DigiCert, Inc.

DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module

FIPS 140-3 Non-Proprietary Security Policy

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Table of Contents

1 – General 5
1.1 Overview 5
1.2 Security Levels 5
2 – Cryptographic Module Specification 6
2.1 Description 6
2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification 7
2.3 Excluded Components 10
2.4 Modes of Operation 10
2.5 Algorithms 11
2.6 Security Function Implementations 15
2.7 Algorithm Specific Information 24
2.8 RBG and Entropy 24
2.9 Key Generation 25
2.10 Key Establishment 25
2.11 Industry Protocols 25
3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces 26
3.1 Ports and Interfaces 26
4 Roles, Services, and Authentication 27
4.1 Authentication Methods 27
4.2 Roles 27
4.3 Approved Services 27
4.4 Non-Approved Services 34
4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded 35
5 Software/Firmware Security 36
5.1 Integrity Techniques 36
5.2 Initiate on Demand 36
6 Operational Environment 37
6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements 37
6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions 37
7 Physical Security 38
8 Non-Invasive Security 39
8.1 Mitigation Techniques 39
9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management 40
9.1 Storage Areas 40
9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods 40

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9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods 40
9.4 SSPs 41
10 Self-Tests 48
10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests 48
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests 48
10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information 58
10.4 Error States 62
11 Life-Cycle Assurance 63
11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures 63
11.2 Administrator Guidance 63
11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance 63
11.4 Design and Rules 63
Rules of Operation 64
11.5 Maintenance Requirements 65
11.6 End of Life 65
12 Mitigation of Other Attacks 67
References and Definitions 68

List of Tables

Table 1: Security Levels 5
Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Components 6
Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets) 8
Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid 9
Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid 9
Table 6: Modes List and Description 10
Table 7: Approved Algorithms 14
Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms 14
Table 9: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms 15
Table 10: Security Function Implementations 23
Table 11: Ports and Interfaces 26
Table 12: Roles 27
Table 13: Approved Services 34
Table 14: Non-Approved Services 35
Table 15: Storage Areas 40
Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods 40
Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods 40
Table 18: SSP Table 1 44
Table 19: SSP Table 2 47
Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests 48
Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests 58
Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information 58

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Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information....61
Table 24: Error States....62
Table 25 References....68
Table 26 Acronyms and Definitions....69

List of Figures

Figure 1 – Cryptographic boundary [and physical perimeter if combined]..... 7

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1 – General

1.1 Overview

This document is the non-proprietary FIPS 140-3 Security Policy for version 7.1.0f of the DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module. It contains the security rules under which the module must operate and describes how this module meets the requirements as specified in FIPS PUB 140-3 (Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3) for an overall Security Level 1 module.

1.2 Security Levels

The FIPS 140-3 security levels for the Module are as follows from the table below:

Section	Title	Security Level
1	General	1
2	Cryptographic module specification	1
3	Cryptographic module interfaces	1
4	Roles, services, and authentication	1
5	Software/Firmware security	1
6	Operational environment	1
7	Physical security	N/A
8	Non-invasive security	N/A
9	Sensitive security parameter management	1
10	Self-tests	1
11	Life-cycle assurance	1
12	Mitigation of other attacks	N/A
	Overall Level	1

Table 1: Security Levels

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2 – Cryptographic Module Specification

This DigiCert, Inc. (DigiCert) DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module, is hereafter denoted as the Module. The Module is the cryptographic engine of DigiCert's TrustCore development platform. The trust and crypto abstraction layer reduce costs with extensibility across secure elements, a modular architecture for H/W acceleration, and plug-ins to comply with export/import controls.

2.1 Description

Purpose and Use:

The primary purpose of the Module is to provide approved cryptographic routines to consuming applications via an Application Programming Interface (API). The Module is intended for use by US Federal agencies or other markets that require FIPS 140-3 validated Security Level 1 software modules. The Module is intended to be used in dedicated purpose IOT (Internet of Things) devices and general-purpose computer systems.

Module Type: Software

Module Embodiment: Multi-Chip Standalone

Module Characteristics:

Cryptographic Boundary:

The physical form of the Module is depicted in Figure 1. The Module is software, with a multi-chip standalone embodiment. The cryptographic boundary is comprised of the shared library files (libmss.so) and the integrity check signature file (libmss.so.sig), the POST status file (mssp.bin), and the CPU when PAA is enabled.

Tested Operational Environment's Physical Perimeter (TOEPP):

The TOEPP is bound by the General Purpose Computer and includes the DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module, the CPU with PAA when PAA is enabled, and API calls from calling applications running within the same process as the Module.

Figure 1 shows the module, interfaces with the Tested Operational Environment (TOEPP), and the delimitation of its cryptographic boundary, shown shaded in blue. The Cryptographic Boundary components are described in Table 1.

Table 2 - Cryptographic Module Components

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Component	Description
libmss.so	Shared Library for cryptographic algorithms
libmss.so.sig	Integrity Check HMAC value for the libmss shared library
mssp.bin	Status file that contains the persistent results from the first run of POST. The file is protected from modification with a HMAC-SHA2-256.



Figure 1 – Cryptographic boundary [and physical perimeter if combined]

2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification

Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
4220-A72-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 4220 Series	HMAC-SHA2-256

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Package or File Name	Software/ Firmware Version	Features	Integrity Test
		with ARM Cortex A72 BCM53642	
5320-A72-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 5320 Series with ARM Cortex A72 BCM56274	HMAC-SHA2-256
5420-A72-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 5420 Series with ARM Cortex A72 BCM56275	HMAC-SHA2-256
5520-A72-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 5520 Series with ARM Cortex A72 BCM56375	HMAC-SHA2-256
5720-C3338-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 5720 Series with Intel C3338 with and without PAA	HMAC-SHA2-256
5720-C3538-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 5720 Series with Intel C3538 with and without PAA	HMAC-SHA2-256
7520-C3758-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 7520 Series with Intel C3758 with and without PAA	HMAC-SHA2-256
7720-C3758-libmss.so	7.1.0f	Extreme Universal Switch 7720 Series with Intel C3758 with and without PAA	HMAC-SHA2-256

Table 3: Tested Module Identification – Software, Firmware, Hybrid (Executable Code Sets)

Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

The DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module is tested on the following operational environments:

Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 4220 Series	ARM Cortex A72 BCM53642	No	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5320 Series	ARM Cortex A72 BCM56274	No	N/A	7.1.0f

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Operating System	Hardware Platform	Processors	PAA/PAI	Hypervisor or Host OS	Version(s)
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5420 Series	ARM Cortex A72 BCM56275	No	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5520 Series	ARM Cortex A72 BCM56375	No	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5720 Series	Intel C3338	Yes	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5720 Series	Intel C3338	No	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5720 Series	Intel C3538	Yes	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 5720 Series	Intel C3538	No	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 7520 Series	Intel C3758	Yes	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 7520 Series	Intel C3758	No	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 7720 Series	Intel C3758	Yes	N/A	7.1.0f
Fabric Engine 9 (64-bit)	Extreme Universal Switch 7720 Series	Intel C3758	No	N/A	7.1.0f

Table 4: Tested Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid:

The DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module is tested on the following operational environments.

Operating System	Hardware Platform
Ubuntu Linux 4.15 (64-bit)	Intel NUC with i7-8650U processor with and without PAA

Table 5: Vendor-Affirmed Operational Environments - Software, Firmware, Hybrid

CMVP makes no statement as to the correct operation of the module or the security strengths of the generated keys when so ported if the specific operational environment is not listed on the validation certificate.

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2.3 Excluded Components

No components are excluded from [140-3] requirements.

