28, 3x 10GB SFP+).

The models use two, distinct entropy sources - the Fortinet entropy token and the Fortinet CP9 Security Processor. The entropy token provides entropy for the main PCB. The CP9 Security Processors provide entropy for the processor cards.

The modules each have one x86 compatible CPU on the main PCB.

The FortiGate-6301F has 6 processor cards each with its own x86 compatible CPU and two FortiASIC CP9 Security Processors.

The FortiGate-6501F has 10 processor cards each with its own x86 compatible CPU and two FortiASIC CP9 Security Processors.

The modules are 3U rackmount devices.

The validated firmware version is FortiOS 5.6, build4265,190820. Any firmware loaded into this module that is not shown on the module certificate is out of the scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

The main PCB and processor cards in the modules each run their own instance of the validated firmware. Any firmware version that is not shown on the module certificate is out of scope of this validation and requires a separate FIPS 140-2 validation.

Figure 1 is representative of the modules tested.

## Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

All of the modules have status LEDs as described in the following table:


**Table 2: Module Status LEDs**

LED	State	Description
Power	Green	The module is powered on.
	Off	The module is powered off.

LED		State	Description
Status		Green	The module is running normally.
		Flashing	The module is starting up.
		Off	The module is powered off.
HA		Green	HA is enabled.
		Red	HA is enabled, but the other FortiGate in the cluster cannot be found.
		Off	The unit is in standalone mode.
Alarm		Red	The unit has a major alarm.
		Amber	The unit has a minor alarm.
		Off	The unit is operating normally.
MGMT Ports 1 and 2	Link/ACT	Green	Port is connected.
		Flashing	Port is sending/receiving data.
		Off	No link established.
	Speed	Green	Connected at 1000 Mbps.
		Amber	Connected at 100 Mbps
		Off	Connected at 10 Mbps
MGMT 3 and HA Ports		Green	Port is connected.
		Flashing	Port is sending/receiving data.
		Off	No link established.
Ports 1 to 24 and 25 to 28		Green	Port is connected.
		Flashing	Port is sending/receiving data.
		Off	No link established.

## FortiGate-6301F and 6501F

**Figure 1 - FortiGate-6301F and 6501F Front and Rear Panels**



**Table 3: FortiGate-6301F and 6501F Connectors and Ports**

Connector	Type	Speed	Supported Logical Interfaces	Description
MGMT 1 and 2	RJ-45	10/100/1000 Base-T	Data input, data output, control input, and status output	Copper gigabit connection to 10/100/1000 copper networks.
MGMT 3, HA 1 and 2	SFP+	10 Gbps	Data input, data output, control input, and status output	Multimode fiber optic connections to gigabit optical networks.

Connector	Type	Speed	Supported Logical Interfaces	Description
Ports 1 to 24	SFP28	25 Gbps	Data input, data output, control input, and status output	Multimode fiber optic connections to gigabit optical networks.
Ports 25 to 28	QSFP28	100 Gbps	Data input, data output, control input, and status output	Multimode fiber optic connections to gigabit optical networks.
USB Port	USB-A	N/A	Control input, data output	Configuration loading, archiving and entropy token.
Console Port	RJ-45	9600 bps	Control input, status output	Optional connection to the management computer. Provides access to the command line interface (CLI).
AC Power	N/A	N/A	Power	120/240VAC power connection.

## Web-Based Manager

The FortiGate web-based manager provides GUI based access to the modules and is the primary tool for configuring the modules. The manager requires a web browser on the management computer and an Ethernet connection between the FortiGate unit and the management computer.

A web-browser that supports Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.1 or 1.2 is required for remote access to the web-based manager when the module is operating in FIPS-CC mode. HTTP access to the web-based manager is not allowed in FIPS mode and is disabled.

## Command Line Interface

The FortiGate Command Line Interface (CLI) is a full-featured, text based management tool for the module. The CLI provides access to all of the possible services and configuration options in the module. The CLI uses a console connection or a network (Ethernet) connection between the FortiGate unit and the management computer. The console connection is a direct serial connection. Terminal emulation software is required on the management computer using either method. For network access, a Telnet or SSH client that supports the SSH v2.0 protocol is required (SSH v1.0 is not supported in FIPS mode). Telnet access to the CLI is not allowed in FIPS mode and is disabled.

## Roles, Services and Authentication

### Roles

When configured in FIPS mode, the module provides the following roles:

- Crypto Officer
- Network User

The Crypto Officer role is initially assigned to the default 'admin' operator account. The Crypto Officer role has read-write-execute access to all of the module's administrative services. The initial Crypto Officer can create additional operator accounts. These additional accounts are assigned the Crypto Officer role and can be assigned a range of read-write-execute or read only access permissions including the ability to create operator accounts.

