

alteryx

The Thrill  
of Solving

## Alteryx Cryptographic Module

# FIPS 140-2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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## References

<i>Reference</i>	<i>Full Specification Name</i>
<b>[ANS X9.31]</b>	<i>Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry (rDSA)</i>
<b>[FIPS 140-2]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 25, 2001</u></a>
<b>[FIPS 180-4]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Secure Hash Standard (SHS)</u></a>
<b>[FIPS 186-4]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Digital Signature Standard (DSS)</u></a>
<b>[FIPS 197]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)</u></a>
<b>[FIPS 198-1]</b>	<a href="#"><u>The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)</u></a>
<b>[IG]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Implementation Guidance for FIPS 140-2 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-38B]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-38C]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-38D]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-38E]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-56A]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-56B]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-57 R5]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Key Management: Part 1 – General</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-67 R2]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-89]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature Applications</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-90A R1]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators</u></a>
<b>[SP 800-131A R2]</b>	<a href="#"><u>Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths</u></a>

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# 1 Introduction

This document is the non-proprietary security policy for the *Alteryx Cryptographic Module*, hereafter referred to as the Module.

The Module is a software library providing a C-language application program interface (API) for use by other processes that require cryptographic functionality. The Module is classified by FIPS 140-2 as a software module, multi-chip standalone module embodiment. The physical cryptographic boundary is the general purpose computer on which the module is installed. The logical cryptographic boundary of the Module is the *fipscanister* object module, a single object module file named *fipscanister.o* (Linux<sup>®1</sup>/Unix<sup>®2</sup> and VxWorks<sup>®3</sup>) or *fipscanister.lib* (Microsoft Windows<sup>®4</sup>). The Module performs no communications other than with the calling application (the process that invokes the Module services).

The current version of the Module is v2.0.16. This version is fully backwards compatible with all earlier revisions of the Module. The v2.0.16 Module incorporates support for new platforms without disturbing functionality for any previously tested platforms. The Module includes versions v2.0.9, v2.0.10, v2.0.11, v2.0.12, v2.0.13, v2.0.14, v2.0.15, and v2.0.16.

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<sup>1</sup> Linux is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.

<sup>2</sup> UNIX is a registered trademark of The Open Group.

<sup>3</sup> VxWorks is a registered trademark owned by Wind River Systems, Inc.

<sup>4</sup> Windows is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries.

The FIPS 140-2 security levels for the Module are as follows:

Security Requirement	Security Level
<b>Cryptographic Module Specification</b>	1
<b>Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces</b>	1
<b>Roles, Services, and Authentication</b>	2
<b>Finite State Model</b>	1
<b>Physical Security</b>	NA
<b>Operational Environment</b>	1
<b>Cryptographic Key Management</b>	1
<b>EMI/EMC</b>	1
<b>Self-Tests</b>	1
<b>Design Assurance</b>	3
<b>Mitigation of Other Attacks</b>	NA

*Table 1 – Security Level of Security Requirements*




Figure 1 – Module Block Diagram

## 2 Tested Configurations

#	Operational Environment	Platform	Processor	Optimizations (Target)	EC	B
1	Windows Server 2016	HPE ProLiant DL60 Gen9	Intel Xeon E5-2609	PAA	BKP	W1
2	Windows Server 2016	HPE ProLiant DL60 Gen9	Intel Xeon E5-2609	None	BKP	W1

*Table 2 - Tested Configurations*

As described in [IG] 1.21, Processor Algorithm Acceleration (PAA) describes mathematical constructs and not the complete cryptographic algorithm (as defined in the NIST standards). Examples of PAA supported by the Module include AES-NI and NEON.

(B = Build Method; EC = Elliptic Curve Support). The EC column indicates support for prime curve only (P), or all NIST defined B, K, and P curves (BKP).

See Appendix A for additional information on build method and optimizations. See Appendix C for a list of the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective operational environments.

