Probabilistic Hash-and-Sign with Retry
in the Quantum Random Oracle Model

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Abstract. A hash-and-sign signature based on preimage-sampleable function (PSF) (Gentry et al. [STOC 2008]) is secure in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) if the PSF is collision-resistant (Boneh et al. [ASI-ACRYPT 2011]) or one-way (Zhandry [CRYPTO 2012]). However, trapdoor functions (TDFs) in code-based and multivariate-quadratic-based (MQ-based) signatures are not PSFs; for example, underlying TDFs of the Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS), Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV), and Hidden Field Equations (HFE) signatures are not surjection. Thus, such signature schemes adopt *probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry*. This paradigm is secure in the (classical) Random Oracle Model (ROM), assuming that the underlying TDF is non-invertible; that is, it is hard to find a preimage of a given random value in the range (e.g., Sakumoto et al. [PQCRYPTO 2011] for the modified UOV/HFE signatures). Unfortunately, there is no known security proof for the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry *in the QROM*.

We give the first security proof for the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry in the QROM, assuming that the underlying *non-PSF* TDF is non-invertible. Our reduction from the non-invertibility is tighter than the existing ones that apply to only signature schemes based on PSFs. We apply the security proof to code-based and MQ-based signatures. Moreover, we extend the proof into the multi-key setting by using prefix hashing (Duman et al. [ACM CCS 2021]).

keywords: Post-quantum cryptography, digital signature, hash-and-sign, quantum random oracle model (QROM), preimage sampleable function.

1 Introduction

Hash-and-Sign Signature in the Random Oracle Model (ROM): A digital signature is an essential and versatile primitive in cryptography since it supports non-repudiation and authentication; if a document is signed, the signer indeed signed it and cannot repudiate the signature. The existential unforgeability against chosen-message attack, the EUF-CMA security, is the standard security notion of the digital signature [GMR88]. Roughly speaking, a signature scheme is said to be EUF-CMA-secure if no efficient adversary can forge a signature even if it can use a signing oracle, which captures non-repudiation and authentication. The hash-and-sign paradigm [BR93, BR96] is one of the most widely adopted paradigms to construct practical signatures along with the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [FS87] in the ROM [BR93]. This paper focuses on the hash-and-sign paradigm.

A hash-and-sign signature scheme is realized by a hard-to-invert function $F : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$, its trapdoor $I : \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{X}$, and a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \to \mathcal{Y}$ modeled as a random oracle. To sign on a message m, a signer first computes $y = H(r, m)$, where r is a random string, computes $x = I(y)$, and outputs $\sigma = (r, x)$ as a signature. A verifier verifies the signature σ with the verification key F by checking if $H(r, m) = F(x)$ or not. We refer to this construction as *probabilistic hash-and-sign*; if r is an empty string, then *deterministic hash-and-sign*.

A prime example is TDP-FDH, a full-domain hash (FDH) using a trapdoor permutation (TDP) such as RSA. TDP-FDH is EUF-CMA-secure in the ROM, assuming the one-wayness (OW) or non-invertibility (INV) of TDP [BR93]. [3] Since TDPs are hard to build in general, Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan proposed a (probabilistic) FDH signature with a preimage-sampleable function (PSF) [GPV08], which is a trapdoor function (TDF) with additional conditions, e.g., surjection. Gentry et al. showed a tight reduction from the collision-resistance (CR) property of PSF to the *strong* EUF-CMA (sEUF-CMA) security of PSF-FDH (and PSF-PFDH), and they constructed a collision-resistant PSF from lattices.

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[3] An adversary tries to find a preimage of a challenge y that is uniformly chosen in the INV game [HY18] and that derived by $F(x)$ for x chosen from some distribution on $\mathcal{X}$ in the OW game [BR93].

Table 1: Summary of the security proofs for the hash-and-sign in the QROM. DHaS/PHaS/PHaSwR stand for deterministic hash-and-sign, probabilistic hash-and-sign, and probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry. ϵ denotes the adversary's advantage in the game of the underlying assumption and $\epsilon_{\text{ow/inv}} \in \{\epsilon_{\text{ow}}, \epsilon_{\text{inv}}\}$. q denotes the number of queries to the signing oracle or the random oracle. Table 2 shows the complete table.

