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Aruba 2930F Switch Series

FIPS 140–2 Non-Proprietary Security Policy Security Level 1 Validation

Hardware: JL253A, JL254A, JL258A, JL263A, JL264A
Firmware: WC.16.11

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Keywords: Security Policy, CSP, Roles, Service, Cryptographic Module

TABLE 1 - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Full spelling
ACL	Access Control List
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CAVP	Cryptographic Algorithm Validation Program
CLI	Command Line Interface
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSE	Communication Security Establishment
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DOA	Dead on Arrival
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
HMAC	Hash-based Message Authentication Code
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
IPQC	In Process Quality Control
IRF	Intelligent Resilient Framework
KAT	Known Answer Test
LED	Light Emitting Diode
MPU	Main Processing Unit
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
PoE+	Power over Ethernet
QoS	Quality of Service
RADIUS	Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
RAM	Random Access Memory
RIP	Routing Information Protocol
RSA	Rivest Shamir and Adleman method for asymmetric encryption
SDN	Software Defined Networking

Abbreviation	Full spelling
sFlow	Sampled Flow
SFP+	Enhanced Small Form-Factor Pluggable
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
TFTP	Trivial File Transfer Protocol

1 Introduction

Purpose

This is a non-proprietary Cryptographic Module Security Policy for the Aruba 2930F Switch Series from Aruba, a Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE) Company. This Security Policy describes how the Aruba 2930F Switch Series meets the security requirements of Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publication 140-2, which details the U.S. and Canadian Government requirements for cryptographic modules. More information about the FIPS 140-2 standard and validation program is available on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) websites at <http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp> and <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en>, respectively.

This document also describes how to run the module in a secure FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This policy was prepared as part of the Overall Level 1 FIPS 140-2 validation of the module. The Aruba 2930F Switch Series are referred to in this document as Aruba 2930F Switch Series, the switches, the cryptographic module, or the module.

References

This document deals only with operations and capabilities of the module in the technical terms of a FIPS 140-2 cryptographic module security policy. More information is available on the module from the following sources:

- The HPE website (www.hpe.com) and Aruba website (www.arubanetworks.com) contain information on the full line of products for Aruba.
- The CMVP website (<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/documents/140-1/140val-all.htm>) contains contact information for individuals to answer technical or sales-related questions for the module.

2 Overview

The 2930F Switch Series is designed for customers creating digital workplaces. The Basic Layer 3 switch supports 10GbE uplinks, PoE+, robust QoS, RIP Routing, Access OSPF, ACLs, and IPV6. The module delivers consistent user experience with unified management tools. It comes with built-in 1GbE or 10GbE uplinks and up to 370W PoE+.

Each device is based on the Aruba OS, version WC.16.11 platform. The module is being validated as a multi-chip standalone network device at FIPS 140-2 Overall Security Level 1.

The module's configurations validated during the cryptographic module test include:

- JL253A – 24G 4SFP+ Switch
- JL254A – 48G 4SFP+ Switch
- JL258A – 8G PoE+ 2SFP+ Switch
- JL263A – 24G PoE+ 4SFP+ Switch
- JL264A – 48G PoE+ 4SFP+ Switch

Security Validation Level

The following table lists the level of validation for each area in the FIPS PUB 140-2.

TABLE 2 - VALIDATION LEVEL BY SECTION

No.	Area	Level
1	Cryptographic Module Specification	1
2	Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces	1
3	Roles, Services, and Authentication	3
4	Finite State Model	1
5	Physical Security	1
6	Operational Environment	N/A
7	Cryptographic Key management	1
8	Electromagnetic Interface/Electromagnetic Compatibility	1
9	Self-Tests	1
10	Design Assurance	2
11	Mitigation of Other Attacks	N/A
12	Overall Level	1

3 Cryptographic Module Specifications

The module is a multiple-chip standalone networking device, and the cryptographic boundary is defined as encompassing the “top,” “front,” “rear”, “left,” “right,” and “bottom” surfaces of the case. The general components of the module include firmware and hardware, which are placed in the three-dimensional space within the case.

The Aruba 2930F Switch Series are multiport switches that can be used to build high-performance switched networks. These switches are store-and-forward devices offering low latency for high-speed networking. The 2930F switches also support Power over Ethernet (PoE+) technologies and full network management capabilities.

HPE 2930F Switch Series

FIGURE 1 - 2930F SWITCH SERIES



TABLE 3 - 2930F SWITCH SERIES

Label	Description
1	Aruba 2930F 24G 4SFP+ Switch (JL253A)
2	Aruba 2930F 48G 4SFP+ Switch (JL254A)
3	Aruba 2930F 24G PoE+ 4SFP+ Switch (JL263A)
4	Aruba 2930F 48G PoE+ 4SFP+ Switch (JL264A)
5	Aruba 2930F 8G PoE+ 2SFP+ Switch (JL258A)

4 Cryptographic Module Port and Interfaces

The cryptographic module's physical ports can be categorized into the following logical interfaces defined by FIPS 140-2:

- Data Input Interface
- Data Output Interface
- Control Input Interface
- Status Output Interface
- Power Interface

Aruba 2930F Series Ports – Front Panel

The Aruba 2930F Series data and management ports are located on the switch front panel.