The modules also provide a **Network User** role for end-users (Users). Network Users can make use of the encrypt/decrypt services, but cannot access the modules for administrative purposes.

The module does not provide a Maintenance role.

### FIPS Approved Services

The following tables detail the types of FIPS approved services available to each role in each mode of operation, the types of access for each role and the Keys or CSPs they affect.

The access types are abbreviated as follows:

<b>Read Access</b>	R
<b>Write Access</b>	W
<b>Execute Access</b>	E

**Table 4: Services available to Crypto Officers**

Service	Access	Key/CSP
connect to module locally using the console port	WE	N/A
connect to module remotely using TLS*	WE	Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie Hellman Keys, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, HTTPS/TLS Server/Host Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key, and HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key, DRBG v and key values, DRBG Output, DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output String

Service	Access	Key/CSP
connect to module remotely using SSH*	WE	Diffie-Hellman Keys, SSH Server/Host Keys, SSH Session Authentication Key, SSH Session Encryption Key, DRBG v and key values, DRBG Output, DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output String
authenticate to module	WE	Crypto Officer Password
show system status	N/A	N/A
show FIPS-CC mode enabled/disabled (console/CLI only)	N/A	N/A
enable FIPS-CC mode of operation (console only)	WE	Configuration Integrity Key
key zeroization	W	All Keys
execute factory reset (disable FIPS-CC mode, console/CLI only)	W	N/A
execute FIPS-CC on-demand self-tests (console only)	E	Configuration Integrity Key, Firmware Integrity Key
add/delete crypto officers and network users	WE	Crypto Officer Password, Network User Password
set/reset crypto officers and network user passwords	WE	Crypto Officer Password, Network User Password
backup/restore configuration file	RWE	Configuration Encryption Key, Configuration Backup Key
read/set/delete/modify module configuration*	N/A	N/A
execute firmware update	WE	Firmware Update Key
read log data	N/A	N/A
delete log data (console/CLI only)	N/A	N/A
execute system diagnostics (console/CLI only)	N/A	N/A
enable/disable alternating bypass mode	N/A	N/A

Service	Access	Key/CSP
read/set/delete/modify IPsec/SSL VPN configuration*	W	IPsec: IPsec Manual Authentication Key, IPsec Manual Encryption Key, IKE Pre-Shared Key, IKE RSA Key, IKE ECDSA Key, Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie-Hellman Keys  SSL: HTTPS/TLS Server/Host Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key
read/set/modify HA configuration	WE	HA Password, HA Encryption Key
log offloading to remote FortiAnalyzer device*	E	OFTP Client Key, Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie-Hellman Keys, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key, DRBG v and key values, DRBG Output, DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output String

**Table 5: Services available to Network Users in FIPS-CC mode**

Service/CSP	Access	Key/CSP
connect to module remotely using TLS*	WE	Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie-Hellman Keys, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, HTTPS/TLS Server/Host Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key, DRBG v and key values, DRBG Output, DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output String
authenticate to module	WE	Network User Password
IPsec VPN controlled by firewall policies*	E	IPsec: IPsec Manual Authentication Key, IPsec Manual Encryption Key, IPsec Session Authentication Key, IPsec Session Encryption Key, IKE Pre-Shared Key, IKE RSA Key, IKE ECDSA Key, IKE SKEYSEED, IKE Authentication Key, IKE Key Generation Key, IKE Session Encryption Key, Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie-Hellman Keys
SSL VPN controlled by firewall policies*	E	Network User Password, Diffie-Hellman Keys, EC Diffie-Hellman Keys, TLS Premaster Secret, TLS Master Secret, HTTPS/TLS Server/Host Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key, HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key, DRBG v and key values, DRBG Output, DRBG Seed, NDRNG Output String

## Non-FIPS Approved Services

The module also provides the following non-FIPS approved services:

- Configuration backups using password protection
- L2TP and PPTP VPN
- Services marked with an asterisk (\*) in Tables 4 and 5 are considered non-approved when using the following algorithms:
  - Non-compliant-strength Diffie-Hellman
  - Non-compliant-strength RSA key wrapping

The above services shall not be used in the FIPS approved mode of operation.

## Authentication

The module implements identity based authentication. Crypto Officers must authenticate with a user-id and password combination to access the modules remotely or locally via the console. Remote Crypto Officer authentication is done over HTTPS (TLS) or SSH. The password entry feedback mechanism does not provide information that could be used to guess or determine the authentication data.