### 3 Ports and Interfaces

The physical ports of the Module are the same as the computer system on which it is executing. The logical interface is a C-language application program interface (API).

Logical interface type	Description
<b>Control input</b>	<i>API entry point and corresponding stack parameters</i>
<b>Data input</b>	<i>API entry point data input stack parameters</i>
<b>Status output</b>	<i>API entry point return values and status stack parameters</i>
<b>Data output</b>	<i>API entry point data output stack parameters</i>

*Table 3 - Logical interfaces*

As a software module, control of the physical ports is outside module scope. However, when the module is performing self-tests, or is in an error state, all output on the logical data output interface is inhibited. The module is single-threaded and in error scenarios returns only an error value (no data output is returned).

## 4 Modes of Operation and Cryptographic Functionality

The Module supports a FIPS 140-2 Approved mode and a Non-Approved mode. Table 4 and Table 5 list the Approved and Non-Approved but Allowed algorithms, respectively. Table 6 lists the Non-Approved algorithms that shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation. All services available in the Approved mode of operation are available in the Non-Approved mode with the addition of the Non-Approved services.

Function	Algorithm	Options	Cert #
<b>Random Number Generation; Symmetric Key Generation</b>	[SP 800-90A R1] DRBG <sup>5</sup> Prediction resistance supported for all variations	Hash DRBG HMAC DRBG, no reseed CTR DRBG (AES), no derivation function	<a href="#">C1990</a>
<b>Encryption, Decryption and CMAC</b>	[SP 800-67 R2]	3-Key TDES ECB, TCBC, TCFB, TOFB; CMAC generate and verify	<a href="#">C1990</a>
	[FIPS 197] AES [SP 800-38B] CMAC [SP 800-38C] CCM [SP 800-38D] GCM [SP 800-38E] XTS	128/192/256 ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB 1, CFB 8, CFB 128, CTR, XTS; CCM; GCM; CMAC generate and verify	<a href="#">C1990</a>
<b>Message Digests</b>	[FIPS 180-4]	SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)	<a href="#">C1990</a>
<b>Keyed Hash</b>	[FIPS 198] HMAC	SHA-1, SHA-2 (224, 256, 384, 512)	<a href="#">C1990</a>
<b>Digital Signature and Asymmetric Key Generation</b>	[FIPS 186-2] RSA	SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS (4096 with all SHA-2 sizes) SigVer9.31, SigVerPKCS1.5, SigVerPSS (2048/3072/4096 with all SHA-2 sizes)	<a href="#">C1990</a>
	[FIPS 186-4] RSA	SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS (2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes)	<a href="#">C1990</a>
	[FIPS 186-4] DSA	PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes) PQG Ver, Sig Ver (1024/2048/3072 with all SHA-2 sizes)	<a href="#">C1990</a>
	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA	PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 K-224 K-256 K-384 K-571 B-224 B-256 B-384 B-571 ExtraRandomBits TestingCandidates ) PKV: CURVES( ALL-P ALL-K ALL-B ) SigGen: CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512)	<a href="#">C1990</a>

<sup>5</sup> For all DRBGs the "supported security strengths" is just the highest supported security strength per [SP 800-90A R1] and [SP 800-57 R5].

Function	Algorithm	Options	Cert #
		B-233: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) B-571: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) ) SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-283: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-409: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-571: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) )	
		PKG: CURVES( P-224 P-256 P-384 P-521 ) PKV: CURVES( ALL-P ) SigGen: CURVES( P-224: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-224, 256, 384, 512) ) SigVer: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-256: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-384: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-521: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) )	
<b>ECC CDH (KAS) (CVL)</b>	[SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2)	All NIST defined B, K and P curves except sizes 163 and 192 All NIST defined P curves	<a href="#">C1990</a>

Table 4 - FIPS Approved Cryptographic Functions

The Module supports only NIST defined curves for use with ECDSA and ECC CDH. The Module supports two operational environment configurations for elliptic curve; NIST prime curve only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") and all NIST defined curves (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP").