Name	DHaS	PHaS	PHaSwR	Assumption	Security Bound
[BDF+11]	✓	✓	–	CR	$O(\epsilon_{\text{cr}})$
[Zha12]	✓	✓	–	OW/INV	$O(q^2\epsilon_{\text{ow/inv}}^{1/2})$
ext. of [YZ21]	✓	✓	–	OW/INV	$O(q^4\epsilon_{\text{ow/inv}})$
[CD20]	–	✓	–	EUF-NMA	$O(\epsilon_{\text{nma}})$
Ours	-	✓	✓	INV	$O(q^2\epsilon_{\text{inv}})$

Unfortunately, it is even hard to build PSFs in code-based and multivariate-quadratic-based (MQ-based) cryptography; for example, F is not surjection. In this case, the trapdoor I would output $\bot$ on input y whose preimage does not exist. For such TDFs, we use probabilistic hash-and-sign *with retry*, where a signer takes randomness r until r allows inversion of $y = H(r, m)$. The Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS) signature [CFS01] in code-based cryptography and the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) [KPG99] and Hidden Field Equations (HFE) signatures [Pat96] in MQ-based cryptography use this paradigm. Dallot [Dal07] and Morozov, Roy, Steinwandt, and Xu [MRSX18] showed the security of the modified CFS signature in the ROM. Sakumoto, Shirai, and Hiwatari [SSH11] also showed the security of the modified HFE and UOV signatures in the ROM.

Hash-and-Sign Signature in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM): Large-scale quantum computers will be able to break widely deployed public-key cryptography such as RSA and ECDSA because of Shor's algorithm [Sho94], and interest has been growing in post-quantum cryptography (PQC). NIST has initiated a PQC standardization project for public-key encryption/key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and digital signature. Many post-quantum hash-and-sign signature schemes have been proposed in lattice-based, code-based, and MQ-based cryptography [DST19, DCP+20, CFM+20, Beu21, FIKT21, PFH+22].

Post-quantum signatures should be EUF-CMA-secure in *the quantum random oracle model (QROM)* [BDF+11] since the QROM modelizes real-world quantum adversaries with *offline* access to the hash function. In the QROM, the adversary can query the random oracle in a superposition of many different values, say a superposition of all inputs in a query. Thus, we could not directly use the proof techniques for the ROM, such as lazy sampling in the QROM. Moreover, schemes that are secure in the ROM are not always secure in the QROM, and Yamakawa and Zhandry gave separation results, including a signature scheme [YZ22]. The history-free reduction, which avoids adaptive reprogramming, has been generally adopted [BDF+11, KLS18, SXY18]. Recently, some breakthrough results have shown that adaptive reprogramming is feasible in some cases [Unr14, HRS16, DFM20, GHHM21].

Summarizing the previous studies, we find that there are *no* security proofs for signature schemes using the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry in the QROM, which impacts the security evaluation of code-based and MQ-based signatures. Thus, it is natural to ask the following question:

Q1. Is there an EUF-CMA *security proof for the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry? How tight is the security proof?*

Table 1 summarizes studies on the EUF-CMA security of the hash-and-sign in the QROM. Boneh et al. [BDF+11] showed a tight reduction from the CR of PSF using the history-free reduction. Zhandry [Zha12] gave a reduction from the OW/INV [4], using a technique called semi-constant distribution. [5] Unfortunately, the semi-constant distribution incurs a square-root loss in the success probability. Yamakawa and Zhandry [YZ21] gave the lifting theorem that shows that any search-type game is hard in the QROM if the game is hard in the ROM. They used the lifting theorem to show that an EUF-NMA-secure signature in the ROM is EUF-NMA-secure in the QROM, where NMA stands for No-Message Attack. By extending the results of [YZ21], we obtain a reduction from the OW/INV of PSF. Chailloux

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[4] If a TDF is PSF, a tight reduction from OW to INV holds.

[5] Zhandry [Zha12] proved the EUF-CMA security of TDP-FDH in the QROM, assuming that the underlying TDP is one-way. The security proof applies to the case for the OW/INV of PSF.

and Debris-Alazard [CD20] gave a security proof of the probabilistic hash-and-sign based on non-PSF TDFs. However, their reduction does not apply to the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry. Also, Grilo, Hövelmanns, Hülsing, and Majenz [GHHM21] gave a reduction from the EUF-RMA security of a signature scheme for fixed-length messages, where RMA stands for Random-Message Attack. [6] However, there is no known reduction to the EUF-RMA security of the underlying signature from the OW/INV of TDF.

Provable Security in the Multi-key Setting: The EUF-CMA security is sometimes insufficient to ensure the security of the digital signature in the real world since exploiting one of many users may be sufficient for a real-world adversary to intrude into a system. We must consider the EUF-CMA security *in the multi-key setting*, the M-EUF-CMA security in short. The adversary, given multiple verification keys, tries to forge a valid signature for one of the verification keys. If the adversary can gain an advantage by targeting multiple keys (*multi-key attack*), the M-EUF-CMA security degrades with the number of keys or users. NIST wrote resistance to multi-key attacks as a "desirable property" in their call for proposals [NIS17] in their PQC standardization project.