2.4 Modes of Operation

Modes List and Description:

Mode Name	Description	Type	Status Indicator
Approved Mode	Only approved or allowed security functions with sufficient key security strength can be used	Approved	FIPS_eventLog, FIPS_EventType
Non-Approved Mode	When non-approved security functions or approved security functions with insufficient key security strength are used.	Non-Approved	FIPS_eventLog, FIPS_EventType

Table 6: Modes List and Description

The Module enters approved mode after pre-operational self-tests have successfully completed. Once the Module is operational, the mode of operation is implicitly assumed depending on the security function invoked and the security strength of the cryptographic keys. To provide an indicator of the current mode of operation, an asynchronous callout event mechanism is provided.

The application using the Module can register for a FIPS_eventLog call-out function to be used as the approved-mode/non-approved-mode indicator. The Module uses the scenario of a shared indicator for multiple services, per IG 2.4.C example #3. It uses a dedicated status output interface that is a software callback function. The calling application using the Module registers a callback function to be called at the beginning and end of all services and algorithm implementations. The application's FIPS_eventLog function will be called from the Module at the beginning and end of each approved or non-approved service or algorithm. This FIPS_eventLog and the FIPS_EventType enumeration value provided as a parameter serves as a thread-safe status indicator of the current approved or non-approved mode of operation.

```
enum FIPS_EventTypes
{
   FIPS_ApprovedAlgoNone = 0,
   FIPS_ApprovedServiceStart,
   FIPS_ApprovedServiceEnd,
   FIPS_ApprovedAlgoStart,
   FIPS_ApprovedAlgoEnd,
   FIPS_UnapprovedServiceStart,
   FIPS_UnapprovedServiceEnd,
   FIPS_UnapprovedAlgoStart,
   FIPS_UnapprovedAlgoEnd
};
```

Mode Change Instructions and Status:
The approved mode of operation is configured at instantiation of the Module by the Cryptographic Officer role by execution of an application or protocol operating system process that uses the Module's cryptographic functions.

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The Module transitions to the non-approved mode of operation when one of the non-approved security functions is utilized. The Module can transition back to the approved mode of operation by utilizing an approved security function.

Keys and CSPs are not shared between the approved and non-approved mode of operation.

Degraded Mode Description:
N/A

2.5 Algorithms

Approved Algorithms:
The Module implements the approved cryptographic algorithms listed the table below.

Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
AES-CBC	A5484	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CCM	A5484	Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38C
AES-CFB128	A5484	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-CMAC	A5484	Direction - Generation, Verification Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38B
AES-CTR	A5484	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-ECB	A5484	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-GCM	A5491	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
AES-GCM	A5492	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External IV Generation Mode - 8.2.1 Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC	A5491	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
AES-GMAC	A5492	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt IV Generation - External Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38D
AES-OFB	A5484	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 192, 256	SP 800-38A
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0	A5484	Direction - Decrypt, Encrypt Key Length - 128, 256	SP 800-38E
Counter DRBG	A5484	Prediction Resistance - No, Yes Mode - AES-128, AES-192, AES-256 Derivation Function Enabled - No, Yes	SP 800-90A Rev. 1

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Secret Generation Mode - testing candidates	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256 Component - No	FIPS 186-5
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Curve - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Hash Algorithm - SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256	FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyGen	A5484	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448	FIPS 186-5
EDDSA KeyVer	A5484	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448	FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigGen	A5484	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448	FIPS 186-5
EDDSA SigVer	A5484	Curve - ED-25519, ED-448	FIPS 186-5
HMAC-SHA-1	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-256	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-384	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA2-512	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-224	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-256	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-384	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
HMAC-SHA3-512	A5484	Key Length - Key Length: 112-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 198-1
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3	A5484	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation Scheme - ephemeralUnified - KAS Role - Initiator, Responder KDF Methods - twoStepKdf - Key Length - 256	SP 800-56A Rev. 3

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3	A5484	Domain Parameter Generation Methods - FB, FC, MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192 Function - Full Validation, Key Pair Generation Scheme - dhEphem - KAS Role - Initiator, Responder KDF Methods - twoStepKdf - Key Length - 256	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
KDF SP800-108	A5484	KDF Mode - Feedback Supported Lengths - Supported Lengths: 8-4096 Increment 8	SP 800-108 Rev. 1
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Key Generation Mode - probable, probableWithProvableAux Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192 Primality Tests - 2powSecStr Hash Algorithm - SHA-1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, SHA2-512 Private Key Format - standard	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	A5484	Modulo - 2048, 3072, 4096 Signature Type - pkcs1v1.5, pss	FIPS 186-5
Safe Primes Key Generation	A5484	Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
Safe Primes Key Verification	A5484	Safe Prime Groups - MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192	SP 800-56A Rev. 3
SHA-1	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 160, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-224	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 224, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-256	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 256, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-384	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 384, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA2-512	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 512, 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 180-4
SHA3-224	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
SHA3-256	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
SHA3-384	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
SHA3-512	A5484	Message Length - Message Length: 0-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202

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Algorithm	CAVP Cert	Properties	Reference
SHAKE-128	A5484	Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202
SHAKE-256	A5484	Output Length - Output Length: 16-65536 Increment 8	FIPS 202

Table 7: Approved Algorithms

ApprovedAlgorithmsTable From Web Cryptik ApprovedAlgorithmsTable

Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms:

The Module implements the FIPS Vendor Affirmed cryptographic algorithms listed.

Name	Properties	Implementation	Reference
CKG	Key Type:Asymmetric	N/A	SP800-133r2 Section 4 (example 1)

Table 8: Vendor-Affirmed Algorithms

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms:

The module does not implement any Non-Approved, but Allowed Algorithms in the Approved Mode of Operation

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Allowed Algorithms with No Security Claimed:

The module does not implement any Non-Approved, Algorithms Allowed with No Security Claimed in the Approved Mode of Operation

N/A for this module.

Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms:

The Module implements the Non-Approved, Not Allowed cryptographic algorithms listed.

Name	Use and Function
AES-EAX (NC)	Authentication and Encryption
AES GCM 256-bit (NC)	256-bit Encryption/Decryption for 256-bit state table implementation
AES GMAC 256-bit (NC)	256-bit Encryption/Decryption for 256-bit state table implementation
AES XCBC (NC)	Message Authentication

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Name	Use and Function
DES (NC)	Encryption/Decryption
DH (NC)	Key Agreement: Key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength
DSA (NC)	FIPS 186-4 key generation, PQG generation, PQG verification, signature generation, and signature verification
ECC CDH (NC)	Key Agreement: Key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength
EDDH (NC)	Curve 25519; Curve 448
HMAC (NC)	HMAC generation with key size less than 112 bits
HMAC-MD5 (NC)	Message Authentication
MD2, MD4, MD5 (NC)	Message Digest
RNG (NC)	FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generation
RSA (NC)	Key Wrapping: Key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength
RSA-OAEP (NC)	PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP Encryption/Decryption
RSA (Key Wrapping) (NC)	Per IG D.G. the module wraps data sent by the requesting application via an API call. Data being wrapped is unknown. PKCS non-approved padding. Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 138 bits of encryption strength.
Triple-DES (NC)	Encryption/Decryption

Table 9: Non-Approved, Not Allowed Algorithms

Note: All the various AES modes (e.g., EAX, XCBC, XTS, etc.) use the same underlying AES implementation as the approved AES cert.