FIGURE 2 - EXAMPLE OF FRONT OF THE 2930F SWITCH




TABLE 4 – FRONT OF THE 2930F SWITCH LABELS AND DESCRIPTIONS

Label	Description
1	SFP+ ports
2	SFP+ port LEDs
3	10/100/1000Base-T RJ-45 ports
4	Switch port LEDs
5	Global Status, Unit Identification, Speed, PoE*, Usr LEDs
6	RJ-45 Serial Console
7	LED Mode button
8	Reset, Clear buttons
9	Micro USB Console

* PoE Mode LED is present only on switch models that support PoE+.

Console Port

There are two serial console port options on the switch, an RJ-45 or Micro USB. These ports are used to connect a console to the switch either by using the RJ-45 serial cable supplied with the switch, or a standard Micro USB cable (not supplied). The Micro USB connector has precedence for input. If both cables are plugged in, the console output is echoed to both the RJ-45 and the Micro-USB ports, but the input is only accepted from the Micro-USB port. For more information about the console connection, see “Connect a management console” in Chapter 2 “[Installing the Switch](#)” of the installation guide.

Aruba 2930F Switch Series - Back Panel

FIGURE 3 - BACK OF THE 24 AND 48 PORT 2930F SWITCHES




TABLE 5 - BACK OF THE 2930F SWITCH LABELS AND DESCRIPTIONS

Label	Description
1	Ground Point
2	AC power connector
3	Cable tie eyelet
4	DC power jack (JL258A)

Aruba 2930F Switch Series Ports and Interfaces

The mapping of logical and physical interfaces to the FIPS validated configuration of the module is detailed in the following table.

TABLE 6 LOGICAL AND PHYSICAL INTERFACES

Logical Interface	Module Physical Interface
Data Input	Gigabit Ethernet ports
	SFP+ Uplink ports
	Console port (RJ-45 or Micro USB)
Data Output	Gigabit Ethernet ports
	SFP+ Uplink ports
	Console port (RJ-45 or Micro USB)
Control Input	Gigabit Ethernet ports
	SFP+ Uplink ports
	Console port (RJ-45 or Micro USB)
	Reset Push Button
	Clear Push Button
	LED Mode Push Button
Status Output	Gigabit Ethernet ports
	SFP+ Uplink ports
	Console port (RJ-45 or Micro USB)
	LEDs
Power Interface	Power Supply

5 Roles, Services, and Authentication

Roles

Each cryptographic module supports three roles that an operator can assume: a Crypto Officer (Manager) role, a User (Operator) role, and a Security Officer role. Each role is accessed through proper Identity-based authentication to the switch. Services associated with each role are listed in the following sections.

The Crypto Officer is responsible for the set up and initialization of the module as documented in Section 10 (Delivery and Operation) of this document. The Crypto Officer has complete control of the module and is in charge of configuring all of the settings for each switch. The Crypto Officer can create RSA key pairs for SSHv2 and TLS. The Crypto Officer is also in charge of maintaining access control and checking error and intrusion logs.

The User role can show the current secure-mode of the module.

The Security Officer role is to view and delete security logs. This role can also copy security logs from the switch but does not have permission to execute any other commands. The security logs cannot be viewed or deleted by other roles on the switch.

The devices allow multiple management users to operate the networking device simultaneously. The module does not employ a maintenance interface and does not have a maintenance role.

Services

The switches can be accessed through:

- Console Port
- SSH
- HTTPS/TLS WebUI
- SNMPv3

Crypto Officer Services

The Crypto Officer role is responsible for the configuration and maintenance of the switches. The services available to the Crypto Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

TABLE 7 - CRYPTO OFFICER SERVICES

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
View Device Status	View status of devices and functions, version of currently running OS	Crypto Officer Password (R)
View Running Status	View memory status, packet statistics, interface status, current configuration, routing table, active sessions, temperature and SNMP MIB statistics	Crypto Officer Password (R)
Perform Network Functions	Network diagnostic service such as “ping” and network configuration service such as “SSHv2” client, TLS service to protect the session between the switch and external server (e.g. Log Server), Initial Configuration setup (IP, hostname, DNS server), SNMPv3 password configuration	SSH private key, SSH Diffie-Hellman Private Key, SSH Diffie-Hellman Public Key, SSH Session Key, SSH Session authentication Key, SSH Public key, DRBG seed, DRBG V, DRBG Key, DRBG Entropy Input, TLS Master secret, TLS Traffic encryption key, TLS traffic authentication, TLS Server public key, TLS Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Private Key, TLS Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Public Key, RSA private key, RSA public key, RADIUS shared secret key, TACACS+ shared secret key, SNMPv3 Password, SNMPv3 Engine ID, SNMPv3 key and Crypto Officer Password (R,W, D)

Perform Security Management	Management (create, delete, modify) of the access control rules, user accounts, roles, and passwords for each role, maintenance of the bootware password, time management, system start-up parameters, file operation (e.g. dir, copy, del), perform self-tests, and shut down or reboot the networking device	Crypto Officer password, Operator Password, Security Officer Password, Encrypting Key, BootROM Password (R, W, D)
Perform Configuration Functions	Save configuration, management of information center, define network interfaces and settings, set the protocols the switches will support (e.g. SFTP server, SSHv2 server), enable interfaces and network services, management of access control scheme, configure the module to run in a FIPS Approved mode, reset of the CSPs	Crypto Officer Password, Operator Password, Security Officer Password (R, W, D)
Zeroization	CSP zeroization	All CSPs