By default, Network User access to the modules is based on firewall policy and authentication by IP address or fully qualified domain names. Network Users can optionally be forced to authenticate to the modules using a username/password combination to enable use of the IPsec VPN encrypt/decrypt or bypass services. This option is configured as part of the firewall policy. For Network Users invoking the SSL-VPN encrypt/decrypt services, the modules support authentication with a user-id/password combination. Network User authentication is done over HTTPS and does not allow access to the modules for administrative purposes.

The minimum password length is 8 characters when in FIPS-CC mode (maximum password length is 32 characters) chosen from the set of ninety four (94) characters. New passwords are required to include 1 uppercase character, 1 lowercase character, 1 numeric character, and 1 special character. The odds of guessing a password are 1 in  $\{94^8\}$  which is significantly lower than one in a million.

Note that Crypto Officer authentication over HTTPS/SSH and Network User authentication over HTTPS are subject to a limit of 3 failed authentication attempts in 1 minute; thus, the maximum number of attempts in one minute is 3. Therefore the probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a one-minute period is 3 in  $\{94^8\}$  which is less than 1/100,000.

Crypto Officer authentication using the console is not subject to a failed authentication limit, but the number of authentication attempts per minute is limited by the bandwidth available over the serial connection which is a maximum of 115,200 bps which is 6,912,000 bits per minute. An 8 byte password would have 64 bits, so there would be no more than 108,000 passwords attempts per minute. Therefore the probability of success would be  $1/\{94^8\}/108,000$  which is less than 1/100,000.

For Network Users invoking the IPsec VPN encrypt/decrypt services, the module acts on behalf of the Network User and negotiates a VPN connection with a remote module. The strength of authentication for IPsec services is based on the authentication method defined in the specific firewall policy: IPsec manual authentication key, IKE pre-shared key, IKE RSA key (RSA certificate) or IKE ECDSA key (ECDSA certificate). The odds of guessing the authentication key for each IPsec method is:

- 1 in  $16^{40}$  for the IPsec Manual Authentication key (based on a 40 digit, hexadecimal key)
- 1 in  $94^8$  for the IKE Pre-shared Key (based on an 8 character, ASCII printable key)

- 1 in  $2^{112}$  for the IKE RSA Key (based on a 2048bit RSA key size)
- 1 in  $2^{128}$  for the IKE ECDSA Key (based on a P-256 curve ECDSA key size)

A gigabit ethernet connection is 1,048,576,000 bits per second which is 62,914,560,000 bits per minute. An 8-byte key would have 64 bits, so there could be no more than 983,040,000 passwords attempts per minute. Therefore, the minimum odds of guessing the authentication key for IPSec within a one-minute period is 1 in  $94^8/983,040,000$  which is less than 1 in 100,000.

## Physical Security

The modules meet FIPS 140-2 Security Level 2 requirements by using production grade components and an opaque, sealed enclosure. Access to the enclosure is restricted through the use of tamper-evident seals to secure the overall enclosure. The tamper-evident seals shall be installed for the module to operate in a FIPS Approved mode of operation. All Networking devices need tamper-evident seals to meet the FIPS 140-2 Level 2 Physical Security requirements.

The seals are red wax/plastic with black lettering that reads "Fortinet Security Seal".

The tamper seals are not applied at the factory prior to shipping. It is the responsibility of the Crypto Officer to apply the seals before use to ensure full FIPS 140-2 compliance. Once the seals have been applied, the Crypto Officer must develop an inspection schedule to verify that the external enclosure of the modules and the tamper seals have not been damaged or tampered with in any way. Upon viewing any signs of tampering, the Crypto Officer must assume that the device has been fully compromised. The Crypto Officer is required to zeroize the cryptographic module by following the steps in the Key Zeroization section of the SP.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for securing and controlling any unused seals. The Crypto Office is also responsible for the direct control and observation of any changes to the modules such as reconfigurations where the tamper-evident seals are removed or installed to ensure the security of the module is maintained during such changes and ensuring the module is returned to a FIPS approved state.

The surfaces should be cleaned with 99% Isopropyl alcohol to remove dirt and oil before applying the seals. Ensure the surface is completely clean and dry before applying the seals. If a seal needs to be re-applied, completely remove the old seal and clean the surface with an adhesive remover before following the instructions for applying a new seal.

Additional seals can be requested through your Fortinet sales contact. Reference the 'FIPS-SEAL-RED' SKU when ordering. Specify the number of seals required based on the specific model as described below:

The FortiGate-6301F and 6501 use one seal to secure the external enclosure (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2 - FortiGate-6301F/6501F external enclosure seal, top, rear**



## Operational Environment

The modules consist of the combination of the FortiOS operating system and the FortiGate appliances. The FortiOS operating system can only be installed, and run, on a FortiGate appliance. The FortiOS operating system provides a proprietary and non-modifiable operating system.