2.6 Security Function Implementations

The table below shows the Security Function Implementations that the module implements:

Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
SFI-AES-UnAuth	BC-UnAuth	Block Cipher Encryption/Decryption		AES-CBC: (A5484) AES-CFB128: (A5484) AES-CTR: (A5484) AES-ECB: (A5484) AES-OFB: (A5484) AES-XTS

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				Testing Revision 2.0: (A5484)
SFI-AES-CCM	BC-Auth	Block Cipher		AES-CCM: (A5484)
SFI-AES-GCM	BC-Auth	Block Cipher		AES-GCM: (A5491, A5492)
SFI-SHS	SHA	Secure Hash Standard	Publication:IG C.B.	SHA-1: (A5484) SHA2-224: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384: (A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484)
SFI-SHA3	SHA	Secure Hash Standard	Publications:IG C.B, IG C.C	SHA3-224: (A5484) SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484)
SFI-SHAKE	XOF	SHAKE Extendable Output Function	Publication:IG C.C	SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484)
SFI-ECDSA KeyGen	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen	Asymmetric Key-Pair Generation		ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-ECDSA-KeyVer	AsymKeyPair-KeyVer	Asymmetric Key-Pair Verification		ECDSA KeyVer (FIPS186-5): (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-ECDSA-SigGen	DigSig-SigGen	Digital Signature Generation		ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5484) SHA2-224:

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				(A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384: (A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA3-224: (A5484) SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484) SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484)
SFI-ECDSA-SigVer	DigSig-SigVer	Digital Signature Verification		ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5484) SHA2-224: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384: (A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA3-224: (A5484) SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484) SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen	Asymmetric Key-Pair Generation		EDDSA KeyGen: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-EdDSA-KeyVer	AsymKeyPair-KeyVer	Asymmetric Key-Pair Verification		EDDSA KeyVer: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-EdDSA-SigGen	DigSig-SigGen	Digital Signature Generation		EDDSA SigGen: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484)
SFI-EdDSA-SigVer	DigSig-SigVer	Digital Signature Verification		EDDSA SigVer: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484)
SFI-RSA-KeyGen	AsymKeyPair-KeyGen	Asymmetric Key-Pair Generation	Publication:IG C.E	RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5): (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-RSA-SigGen	DigSig-SigGen	Digital Signature Generation using PKCS1v1.5		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA2-224: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384:

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				(A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484) SHA3-224: (A5484) SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484)
SFI-RSA-SigVer	DigSig-SigVer	Digital Signature Verification using PKCS1v1.5		RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA2-224: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384: (A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484) SHA3-224: (A5484) SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484)
SFI-AES-CMAC	MAC	Message Authentication Generation		AES-CMAC: (A5484)
SFI-AES-GMAC	MAC	Message Authentication Generation		AES-GMAC: (A5491, A5492)
SFI-HMAC	MAC	Message Authentication Generation		HMAC-SHA-1: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5484)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5484)
SFI-HMAC-KDF	KBKDF	Key-Based Key Derivation		KDF SP800-108: (A5484) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5484)
SFI-DRBG-Generate	DRBG	Random Number Generation		Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484)
SFI-DRBG-ReSeed	DRBG	Random Number ReSeed		Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484)
SFI-KAS-ECC	KAS-Full	Key Agreement	Reference:IG D.F, Scenario 2, Path (2), end-to-end Key Confirmation:No Key Derivation:KDA (tested as part KAS certificate) Caveat:Key	KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5484) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5484)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
			establishment methodology provides between 112 and 256 bits of security strength	HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-KAS-FFC	KAS-Full	Key Agreement	Reference:IG D.F, Scenario 2, Path 2, end-to-end Key Confirmation:No Key Derivation:KDA (tested as part KAS certificate) Caveat:Key establishment methodology provides between 112 and 200 bits of security strength	KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5484) HMAC-SHA-1: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA2-512: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-224: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-256: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-384: (A5484) HMAC-SHA3-512: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-RSA-PSS-SigGen	DigSig-SigGen	Digital Signature Generation using PSS		RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5): (A5484) SHA2-224: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384: (A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484) SHA3-224: (A5484)

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484) SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484)
SFI-RSA-PSS-SigVer	DigSig-SigVer	Digital Signature Verification using PSS		RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5): (A5484) Counter DRBG: (A5484) SHA2-224: (A5484) SHA2-256: (A5484) SHA2-384: (A5484) SHA2-512: (A5484) SHA3-224: (A5484) SHA3-256: (A5484) SHA3-384: (A5484) SHA3-512: (A5484) SHAKE-128: (A5484) SHAKE-256: (A5484)
SFI-KeyGen-KAS-FFC	KAS-KeyGen	Asymmetric Key Generation	Publication:IG D.H	KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3: (A5484) CKG: () Safe Primes Key Generation: (A5484) Safe Primes Key

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Name	Type	Description	Properties	Algorithms
				Verification: (A5484)

Table 10: Security Function Implementations

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2.7 Algorithm Specific Information

AES GCM IV Uniqueness: FIPS 140-3 IG C.H., Option 1
The AES GCM implementation generates GCM IVs deterministically as specified in SP800-38D Section 8.2.1 using the following protocols:

TLS 1.2 Protocol IV generation for GCM Cipher Suites: The Module supports TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS, as described in RFCs 5116, 5246, 5288 and 5289 and shall only be used for the TLS protocol version 1.2 to be compliant with FIPS140-3 IG C.H, Option 1.

Per [IG] C.H. technique 1.a. TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS method was used for testing during operational testing. During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.

The counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary.

The nonce_explicit part of the IV is incremented each time an AES GCM computation is performed. The Module establishes a new session key when the nonce_explicit part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values (2^{32}-1).

In case the Module's power is lost and then restored, a new key for use with the AES GCM encryption/decryption shall be established.

AES XTS Requirements on the Key: FIPS 140-3 IG C.I.

Per [IG] C.I. the XTS algorithm implementation includes a check to ensure Key_1 ≠ Key_2.

AES-XTS keys (i.e., Key_1 and Key_2) entered into the module shall be generated and/or established independently according to NIST SP 800-133rev2, Section 6.3 for an approved use of AES-XTS.

AES-XTS shall only be used for confidentiality on storage devices, as specified in SP800-38E.

KAS Requirements on the Key: FIPS 140-3 IG D.F., Scenario 2 path (2)

KAS [56Ar3] - Per [IG] D.F Scenario 2 path (2), compliant key agreement scheme where testing is performed end-to-end for the shared secret computation and a KDF compliant with SP800-56Cr2. The Module has both a KAS-ECC and KAS-FFC certificate with no key confirmation.

SHA-1 Usage

Per SP800-131Ar2, the use of SHA-1 is disallowed for digital signature generation, but is permitted for digital signature verification (legacy use) and all non-digital signature applications.

2.8 RBG and Entropy

The Module does not have a specific entropy source. Entropy must be provided by the calling application through the API.

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The Module implements a CTR-based DRBG per SP800-90Ar1 for creation of symmetric and asymmetric keys.

The Module accepts input from entropy sources external to the cryptographic boundary for use as seed material for the Module's approved DRBGs. External entropy can be added via several APIs available to the cryptographic module client application.

The calling application of the Module shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random bit generation mechanism as shown in NIST SP800-90Ar1 Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). A minimum of 384 bits of entropy must be provided by the calling application. The calling application shall provide full entropy for 256-bit keys. When the CTR_DRBG is used without a derivation function full entropy must be provided, per SP 800.90Ar1, IG D.L. Due to the entropy being provided by an external source, the following caveat applies: There is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g. keys).

The Module performs DRBG health tests (Instantiate, Generate, Reseed) as defined in section 11.3 of SP800-90Ar1.

2.9 Key Generation

The module performs Cryptographic Key Generation in conformance to FIPS 140-3 IG D.H. The CKG for generating asymmetric keys is performed as per Section 4 of the SP800-133r2 without modifying the output of the SP800-90Arev1 compliant DRBG.

2.10 Key Establishment

Key Agreement Information

The module provides SP 800-56Ar3 compliant key-establishment scheme.

2.11 Industry Protocols

The module does not implement any Industry Protocols

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3 Cryptographic Module Interfaces

3.1 Ports and Interfaces

The Module's ports and associated defined logical interface categories are listed below. The module's logical interface (API) provides logical separation of the input and output interfaces.

Physical Port	Logical Interface(s)	Data That Passes
N/A	Data Input	Input parameters of API function calls
N/A	Data Output	Output parameters of API function calls
N/A	Control Input	API Function Calls
N/A	Status Output	Used for FIPS Indicator to indicate FIPS approved or non-approved mode using the FIPS_EventyType enumeration. For Approved mode, function calls returning status information and return code provided by API function calls
N/A	Power	None

Table 11: Ports and Interfaces

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4 Roles, Services, and Authentication

4.1 Authentication Methods

Note: The module is Level 1 and does not implement any Authentication techniques.