The inclusion of an entire verification key enables one to separate the domain of the hash function for each verification key [MS04]. Similarly, Duman et al. [DHK$^+$21] proposed a technique called *prefix hashing* for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform of KEM. In prefix hashing, the hash function includes only a small unpredictable part of a public key. This modification causes less increase in the execution time than in the case including the entire key. Since this technique only changes the method of hashing, the hash-and-sign can adopt it. Thus, one might also ask the following question:

Q2. Does the hash-and-sign become M-EUF-CMA-*secure with prefix hashing? How tight is the security proof?*

1.1 Contributions

Security Proof of Probabilistic Hash-and-Sign with Retry in the QROM: We affirmatively answer Q1 by giving the *first* reduction from the INV of the underlying TDF to the EUF-CMA security of the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry in the QROM (*main theorem*). Also, we show that a signature scheme is sEUF-CMA-secure if the underlying TDF is an injection.

Our reduction is tighter than the existing ones from the INV that apply to probabilistic hash-and-sign without retry only [Zha12, CD20, YZ21]. Fig. 1 shows a diagram of the existing and our reductions. The main theorem comprises two reductions; INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-NMA and EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA, where X $\Rightarrow$ Y inidicates a reduction from X to Y. Our reduction of INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-NMA is tighter than the one using the lifting theorem [YZ21], and our reduction of EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA is tight. In the main theorem, a bound on the EUF-CMA advantage is $(2q_{\mathsf{qro}} + 1)^2 \epsilon_{\mathsf{inv}}$, where q_{qro} is a bound on the number of random oracle queries and ϵ_{inv} is the INV advantage of the underlying TDF.

Applications: We apply the main theorem to the existing code-based and MQ-based hash-and-sign signatures. We improve the EUF-CMA security of Wave [DST19] and give the first proof for the sEUF-CMA security of the modified CFS signature [Dal07] and the EUF-CMA security of some MQ-based signatures, including Rainbow [DCP$^+$20], GeMSS [CFM$^+$20], MAYO [Beu21], and QR-UOV [FIKT21] in the QROM. To the best of our knowledge, the main theorem covers all post-quantum hash-and-sign signature schemes with provable securities of INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA or INV $\Rightarrow$ sEUF-CMA in the ROM.

In response to the practical break of Rainbow [Beu22], NIST has announced a new call for proposals of the post-quantum signature with short signatures and fast verification [NIS22]. NIST has the intention of standardizing schemes that are not based on structured lattices. Since the main theorem has wide application in code-based and MQ-based cryptography, promising candidates for this call, our work will be used to ensure the security of new candidates.

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[6] A signer chooses r, computes $m' = \mathsf{H}(r, m)$, and signs on m' by using a signing algorithm of the signature scheme for fixed-length messages, and outputs (r, σ).

Fig. 1: A diagram for existing and our reductions of the hash-and-sign in the QROM. Red arrows indicate our reductions of the main theorem. Solid arrows indicate tight reductions, double arrows indicate reductions with linear or quadratic loss, and dashed arrows indicate non-tight reductions.

Multi-Key Extension: We affirmatively answer Q2 by showing a reduction from the multi-instance INV (M-INV) of TDF to the M-EUF-CMA security of the hash-and-sign with prefix hashing by extending the main theorem. The M-EUF-CMA advantage has a bound $(2q_{\mathsf{qro}} + 1)^2 \epsilon_{\mathsf{inv^m}}$, where $\epsilon_{\mathsf{inv^m}}$ is the M-INV advantage. Also, we show a tight reduction from the multi-instance CR (M-CR). Note that the above reductions incur security losses in the number of keys without prefix hashing. The reduction from the M-INV or M-CR does not assure resistance to multi-key attacks in general. However, if there is a reduction from the INV or CR without the security loss in the number of keys, we can ensure resistance to multi-key attacks. This paper proposes a generic method for such *single-key to multi-key reduction.*

Organization: Section 2 gives notations, definitions, and so on. Section 3 reviews the existing security proofs in the (Q)ROM. Section 4 introduces our main theorem. Section 5 applies the main theorem to code-based and MQ-based signatures. Section 6 shows the multi-key extension of the main theorem. Section 7 explains the generic method for single-key to multi-key reduction. Appendix C applies the generic method for single-key to multi-key reduction to lattice-based, code-based, and MQ-based signatures. In appendix, Appendix A reviews the TDFs of signature schemes. Appendix B shows missing proofs.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations and Terminology

For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we let $[n] := \{1, \dots, n\}$. We write any symbol for sets in calligraphic font. For a finite set $\mathcal{X}$, $|\mathcal{X}|$ is the cardinality of $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathsf{U}(\mathcal{X})$ is the uniform distribution over $\mathcal{X}$. By $x \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{X}$ and $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$, we denote the sampling of an element from $\mathsf{U}(\mathcal{X})$ and $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$ (distribution on $\mathcal{X}$). For a domain $\mathcal{X}$ and a range $\mathcal{Y}$, by $\mathcal{Y}^\mathcal{X}$ we denote a set of functions $\mathsf{F} : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$.