## Cryptographic Key Management

### Random Number Generation

The modules use a firmware based, deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) that conforms to NIST Special Publication 800-90A.

### Entropy

The modules use both the Fortinet Entropy Token (part number FTR-ENT-2) and the Fortinet CP9 Security Processor as entropy sources. The entropy token provides entropy to the main PCB. The CP9 Security Processors provide entropy to each of the processor cards. In both cases the entropy sources seed the DRBG instances during the modules' boot process and periodically reseed the DRBG instances.

The entropy token is not included in the boundary of the module and therefore no assurance can be made for the correct operation of the entropy token nor is there a guarantee of stated entropy.

### Entropy Strength

The entropy loaded into the approved AES-256 bit DRBG is 256 bits. The entropy source is over-seeded and then an HMAC-SHA-256 post-conditioning component (as per section 3.1.5.1.1 and/or 3.1.5.1.2 of SP 800-90B) is applied.

## Reseed Period

The RBG is seeded from the Entropy Token and CP9 Security Processors during the boot process and then reseeded periodically. The default reseed period is once every 24 hours (1440 minutes) and is configurable (1 to 1440 minutes). The entropy token must be installed to complete the boot process and to reseed the main PCB DRBG instance.

## Key Zeroization

The zeroization process must be performed under the direct control of the operator. The operator must be present to observe that the zeroization method has completed successfully.

All keys and CSPs are zeroized by erasing the module's boot device and then power cycling the FortiGate unit. To erase the boot device, execute the following command from the CLI:

```
execute erase-disk <boot device>
```

The boot device ID may vary depending on the FortiGate module. Executing the following command will output a list of the available internal disks:

```
execute erase-disk ?
```

## Algorithms

**Table 6: FIPS approved algorithms**

Algorithm	NIST Cert Number
CTR DRBG (NIST SP 800-90A) with AES 256-bits	C613
AES in CBC mode (128, 256 bits)	C599, C644, C531
AES in GCM mode (128, 256 bits)	C599, C644, C531
SHA-1	C599, C644, C531
SHA-256	C599, C644, C531
SHA-384	C599, C644, C531
SHA-512	C599, C644, C531
HMAC SHA-1	C599, C644, C531
HMAC SHA-256	C599, C644, C531
HMAC SHA-384	C599, C644, C531
HMAC SHA-512	C599, C644, C531

Algorithm	NIST Cert Number
RSA PKCS 1.5 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key Pair Generation: 2048 and 3072 bit (186-4)</li> <li>• Signature Generation: 2048 and 3072 bit (186-4)</li> <li>• Signature Verification: 1024, 2048 and 3072 bit (186-4)</li> <li>• For legacy use, the module supports 1024 bit RSA keys and SHA-1 for signature verification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• C644</li> <li>• C644, C531</li> <li>• C644, C531</li> </ul>
ECDSA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key Pair Generation: curves P-256, P-384 and P-521</li> <li>• Signature Generation: curves P-256, P-384 and P-521</li> <li>• Signature Verification: curves P-256, P-384 and P-521</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• C644, C531</li> <li>• C644, C599, C531</li> <li>• C644, C599, C531</li> </ul>
CVL (SSH) - AES 128 bit, AES 256 bit -CBC (using SHA1)	C644
CVL (TLS 1.1 and 1.2 (SHA2-256) )	C644
CVL (IKE v1 and v2 (SHA-1, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512) )	C599
CVL (ECDSA SigGen Component: Curves P-256, P-384 and P-521)	C599, C644, C531

KTS (AES Cert. #C644 and HMAC Cert. #C644; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength); and

KTS (AES Cert. #C644; key establishment methodology provides 128 or 256 bits of encryption strength)

There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVs tested but are not available when the module is configured for FIPS compliant operation. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are supported by the module in the FIPS validated configuration.

**Table 7: FIPS allowed algorithms**

Algorithm
RSA (key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)
Diffie-Hellman (CVL Certs. #C599 and #C644, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 196 bits of encryption strength)
EC Diffie-Hellman (CVL Cert. #C644, key agreement; key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256 bits of encryption strength)
NDRNG (Entropy Token)
NDRNG (FortiASIC CP9)
MD5 (Used in the TLS 1.1 protocol only)

**Table 8: Non-FIPS approved algorithms**

Algorithm
DES (disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
MD5 (disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
HMAC MD5 (disabled in FIPS-CC mode)
RSA is non-compliant when keys less than 2048 bits are used, since such keys do not provide the minimum required 112 bits of encryption strength.
4096-bit RSA signature generation is non-compliant.
Diffie-Hellman is non-compliant when keys less than 2048 bits are used, since such keys do not provide the minimum required 112 bits of encryption strength.
SNMP (The SNMP KDF has not undergone CAVP testing in accordance with NIST SP 800-135, Rev1, and thus SNMP shall not be used in the Approved mode. Any use of SNMP will cause the module to operate in a non-Approved mode.)