N/A for this module.

4.2 Roles

The Module supports one distinct operator role, Cryptographic Officer (CO).

The Roles Table below lists all operator roles supported by the Module.

The Module does not support concurrent operators, bypass capability, or a maintenance role. The Cryptographic Officer role is implicitly identified by the service that is requested.

Name	Type	Operator Type	Authentication Methods
CO	Role	Cryptographic Officer	None

Table 12: Roles

4.3 Approved Services

All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:

Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
AES Encrypt	Perform encryption on a block of data using the shared key	Approved	Encrypt command with AES, input data, input size, key, key size, mode of operation	Ciphertext and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-UnAuth	CO - AES Keys: W,E
AES Decrypt	Perform decryption on a block of data using the shared key	Approved	Decrypt command with AES, input data, input size, key, key size, mode of operation	Plaintext and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-UnAuth	CO - AES Keys: W,E

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
AES-CCM Encrypt	Perform encryption on a block of data using the shared key and CCM message authentication code	Approved	Encrypt command with AES, input data, input size, key, key size, mode of operation	Ciphertext and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-CCM SFI-AES-CMAC	CO - AES Keys: W,E
AES-CCM Decrypt	Perform decryption on a block of data using the shared key and CCM message authentication code	Approved	Decrypt command with AES, input data, input size, key, key size, mode of operation	Plaintext and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-CCM SFI-AES-CMAC	CO - AES Keys: W,E
AES-GCM Encrypt	Perform encryption on a block of data using the shared key and GCM message authentication code	Approved	Encrypt command with AES, input data, input size, key, key size, mode of operation	Ciphertext and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-GCM SFI-AES-GMAC	CO - AES Keys: W,E
AES-GCM Decrypt	Perform decryption on a block of data using the shared key and GCM message authentication code	Approved	Decrypt command with AES, input data, input size, key, key size, mode of operation	Plaintext and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-GCM SFI-AES-GMAC	CO - AES Keys: W,E
SHS	Generation a SHA-1 or SHA-2 message digest	Approved	Message	Message Digest	SFI-SHS	CO
SHA3	Generation a SHA-3	Approved	Message	Message Digest	SFI-SHA3	CO

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	message digest					
SHA3-SHAKE	Generation a SHA-3 Extendable Output Function (XOF) message digest	Approved	Message	Message Digest	SFI-SHAKE	CO
ECDSA KeyGen	Generate Public/Private Asymmetric key pairs.	Approved	Generate Key command with random number and key size	Key (public and private) and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-ECDSA KeyGen	CO - ECDSA Private Key: G,R - ECDSA Public Key: G,R
ECDSA KeyVer	Verify Public/Private Asymmetric key pairs.	Approved	ECDSA public/private key pairs	Return status of OK or error condition	SFI-ECDSA-KeyVer	CO - ECDSA Private Key: W,E - ECDSA Public Key: W,E
ECDSA SigGen	Perform digital signature generation	Approved	Signature command with ECDSA private key and message	Digital Signature and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-ECDSA-SigGen	CO - ECDSA Private Key: W,E
ECDSA SigVer	Perform digital signature verification	Approved	Verify command with ECDSA public key and signature	Valid Signature Indicator (True/False) and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-ECDSA-SigVer	CO - ECDSA Public Key: W,E
EdDSA KeyGen	Generate Public/Private Asymmetric key pairs.	Approved	Generate Key command with random number and key size	Key (public and private) and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen	CO - EdDSA Private Key: G,R - EdDSA Public Key: G,R

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
EdDSA KeyVer	Verify Public/Private Asymmetric key pairs.	Approved	EdDSA public/private key pairs	Return status of OK or error condition	SFI-EdDSA-KeyVer	CO - EdDSA Private Key: W,E - EdDSA Public Key: W,E
EdDSA SigGen	Perform digital signature generation	Approved	Signature command with EdDSA private key and message	Digital Signature and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-EdDSA-SigGen	CO - EdDSA Private Key: W,E
EdDSA SigVer	Perform digital signature verification	Approved	Verify command with EdDSA public key and signature	Valid Signature Indicator (True/False) and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-EdDSA-SigVer	CO - EdDSA Public Key: W,E
RSA KeyGen	Generate Public/Private RSA Asymmetric key pairs	Approved	Generate Key command with random number and key size	Key (public and private) and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-RSA-KeyGen	CO - RSA Private Key: G,R - RSA Public Key: G,R
RSA SigGen	Perform digital signature generation	Approved	Signature command with RSA private key and message	Digital Signature and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-RSA-SigGen SFI-RSA-PSS-SigGen	CO - RSA Private Key: W,E
RSA SigVer	Perform digital signature verification	Approved	Verify command with RSA public key and signature	Valid Signature Indicator (True/False) and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-RSA-SigVer SFI-RSA-PSS-SigVer	CO - RSA Public Key: W,E
CMAC MACGen	Generate a keyed-hash message authenticatio	Approved	AES key, message	Keyed hash with return status of	SFI-AES-CMAC	CO - AES Keys: W,E

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	n code with AES-CMAC			OK or error condition		
GMAC MACGen	Generate a keyed-hash message authentication code with AES-GCM	Approved	AES key, message	Keyed hash with return status of OK or error condition	SFI-AES-GMAC	CO - AES Keys: W,E
HMAC MACGen	Generate a keyed-hash message authentication code	Approved	HMAC key, message	Keyed hash with return status of OK or error condition	SFI-SHS SFI-SHA3 SFI-HMAC	CO - HMAC Keys: W,E
KDF-HMAC	Extract input key material and expand into additional keys	Approved	Pseudorandom key material	Key material and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-SHS SFI-SHA3 SFI-HMAC SFI-HMAC-KDF	CO - KBKDF Pseudorandom Keys: W,E - KBKDF Output Key: G,R
AES-CTR-DRBG Gen	Generate Psuedo random numbers	Approved	Generate command	Random number with status of OK or error condition	SFI-DRBG-Generate	CO - DRBG Entropy Input: W - Nonce Values: W - DRBG Values: R - DRBG V: W - DRBG Key: W - DRBG Reseed Counter: G
AES-CTR-DRBG Reseed	Re-seed the DRBG	Approved	Reseed command with input of entropy	Status of OK or error condition	SFI-DRBG-ReSeed	CO - DRBG Entropy Input: W - Nonce Values: W - DRBG Reseed Counter: G

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
KAS-FFC KeyGen	Generate a local asymmetric key for an approved group to be used as part of the key-agreement protocol (KAS-FFC Key Generation)	Approved	Approved Security Group	Local Public/Private key-pair	SFI-KeyGen-KAS-FFC	CO - FFC Private Key: G,R,E - FFC Public Key: G,R,E
KAS-FFC KeyExchange	Generate a shared secret key based on local asymmetric key and remote public key parameters to be used between two or more parties based on the key-agreement protocol	Approved	Generate command with random number, Local and remote Asymmetric keys	Shared secret symmetric key and return status of OK or error condition	SFI-KAS-FFC	CO - FFC Private Key: W,E - FFC Public Key: W,E - FFC Shared Secret: G,R
KAS-ECC KeyGen	Generate a secret key to be used between two or more parties based on the key-agreement protocol, ECC Key Generation	Approved	Approved ECC curves	Local Public/Private key-pair	SFI-ECDSA KeyGen	CO - ECC Private Key: G,R,E - ECC Public Key: G,R,E
KAS-ECC KeyExchange	Generate a secret key to be used between two	Approved	Generate command with random number,	Shared secret symmetric key and	SFI-KAS-ECC	CO - ECC Private Key: W,E