User Services

The following table describes the services available to user service. The services available to the User role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

TABLE 8 - USER SERVICES

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
View Device Status	View status of devices and functions, version of currently running OS	Operator Password (R)
View Running Status	View memory status, packet statistics, interface status, current configuration, routing table, active sessions, temperature and SNMP MIB statistics	Operator Password (R)
Perform Network Functions	Network diagnostic service such as “ping”	Operator Password (R)

Security Officer Services

The Security Officer can only view security logs and does not have permission to execute any other commands on the switch. The following table describes the services available to security officer. The services available to the Security Officer role accessing the CSPs, the type of access – read (r), write (w) and zeroized/delete (d) – and which role accesses the CSPs are listed below:

TABLE 9 - SECURITY OFFICER SERVICES

Services	Description	Keys and CSPs Access
Perform Security Log Commands	View, Clear, and Copy security logs	Security Officer Password (R,W,D)

Unauthenticated Services

- Cycle the power on the switch
- Perform self-tests at power on
- Observe status LED

Non-Approved Services

Please refer to Table 12 below in this document for the detailed non-approved algorithms and the associated services.

Authentication Mechanisms

The module supports Identity-based authentication to control access to all services provided by the switches. The username and password will be configured by the Crypto Officer and the operator (User or Security Officer) will be able to login using these credentials. Once the authentication is completed, the operator will assume the respective role to carry out the available services as listed in Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9.

Authentication Data Protection

The module does not allow the disclosure, modification, or substitution of authentication data to unauthorized operators. Authentication data can only be modified by the operator who has assumed the Crypto Officer role.

Identity-based Authentication

Each operator (Crypto Officer, User, or Security Officer) is authenticated upon initial access to the device. The authentication of the operator is Identity-based. All Switch users can be either authenticated locally, or authenticated via an external RADIUS or TACACS+ server. The authentication method is Username and Password.

To logon to the networking devices, an operator must connect to it through one of the management interfaces (Console port, SSH) and provide the Username and Password.

Each user must be authenticated using username and password. The minimum password length is 8 characters, and the maximum is 64. The passwords can contain the following, equaling 94 possibilities per character:

- lower case letters (26),
- upper case letters (26),

special characters (32) and
numeric characters (10)

Therefore, for an 8-character password, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is 1 in 94^8 (this calculation is based on the use of the typical standard American QWERTY computer keyboard).

Since the module requires an 8 characters password with 94 possible characters per password character, the probability of randomly guessing the correct sequence is one (1) in $94^8 = 6.096 \times 10^{15}$, which is less than one in 1,000,000. In addition, in order to successfully guess the sequence in one minute would require the ability to make over $94^8/60 = 1.016 \times 10^{14}$ guesses per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module. Therefore, the password strengths meet FIPS 140-2 requirements.

Additionally, each operator (Crypto Officer, User, or Security Officer) can also be authenticated via the RSA based authentication method. When using this authentication method, as RSA key pair has modulus size of 2048 bits, it provides 112 bits of authentication strength. In such a case, an attacker would have a 1 in 2^{112} chance of randomly obtaining the key, which is much stronger than the one in a million chance required by FIPS 140-2. To exceed a one in 100,000 probability of a successful random key guess in one minute, an attacker would have to be capable of approximately 8.6×10^{31} ($5.2 \times 10^{33}/60 = 8.6 \times 10^{31}$) attempts per second, which far exceeds the operational capabilities of the module to support.

6 Physical Security Mechanism

The module meets the FIPS 140-2 Level 1 security requirements as production grade equipment.

7 Cryptographic Algorithms

FIPS Approved Cryptographic Algorithms

The following table lists the FIPS-Approved algorithms that the module provides.

TABLE 10 - FIPS-APPROVED CRYPTOGRAPHY ALGORITHMS

CAVP Certificate	Algorithm	Standard	Mode/ Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
AES #A2638	AES	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A, SP 800-38D	CBC and GCM	128, 192, 256	Data Encryption/ Decryption
CVL #A2638	TLS v1.0/1.1/1.2, SSHv2, SNMPv3 KDFs	SP 800-135rev1	N/A	N/A	Key Derivation
DRBG #A2638	DRBG	SP 800-90Arev1	CTR (AES-256)	N/A	Deterministic Random Bit Generation
ECDSA #A2638	ECDSA	FIPS 186-4	KeyGen/KerVer	P-256, P-384	KAS-ECC-SSC Domain Parameters Generation
HMAC #A2638	HMAC	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA1	160	Message Authentication
KAS-SSC #A2638	KAS-ECC-SSC KAS-FFC-SSC	SP 800-56Arev3	KAS-ECC-SSC: ephemeralUnified: KAS Role: initiator, responder KAS-FFC-SSC: dhEphem: KAS Role: initiator, responder:	KAS-ECC-SSC: P-256, P-384 KAS-FFC-SSC: MODP-2048	KAS-ECC-SSC: Key establishment methodology provides 112 or 192 bits of encryption strength KAS-FFC-SSC: Key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength

CAVP Certificate	Algorithm	Standard	Mode/ Method	Key Lengths, Curves or Moduli	Use
KAS (KAS-SSC Cert. #A2638, CVL Cert. #A2638)	KAS (ECC)	SP 800-56Arev3;	KAS (ECC): ephemeralUnified: KAS Role: initiator, responder	KAS (ECC): P-256 and P-384 with SSH and TLS KDF (SP800-135rev1)	Key Agreement Scheme per SP800-56Arev3 with key derivation function (SP800-135rev1)
	KAS (FFC)	SP 800-135rev1	KAS (FFC): dhEphem: KAS Role: initiator, responder	KAS (FFC): MODP-2048 with SSH and TLS KDF (SP800-135rev1)	Note: The module's KAS (ECC/FFC) implementation is FIPS140-2 IG D.8 Scenario X1 (path 2) compliant
RSA #A2638	RSA	FIPS 186-4	Fixed Public Exponent e 10001	2048, 3072	Key Pair Generation
			SHA-256, PKCS1 v.1.5	2048	Digital Signature Generation
			SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, PKCS1 v1.5	2048	Digital Signature Verification
SHS #A2638	SHS	FIPS 180-4	SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512		Message Digest
Triple-DES #A2638	Triple-DES	SP 800-67	Triple-DES - CBC	192	Data Encryption/ Decryption
CKG (vendor affirmed)	Cryptographic Key Generation	SP 800-133rev2	N/A	N/A	Key Generation

Notes:

- There are algorithms, modes, and keys that have been CAVs tested but are not implemented or used by any service of the module. Only the algorithms, modes/methods, and key lengths/curves/moduli shown in this table are implemented by the module.
- The AES-GCM IV generation method from each of AES #A2638 is in compliance with IG A.5, scenario #2. The DRBG Cert. #A2638 is called to generate the IV inside the module and the IV length is 96 bits. The module generates new AES-GCM keys if the module loses power.
- Per SP 800-67 rev1, the user is responsible for ensuring the module's limit to 2^{32} encryptions with the same Triple-DES key while being used in TLS protocol.
- No parts of the protocol (SSH, TLS or SNMPv3), other than the KDF, have been tested by the CAVP and CMVP.
- In accordance with FIPS 140-2 IG D.12, the cryptographic module performs Cryptographic Key Generation as per section 6 in SP 800-133rev2. The resulting generated seed used in the asymmetric key generation is the unmodified output from SP 800-90Arev1 DRBG.

FIPS Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms

The following table contains the set of FIPS Allowed cryptographic algorithms that can also be used in FIPS-mode.

TABLE 11 - FIPS-ALLOWED CRYPTOGRAPHY ALGORITHMS

Algorithm	Application
HMA-MD5	Only allowed with KDF in TLS 1.0/1.1 Note: other cryptographic uses of HMAC-MD5 are not allowed in FIPS mode.
MD5	Only allowed with KDF in TLS 1.0/1.1 Note: other cryptographic uses of MD5 are not allowed in FIPS mode.
NDRNG	Seeding for the Approved DRBG (contain no less than 256 bits of entropy)
RSA	Key wrapping; Key establishment (provides 112 or 128 bits of encryption strength)

Non-FIPS Approved/Allowed Cryptographic Algorithms

The following table contains the set of non-FIPS Approved/Allowed cryptographic algorithms that are implemented but shall not be used when operating in FIPS-mode. These algorithms are used in non-FIPS-mode. Using the algorithms with the associated services listed in Table 12 will put the module in the Non-FIPS mode of operation.

TABLE 12 - NON-FIPS APPROVED/ALLOWED CRYPTOGRAPHY ALGORITHMS

Algorithm	Application	Services
DES	Encryption/Decryption	SSH and TLS
Diffie-Hellman (< 2048-bits)	Key Agreement	SSH
MD5	Hashing	SNMP
HMAC-MD5	Message Authentication	SSH
RSA (<2048-bits)	Key Pair Generation	SSH and TLS

Algorithm	Application	Services
	Digital Signature Generation Key Agreement Key Wrapping	
ECDSA SigGen/SigVer (non-compliant)	Digital Signature Generation Digital Signature Verification	TLS
DSA SigGen/SigVer (non-compliant)	Digital Signature Generation Digital Signature Verification	SSH

8 Cryptographic Key Management

The networking devices use a variety of Critical Security Parameters (CSPs) during operation. The following table lists the CSPs including cryptographic keys used by the module. It summarizes generation, storage, and zeroization methods for the CSP.