Note that the IKE, SSH and TLS protocols, other than the KDF, have not been tested by the CMVP or CAVP as per FIPS 140-2 Implementation Guidance D.11.

The module is compliant to IG A.5: GCM is used in the context of TLS and IKEv2/IPSec.

For TLS, The GCM implementation meets Option 1 of IG A.5: it is used in a manner compliant with SP 800-52 and in accordance with RFC 5246 for TLS key establishment. The AES GCM IV generation is in compliance with RFC 5288 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with FIPS140-2 IG A.5, Option 1 (“TLS protocol IV generation”); thus, those cipher suites implemented in the module that utilize AES-GCM are consistent with those specified in Sections 3.3.1.1.2 of [SP800-52, Rev2]. In case the module’s power is lost and then restored, the key used for the AES GCM encryption or decryption shall be re-distributed. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.

For IPsec/IKEv2, the GCM implementation meets Option 1 of IG A.5: it is used in a manner compliant with RFCs 4106 and 7296. During operational testing, the module was tested against an independent version of IPsec with IKEv2 to establish the shared secret SKEYSEED from which the AES GCM encryption keys are derived, and found to behave correctly.

Note that the CVL certificates referenced in Table 7 (above) for Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman are only KDFs, and not components. Please also be advised that neither scheme is tested at power-up.

## Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters

The following table lists all of the cryptographic keys and critical security parameters used by the modules. The following definitions apply to the table.

**Table 9: Cryptographic Keys and Critical Security Parameters used in FIPS-CC mode**

Key or CSP	Generation	Storage	Usage	Zeroization
NDRNG output string	NDRNG	Boot device Plain-text	Input string for the entropy pool	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
DRBG seed	Internally generated	Boot device Plain-text	256-bit seed used by the DRBG (output from NDRNG)	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
DRBG output	Internally generated	Boot device Plain-text	Random numbers used in cryptographic algorithms (256-bits)	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
DRBG v and key values	Internally generated	Boot device Plain-text	Internal state values for the DRBG 128 and 256	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IPsec Manual Authentication Key	Electronic key entry	Boot device AES encrypted	Used as IPsec Session Authentication Key	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IPsec Manual Encryption Key	Electronic key entry	SDRAM Plain-text	Used as IPsec Session Encryption Key using AES (128, 256 bit)	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IPsec Session Authentication Key	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	IPsec peer-to-peer authentication using HMAC SHA-1 or HMAC SHA-256	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IPsec Session Encryption Key	Internally generated via DH or ECDH KAS	SDRAM Plain-text	VPN traffic encryption/decryption using AES (128, 256 bit)	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IKE SKEYSEED	Derived via KDF defined in SP800-135 (IKEv2)	SDRAM Plain-text	Used to generate IKE protocol keys	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IKE Pre-Shared Key	Electronic key entry	Boot device AES encrypted	Used to generate IKE protocol keys	By erasing the Boot device and power cycling the module
IKE Authentication Key	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	IKE peer-to-peer authentication using HMAC SHA-1, -256, -384 or -512	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module

Key or CSP	Generation	Storage	Usage	Zeroization
IKE Key Generation Key	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	IPsec SA keying material	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
IKE Session Encryption Key	Internally generated via DH or ECDH KAS	SDRAM Plain-text	Encryption of IKE peer-to-peer key negotiation using or AES (128, 256 bit)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
IKE RSA Key	Externally generated	Boot device Plain-text	RSA private key used in the IKE protocol (2048- and 3072-bit signatures)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
IKE ECDSA Key	Externally generated	Boot device Plain-text	RSA private key used in the IKE protocol (signatures using P-256, -384 and -521 curves)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
Diffie-Hellman Keys	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	Key agreement and key establishment (Public key size of 2048- to 8192-bits with Private key size of 224- to 400-bits)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
EC Diffie-Hellman Keys	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	Key agreement and key establishment (key pairs on the curves secp256r1, secp384r1 and secp521r1)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
Firmware Update Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	Verification of firmware integrity when updating to new firmware versions using RSA public key (firmware load test, 2048-bit signature)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
Firmware Integrity Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	Verification of firmware integrity in the firmware integrity test using RSA public key (firmware integrity test, 2048-bit signature)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module