We write any symbol for functions in sans-serif font and adversaries in calligraphic font. Let F be a function and $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary. We denote by $y \leftarrow \mathsf{F}^\mathsf{H}(x)$ and $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^\mathsf{H}(x)$ (resp., $y \leftarrow \mathsf{F}^{|\mathsf{H}\rangle}(x)$ and $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{|\mathsf{H}\rangle}(x)$) probabilistic computations of F and $\mathcal{A}$ on input x with a classical (resp., quantum) oracle access to a function H. If F and $\mathcal{A}$ are deterministic, we write $y := \mathsf{F}^\mathsf{H}(x)$ and $y := \mathcal{A}^\mathsf{H}(x)$. For a random function H, we denote by $\mathsf{H}^{x^* \mapsto y^*}$ a function such that $\mathsf{H}^{x^* \mapsto y^*}(x) = \mathsf{H}(x)$ for $x \neq x^*$ and $\mathsf{H}^{x^* \mapsto y^*}(x^*) = y^*$. The notation $\mathsf{G}^\mathcal{A} \Rightarrow y$ denotes an event in which a game G played $\mathcal{A}$ returns y.

We denote 1 if the Boolean statement is true $\top$ and 0 if the statement is false $\bot$. A binary operation $a \overset{?}{=} b$ outputs $\top$ if $a = b$ and outputs $\bot$ otherwise.

2.2 Digital Signature

A digital signature scheme Sig consists of three algorithms:

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GAME: EUF-CMA	Sign(m_i)	GAME: EUF-NMA
1 $(vk, sk) \leftarrow$ Sig.KeyGen(1^λ)	1 $\sigma_i \leftarrow$ Sig.Sign(sk, m_i)	1 $(vk, sk) \leftarrow$ Sig.KeyGen(1^λ)
2 $(m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{cma}^{Sign}(vk)$	2 **return** σ_i	2 $(m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{nma}(vk)$
3 **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i$ **then**		3 **return** Sig.Verify(vk, m^*, σ^*)
4 **return** 0		
5 **return** Sig.Verify(vk, m^*, σ^*)		

Fig. 2: EUF-CMA and EUF-NMA games.

GAME: INV	GAME: OW	GAME: CR
1 $(F, I) \leftarrow$ Gen(1^λ)	1 $(F, I) \leftarrow$ Gen(1^λ)	1 $(F, I) \leftarrow$ Gen(1^λ)
2 $y \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$	2 $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$	2 $(x_1^*, x_2^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{cr}(F)$
3 $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{inv}(F, y)$	3 $y := F(x)$	3 **return** $F(x_1^*) \stackrel{?}{=} F(x_2^*)$
4 **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} y$	4 $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{ow}(F, y)$	
	5 **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} y$	

Fig. 3: Non-invertibility (INV), one-wayness (OW), and collision-resistance (CR) games.

Sig.KeyGen(1^λ): This algorithm takes the security parameter 1^λ as input and outputs a verification key vk and a signing key sk.

Sig.Sign(sk, m): This algorithm takes a signing key sk and a message m as input and outputs a signature σ.

Sig.Vrfy(vk, m, σ): This algorithm takes a verification key vk, a message m, and a signature σ as input, and outputs $\top$ (acceptance) or $\bot$ (rejection).

We define existential unforgeability against chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA security) and that against no-message attack (EUF-NMA security).

Definition 2.1 (Security of Signature). *Let* Sig *be a signature scheme. Using games given in* Fig. 2, *we define advantage functions of adversaries playing* EUF-CMA *(Existential UnForgeability against Chosen-Message Attack) and* EUF-NMA *(No-Message Attack) games against* Sig *as* $\mathrm{Adv}_{Sig}^{EUF\text{-}CMA}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) = \Pr\left[\text{EUF-CMA}^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$ *and* $\mathrm{Adv}_{Sig}^{EUF\text{-}NMA}(\mathcal{A}_{nma}) = \Pr\left[\text{EUF-NMA}^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$. *Also, we define an advantage function for a* sEUF-CMA *(strong* EUF-CMA*) game as* $\mathrm{Adv}_{Sig}^{sEUF\text{-}CMA}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) = \Pr\left[\text{sEUF-CMA}^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$, *where the* sEUF-CMA *game is identical to the* EUF-CMA *game except that* Line 3 *is changed as "* **if** $\exists i, (m^*, \sigma^*) = (m_i, \sigma_i)$ **then** *". We say* Sig *is* EUF-CMA-*secure,* EUF-NMA-*secure, or* sEUF-CMA-*secure if its corresponding advantage is negligible for any efficient adversary in the security parameter.*

2.3 Trapdoor Function

A trapdoor function (TDF) T consists of three algorithms:

Gen(1^λ): This algorithm takes the security parameter 1^λ as input and outputs a function F with a trapdoor I.

F(x): This algorithm takes $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and deterministically outputs $F(x) \in \mathcal{Y}$.