TABLE 13 - CRYPTOGRAPHIC SECURITY PARAMETERS

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description	Storage	Zeroization
RSA private key	RSA	2048 bits	Identity certificates for the networking device itself. Generated within the module by calling SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG.	FLASH (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
RSA Public key	RSA	2048 bits	Public keys used to validate the firmware image. Generated within the module along with RSA private key generation.	FLASH (plain text)	This is part of the firmware code and will get deleted when the image is deleted
SSH Private key	RSA	2048 bits, 3072 bits	Private key used for SSH protocol. Generated within the module by calling SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG.	FLASH (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
SSH Public key	RSA	2048 bits, 3072 bits	Public key used for SSH protocol. Generated within the module along with SSH private key generation.	Flash (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
SSH Diffie-Hellman private Key	KAS-FFC-SSC SP 800-56Arev3 (Diffie-Hellman)	224 bits	Private Key for Diffie-Hellman key agreement in SSH protocol implementation. Generated within the module by calling SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically when handshake finishing
SSH Diffie-Hellman public key	KAS-FFC-SSC SP 800-56Arev3 (Diffie-Hellman)	MODP-2048	Public Key for Diffie-Hellman key agreement in SSH protocol implementation. Generated within the module along with SSH Diffie-Hellman Private Key.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically when handshake finishing
SSH Session Key	AES-CBC	128 bits, 256 bits	SSH session symmetric key. Derived within the module during the SSH protocol implementation.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically when SSH session terminated
SSH Session authentication Key	HMAC-SHA1	160 bits	SSH session authentication key. Derived within the module during the SSH protocol implementation.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically when SSH session terminated
Crypto-Officer Password	Password	8 ~ 64 characters	Critical security parameters used to authenticate the CO role login. Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
Operator Password	Password	8 ~ 64 characters	Critical security parameters used to authenticate the Operator (User role). Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description	Storage	Zeroization
RADIUS shared secret	Shared Secret	8 ~ 32 characters	Used for authenticating the RADIUS server to the networking device and vice versa. Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
TACACS+ shared secret	Shared Secret	8 ~ 100 characters	Used for authenticating the TACACS+ server to the networking device and vice versa. Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
Security-Officer Password	Password	8 ~ 64 characters	Critical security parameters used to authenticate the security officer. Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
DRBG seed	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	384 bits	Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG. Derived by using DRBG derivation function that includes the entropy input.	RAM (plaintext)	Resetting or rebooting the networking device
DRBG V	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	128 bits	Generated by entropy source via the CTR_DRBG derivation function.	RAM (plaintext)	Resetting or rebooting the networking device
DRBG Key	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	256 bits	DRBG key used for SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG. Established per SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG.	RAM (plaintext)	Resetting or rebooting the networking device
DRBG Entropy input	SP 800-90A CTR_DRBG	384 bits	DRBG input used for SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG. This is the entropy for SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG, used to construct the DRBG seed.	RAM (plaintext)	Resetting or rebooting the networking device
TLS Server private key	RSA	2048 bits	Private key used for TLS negotiations. Generated within the module by calling approved SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG.	FLASH (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
TLS Server public key	RSA	2048 bits	Key agreement for HTTPS/TLS sessions. Generated within the module along with TLS Server private key.	RAM (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
TLS Master secret	Shared key	384 bits	Shared secret used for creating TLS traffic keys. Derived within the module during the TLS protocol implementation.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically zeroize when session terminated
TLS Traffic encryption key	AES-CBC/GCM Triple-DES	128 / 256 bits or 192 bits	Used for encrypting HTTPS/TLS data. Derived within the module during the TLS protocol implementation.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically zeroize when session terminated
TLS traffic authentication key	HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-MD5	160 bits/128 bits	Used for authenticating HTTPS/TLS data. Derived within the module during the TLS protocol implementation.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically zeroize when session terminated
TLS Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Private Key	KAS-ECC-SSC SP 800-56Arev3 (EC Diffie-Hellman)	Curves P-256 and P-384	Private Key for HTTPS/TLS sessions. Generated within the module by calling approved SP 800-90Arev1 CTR_DRBG.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically when handshake finishing

Name	CSP Type	Size	Description	Storage	Zeroization
TLS Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman public Key	KAS-ECC-SSC SP 800-56Arev3 (EC Diffie-Hellman)	Curves P-256 and P-384	Public Key for HTTPS/TLS sessions. Generated within the module along with EC Diffie-Hellman private key.	RAM (plain text)	Automatically when handshake finishing
Encrypting key	AES	256 bits	A key embedded in the firmware, used to protect CSPs stored in the 'config' file.	FLASH (plain text)	This is part of the firmware code and will get deleted when the image is deleted
BOOTROM Password	Password	8 ~ 64 characters	Password used to access the switch in BootROM mode. Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
SNMP v3 Password	Password	8 ~ 32 characters	Password used during SNMPv3 authentication. Entered by the Crypto Officer, encrypted by Encrypting Key stored in module's Flash memory.	FLASH (cipher text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
SNMPv3 engineID	Shared Secret	96 bits	This is the SNMP engine ID. Entered by the Crypto Officer, a unique string used to identify the SNMP engine.	FLASH (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize
SNMP v3 key	AES	128 bits	Key used to protect the SNMP traffic. Derived within the module during the SNMP v3 protocol implementation.	RAM (plain text)	Using CLI command to zeroize

9 Self-Tests

When the power is applied, the module will perform the Power-Up Self-Tests regardless of the mode (FIPS and non-FIPS mode). In addition, the module also performs Conditional tests after being configured into the FIPS mode. The purpose of these self-tests is to verify functionality and correctness of the cryptographic algorithms listed in Section 7 above. Should any of the power-up self-tests or conditional self-tests fail, the module will cease operation, inhibiting all data output from the module. The module will automatically reboot and perform power-up self-tests. Successful completion of the power-up self-tests will return the module to normal operation.

Power-Up Self-Tests

Power-up self-tests are performed when the Aruba 2930F Switch Series first powers up.