Key or CSP	Generation	Storage	Usage	Zeroization
TLS Premaster Secret	Internally generated via DH or ECDH KAS	SDRAM Plain-text	HTTPS/TLS keying material	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
TLS Master Secret	Internally generated from the TLS Premaster Secret	SDRAM Plain-text	384-bit master key used in the HTTPS/TLS protocols	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
HTTPS/TLS Server/Host Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	RSA private key used in the HTTPS/TLS protocols (key establishment, 2048- or 3072-bit)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
HTTPS/TLS Session Authentication Key	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	HMAC SHA-1, -256 or -384 key used for HTTPS/TLS session authentication	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
HTTPS/TLS Session Encryption Key	Internally generated via DH or ECDH KAS	SDRAM Plain-text	AES (128, 256 bit) key used for HTTPS/TLS session encryption	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
SSH Server/Host Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	RSA private key used in the SSH protocol (key establishment, 2048- or 3072-bit)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
SSH Session Authentication Key	Internally generated using DRBG	SDRAM Plain-text	HMAC SHA-1 or HMAC SHA-256 key used for SSH session authentication	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
SSH Session Encryption Key	Automatic	SDRAM Plain-text	AES (128, 256 bit) key used for SSH session encryption	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
Crypto Officer Password	Electronic key entry	Boot device SHA-1 hash	Used to authenticate operator access to the module	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
Configuration Integrity Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	HMAC SHA-256 hash used for configuration bypass test	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module

Key or CSP	Generation	Storage	Usage	Zeroization
Configuration Encryption Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	AES 256 bit key used to encrypt CSPs on the Boot device and in the backup configuration file (except for crypto officer passwords in the backup configuration file)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module
Configuration Backup Key	Preconfigured	Boot device Plain-text	HMAC SHA-256 key used to encrypt crypto officer passwords in the backup configuration file	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the unit
Network User Password	Electronic key entry	Boot device SHA-1 hash	Used to authenticate network access to the module	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the unit
HA Password	Electronic key entry	Boot device AES encrypted	Used to authenticate FortiGate units in an HA cluster	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the unit
HA Encryption Key	Externally Generated	Boot device AES encrypted	Encryption of traffic between units in an HA cluster using AES 128 bit key	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the unit
OFTP Client Key	Externally Generated	Boot device Plain-text	RSA private key used in the OFTP/TLS protocol (key establishment, 2048 bit signature)	By erasing the boot device and power cycling the module



The Generation column lists all of the keys/CSPs and their entry/generation methods. Electronically entered keys are entered by the operator electronically (as defined by FIPS) using the console or a management computer. Pre-configured keys are set as part of the firmware (hardcoded) and are not operator modifiable.

Externally generated keys are generated outside the module and loaded by the operator electronically and are not compliant with SP 800-133 unless they were generated by another FIPS validated module.

## Alternating Bypass Feature

The primary cryptographic function of the module is as a firewall and VPN device. The module implements two forms of alternating bypass for VPN traffic: policy based (for IPsec and SSL VPN) and interface based (for IPsec VPN only).

## Policy Based VPN

Firewall policies with an action of IPsec or SSL-VPN mean that the firewall is functioning as a VPN start/end point for the specified source/destination addresses and will encrypt/decrypt traffic according to the policy. Firewall policies with an action of allow mean that the firewall is accepting/sending plaintext data for the specified source/destination addresses.

A firewall policy with an action of accept means that the module is operating in a bypass state for that policy. A firewall policy with an action of IPsec or SSL-VPN means that the module is operating in a non-bypass state for that policy.

## Interface Based VPN

Interface based VPN is supported for IPsec only. A virtual interface is created and any traffic routed to the virtual interface is encrypted and sent to the VPN peer. Traffic received from the peer is decrypted. Traffic through the virtual interface is controlled using firewall policies. However, unlike policy based VPN, the action is restricted to Accept or Deny and all traffic controlled by the policy is encrypted/decrypted.

When traffic is routed over the non-virtual interface, the module is operating in a bypass state. When traffic is routed over the virtual interface, the module is operating in a non-bypass state.

In both cases, at least two independent internal actions must be taken to create a bypass. The actions required are policy creation, application of the policy (save), followed by explicit configuration.

## Key Archiving

The module supports key archiving to a management computer as part of the module configuration file backup. Operator entered keys are archived as part of the module configuration file. The configuration file is stored in plain text, but keys in the configuration file are either AES encrypted using the Configuration Encryption Key or stored as a keyed hash using HMAC SHA-256 using the Configuration Backup Key.

## Mitigation of Other Attacks

The module includes a real-time Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) as well as antivirus protection, web content filtering, DNS filtering, application control and data leak prevention. Use of these capabilities is optional.