I(y): This algorithm takes $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and outputs $x \in \mathcal{X}$, s.t., $F(x) = y$, or outputs $\bot$.

Definition 2.2 (Security of TDF). *Let* T *be a TDF. Using games given in* Fig. 3, *we define advantage functions of adversaries playing the* non-INVertibility *(*INV*)[7], One-Wayness (*OW*) and Collision-Resistance (*CR*) games against* T *as* $\mathrm{Adv}_T^{INV}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}) = \Pr\left[\text{INV}^{\mathcal{B}_{inv}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$, $\mathrm{Adv}_T^{OW}(\mathcal{B}_{ow}) = \Pr\left[\text{OW}^{\mathcal{B}_{ow}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$ *and* $\mathrm{Adv}_T^{CR}(\mathcal{B}_{cr}) = \Pr\left[\text{CR}^{\mathcal{B}_{cr}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$.

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[7] In general, *non-invertibility* of TDFs is called *one-wayness* [GPV08, SSH11, CD20]. We make a distinction between them depending on the way to choose challenges (INV follows [HY18] and OW follows [BR93]).

<table>
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Game: PS_b

1 $(\mathsf{F},\mathsf{I}) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
2 $b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps}}^{\mathrm{Sample}_b}(\mathsf{F})$
3 **return** b^*

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$\underline{\mathrm{Sample}_0()}$

1 **repeat**
2 $\quad r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
3 $\quad y_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$
4 $\quad x_i \leftarrow \mathsf{I}(y_i)$
5 **until** $x_i \neq \bot$
6 **return** (r_i, x_i)

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$\underline{\mathrm{Sample}_1()}$

1 $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
2 $x_i \leftarrow \mathrm{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$
3 **return** (r_i, x_i)

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Fig. 4: A preimage sampling (PS) game.

2.4 Preimage-Sampleable Function

In the ROM, the hash-and-sign is EUF-CMA-secure when instantiated with a preimage-sampleable function (PSF) proposed in [GPV08]. We first define its weakened version as follows:

Definition 2.3 (Weak Preimage-Sampleable Function (WPSF)). *A TDF* T *is said to be a WPSF if it consists of the following four algorithms:*

$\mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$*: This algorithm takes the security parameter* 1^λ *as input and outputs a function* F *with a trapdoor* I.
$\mathsf{F}(x)$*: This algorithm takes* $x \in \mathcal{X}$ *and deterministically outputs* $\mathsf{F}(x) \in \mathcal{Y}$.
$\mathsf{I}(y)$*: This algorithm takes* $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ *and outputs* $x \in \mathcal{X}$ *satisfying* $\mathsf{F}(x) = y$ *or outputs* $\bot$.
$\mathrm{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$*: This algorithm takes* $\mathsf{F} \in \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$ *and outputs* $x \in \mathcal{X}$.

We then review PSF [GPV08]:

Definition 2.4 (Preimage-Sampleable Function (PSF) [GPV08]). *A TDF* T *is said to be a PSF if* T *is WPSF and its algorithms satisfy three conditions for any* $(\mathsf{F}, \mathsf{I}) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$:

Condition 1*:* $\mathsf{F}(x)$ *is uniform over* $\mathcal{Y}$ *for* $x \leftarrow \mathrm{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$.
Condition 2*:* $x \leftarrow \mathsf{I}(y)$ *follows a distribution of* $x \leftarrow \mathrm{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$ *given* $\mathsf{F}(x) = y$.
Condition 3*:* $\mathsf{I}(y)$ *outputs* x *satisfying* $\mathsf{F}(x) = y$ *for any* $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. [8]

If T *is collision-resistant PSF, it satisfies the above conditions plus the following:*

Condition 4*: For any* $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, *the conditional min-entropy of* $x \leftarrow \mathrm{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$ *given* $\mathsf{F}(x) = y$ *is at least* $\omega(\log n)$.

We define a condition for indistinguishability of $x \leftarrow \mathrm{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$ and $x \leftarrow \mathsf{I}(y)$ in a different manner from **Condition 2**.

Definition 2.5 (Preimage Sampling (PS) Game). *Let* T *be a WPSF. Using a game defined in Fig. 4, we define an advantage function of an adversary playing the* PS *game against* T *as* $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}}^{\mathrm{PS}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps}}) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathrm{PS}_0^{\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathrm{PS}_1^{\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right|$.

The condition that $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}}^{\mathrm{PS}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps}})$ is negligible is a relaxation of **Condition 2** in which we can use either statistical or computational indistinguishability.

2.5 Security Games in the Multi-key/Multi-instance Settings

We define multi-key/multi-instance versions of the security notions.

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[8] The original definition of PSF [GPV08] does not explicitly assume **Condition 3** but implicitly assumes by **Condition 2**. **Condition 3** is necessary for a signature generation without retry.