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
	or more parties based on the key-agreement protocol		Local and remote Asymmetric keys	return status of OK or error condition		- ECC Public Key: W,E - ECC Shared Secret: G,R
Integrity Verify	Perform integrity test and return the status	None	Integrity Command	Return status of OK or error condition	None	CO
Self-tests	Initiate self-tests (Software Integrity Check, DRBG KAT, SHA-256 KAT, HMAC-SHA-256 KAT)	Approved	Command with list of CASTs to be performed	Return Code - OK or error condition	None	CO
Show Status	Return the status of the module state, exit codes, kernel log (dmesg)	None	Status Command	Return Code - OK or error condition	None	CO
Show Version	Return module version information	None	Version Command	SW Version: 7.1.0f and libmss.so	None	CO
Zeroize	Destroy/Zeroize all SSPs	Approved	Zeroize command	Return status of OK or error condition	None	CO - FFC Shared Secret: Z - FFC Private Key: Z - FFC Public Key: Z - ECC Private Key: Z - ECC Shared Secret: Z - ECC Public Key: Z

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Name	Description	Indicator	Inputs	Outputs	Security Functions	SSP Access
						- DRBG Entropy Input: Z - Nonce Values: Z - DRBG Values: Z - RSA Private Key: Z - RSA Public Key: Z - ECDSA Private Key: Z - ECDSA Public Key: Z - EdDSA Private Key: Z - EdDSA Public Key: Z - AES Keys: Z - HMAC Keys: Z - KBKDF Pseudorandom Keys: Z - DRBG V: Z - DRBG Reseed Counter: Z - DRBG Key: Z

Table 13: Approved Services

4.4 Non-Approved Services

All approved services implemented by the Module are listed in the table below:

Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
NC Digital Signature	DSA (FIPS 186-4)	DSA (NC)	CO

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Name	Description	Algorithms	Role
NC Key Agreement DH	Key agreement; key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength	DH (NC)	CO
NC Key Agreement ECC_CDH	Key agreement; key establishment methodology provides less than 112 bits of encryption strength	ECC CDH (NC)	CO
NC Key Agreement EDDH	Generate a secret key to be used between 2 or more parties based on the key-agreement protocol	EDDH (NC)	CO
NC Keyed Message Digest GCM/GMAC	AES-GCM or AES-GMAC encryption and decryption for 256-bit state table implementations	AES GCM 256-bit (NC) AES GMAC 256-bit (NC)	CO
NC Keyed Message Digest HMAC	HMAC generation with key size less than 112 bits	HMAC (NC)	CO
NC Keyed Message Digest HMAC MD5	HMAC generation with MD5	HMAC-MD5 (NC)	CO
NC Key Wrapping	Key wrapping; key establishment methodology	RSA (NC) RSA (Key Wrapping) (NC)	CO
NC OAEP Encryption	PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP encryption/decryption	RSA-OAEP (NC)	CO
NC Message Digest	Generate an MD2, MD4, or MD5 message digest	MD2, MD4, MD5 (NC)	CO
NC Random Number Generation	FIPS 186-2 Random Number Generation	RNG (NC)	CO
NC Symmetric Encryption/Decryption AES	Compute the cipher for encryption and decryption	AES-EAX (NC) AES XCBC (NC)	CO
NC Symmetric Encryption/Decryption DES	Compute the cipher for encryption and decryption	DES (NC) Triple-DES (NC)	CO

Table 14: Non-Approved Services

4.5 External Software/Firmware Loaded

NOTE: There is no External Software/Firmware loaded

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5 Software/Firmware Security

5.1 Integrity Techniques

The Module is composed of the following software component(s):

- libmss.so: executable - binary - The shared library that contains the cryptographic module code, data, and constants
- libmss.so.sig: - data - The integrity check signature file that contains an HMAC-SHA2-256 of the cryptographic module.
- mssp.bin: - data - The POST status file that contains persistent results of the first run of POST

The software components are protected with the HMAC-SHA2-256 authentication technique.

The HMAC for the Shared Library is calculated during the manufacturing (build) process of the Shared Library. This HMAC value is stored either within the resulting “libmss.so” shared or as a separate “libmss.so.sig” file dependent upon the development tools and target operating system constraints.

During the load of the shared object, the integrity check of the library code and constants occurs in the module startup function. It verifies the integrity of the shared library by executing the HMAC-SHA2-256 fingerprint algorithm on the libmss.so file and comparing the result with the signature. This integrity check is performed as part of the function FIPS_powerupSelfTest(). This function is called automatically by the host O/S upon loading the shared object into memory as shown below.

```
#ifdef __ENABLE_MOCANA_FIPS_LIB_CONSTRUCTOR__
static void FIPS_constructor() __attribute__((constructor));
void FIPS_constructor()
{
        FIPS_powerupSelfTest();
}
#endif
```

5.2 Initiate on Demand

The operator can initiate the integrity test on demand by reloading the Module or by calling the API function: FIPS_StartupSelftestIntegrity(void).

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6 Operational Environment

6.1 Operational Environment Type and Requirements

Type of Operational Environment: Modifiable

The Module has a modifiable operational environment under the FIPS 140-3 definitions. The tested operational environments are listed in Section 2.2 Tested and Vendor Affirmed Module Version and Identification above. In addition, DigiCert claims that the Module can be ported on the Vendor Affirmed Operational Environment(s); no statement is made regarding the correct operation of the Module on the Vendor Affirmed Operational Environments.

For each process, session management through the operating system provides role association, process and session isolation, and memory protection. Each process has control over its own data while the operating system prevents uncontrolled access to the data and other processes. The module does not support concurrent operators.

A software handle between the consuming application (i.e., entity) and the cryptographic module's key structure provides the key to entity association in the module. The software handle is specific to the consuming application and is contained within its own process (e.g., handles are not shared between multiple consuming applications).

6.2 Configuration Settings and Restrictions

No operational environment restrictions are required for the operation of the Module. The operating system of the host device prevents unauthorized access to SSPs during execution of the Module. The Module allows access to SSPs only through specific APIs.

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7 Physical Security

The module is a software module at level 1.

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8 Non-Invasive Security

8.1 Mitigation Techniques

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against non-invasive attack.

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9 Sensitive Security Parameters Management

9.1 Storage Areas

Storage Area Name	Description	Persistence Type
Memory (S1)	Only stored in volatile memory (RAM)	Dynamic

Table 15: Storage Areas

9.2 SSP Input-Output Methods

Name	From	To	Format Type	Distribution Type	Entry Type	SFI or Algorithm
Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1)	Memory (S1)	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	
Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1)	Memory (S1)	Plaintext	Manual	Electronic	

Table 16: SSP Input-Output Methods

9.3 SSP Zeroization Methods

Zeroization Method	Description	Rationale	Operator Initiation
Z1	Zeroized by the zeroization service by overwriting with a fixed pattern of zeros.	The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the API. These functions overwrite the memory with zeros and de-allocate the memory. In case of abnormal termination, the Linux kernel overwrites the keys in physical memory before the physical memory is allocated to another process.	"Zeroize" service.