Category	Algorithm	Description
<b>Key Agreement</b>	EC DH	Non-compliant (untested) DH scheme using elliptic curve, supporting all NIST defined B, K and P curves except sizes 163 and 192. Key agreement is a service provided for calling process use, but is not used to establish keys into the Module.
<b>Key Encryption, Decryption</b>	RSA	The RSA algorithm may be used by the calling application for encryption or decryption of keys. No claim is made for SP 800-56B compliance, and no CSPs are established into or exported out of the module using these services.

Table 5 - Non-FIPS Approved but Allowed Cryptographic Functions

The Module implements the following services which are Non-Approved per the SP 800-131A and [IG] G.18 transitions:

Function	Algorithm	Options
<b>Random Number Generation; Symmetric key generation</b>	[ANS X9.31] RNG	AES 128/192/256
<b>Random Number Generation; Symmetric key generation</b>	[SP 800-90A R1] DRBG	Dual EC DRBG (note the Dual EC DRBG algorithm shall not be used in the FIPS Approved mode of operation)
<b>Digital Signature and Asymmetric Key Generation</b>	[FIPS 186-2] RSA	GenKey9.31 (1024/1536/2048/3072/4096) SigGen9.31, SigGenPKCS1.5, SigGenPSS (1024/1536/2048/3072 with all SHA sizes, 4096 with SHA-1)
	[FIPS 186-4] DSA	PQG Gen, Key Pair Gen, Sig Gen (1024 with all SHA sizes, 2048/3072 with SHA-1)
	[FIPS 186-4] ECDSA	PKG: CURVES( P-192 K-163 B-163 ) SigGen: CURVES( P-192: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) P-224:(SHA-1) P-256:(SHA-1) P-384:(SHA-1) P-521:(SHA-1) K-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) K-233:(SHA-1) K-283:(SHA-1) K-409:(SHA-1) K-571:(SHA-1) B-163: (SHA-1, 224, 256, 384, 512) B-233:(SHA-1) B-283:(SHA-1) B-409:(SHA-1) B-571:(SHA-1) )
<b>ECC CDH (CVL)</b>	[SP 800-56A] (§5.7.1.2)	All NIST Recommended B, K and P curves sizes 163 and 192

Table 6 - FIPS Non-Approved Cryptographic Functions

X9.31 RNG is Non-Approved effective December 31, 2015, per the CMVP Notice "X9.31 RNG transition, December 31, 2015".

These algorithms shall not be used when operating in the FIPS Approved mode of operation.

EC DH Key Agreement provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength. RSA Key Wrapping provides a maximum of 256 bits of security strength.

The Module requires an initialization sequence (see [IG 9.5]): the calling application invokes `FIPS_mode_set()`<sup>6</sup>, which returns a "1" for success and "0" for failure. If `FIPS_mode_set()` fails then all cryptographic services fail from then on. The application can test to see if FIPS mode has been successfully performed.

<sup>6</sup> The function call in the Module is `FIPS_module_mode_set()` which is typically used by an application via the `FIPS_mode_set()` wrapper function.

The Module is a cryptographic engine library, which can be used only in conjunction with additional software. Aside from the use of the NIST defined elliptic curves as trusted third-party domain parameters, all other FIPS 186-4 assurances are outside the scope of the Module, and are the responsibility of the calling process.

#### 4.1 Critical Security Parameters and Public Keys

All CSPs used by the Module are described in this section. All access to these CSPs by Module services are described in Section 4. The CSP names are generic, corresponding to API parameter data structures.