The FortiOS IPS has two components: a signature based component for detecting attacks passing through the FortiGate appliance and a local attack detection component that protects the firewall from direct attacks. Functionally, signatures are similar to virus definitions, with each signature designed to detect a particular type of attack. The IPS signatures are updated through the FortiGuard IPS service. The IPS engine can also be updated through the FortiGuard IPS service.

FortiOS antivirus protection removes and optionally quarantines files infected by viruses from web (HTTP), file transfer (FTP), and email (POP3, IMAP, and SMTP) content as it passes through the FortiGate modules. FortiOS antivirus protection also controls the blocking of oversized files and supports blocking by file extension. Virus signatures are updated through the FortiGuard antivirus service. The antivirus engine can also be updated through the FortiGuard antivirus service.

FortiOS antispam protection tags (SMTP, IMAP, POP3) or discards (SMTP only) email messages determined to be spam. Multiple spam detection methods are supported including the FortiGuard managed antispam service.

FortiOS web filtering can be configured to provide web (HTTP) content filtering. FortiOS web filtering uses methods such as banned words, address block/exempt lists, and the FortiGuard managed content service.

FortiOS DNS filtering can be configured to provide web content (HTTP/HTTPS) content filtering based on DNS domain lookup. FortiOS DNS filtering uses the FortiGuard DNS database.

FortiOS application control can detect and take action against network traffic depending on the application generating the traffic. FortiOS application control uses the FortiGuard application control database.

FortiOS data leak prevention is used to prevent sensitive data from leaving your network. After sensitive data patterns are defined, data matching the patterns will either be blocked or logged and then allowed.

Whenever a IPS, antivirus, or other filtering event occurs, the modules can record the event in the log and/or send an alert email to an operator.

For complete information refer to the FortiGate Installation Guide for the specific module in question, the FortiGate Administration Guide and the FortiGate IPS Guide.

# Electromagnetic Interference/Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMI/EMC)

The modules comply with EMI/EMC requirements for Class A devices as specified by Part 15, Subpart B, of the FCC rules. The following table lists the specific lab and report information for the modules.

## FCC Report Information

Module	Lab Information	FCC Report Number
FG-6301F	Bay Area Compliance Laboratories Corp 1274 Anvilwood Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA 94089, USA	R1801021-15
FG-6501F	Bay Area Compliance Laboratories Corp 1274 Anvilwood Avenue, Sunnyvale, CA 94089, USA	R1801021-15

# FIPS 140-2 Compliant Operation

The Fortinet hardware is shipped in a non-FIPS 140-2 compliant configuration. The following steps must be performed to put the module into a FIPS compliant configuration:

1. Download the model specific FIPS validated firmware image and md5sum.txt file from the Fortinet Support site at <https://support.fortinet.com/>.
2. Use a hashing utility on the downloaded firmware image to compare and verify the output against the result from the md5sum.txt file.
3. Install the FIPS validated firmware image from a TFTP server using the BIOS boot menu. To access the BIOS boot menu, use the console connection and press any key when the "Press any key to display the configuration menu" option is displayed during the boot process. Then select "[G]: Get firmware image from TFTP server" and follow the instructions to complete the installation of the firmware image.
4. Install the entropy token.
5. Enable the FIPS-CC mode of operation as per the "Enabling FIPS-CC Mode" section.

In addition, FIPS 140-2 compliant operation requires both that you use the module in its FIPS-CC mode of operation and that you follow secure procedures for installation and operation of the FortiGate unit. You must ensure that:

- The FortiGate unit is configured in the FIPS-CC mode of operation.
- The FortiGate unit is installed in a secure physical location.
- Physical access to the FortiGate unit is restricted to authorized operators.
- The entropy token remains in the USB port during operation.
- Administrative passwords are at least 8 characters long.
- Administrative passwords are changed regularly.
- Administrator account passwords must have the following characteristics:
  - One (or more) of the characters must be capitalized
  - One (or more) of the characters must be lower case
  - One (or more) of the characters must be numeric
  - One (or more) of the characters must be non alpha-numeric (e.g. punctuation mark)
- Administration of the module is permitted using only validated administrative methods. These are:
  - Console connection
  - Web-based manager via HTTPS
  - Command line interface (CLI) access via SSH
- Diffie-Hellman groups of less than 2048 bits are not used.
- Client side RSA certificates must use 2048 bit or greater key sizes.
- Only approved and allowed algorithms are used.
- IPSec VPN tunnels using AES-GCM should be configured with a key lifetime of 98,000 KB to ensure a rekey after a maximum of  $2^{16}$  encryptions.

The module can be used in either of its two operation modes: NAT/Route or Transparent. NAT/Route mode applies security features between two or more different networks (for example, between a private network and the Internet). Transparent mode applies security features at any point in a network. The current operation

mode is displayed on the web-based manager status page and in the output of the `get system status` CLI command.