Table 17: SSP Zeroization Methods

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9.4 SSPs

All usage of these SSPs by the Module are described in the services detailed in Section 4.3

Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
FFC Shared Secret	Shared secret computation established as part of FFC key agreement scheme	2048 to 4096 bits - 112-200 bits	Private - CSP		SFI-KAS-FFC	SFI-KAS-FFC
FFC Private Key	Used to derive the secret key during the FFC key agreement protocol	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, and MODP-8192 - 112-200 bits	Private - CSP	SFI-KeyGen-KAS-FFC		SFI-KAS-FFC
FFC Public Key	Used to derive the secret key during FFC key agreement protocol	MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, and MODP-8192 - 112-200 bits	Public - PSP	SFI-KeyGen-KAS-FFC		SFI-KAS-FFC
ECC Shared Secret	Shared secret computation	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 - 112-256 bits	Private - CSP		SFI-KAS-ECC	SFI-KAS-ECC KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5484)
ECC Private Key	Used to derive the secret session key during ECC key agreement protocol	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 - 112-256 bits	Private - CSP	SFI-ECDSA KeyGen		SFI-KAS-ECC
ECC Public Key	Used to derive the secret session key during ECC key agreement protocol	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 - 112-256 bits	Public - PSP	SFI-ECDSA KeyGen		SFI-KAS-ECC
DRBG Entropy Input	Used to seed the DRBG for key generation	1282^24 bits - 128 s 256	Entropy - CSP			Counter DRBG (A5484)

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
Nonce Values	Used to seed the DRBG for key generation	02^24 bits - N/A	Entropy - CSP	Counter DRBG (A5484)		Counter DRBG (A5484)
DRBG Values	Random number	256 bits - 256 bits	RBG - CSP	SFI-DRBG-Generate		SFI-ECDSA KeyGen SFI-ECDSA-SigGen SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen SFI-EdDSA-SigGen SFI-RSA-KeyGen SFI-RSA-SigGen SFI-DRBG-Generate SFI-DRBG-ReSeed SFI-KAS-ECC SFI-KAS-FFC SFI-RSA-PSS-SigGen SFI-KeyGen-KAS-FFC ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5484) ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5484) EDDSA

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
						KeyGen (A5484) EDDSA SigGen (A5484) KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5484) KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3 (A5484) RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5) (A5484) RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5) (A5484)
RSA Private Key	Used to create RSA digital signatures	2048 to 8192 bits - 112 to 256 bits	Private - CSP	SFI-RSA-KeyGen		SFI-RSA-KeyGen
RSA Public Key	Used to verify RSA signatures	2048 to 8192 bits - 112 to 256 bits	Public - PSP	SFI-RSA-KeyGen		SFI-RSA-KeyGen
ECDSA Private Key	Used to create ECDSA digital signatures	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 - 112 to 256 bits	Private - CSP	SFI-ECDSA KeyGen		SFI-ECDSA KeyGen
ECDSA Public Key	Used to verify ECDSA signatures	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 - 112 to 256 bits	Public - PSP	SFI-ECDSA KeyGen		SFI-ECDSA KeyGen
EdDSA Private Key	Used to create EdDSA digital signatures	ED-25519, ED-448 - 128 to 224 bits	Private - CSP	SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen		SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen
EdDSA Public Key	Used to verify EdDSA signatures	ED-25519, ED-448 - 128 to 224 bits	Public - PSP	SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen		SFI-EdDSA-KeyGen
AES Keys	Used during AES Encryption,	128, 192, 256 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Symmetric - CSP			SFI-AES-UnAuth SFI-AES-CCM

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Name	Description	Size - Strength	Type - Category	Generated By	Established By	Used By
	Decryption, CMAC, and GMAC operations					SFI-AES-GCM SFI-AES-CMAC SFI-AES-GMAC
HMAC Keys	Used during HMAC-SHA operations	112-65536 - 128 to 256 bits	Symmetric - CSP			SFI-HMAC
KBKDF Pseudorandom Keys	Used in deriving other keys per SP800-108	112-4096 - 128 to 256 bits	Symmetric - CSP			SFI-HMAC-KDF
DRBG V	Internal State Value of V	128 to 256 bits - 128 s 256 bits	Internal State Critical Value - CSP	Counter DRBG (A5484)		Counter DRBG (A5484)
DRBG Reseed Counter	Internal State Value of Reseed Counter	64 bits - N/A	Internal State Critical Value - CSP	SFI-DRBG-ReSeed		SFI-DRBG-ReSeed
DRBG Key	Internal State Value of Key	128 to 256 bits - 128 s 256 bits	Internal State Critical Value - CSP	Counter DRBG (A5484)		Counter DRBG (A5484)
KBKDF Output Key	Output key derived per SP800-108	128 to 256 bits - 128 to 256 bits	Symmetric - CSP	SFI-HMAC-KDF		SFI-HMAC-KDF

Table 18: SSP Table 1

Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
FFC Shared Secret	Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	FFC Private Key:Derived From FFC Public Key:Derived From
FFC Private Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	FFC Public Key:Paired With

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
FFC Public Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	FFC Private Key:Paired With
ECC Shared Secret	Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	ECC Private Key:Derived From ECC Public Key:Derived From
ECC Private Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	ECC Public Key:Paired With
ECC Public Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	ECC Private Key:Paired With
DRBG Entropy Input	Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	Nonce Values:Used With DRBG V:Derived From DRBG Key:Derived From
Nonce Values	Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With
DRBG Values	Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	DRBG Entropy Input:Derived From Nonce Values:Derived From DRBG V:Derived From DRBG Key:Derived From DRBG Reseed Counter:Derived From
RSA Private Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	RSA Public Key:Paired With
RSA Public Key	Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	RSA Private Key:Paired With

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
	Output in plaintext (IO3)				
ECDSA Private Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	ECDSA Public Key:Paired With
ECDSA Public Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	ECDSA Private Key:Paired With
EdDSA Private Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	EdDSA Public Key:Paired With
EdDSA Public Key	Input in plaintext (IO2) Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	EdDSA Private Key:Paired With
AES Keys	Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	
HMAC Keys	Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	
KBKDF Pseudorandom Keys	Input in plaintext (IO2)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	
DRBG V		Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime (module up time for internal DRBG)	Z1	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With Nonce Values:Used With DRBG Key:Used With DRBG Reseed Counter:Used With
DRBG Reseed Counter		Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime (module up time for internal DRBG)	Z1	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With Nonce Values:Used With DRBG V:Used With DRBG Key:Used With

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Name	Input - Output	Storage	Storage Duration	Zeroization	Related SSPs
DRBG Key		Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime (module up time for internal DRBG)	Z1	DRBG Entropy Input:Used With Nonce Values:Used With DRBG V:Used With DRBG Reseed Counter:Used With
KBKDF Output Key	Output in plaintext (IO3)	Memory (S1):Plaintext	Call lifetime	Z1	KBKDF Pseudorandom Keys:Derived From

Table 19: SSP Table 2

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10 Self-Tests

10.1 Pre-Operational Self-Tests

The Module performs self-tests to ensure the proper operation of the Module. Per FIPS 140-3 these are categorized as either pre-operational self-tests or conditional self-tests.

Pre-operational self–tests are available on demand by power cycling the Module or reloading the Module into memory. The Module is available to perform services only after successfully completing the pre-operational self-tests.

The Module performs the following pre-operational self-tests in table below

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5484)	Key Length = 256	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES1 error status upon KAT failure	HMAC-SHA2-256 integrity check is performed. Result is compared against the hash value in the signature .sig file

Table 20: Pre-Operational Self-Tests

10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

The Module performs the conditional self-tests listed in the table below

Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-CBC-Encrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-CBC
AES-CBC-Decrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2	Decryption	Before first use of AES-CBC

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				error status upon KAT failure		
AES-CCM-Encrypt	Key length = 128 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-CCM
AES-CCM-Decrypt	Key length = 128 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-CCM
AES-CFB128-Encrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-CFB128
AES-CFB128-Decrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-CFB128
AES-CTR-Encrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-CTR
AES-CTR-Decrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-CTR
AES-ECB-Encrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return	Encryption	Before first use of AES-ECB

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure		
AES-ECB-Decrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-ECB
AES-OFB-Encrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-OFB
AES-OFB-Decrypt	Key length = 256 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-OFB
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0-Encrypt	Key length = 128 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-XTS
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0-Decrypt	Key length = 128 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-XTS
AES-CMAC	Key length = 128 bits	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Generate and Verify	Before first use of AES-CMAC

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
AES-GCM-Encrypt (A5491)	Key length = 128 bits for 4k modules	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-GCM
AES-GCM-Decrypt (A5491)	Key length = 128 bits for 4k modules	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-GCM
AES-GCM-Encrypt (A5492)	Key length = 128 bits for 64k modules	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Encryption	Before first use of AES-GCM
AES-GCM-Decrypt (A5492)	Key length = 128 bits for 64k modules	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Decryption	Before first use of AES-GCM
AES-GMAC (A5491)	Key length = 128 bits for 4k modules	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Generate and Verify	Before first use of AES-GMAC
AES-GMAC (A5492)	Key length = 128 bits for 64k modules	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Generate and Verify	Before first use of AES-GMAC
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3	Group-14 2k bit prime with SHA-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2	Verify computation of shared secret Z in dhEphem scheme	Before first use of algorithm: KAS-FFC