CSP Name	Description
<b>RSA SGK</b>	RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature generation key
<b>RSA KDK</b>	RSA (1024 to 16384 bits) key decryption (private key transport) key
<b>DSA SGK</b>	[FIPS 186-4] DSA (2048/3072) signature generation key
<b>ECDSA SGK</b>	ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves except sizes 163 and 192) signature generation key
<b>EC DH Private</b>	EC DH (All NIST defined B, K, and P curves except sizes 163 and 192) private key agreement key.
<b>AES EDK</b>	AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt key
<b>AES CMAC</b>	AES (128/192/256) CMAC generate / verify key
<b>AES GCM</b>	AES (128/192/256) encrypt / decrypt / generate / verify key
<b>AES XTS</b>	AES (256/512) XTS encrypt / decrypt key
<b>TDES EDK</b>	TDES (3-Key) encrypt / decrypt key
<b>TDES CMAC</b>	TDES (3-Key) CMAC generate / verify key
<b>HMAC Key</b>	Keyed hash key (160/224/256/384/512)
<b>Hash_DRBG CSPs</b>	V (440/888 bits) and C (440/888 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
<b>HMAC_DRBG CSPs</b>	V (160/224/256/384/512 bits) and Key (160/224/256/384/512 bits), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
<b>CTR_DRBG CSPs</b>	V (128 bits) and Key (AES 128/192/256), entropy input (length dependent on security strength)
<b>CO-AD-Digest</b>	Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for Crypto Officer role authentication
<b>User-AD-Digest</b>	Pre-calculated HMAC-SHA-1 digest used for User role authentication

Table 7 - Critical Security Parameters

Authentication data is loaded into the module during the module build process, performed by an authorized operator (Crypto Officer), and otherwise cannot be accessed.

The module does not output intermediate key generation values.

Public Key Name	Description
<b>RSA SVK</b>	RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) signature verification public key
<b>RSA KEK</b>	RSA (2048 to 16384 bits) key encryption (public key transport) key
<b>DSA SVK</b>	[FIPS 186-4] DSA (1024/2048/3072) signature verification key
<b>ECDSA SVK</b>	ECDSA (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) signature verification key
<b>EC DH Public</b>	EC DH (All NIST defined B, K and P curves) public key agreement key

Table 8 - Public Keys

**For all CSPs and Public Keys:**

**Storage:** RAM, associated to entities by memory location. The Module stores DRBG state values for the lifetime of the DRBG instance. The module uses CSPs passed in by the calling application on the stack. The Module does not store any CSP persistently (beyond the lifetime of an API call), with the exception of DRBG state values used for the Modules' default key generation service.

**Generation:** The Module implements SP 800-90A compliant DRBG services for creation of symmetric keys, and for generation of DSA and elliptic curve keys as shown in Table 4. The calling application is responsible for storage of generated keys returned by the module.

**Entry:** All CSPs enter the Module's logical boundary in plaintext as API parameters, associated by memory location. However, none cross the physical boundary.

**Output:** The Module does not output CSPs, other than as explicit results of key generation services. However, none cross the physical boundary.

**Destruction:** Zeroization of sensitive data is performed automatically by API function calls for temporarily stored CSPs. In addition, the module provides functions to explicitly destroy CSPs related to random number generation services. The calling application is responsible for parameters passed in and out of the module.

Private and secret keys as well as seeds and entropy input are provided to the Module by the calling application, and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. Keys residing in internally allocated data structures (during the lifetime of an API call) can only be accessed using the Module defined API. The operating system protects memory and process space from unauthorized access. Only the calling application that creates or imports keys can use or export such keys. All API functions are executed by the invoking calling application in a non-overlapping sequence such that no two API functions will execute concurrently. An authorized application as user (Crypto-Officer and User) has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module.

In the event Module power is lost and restored the calling application must ensure that any AES-GCM keys used for encryption or decryption are re-distributed.

Module users (the calling applications) shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random number generation mechanism as shown in [SP 800-90A R1] Table 2 (Hash\_DRBG, HMAC\_DRBG) and Table 3 (CTR\_DRBG). This entropy is supplied by means of callback functions. Those functions must return an error if the minimum entropy strength cannot be met.