Once the FIPS validated firmware has been installed and the module properly configured in the FIPS-CC mode of operation, the module is running in a FIPS compliant configuration. It is the responsibility of the CO to ensure the module only uses approved algorithms and services to maintain the module in a FIPS-CC Approved mode of operation. Using any of the non-approved algorithms and services switches the module to a non-FIPS mode of operation.

## Enabling FIPS-CC mode

To enable the FIPS 140-2 compliant mode of operation, the operator must execute the following command from the Local Console:

```
config system fips-cc
  set status enable
end
```

The Operator is required to supply a password for the admin account which will be assigned to the Crypto Officer role.

The supplied password must be at least 8 characters long and correctly verified before the system will restart in FIPS-CC mode.

Upon restart, the module will execute self-tests to ensure the correct initialization of the module's cryptographic functions.

After restarting, the Crypto Officer can confirm that the module is running in FIPS-CC mode by executing the following command from the CLI:

```
get system status
```

If the module is running in FIPS-CC mode, the system status output will display the line:

```
FIPS-CC mode: enable
```

# Self-Tests

## Startup and Initialization Self-tests

The module executes the following self-tests during startup and initialization:

- Firmware integrity test using RSA 2048-bit signatures
- Configuration/VPN bypass test using HMAC SHA-256
- AES (128, 256 bit), CBC mode, encrypt known answer test
- AES (128, 256 bit) CBC mode, decrypt known answer test
- AES (128, 256 bit), GCM mode, encrypt known answer test
- AES (128, 256 bit), GCM mode, decrypt known answer test
- HMAC SHA-1 known answer test
- SHA-1 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-1 known answer test)
- HMAC SHA-256 known answer test
- SHA-256 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-256 known answer test)
- HMAC SHA-384 known answer test
- SHA-384 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-384 known answer test)
- HMAC SHA-512 known answer test
- SHA-512 known answer test (tested as part of HMAC SHA-512 known answer test)
- RSA 2048 bit signature generation known answer test
- RSA 2048 bit signature verification known answer test
- ECDSA pairwise consistency test with P-256 curve
- DRBG known answer tests (as per SP 800-90A)

The results of the startup self-tests are displayed on the console during the startup process.

The startup self-tests can also be initiated on demand using the CLI command `execute fips kat all` (to initiate all self-tests) or `execute fips kat <test>` (to initiate a specific self-test).

When the self-tests are run, each implementation of an algorithm is tested - i.e. when the AES self-test is run, all AES implementations are tested.

## Conditional Self-tests

The module executes the following conditional tests when the related service is invoked:

- Continuous NDRNG test
- Continuous DRBG test
- RSA pairwise consistency test
- ECDSA pairwise consistency test
- Configuration/VPN bypass test using HMAC SHA-256
- Firmware load test using RSA 2048-bit signatures

## Critical Function Self-tests

The module also performs the following critical function self-tests applicable to the DRBG, as per NIST SP 800-90A Section 11:

- Instantiate test
- Generate test
- Reseed test

## Error State

If any of the self-tests or conditional tests fail, the module enters an error state as shown by the console output below:

```
Self-tests failed
Entering error mode...
The system is going down NOW !!
The system is halted.
```

All data output and cryptographic services are inhibited in the error state.

**FORTINET**

*High Performance Network Security*



Copyright© 2020 Fortinet, Inc. All rights reserved. Fortinet®, FortiGate®, FortiCare® and FortiGuard®, and certain other marks are registered trademarks of Fortinet, Inc., in the U.S. and other jurisdictions, and other Fortinet names herein may also be registered and/or common law trademarks of Fortinet. All other product or company names may be trademarks of their respective owners. Performance and other metrics contained herein were attained in internal lab tests under ideal conditions, and actual performance and other results may vary. Network variables, different network environments and other conditions may affect performance results. Nothing herein represents any binding commitment by Fortinet, and Fortinet disclaims all warranties, whether express or implied, except to the extent Fortinet enters a binding written contract, signed by Fortinet's General Counsel, with a purchaser that expressly warrants that the identified product will perform according to certain expressly-identified performance metrics and, in such event, only the specific performance metrics expressly identified in such binding written contract shall be binding on Fortinet. For absolute clarity, any such warranty will be limited to performance in the same ideal conditions as in Fortinet's internal lab tests. In no event does Fortinet make any commitment related to future deliverables, features, or development, and circumstances may change such that any forward-looking statements herein are not accurate. Fortinet disclaims in full any covenants, representations, and guarantees pursuant hereto, whether express or implied. Fortinet reserves the right to change, modify, transfer, or otherwise revise this publication without notice, and the most current version of the publication shall be applicable.