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				error status upon KAT failure		
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3	P224 curve curve with SHA-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Verify computation of shared secret Z in Ephemeral Unified scheme	Before first use of algorithm: KAS-ECC
Counter DRBG	256 Bits with and without df	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Instantiation, Generation, Reseed	Initialization
Counter DRBG Health Test	Heath Test (DRBG history)	KAT	Critical Function	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES3 error status upon test failure	Instantiation, Generation, Reseed	For each DRBG generated
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	P-224 curve with SHA-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Sign	Before first use of algorithm: ECDSA
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	P-224 curve with SHA-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Verify	Before first use of algorithm: ECDSA
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521	PCT	PCT	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES3 error status upon PCT failure	Sign and Verify	For each Key pair generation
EDDSA SigGen	Ed25519 with SHA-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return	Sign	Before first use of algorithm: EDDSA

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure		
EDDSA SigVer	Ed25519 with SHA-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Verify	Before first use of algorithm: EDDSA
EDDSA KeyGen	Ed25519 with SHA-512	PCT	PCT	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES3 error status upon PCT failure	Sign and Verify	For each Key pair generation
HMAC-SHA-1	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA-1
HMAC-SHA2-224	SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA2-224
HMAC-SHA2-256	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA2-256. Before pre-operational integrity test.
HMAC-SHA2-384	SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA2-384

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
HMAC-SHA2-512	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA2-512
HMAC-SHA3-224	SHA3-224 Feedback Mode	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA3-224
HMAC-SHA3-256	SHA3-256 Feedback Mode	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA3-256
HMAC-SHA3-384	SHA3-384 Feedback Mode	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA3-384
HMAC-SHA3-512	SHA3-512 Feedback Mode	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash-based Authentication	Before first use of algorithm: HMAC-SHA3-512
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA-1	HMAC-SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA-1
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-224	HMAC-SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA2-224

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				error status upon KAT failure		
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-256	HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA2-256
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-384	HMAC-SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA2-384
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-512	HMAC-SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA2-512
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-224	HMAC-SHA3-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA3-224
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-256	HMAC-SHA3-256	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA3-256
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-384	HMAC-SHA3-384	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA3-384

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-512	HMAC-SHA3-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Key Derivation	Before first use of algorithm: KDF HMAC-SHA3-512
SHA-1	SHA-1	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA-1
SHA2-224	SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA2-224
SHA2-256	SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA2-256
SHA2-384	SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA2-384
SHA2-512	SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA2-512
SHA3-224	SHA3-224	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA3-224

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				error status upon KAT failure		
SHA3-256	SHA3-256	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA3-256
SHA3-384	SHA3-384	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA3-384
SHA3-512	SHA3-512	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHA3-512
SHAKE-128	SHAKE-128	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHAKE-128
SHAKE-256	SHAKE-256	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Hash	Before first use of algorithm: SHAKE-256
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	2048 bit	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure	Sign	Before first use of algorithm: RSA
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	2048 bit	KAT	CAST	Crypto module enabled upon return	Verify	Before first use of algorithm: RSA

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Algorithm or Test	Test Properties	Test Method	Test Type	Indicator	Details	Conditions
				status of OK. ES2 error status upon KAT failure		
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	2048, 3072, and 4096 bit	PCT	PCT	Crypto module enabled upon return status of OK. ES3 error status upon KAT failure	Sign and Verify	For each key pair generation

Table 21: Conditional Self-Tests

The intended usage of the generation of ECDSA, EdDSA, or RSA key pairs is not known at the time when the key pair is generated. A pair-wise consistency test (PCT) is performed, providing assurance for the generated key pair. These tests are conducted for the testing of signature generation and signature verification. Upon failure of a test, the module transitions into an error state, as shown in Section 10.4.

10.3 Periodic Self-Test Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA2-256 (A5484)	KAT	SW/FW Integrity	On demand	By power cycling or reloading the Module into memory

Table 22: Pre-Operational Periodic Information

Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-CBC-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CBC-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CCM-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CFB128-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CFB128-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CTR-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CTR-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
AES-ECB-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-ECB-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-OFB-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-OFB-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0-Encrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-XTS Testing Revision 2.0-Decrypt	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-CMAC	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM-Encrypt (A5491)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM-Decrypt (A5491)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM-Encrypt (A5492)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GCM-Decrypt (A5492)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GMAC (A5491)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
AES-GMAC (A5492)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-FFC Sp800-56Ar3	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KAS-ECC Sp800-56Ar3	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
Counter DRBG	KAT	CAST	Initialization and on demand	Manually
Counter DRBG Health Test	KAT	Critical Function	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
ECDSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually
EDDSA SigGen	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
EDDSA SigVer	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
EDDSA KeyGen	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
HMAC-SHA-1	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-224	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-384	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
HMAC-SHA3-512	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA-1	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-224	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-384	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
KDF SP800-108 HMAC-SHA3-512	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA-1	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-224	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-384	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA2-512	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA3-224	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA3-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually

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Algorithm or Test	Test Method	Test Type	Period	Periodic Method
SHA3-384	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHA3-512	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHAKE-128	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
SHAKE-256	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigGen (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA SigVer (FIPS186-5)	KAT	CAST	On demand	Manually
RSA KeyGen (FIPS186-5)	PCT	PCT	On demand	Manually

Table 23: Conditional Periodic Information

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10.4 Error States

Name	Description	Conditions	Recovery Method	Indicator
ES1	The Module enters the disable Crypto Module "Error State"	The Module fails the software integrity pre-operational self-test.	Reboot/Power cycle the module	Outputs status of ERR_FIPS_INTEGRITY_FAIL, otherwise it indicates successful completion by returning the OK status.
ES2	The Module enters the disable Crypto Module "Error State"	The Module fails the software CAST test with a specified error number.	Reboot/Power cycle the module	Outputs a specific error status; otherwise, it indicates successful completion by enabling the Crypto Module with OK status.
ES3	The Module enters the disable Crypto Module "Error State"	The Module fails all other self-tests not listed above.	Reboot/Power cycle the module	Outputs a specific error status; otherwise, it indicates successful completion by enabling the Crypto Module with OK status.

Table 24: Error States

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11 Life-Cycle Assurance

11.1 Installation, Initialization, and Startup Procedures

Installation is performed by placing the module in the target file system during the OEM or ISV's manufacturing process. The module initialization is performed automatically by the operating system's loader when a calling application is loaded into memory. Operation of the module is controlled by the calling application's use of the module's API functions.

Installation and Initialization:

The following steps must be performed in order to securely install, initialize, and start up the DigiCert TrustCore Cryptographic Suite B Module in the Approved mode of operation:

The Module shall be installed within the operating system confines and structures consistent with DigiCert's operating environment specific documentation. The installation may be specified in the operating environment's specific documentation. The Cryptographic Officer will install the Module and associated signature of the Module into the proper location within the computer system. For example, the shared memory library and signature file may be installed in the /usr/local/lib directory, which is protected by Linux access control mechanisms. The Module is protected from modification by the integrity self-test performed during start-up. The Module is initialized by the operating system upon loading the Module into memory for use by calling applications.

The Module must be operated in the approved mode to ensure that FIPS 140-3 validated cryptographic algorithms and security functions are used.

In addition, the security rules defined in section Rules of Operation0 shall apply to the operating system.

11.2 Administrator Guidance

The module is provided with supporting documentation which includes an API Reference document and Operating Environment document.

11.3 Non-Administrator Guidance

The Module supports the Cryptographic Officer (CO) operator role and does not support non-administrators or non-administrative roles.