## 5 Roles, Authentication and Services

The Module implements the required User and Crypto Officer roles and requires authentication for those roles. Only one role may be active at a time and the Module does not allow concurrent operators. The User or Crypto Officer role is assumed by passing the appropriate password to the `FIPS_module_mode_set()` function. The password values may be specified at build time and must have a minimum length of 16 characters. Any attempt to authenticate with an invalid password will result in an immediate and permanent failure condition rendering the Module unable to enter the FIPS mode of operation, even with subsequent use of a correct password.

Authentication data is loaded into the Module during the Module build process, performed by the Crypto Officer, and otherwise cannot be accessed.

Since minimum password length is 16 characters, the probability of a random successful authentication attempt in one try is a maximum of  $1/256^{16}$ , or less than  $1/10^{38}$ . The Module permanently disables further authentication attempts after a single failure, so this probability is independent of time.

Both roles have access to all of the services provided by the Module.

- User Role (User): Loading the Module and calling any of the API functions.
- Crypto Officer Role (CO): Installation of the Module on the host computer system and calling of any API functions.

All services implemented by the Module are listed below, along with a description of service CSP access.

Service	Role	Description
<b>Initialize</b>	User, CO	Module initialization. Does not access CSPs.
<b>Self-test</b>	User, CO	Perform self-tests (FIPS_selftest). Does not access CSPs.
<b>Show status</b>	User, CO	Functions that provide module status information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Version (as unsigned long or const char *)</li> <li>• FIPS Mode (Boolean)</li> </ul> Does not access CSPs.
<b>Zeroize</b>	User, CO	Functions that destroy CSPs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <code>fips_drbg_uninstantiate</code>: for a given DRBG context, overwrites DRBG CSPs (Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs)</li> </ul> All other services automatically overwrite CSPs stored in allocated memory. Stack cleanup is the responsibility of the calling application.
<b>Random number generation</b>	User, CO	Used for random number and symmetric key generation. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Seed or reseed a DRBG instance</li> <li>• Determine security strength of a DRBG instance</li> <li>• Obtain random data</li> </ul> Uses and updates Hash_DRBG CSPs, HMAC_DRBG CSPs, CTR_DRBG CSPs.
<b>Asymmetric key generation</b>	User, CO	Used to generate DSA and ECDSA keys: DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK There is one supported entropy strength for each mechanism and algorithm type, the maximum specified in [SP 800-90A R1]

Service	Role	Description
<b>Symmetric encrypt/decrypt</b>	User, CO	Used to encrypt or decrypt data. Executes using AES EDK, TDES EDK (passed in by the calling process).
<b>Symmetric digest</b>	User, CO	Used to generate or verify data integrity with CMAC. Executes using AES CMAC, TDES, CMAC (passed in by the calling process).
<b>Message digest</b>	User, CO	Used to generate a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest. Does not access CSPs.
<b>Keyed Hash</b>	User, CO	Used to generate or verify data integrity with HMAC. Executes using HMAC Key (passed in by the calling process).
<b>Key transport<sup>7</sup></b>	User, CO	Used to encrypt or decrypt a key value on behalf of the calling process (does not establish keys into the module). Executes using RSA KDK, RSA KEK (passed in by the calling process).
<b>Key agreement</b>	User, CO	Used to perform key agreement primitives on behalf of the calling process (does not establish keys into the module). Executes using EC DH Private, EC DH Public (passed in by the calling process).
<b>Digital signature</b>	User, CO	Used to generate or verify RSA, DSA or ECDSA digital signatures. Executes using RSA SGK, RSA SVK; DSA SGK, DSA SVK; ECDSA SGK, ECDSA SVK (passed in by the calling process).
<b>Utility</b>	User, CO	Miscellaneous helper functions. Does not access CSPs.

Table 9 - Services and CSP Access

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<sup>7</sup> "Key transport" can refer to a) moving keys in and out of the module or b) the use of keys by an external application. The latter definition is the one that applies to the *Module*.

## 6 Self-Tests

The Module performs the self-tests listed below on invocation of Initialize or Self-test.