GAME: M-EUF-CMA

1 **for** $j \in [q_{\text{key}}]$ **do**
2    $(vk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \text{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$
3 $(j^*, m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}^{\text{Sign}}(\{vk_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{key}}]})$
4 **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i^{j^*}$ **then**
5   **return** 0
6 **return** $\text{Sig.Verify}(vk_{j^*}, m^*, \sigma^*)$

$\text{Sign}(k, m_i^k)$

1 $\sigma_i^k \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk_k, m_i^k)$
2 **return** σ_i^k

Fig. 5: An EUF-CMA game in the multi-key setting.

GAME: M-INV

1 **for** $j \in [q_{\text{inst}}]$ **do**
2    $(F_j, I_j) \leftarrow_\$ \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
3    $y_j \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$
4 $(j^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}(\{(F_j, y_j)\}_{j \in [q_{\text{inst}}]})$
5 **return** $F_{j^*}(x^*) \overset{?}{=} y_{j^*}$

GAME: M-CR

1 **for** $j \in [q_{\text{inst}}]$ **do**
2    $(F_j, I_j) \leftarrow_\$ \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$;
3 $(j^*, x_1^*, x_2^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}^m}(\{F_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{inst}}]})$
4 **return** $F_{j^*}(x_1^*) \overset{?}{=} F_{j^*}(x_2^*)$

GAME: M-PS$_b$

1 **for** $j \in [q_{\text{inst}}]$ **do**
2    $(F_j, I_j) \leftarrow_\$ \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
3 $b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}^{\text{Sample}_b}(\{F_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{inst}}]})$
4 **return** b^*

$\text{Sample}_0(k)$

1 **repeat**
2    $r_i^k \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
3    $y_i^k, \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$
4    $x_i^k \leftarrow I_k(y_i^k)$
5 **until** $x_i^k \neq \perp$
6 **return** (r_i^k, x_i^k)

$\text{Sample}_1(k)$

1 $r_i^k \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
2 $x_i^k \leftarrow \text{SampDom}(F_k)$
3 **return** (r_i^k, x_i^k)

Fig. 6: INV, CR, and PS games in the multi-instance setting.

Definition 2.6 (Security of Signature in the Multi-key Setting [KMP16]). *Let* Sig *be a signature scheme. Using a game given in Fig. 5, we define advantage functions of adversaries playing the* M-EUF-CMA *(Multi-key EUF-CMA) and* M-sEUF-CMA *(Multi-key sEUF-CMA) games against* Sig *as* $\text{Adv}_{\text{Sig}}^{\text{M-EUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}) = \Pr\left[\text{M-EUF-CMA}^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$ *and* $\text{Adv}_{\text{Sig}}^{\text{M-sEUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}) = \Pr\left[\text{M-sEUF-CMA}^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$*, where the* M-sEUF-CMA *game is identical to the* M-EUF-CMA *game except that Line 4 is changed as "* **if** $\exists i, (m^*, \sigma^*) = (m_i^{j^*}, \sigma_i^{j^*})$ **then** *". We say* Sig *is* M-EUF-CMA*-secure or* M-sEUF-CMA*-secure if its corresponding advantage is negligible for any efficient adversary in the security parameter.*

Definition 2.7 (INV, CR, and PS in Multi-instance Setting). *Let* T *be a TDF or a WPSF. Using games given in Fig. 6, we define advantage functions of adversaries playing the* M-INV *(Multi-instance INV),* M-CR *(Multi-instance CR), and* M-PS *(Multi-instance PS) against* T *as* $\text{Adv}_T^{\text{M-INV}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}) = \Pr\left[\text{M-INV}^{\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$*,* $\text{Adv}_T^{\text{M-CR}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}^m}) = \Pr\left[\text{M-CR}^{\mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$*, and* $\text{Adv}_T^{\text{M-PS}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}) = \left|\Pr\left[\text{M-PS}_0^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\text{M-PS}_1^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right|$*.*

2.6 Quantum Random Oracle Model and Proof Techniques

In the ROM, a hash function $H : \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is modeled as a random function $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$. The random function is under the control of the challenger, and the adversary makes queries to the random oracle (*random oracle queries*) to compute the hash values. In the ROM, the challenger chooses $y \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$ and programs H as $H(r, m) := y$ for queried (r, m) on-the-fly instead of choosing $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$ at the beginning (lazy sampling technique).

Game: AR_b	Repro(m_i)
1 $\mathrm{H}_0 \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R}\times\mathcal{M}}$	**1** $(r_i, y_i) \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{Y}$
2 $\mathrm{H}_1 := \mathrm{H}_0$	**2** $\mathrm{H}_1 := \mathrm{H}_1^{(r_i,m_i)\mapsto y_i}$
3 $b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}_b\rangle,\mathrm{Repro}}()$	**3** **return** r_i
4 **return** b^*	

Fig. 7: An adaptive reprogramming (AR) game.