There are two stages of power-up self-tests that are performed:

- BootROM self-tests
- Firmware self-tests

BootROM Power-Up Self-Tests

The first instance is performed by the BootROM image. The BootROM, used for the selection of a cryptographic firmware image, performs the following self-tests:

- Known Answer Tests (KATs)
 - SHA-1 KAT
 - SHA-256 KAT
 - SHA-512 KAT
 - RSA Sign and Verify KATs (Separate KAT for signing; Separate KAT for verification)
- BootROM integrity check
- Firmware integrity check

The BootROM performs the integrity check on itself to ensure that its image is valid. To perform an integrity check on itself, as well as on images that can be downloaded within, the BootROM performs an RSA signature verification (RSA 2048 with SHA-256). If the BootROM integrity check fails, the switch will continuously reboot and thus must be returned to HPE. If the Firmware integrity check (RSA 2048 with SHA-256) fails, the switch will transition to the BootROM console where a new image with a valid signature can be downloaded.

Firmware Power-Up Self-Tests

The power-up self-tests are performed on the module either when a FIPS Approved image has been loaded by the BootROM or when there is a ROM upgrade. These are performed by the corresponding image. The following power-up self-tests are performed:

- AES Encrypt and Decrypt KATs
- CTR DRBG KATs (DRBG Health Tests as specified in SP 800-90Arev1 Section 11.3 are performed)
- HMAC-SHA1 KAT
- KAS-FFC-SSC Primitive “Z” computation KAT
- KAS-ECC-SSC Primitive “Z” computation KAT
- RSA Known Answer Tests (Separate KAT for signing; Separate KAT for verification)
- SHA1/256/512 KATs
- Triple-DES Encrypt and Decrypt KATs
- SP800-135rev1 SSHv2 KDF KAT
- SP800-135rev1 TLS v1.0/1.1/1.2 KDF KAT
- SP800-135rev1 SNMPv3 KDF KAT

When there is power up self-test failure, the error message indicating which crypto algorithm failed in self-test will be displayed and the switch will reboot.

An example error message with SHA1 power-up self-test failure is:

“Crypto powerup self-tests for SHA1_KAT failed.”

Conditional Self-Tests

Conditional self-tests implemented by the switches:

- CRNGT to DRBG
- CRNGT to NDRNG
- RSA PWCT
- Firmware Load Test

10 Delivery and Operation

Secure Delivery

To ensure no one has tampered with the goods during delivery, inspect the Networking switch physical package and check as follows:

1. Outer Package Inspection

- a) Check that the outer carton is in good condition.
- b) Check the package for an HPE Quality Seal or IPQC Seal, and ensure that it is intact.
- c) Check that the IPQC seal on the plastic bag inside the carton is intact.
- d) If any check failed, the goods shall be treated as dead-on-arrival (DOA) goods.

2. Packing List Verification

Check against the packing list for any possible discrepancy in material type and quantity. If any discrepancy is found, the goods shall be treated as DOA goods.

3. External Visual Inspection

Inspect the cabinet or chassis for any defects, loose connections, damages, and/or illegible marks. If any surface defect or material shortage is found, the goods shall be treated as DOA goods.

4. Confirm firmware

- a) Version verification

To verify the firmware version, start the networking device, view the self-test result during startup, and use the **show version** command to check the firmware version. If firmware loading failed or the version information is incorrect, please contact HPE for support.

- b) RSA with SHA-256 verification

To verify that firmware has not been tampered with, run **verify signature flash <primary/secondary>** on the networking device. The command will return a pass or fail message.

5. DOA (Dead on Arrival)

If the package is damaged, any label/seal is incorrect or tampered with, stop unpacking the goods, retain the package, and report to HPE for further investigation. The damaged goods will be replaced if necessary.

Secure Operation

The module is capable of two different modes of operation:

- Standard Secure-Mode - Non-FIPS Approved mode of operation for the switches
- Enhanced Secure-Mode - FIPS-Approved mode of operation for the switches

In Enhanced Secure-Mode (FIPS-Approved Mode), services such as Telnet, TFTP, HTTP, and SNMPv2 will be disabled and other services such as SSHv2, SFTP and SNMPv3 will be enabled.

Auxiliary ports and buttons capable of manual reset and password clearing need to be disabled on the front panel of the module. Beginning at Pre-Initialization, the initialization steps identified below in this security policy must be followed to ensure that the module is running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. The Crypto Officer shall strictly follow the setting instructions provided below to place the module in FIPS-approved mode. Operating the module without maintaining the following settings will remove the module from the FIPS approved mode of operation.

For more information on switch firmware commands related to Secure Mode, see the HPE ArubaOS-Switch Access Security Guide for WC.16.11 for the specific switch model number.

Note: The FIPS set-up instructions here-in are to be executed from the local serial port of the switch.

Note: The examples show an “Aruba-Switch” prompt. Prompts will differ based on the specific switch model number.