Algorithm	Type	Test Attributes
<b>Software integrity</b>	KAT	HMAC-SHA1
<b>HMAC</b>	KAT	One KAT per SHA1, SHA224, SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 Per [IG 9.3], this testing covers SHA POST requirements.
<b>AES</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 128-bit key length
<b>AES CCM</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, 192 key length
<b>AES GCM</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, 256 key length
<b>XTS-AES</b>	KAT	128, 256 bit key sizes to support either the 256-bit key size (for XTS-AES-128) or the 512-bit key size (for XTS-AES-256)
<b>AES CMAC</b>	KAT	Sign and verify CBC mode, 128, 192, 256 key lengths
<b>TDES</b>	KAT	Separate encrypt and decrypt, ECB mode, 3-Key
<b>TDES CMAC</b>	KAT	CMAC generate and verify, CBC mode, 3-Key
<b>RSA</b>	KAT	Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-256, PKCS#1
<b>DSA</b>	PCT	Sign and verify using 2048 bit key, SHA-384
<b>DRBG</b>	KAT	CTR_DRBG: AES, 256 bits with and without derivation function HASH_DRBG: SHA256 HMAC_DRBG: SHA256
<b>ECDSA</b>	PCT	Keygen, sign, verify using P-224, K-233 and SHA512. The K-233 self-test is not performed for operational environments that support prime curve only (see Table 2).
<b>ECC CDH</b>	KAT	Shared secret calculation per SP 800-56A §5.7.1.2, [IG 9.6]

Table 10 - Power-On Self-Tests (KAT = Known answer test; PCT = Pairwise consistency test)

The Module is installed using one of the set of instructions in Appendix A, as appropriate for the target system. The HMAC-SHA-1 of the Module distribution file as tested by the CMT Laboratory and listed in Appendix A is verified during installation of the Module file as described in Appendix A.

The `FIPS_mode_set()`<sup>8</sup> function performs all power-up self-tests listed above with no operator intervention required, returning a “1” if all power-up self-tests succeed, and a “0” otherwise. If any component of the power-up self-test fails an internal flag is set to prevent subsequent invocation of any cryptographic function calls. The module will only enter the FIPS Approved mode if the module is reloaded and the call to `FIPS_mode_set()`<sup>8</sup> succeeds.

The power-up self-tests may also be performed on-demand by calling `FIPS_selftest()`, which returns a “1” for success and “0” for failure. Interpretation of this return code is the responsibility of the calling application.

<sup>8</sup> `FIPS_mode_set()` calls Module function `FIPS_module_mode_set()`

The Module also implements the following conditional tests:

Algorithm	Test
DRBG	Tested as required by [SP 800-90A R1] Section 11
DRBG	FIPS 140-2 continuous test for stuck fault
DSA	Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair
ECDSA	Pairwise consistency test on each generation of a key pair

*Table 11 - Conditional Tests*

In the event of a DRBG self-test failure the calling application must unstantiate and re-instantiate the DRBG per the requirements of [SP 800-90A R1]; this is not something the Module can do itself.

The Module supports two operational environment configurations for elliptic curve: NIST prime curves only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") and all NIST defined curves (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP").

## 7 Operational Environment

The tested operating systems segregate user processes into separate process spaces. Each process space is logically separated from all other processes by the operating system software and hardware. The Module functions entirely within the process space of the calling application, and implicitly satisfies the FIPS 140-2 requirement for a single user mode of operation.

## 8 Mitigation of other Attacks

The module is not designed to mitigate against attacks which are outside of the scope of FIPS 140-2.

## Appendix A Installation and Usage Guidance

The test platforms represent different combinations of installation instructions. For each platform, there is a build system, the host providing the build environment in which the installation instructions are executed, and a target system on which the generated object code is executed. The build and target systems may be the same type of system or even the same device, or may be different systems – the Module supports cross-compilation environments.