Adversary: $\mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}\rangle}()$	Simulator: $\mathcal{S}(\theta)$ for $\mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}\rangle}()$
1 $(r, m, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}\rangle}()$	**1** $\mathrm{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R}\times\mathcal{M}}$
2 **return** (r, m, z)	**2** $(r', m') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1^{\mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}\rangle}}()$
	3 $\mathrm{H}' := \mathrm{H}^{(r',m')\mapsto\theta}$
	4 $z \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}'\rangle}}(\theta)$
	5 **return** (r', m', z)

Fig. 8: A simulator $\mathcal{S}$ for any search-type game adversary $\mathcal{A}$.

In the QROM, the adversary makes queries to H in a superposition of many different values, e.g., $\sum_{(r,m)} \alpha_{r,m} \lvert r, m\rangle \lvert y\rangle$. The challenger computes H and gives a superposition of the results to the adversary, $\sum_{(r,m)} \alpha_{r,m} \lvert r, m\rangle \lvert y \oplus \mathrm{H}(r,m)\rangle$. Some works enable one to adaptively reprogram H in the security game [Unr14, HRS16, DFM20, GHHM21]. Among the works, we will use the tight adaptive reprogramming technique [GHHM21] and the measure-and-reprogram technique [DFM20].

Tight Adaptive Reprogramming Technique [GHHM21]: Fig. 7 shows a game called *adaptive reprogramming* (AR) game, in which the adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}$ tries to distinguish H_0 (no reprogramming) from H_1 (reprogrammed by Repro). For i-th reprogramming query, the challenger reprograms H_1 for uniformly chosen (r_i, y_i), and gives r_i to $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}$. A distinguishing advantage of the AR game is defined by $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{AR}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}) = \left\lvert \Pr\left[\mathrm{AR}_0^{\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathrm{AR}_1^{\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \right\rvert$.

Lemma 2.1 (Tight Adaptive Reprogramming Technique: Proposition 1 of [GHHM21]). *For any quantum* AR *adversary* $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}$ *issuing at most* q_{rep} *classical reprogramming queries and* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* H_b, *the distinguishing advantage of the* AR *game is bounded by*

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathrm{H}}^{\mathrm{AR}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}) \leq \frac{3q_{\mathrm{rep}}}{2}\sqrt{\frac{q_{\mathrm{qro}}}{\lvert\mathcal{R}\rvert}}.$$

Measure-and-Reprogram Technique [DFM20]: Fig. 8 shows a two-stage simulator $\mathcal{S}$ for $\mathcal{A}$ playing any search-type game in the QROM. In the first stage, $\mathcal{S}_1$ uniformly chooses one of the $\mathcal{A}$'s queries to a random function H and outputs the observed value (r', m') of the chosen query. Then, H is reprogrammed as $\mathrm{H}' := \mathrm{H}^{(r',m')\mapsto\theta}$ for a random θ. In the second stage, $\mathcal{S}_2$ runs $\mathcal{A}$ using H'. Finally, $\mathcal{S}_2$ outputs whatever $\mathcal{A}$ outputs, which is denoted by z and maybe quantum.

Lemma 2.2 (Measure-and-Reprogram Technique: Theorem 2 of [DFM20]). *For any quantum adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *issuing at most* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* $\mathrm{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R}\times\mathcal{M}}$, *there exists a two-stage quantum simulator* $\mathcal{S}$ *given uniformly chosen* θ *such that for any* $(\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \in \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}$ *and any predicate* V,

$$\Pr\left[(r', m') = (\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \wedge \mathsf{V}(r', m', \theta, z) : (r', m') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1^{\mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}\rangle}}(), \ z \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}'\rangle}}(\theta)\right]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{(2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2}\Pr\left[(r, m) = (\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \wedge \mathsf{V}(r, m, \mathrm{H}(r, m), z) : (r, m, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\lvert\mathrm{H}\rangle}()\right].$$

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HaS[T, H].KeyGen(1^λ)	HaS[T, H].Sign(I, m)	HaS[T, H].Vrfy(F, m, r, x)
1 (F, I) ← Gen(1^λ) 2 **return** (F, I)	1 **repeat** 2 $\quad r \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$ 3 $\quad x \leftarrow$ I(H(r, m)) 4 **until** $x \neq \perp$ 5 **return** (r, x)	1 **return** F(x) $\overset{?}{=}$ H(r, m)

Fig. 9: Algorithms of the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry.

Table 2: Summary of the existing and our security proofs. ϵ denotes the adversary's advantage in the game of the underlying assumption and $\epsilon_{\text{ow/inv}} \in \{\epsilon_{\text{ow}}, \epsilon_{\text{inv}}\}$. In "Conditions of PSF", ✓ indicates this condition is necessary, and ✓^{1}/✓^{2} indicates that **Condition 2** is relaxed as "A bound δ on average of $\delta_{\text{F,I}}$ is negligible" and "$\epsilon_{\text{ps}} = \text{Adv}^{\text{PS}}_{\text{T}_{\text{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}})$ is negligible". In "Target scheme", d/p/pr indicate that the security proof is applied to deterministic hash-and-sign, probabilistic hash-and-sign, and probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry.