Pre-Initialization

Prior to enabling the switch for a FIPS-Approved mode of operation, the Crypto Officer must download the latest FIPS-Approved firmware image from HPE and load it onto the switch. In the following example, the FIPS firmware image is downloaded as the primary flash image using this command structure: `Copy tftp flash <tftp server> <FIPS image>`

```
Aruba-Switch# copy tftp flash 192.168.1.1 WC_16_11_0005.swi
```

Once the image has been downloaded, the Crypto Officer must reboot the switch (still in Standard Secure-Mode) with the newly loaded FIPS-Approved firmware image.

```
Aruba-Switch# boot system flash primary
```

The switch will reboot to the primary flash image. Once presented with the CLI, the Crypto Officer must download the FIPS-Approved image a second time. This is a mandatory measure to ensure that a switch will not “downgrade” to a non FIPS-Approved image in the event that its primary image becomes corrupt. Again, the FIPS firmware image will be downloaded as the primary flash image:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH# copy tftp flash 192.168.1.1 WC_16_11_0005.swi
```

After completing the download, the Crypto Officer will set the configuration file of the switch to its default settings. This will erase custom keys and other custom configuration settings.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH# erase startup-config
```

After the startup configuration file has been set to its default settings, the Crypto Officer will enter the ‘configuration’ context and reboot the switch into a FIPS-ready mode of operation. This means that only FIPS-Approved algorithms and operations are used. Authentication, CSPs, and other services still need to be set up to bring the switch to a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH# configure
```

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# secure-mode enhanced
```

Before transitioning to FIPS-mode, the Crypto Officer will be asked to confirm whether or not they would like to zeroize the switch, erasing all files except for the firmware image. Zeroization is required when bringing the switch out of or into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This is required so that private keys and CSPs established in one mode of operation cannot be used in another. Zeroization can take up to an hour to complete.

```
The system will be rebooted and all files except firmware images
will be erased and zeroized. This will take up to 60 minutes
and the switch will not be usable during that time. Continue
(y/n)?
```

After the Crypto Officer confirms the above message, the switch will reboot directly into the last loaded firmware image (the FIPS firmware image), run cryptographic self-tests, and do a complete zeroization of the switch. Once completed, the switch is ready to be configured to run in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation.

```
ATTENTION: Zeroization has started and will take up to 60 minutes.
Interrupting this process may cause the switch
to become unstable.
```

```
Backing up firmware images and other system files...
Zeroizing the file system... 100%
Verifying cleanness of the file system... 100%
Restoring firmware images and other system files...
Zeroization of the file system completed.
Continue initializing...initialization done.
```

Initialization and Configuration

The steps outlined in this section will require the Crypto Officer to enter the 'configuration' context in order to execute the commands necessary for initializing the module.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH# configure
```

The Crypto Officer must create passwords for himself or herself, the User/Operator, and for the BootROM console in order to meet the security requirements laid out by FIPS PUB 140-2. All other commands for password management not used in this document are prohibited in the FIPS-Approved mode of operation. A password for the BootROM console is necessary to ensure that only an authorized operator is able to access the BootROM console services. The Crypto Officer shall be the only one with knowledge of the BootROM password. Substitute the "*" with a secure password.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# password operator
New password for operator: *****
Please retype new password for operator: *****
```

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# password manager
New password for manager: *****
Please retype new password for manager: *****
```

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# password rom-console
Enter password: *****
Re-enter password: *****

ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# aaa authentication local-user secuser group
default-security-group password plaintext
New password for secuser: *****
Please retype new password for secuser: *****
```

Following password initialization, the Crypto Officer will disable Telnet services.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no telnet-server
```

SSHv2 services will be turned on to allow the User/Operator and Crypto Officer to access the switch's CLI services remotely. To do this, the Crypto Officer must first generate a new RSA key pair (2048 or 3072 bits) to be used for secure key and message transportation through the SSHv2 connection.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# crypto key generate ssh rsa bits 3072
Installing new key pair. If the key/entropy cache is
depleted, this could take up to a minute.
```

The following command enables the SSHv2 server:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# ip ssh
```

SFTP/SCP services must be enabled in order to download new firmware images and security updates from HPE Networking. It may also be necessary to access an SFTP server to securely save a copy of the configuration file or device log to an external storage device. Enabling SFTP will disable the TFTP service.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# ip ssh filetransfer
Tftp and auto-tftp have been disabled.
```

As an added security measure, the Crypto Officer will type the following commands to ensure the switch does not have access to the TFTP client and server services:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no tftp client
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no tftp server
```

In order to disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2, the Crypto Officer must first initialize SNMPv3. Set-up of SNMPv3 requires that an 'initial' user be created with an associated MD5 authentication hash. After creating the 'initial' user, the Crypto Officer will type in an authentication password and associated privacy password for the 'initial' user:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# snmpv3 enable
SNMPv3 Initialization process.
Creating user 'initial'
Authentication Protocol: MD5
Enter authentication password: *****
```

```
Privacy protocol is DES
Enter privacy password: *****
```

Following the creation of the 'initial' user, the Crypto Officer will be asked if they would like to create a second user that uses SHA-1 for authentication. The Crypto Officer will type 'y' then press the "Enter" or "Return" key in order to create the second user.

```
User 'initial' has been created
Would you like to create a user that uses SHA? [y/n] y
Enter user name: crypto_officer
Authentication Protocol: SHA
Enter authentication password: *****
Privacy protocol is DES
Enter privacy password: *****
```

Once the FIPS-Approved user has been created with their associated authentication and privacy passwords, the Crypto Officer will limit access to SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c messages to 'read only'. This does not disable SNMPv1 and SNMPv2.

```
User creation is done.  SNMPv3 is now functional.

Would you like to restrict SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c messages to have read
only access (you can set this later by the command 'snmp restrict-
access')? [y/n] y
```