Each of these command sets are relative to the top of the directory containing the uncompressed and expanded contents of the distribution files *openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz* (all NIST defined curves as listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP") or *openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.16.tar.gz* (NIST prime curves only as listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P"). The command sets are:

```
U1:
    ./config no-asm
    make
    make install
```

```
U2:
    ./config
    make
    make install
```

```
W1:
    ms\do_fips no-asm
```

```
W2:
    ms\do_fips
```

```
C1:
    c6x/do_fips
```

### Installation instructions

1. Download and copy the distribution file to the build system. These files can be downloaded from <https://www.openssl.org/source/>.
2. Verify the HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the distribution file; see Appendix B. An independently acquired FIPS 140-2 validated implementation of SHA-1 HMAC must be used for this digest verification. Note that this verification can be performed on any convenient system and not necessarily on the specific build or target system.

3. Unpack the distribution

```
gunzip -c openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz | tar xf -
cd openssl-fips-2.0.16
```

or

```
gunzip -c openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.16.tar.gz | tar xf -
cd openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.16
```

4. Execute one of the installation command sets U1, W1, U2, W2 as shown above. No other command sets shall be used.
5. The resulting *fipsanister.o* or *fipsanister.lib* file is now available for use.

6. The calling application enables FIPS mode by calling the `FIPS_mode_set()`<sup>10</sup> function.

Note that failure to use one of the specified commands sets exactly as shown will result in a module that cannot be considered compliant with FIPS 140-2.

#### Linking the Runtime Executable Application

Note that applications interfacing with the FIPS Object Module are outside of the cryptographic boundary. When linking the application with the FIPS Object Module two steps are necessary:

1. The HMAC-SHA-1 digest of the FIPS Object Module file must be calculated and verified against the installed digest to ensure the integrity of the FIPS object module.
2. A HMAC-SHA1 digest of the FIPS Object Module must be generated and embedded in the FIPS Object Module for use by the `FIPS_mode_set()`<sup>10</sup> function at runtime initialization.

The `fips_standalone_sha1` command can be used to perform the verification of the FIPS Object Module and to generate the new HMAC-SHA-1 digest for the runtime executable application. Failure to embed the digest in the executable object will prevent initialization of FIPS mode.

At runtime, the `FIPS_mode_set()`<sup>9</sup> function compares the embedded HMAC-SHA-1 digest with a digest generated from the FIPS Object Module object code. This digest is the final link in the chain of validation from the original source to the runtime executable application file.

#### **Optimization**

The “asm” designation means that assembler language optimizations were enabled when the binary code was built, “no-asm” means that only C language code was compiled.

For OpenSSL with x86 there are three possible optimization levels:

1. No optimization (plain C)
2. SSE2 optimization
3. AES-NI+PCLMULQDQ+SSSE3 optimization

Other theoretically possible combinations (e.g. AES-NI only, or SSE3 only) are not addressed individually, so that a processor which does not support all three of AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, and SSSE3 will fall back to SSE2 optimization.

For more information, see:

- <http://www.intel.com/support/processors/sb/CS-030123.htm?wapkw=sse2>
- <http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-advanced-encryption-standard-instructions-aes-ni/?wapkw=aes-ni>

---

<sup>9</sup> `FIPS_mode_set()` calls the Module function `FIPS_module_mode_set()`

For OpenSSL with ARM there are two possible optimization levels:

1. Without NEON
2. With NEON (ARM7 only)

For more information, see <http://www.arm.com/products/processors/technologies/neon.php>

## Appendix B Controlled Distribution File Fingerprint

The Module v2.0.16 consists of the OpenSSL FIPS Object Module v2.0.16 (the *fipscanister.o* or *fipscanister.lib* contiguous unit of binary object code) generated from the specific source files.

For all NIST defined curves (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "BKP") the source files are in the specific special OpenSSL distribution *openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz* with HMAC-SHA-1 digest of

```
e8dbfa6cb9e22a049ec625ffb7ccaf33e6116598
```

located at <http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz>.