11.4 Design and Rules

(RSA)
The calling application of the Module must generate RSA key pairs of at least 2048 bits to operate in approved mode.

(ECC)
The calling application of the module must generate ECC keys using a P-Curve with a security strength of at least 112 bits to operate in the approved mode of operation.

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(Random Number Generation)
The Module implements a CTR-based DRBG per SP800-90Ar1 for creation of symmetric and asymmetric keys.
The Module accepts input from entropy sources external to the cryptographic boundary for use as seed material for the Module's approved DRBG. External entropy can be added via the AES-CTR-DRBG Gen and the AES-CTR-DRBG Reseed service available to the cryptographic module client application.
The calling application of the Module shall use entropy sources that meet the security strength required for the random bit generation mechanism as shown in NIST SP 800-90Ar1 Table 3 (CTR_DRBG). A minimum of 384 bits of entropy must be provided by the calling application. The calling application shall provide full entropy for 256-bit keys. Due to the entropy being provided by an external source, the following caveat applies: There is no assurance of the minimum strength of generated SSPs (e.g., keys).
The Module performs DRBG health tests (Instantiate, Generate, Reseed) as defined in section 11.3 of SP800-90Ar1.

(Key Management)
The application that uses the module is responsible for appropriate destruction and zeroization of the keys. The Module provides API calls for key allocation and destruction. These API calls overwrite the memory occupied by the key information with zeros before that memory is de-allocated. See Key Destruction Service below.

(Key/CSP Authorized Access and Use)
An authorized application has access to all key data generated during the operation of the Module.

(Key/CSP Storage)
Private and public keys are provided to the module by the calling process and are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls. The module does not perform persistent storage of keys.

(Key/CSP Zeroization)
The application is responsible for calling the appropriate destruction functions from the API. These functions overwrite the memory with zeros and de-allocate the memory. In case of abnormal termination, the Linux kernel overwrites the keys in physical memory before the physical memory is allocated to another process.

(Key Destruction Service)
A context structure is associated with every cryptographic algorithm available in the Module. Context structures hold sensitive information such as cryptographic keys. These context structures must be zeroized when the application software no longer needs to use a specific algorithm. This API call will zeroize all sensitive information before freeing the dynamically allocated memory. This will occur while the application process is still in memory, but no longer needs the specific algorithm, which protects the sensitive information from compromise. See the *Cryptographic API Reference* for additional information.

Rules of Operation

1. The Module provides one operator role: Cryptographic Officer.
2. The Module does not provide any operator authentication.
3. An operator does not have access to any cryptographic services prior to assuming an authorized role.

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4. The Module allows the operator to initiate power-up self-tests by power cycling power or reloading the Module into memory.
5. All self-tests do not require any operator action.
6. Data and Control outputs are inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Because the logical interface is defined as the API of the Module and the API of the Module is single-threaded, key generation or zeroization must be complete before the API returns control to the calling application.
7. Status information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of the Module.
8. There are no restrictions on which keys or SSPs are zeroized by the zeroization service.
9. The Module does not support concurrent operators.
10. The Module does not support a maintenance interface or role.
11. The Module does not support a manual SSP establishment method.
12. The Module does not have any proprietary external input/output devices used for entry/output of data.
13. The Module does not enter or output plaintext SSPs, except to/from the calling application via API parameters. The module does not support the entry or output of encrypted SSPs.
14. The Module does not store any plaintext SSPs. SSPs provided to the Module by the calling processes are destroyed when released by the appropriate API function calls.
15. The Module does not output intermediate key values.
16. The Module does not provide bypass services or ports/interfaces.
17. AES GCM IV uniqueness: The AES GCM implementation meets Option 1 of IG C.H. The Module supports TLS 1.2 GCM Cipher Suites for TLS, as described in RFCs 5116, 5288 and 5289. The counter portion of the IV is set by the Module within its cryptographic boundary.
18. When the nonce explicit (counter) part of the IV exhausts the maximum number of possible values for a given session key this condition triggers a handshake to establish a new encryption key per RFC 5246. During operational testing, the Module was tested against an independent version of TLS and found to behave correctly.
    AES GCM keys are zeroized when the Module is power-cycled and for each new TLS session, a new AES GCM key is established.
19. AES XTS is to be used only for storage purposes, per SP800-38E.

11.5 Maintenance Requirements

The module currently does not have any maintenance requirements.

11.6 End of Life

For secure sanitization all SSPs shall first be zeroized and the calling application shall be closed. SSP zeroization is performed through the Key Destruction service that is described below. API calls will

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overwrite the memory occupied by the key information with zeros before that memory is de-allocated. If the calling application is terminated prior to zeroization, the Linux kernel overwrites the keys in physical memory before the physical memory is allocated to another process. The key zeroization process is performed in a sufficient time to prevent compromise of SSPs, taking only a few milliseconds.

Then, for actual deprecation, the module shall be upgraded to a newer version that is FIPS 140-3 validated. Since the module does not possess persistent storage of SSPs, no further sanitization steps are needed.

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12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The Module does not implement any mitigation method against other attacks.

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References and Definitions

The following standards are referred to in this Security Policy.

Table 25 References

Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
[FIPS140-3]	*Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules*, March 22, 2019
[ISO19790]	*International Standard, ISO/IEC 19790, Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Third edition, March 2017*
[ISO24759]	*International Standard, ISO/IEC 24759, Information technology — Security techniques — Test requirements for cryptographic modules, Second and Corrected version, 15 December 2015*
[IG]	*Implementation Guidance for FIPS PUB 140-3 and the Cryptographic Module Validation Program, <date>*
[108]	*NIST Special Publication 800-108, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions (Revised), October 2009*
[131A]	*Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, Revision 2, March 2019*
[132]	*NIST Special Publication 800-132, Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation, Part 1: Storage Applications, December 2010*
[133]	*NIST Special Publication 800-133r2, Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation, Revision 2, June 2020*
[135]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Existing Application-Specific Key Derivation Functions, Special Publication 800-135rev1, December 2011.*
[186]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-4, July 2013.*
[197]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001*
[198]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 198-1, July, 2008*
[180]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Secure Hash Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4, August, 2015*
[202]	*FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION, SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions, FIPS PUB 202, August 2015*
[38A]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation, Methods and Techniques, Special Publication 800-38A, December 2001*

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Abbreviation	Full Specification Name
[38B]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for Authentication, Special Publication 800-38B, May 2005*
[38C]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, Special Publication 800-38C, May 2004*
[38D]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC, Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007*
[38E]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The XTS-AES Mode for Confidentiality on Storage Devices, Special Publication 800-38E, January 2010*
[38F]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping, Special Publication 800-38F, December 2012*
[56Ar3]	*NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, April 2018*
[56Br2]	*NIST Special Publication 800-56B Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Finite Field Cryptography, March 2019*
[56Cr2]	*NIST Special Publication 800-56C Revision 2, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, August 2020*
[67]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block Cipher, Special Publication 800-67, May 2004*
[90A]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators, Special Publication 800-90A, Revision 1, June 2015.*
[90B]	*National Institute of Standards and Technology, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit Generation, Special Publication 800-90B, January 2018.*

Table 26 Acronyms and Definitions

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AES-NI	Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions
API	Application Program Interface
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CMAC	Cipher-based Message Authentication Code

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Acronym	Definition
CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
CTR	Counter Mode
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DRBG	Deterministic Random Bit Generator
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECC CDH	Elliptic Curve Cryptography Cofactor Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EdDSA	Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EMC	Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Hash Message Authentication Code
IG	Implementation Guidance
KAT	Known Answer Test
KDF	Key Derivation Function
KVM	Kernel-based Virtual Machine
PAA	Processor Algorithm Acceleration
PCT	Pair-wise Consistency Test
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir and Adleman Algorithm
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SHS	Secure Hash Standard
SO	Shared Object
TDES	Triple-DES
XTS	XEX-based Tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext Stealing

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