The privacy protocol for the SNMPv3 "crypto officer" user must be changed from DES to AES-128. Use the following command to manually change the privacy protocol for the "crypto officer" user.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# snmpv3 user crypto_officer auth sha
***** priv aes *****
```

The following commands will be typed by the Crypto Officer in order to delete the unapproved SNMPv3 'initial' user and to disable use of SNMPv1 and SNMPv2.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no snmpv3 user initial
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no snmp-server enable
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# snmpv3 only
```

Plaintext connections to the switch are not allowed in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation and must be disabled with the following command:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no web-management plaintext
```

HTTPS access to the module must be enabled. The Crypto Officer will use the following command to enable web management services.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# web-management ssl
```

To prevent unintentional factory reset of the switch, the "Reset" button located on the module must be disabled. The Crypto Officer must confirm the prompt with a 'y' to complete the command.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no front-panel-security factory-reset
```

```
**** CAUTION ****
```

Disabling the factory reset option prevents switch configuration and passwords from being easily reset or recovered. Ensure that you are familiar with the front panel security options before proceeding.

Continue with disabling the factory reset option[y/n]? y

To prevent unintentional password reset of the switch, the “Clear” button located on the module must be disabled. The Crypto Officer must confirm the prompt with a ‘y’ to complete the command.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no front-panel-security password-clear
```

```
**** CAUTION ****
```

Disabling the clear button prevents switch passwords from being easily reset or recovered. Ensure that you are familiar with the front panel security options before proceeding.

Continue with disabling the clear button [y/n]? y

Please note: The autorun feature will not function when the USB port is disabled.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# no usb-port
```

The start-up configuration file needs to be written with the new settings that have been applied in this section. The following command will write the new start-up configuration file:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# write memory
```

The last steps to ensure that the switch is running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation are to set the default boot image to the primary image and then reboot the switch into the newly configured FIPS-Approved firmware image.

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# boot set default primary
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# boot system flash primary
```

Use the following command to confirm the switch is running in a FIPS-Approved mode of operation:

```
ARUBA-SWITCH(config)# show secure-mode
Secure-mode: Enabled
```

Zeroization

Zeroization is required when bringing the switch out of or into a FIPS-Approved mode of operation. This is required so that private keys and CSPs established in one mode of operation cannot be used in another. The module will execute full system zeroization when the switch is changing secure-mode states. For example, this can be done by calling `secure-mode enhanced` while the switch is in a “secure-mode standard” state. The module will not execute zeroization if calling `secure-mode enhanced` while the switch is currently in the “secure-mode enhanced” state.

Zeroization can also be done by executing the `erase all zeroize` command. This command has the same effect as the above command; however the switch will not transition to the opposite mode from which the command was called in. The `secure-mode` commands shall only be called when accessing the switch directly through a serial connection. Otherwise status information about the zeroization process will not be displayed nor will the operator be able to access the module remotely until remote access has been set up. The only things that will remain on the switch after zeroization has completed are the BootROM image and the firmware images.

Secure Management

Once the module has been configured for a FIPS-Approved mode of operation, the Crypto Officer will be responsible for keeping track of and regenerating RSA key pairs for SSHv2 authentication to the switches. Remote management is available via SSHv2. The Crypto Officer is the only operator that can change configuration settings of the switch, which includes access control, password management, and port security. Physical access to and local control of the module shall be limited to the Crypto Officer.

User Management Access Guidance

The User will be able to access the module remotely via the access methods mentioned in Section 5, “Roles, Services and Authentication”. When accessing the switches remotely, the User will be presented with the same CLI interface as if connected locally. In a remote session, the User is able to see most of the health information and configuration settings of the switches, but is unable to change them.

BootROM Guidance

The primary purpose of the BootROM console is to download a new firmware image should there be a problem booting the current FIPS-Approved image. The BootROM may be accessed when rebooting the Aruba 2930F Switch Series locally through the serial port. When entering into the BootROM, the BootROM selection menu will present the Crypto Officer with three options. Option `0` allows the Crypto Officer to access BootROM console services. Option `1` and Option `2` allow the Crypto Officer to boot the system into either the primary or secondary firmware image, respectively. Only a FIPS approved firmware image may be selected from the menu. If nothing is pressed within 3 seconds of being presented with the selection menu, the switch will boot into the last booted image.

When accessing the BootROM console from the BootROM selection menu, the Crypto Officer will be prompted for the BootROM password which was previously configured by the Crypto Officer during switch initialization. This password shall be different than the Crypto Officer password. A limited set of commands is available to the Crypto Officer within the BootROM console that allows the Crypto Officer to download a new image, reboot the switch, zeroize the switch, or display BootROM image versioning information. The BootROM console may be exited at any time, to access the image selection menu, via the `quit` command.

11 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The networking devices do not claim to mitigate any attacks in a FIPS approved mode of operation.

12 Documentation References

Obtaining documentation

Access the HPE Networking products page:

<https://www.hpe.com/us/en/networking.html#.UcMNEpzzlX0>, to obtain the up-to-date documents of HPE Switches, such as datasheet, installation manual, configuration guide, command reference, and other reference documents.

Technical support

For technical or sales related questions please refer to the contacts list on the HPE website:

<http://www.hpe.com>.