The `openssl` command from a version of OpenSSL that incorporates a previously validated version of the module may be used:

```
openssl sha1 -hmac etaonrishdlcupfm openssl-fips-2.0.16.tar.gz
```

For NIST prime curves only (listed in Table 2 with the EC column marked "P") the source files are in the specific special OpenSSL distribution *openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.16.tar.gz* with HMAC-SHA-1 digest of

```
205ce773d4d6a7abbcee2cf6ca9e923a0d120f1a
```

located at <http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.16.tar.gz>. Note this is from the previous revision of the Module as no modifications relevant to NIST prime curves only were introduced in revision 2.0.16.

The set of files specified in this tar file constitutes the complete set of source files of this module. There shall be no additions, deletions, or alterations of this set as used during module build. The OpenSSL distribution tar file (and patch file if used) shall be verified using the above HMAC-SHA-1 digest(s).

The arbitrary 16-byte key of:

```
65 74 61 6f 6e 72 69 73 68 64 6c 63 75 70 66 6d
```

(equivalent to the ASCII string "etaonrishdlcupfm") is used to generate the HMAC-SHA-1 value for the Module integrity check.

The functionality of all earlier revisions of the Module are subsumed by this latest revision, so there is no reason to use older revisions for any new deployments. However, older revisions remain valid. The source distribution files and corresponding HMAC-SHA-1 digests are listed below:

`openssl-fips-2.0.15.tar.gz`

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.15.tar.gz>

Digest: b4967baaff637dda636224fdc732992dc5a5dd77

`openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.15.tar.gz`

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.15.tar.gz>

Digest: 79038b02ac9ea08a63ce3fc60e493e3a0a728ebd

openssl-fips-2.0.14.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.14.tar.gz>

Digest: fa4eea2c159885c896f4760dcc73efe59244f1d

openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.14.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.14.tar.gz>

Digest: bf676ee9f52b30e9f7348d19d5e6bf5b244ccf52

openssl-fips-2.0.13.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.13.tar.gz>

Digest: 26f923491458df77a1f4c6ce39fef2f5bea88cd5

openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.13.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.13.tar.gz>

Digest: bd935902af260cceb29d30708c7ed5461698280d

openssl-fips-2.0.12.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.12.tar.gz>

Digest: 86ec30179f1bfb2edde4ababf0fb519ba7380b69

openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.12.tar.gz>

Digest: 3da3e6d610378ad4b6ee2638a141c17cb3a2aabf

openssl-fips-2.0.11.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.11.tar.gz>

Digest: b9d2a466c66841fcbf65a3cbe21abf81fe140bcf

openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.11.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.11.tar.gz>

Digest: 571662bb0e413bd42f612c695c0b76deb2e9b33e

openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.10.tar.gz>

Digest: af8bda4bb9739e35b4ef00a9bc40d21a6a97a780

openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.10.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.10.tar.gz>

Digest: 02cc9ddfffb2e917d1cdc9ebc97a9731c40f6394

openssl-fips-2.0.9.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-2.0.9.tar.gz>

Digest: 54552e9a3ed8d1561341e8945fcdec55af961322

openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.9.tar.gz

URL: <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/openssl-fips-ecp-2.0.9.tar.gz>

Digest: 91d267688713c920f85bc5e69c8b5d34e1112672

Note that older versions of the FIPS module are migrated from <http://www.openssl.org/source/> to <http://www.openssl.org/source/old/fips/>, so depending on the time at which this document is referenced the URLs above may need to be adjusted accordingly.

## Appendix C Compilers

This appendix lists the specific compilers used to generate the Module for the respective Operational Environments. Note this list does not imply that use of the Module is restricted to only the listed compiler versions, only that the use of other versions has not been confirmed to produce a correct result.

#	Operational Environment	Compiler
1	Windows Server 2016	Visual Studio 2015
2	Windows Server 2016	Visual Studio 2015

*Table 12 - Compilers*