Security proof	Security Bound	Assumption	Conditions of PSF				Target scheme
			1	2	3	4	
[Zha12]	$4\left(q_{\text{sign}} + q_{\text{qro}} + 1\right)^2 \sqrt{\text{Adv}^{\text{INV}}_{\text{T}_{\text{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{INV}})}$	INV	✓	✓	✓	–	d/p
ext. of [YZ21]	$4q_{\text{sign}}(q_{\text{qro}} + 1)(2q_{\text{qro}} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}^{\text{INV}}_{\text{T}_{\text{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{INV}})$	INV	✓	✓	✓	–	d/p
[CD20]	$\frac{1}{2}\left(\text{Adv}^{\text{EUF-NMA}}_{\text{HaS}[\text{T}_{\text{wpsf}},\text{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}}) + \frac{8\pi}{\sqrt{3}}q^{\frac{3}{2}}\sqrt{\delta} + q_{\text{sign}}\left(\delta + \frac{q_{\text{sign}}}{|\mathcal{R}|}\right)\right)$	EUF-NMA	–	✓^{1}	✓	–	p
[BDF$^+$11]	$\frac{1}{1-2^{-\omega(\log n)}}\text{Adv}^{\text{CR}}_{\text{T}_{\text{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}})$	CR	✓	✓	✓	✓	d/p
ours	$(2q_{\text{qro}} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}^{\text{INV}}_{\text{T}_{\text{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{INV}}) + \text{Adv}^{\text{PS}}_{\text{T}_{\text{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}}) + 3q'_{\text{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{\text{sign}} + q_{\text{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$	INV	–	✓^{2}	–	–	p/pr

3 Hash-and-Sign Paradigm and Existing Security Proofs

3.1 Hash-and-Sign Paradigm

Fig. 9 shows algorithms of the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry, and HaS[T, H] denotes a signature scheme using a TDF T and a hash function H. If HaS[T, H].Sign outputs a signature without retry, HaS[T, H] instantiates the probabilistic hash-and-sign. If r is an empty string, HaS[T, H] instantiates the deterministic hash-and-sign.

3.2 Existing Security Proofs

We review existing security proofs. Table 2 summarizes the existing security proofs (and ours).

Security Proof in the ROM [BR96, GPV08]: Let T_{psf} be a PSF. A reduction from the INV of T_{psf} to the EUF-CMA security of HaS[T_{psf}, H] in the ROM is given by lazy sampling and programming. The INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$, given a challenge (F, y), simulates the EUF-CMA game played by an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}$ as follows: For a random oracle query (r, m), $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$ returns F(x) for $x \leftarrow$ SampDom(F) and stores (r, m, x) in a database $\mathcal{D}$. If (r, m, x) $\in \mathcal{D}$ with some x, then $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$ gives F(x) to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}$. For a signing query m, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$ chooses (r, x) by $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$ and $x \leftarrow$ SampDom(F). If (r, m, $*$) $\notin \mathcal{D}$, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$ returns (r, x) and stores (r, m, x) in $\mathcal{D}$; otherwise $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$ returns stored (r, x).

From **Condition 1** of PSF (F(x) is uniform), $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}}$ can use F(x) as an output of the random function. Also from **Conditions 2** and **3**, honestly generated signatures $x_i \leftarrow$ I(H(r_i, m_i)) and simulated signatures $x_i \leftarrow$ SampDom(F)

are statistically indistinguishable. To win the INV game, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ gives his query y to $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}$ in one of $(q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{ro}} + 1)$ queries to H. If $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}$ outputs a valid signature (m^*, r^*, x^*), $\mathsf{H}(r^*, m^*) = y$ holds and $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ can win the INV game with probability $\frac{1}{q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{ro}} + 1}$. Hence, we have

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}^c}) \leq (q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{ro}} + 1)\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}),$$

where $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}^c}$ is an adversary who can make only classical queries to H.

Note that a tight reduction of $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}) \leq \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{ow}})$ holds ($\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{X}}$ is defined as $\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$ in the OW game (see Fig. 3)) since the OW adversary can simulate the INV game by giving a uniform $\mathsf{F}(x)$ to the INV adversary.

Security Proof by Semi-constant Distribution [Zha12]: Zhandry showed the reduction from the OW of TDP in the QROM using a technique called *semi-constant distribution*. This technique leads to a reduction from the INV of PSF. $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ simulates the EUF-CMA game by generating signatures without the trapdoor as the above security proof in the ROM. Instead of adaptively programming H, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ replaces H as $\mathsf{H}' = \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{DetSampDom}(\mathsf{F}, \widetilde{\mathsf{H}}(r, m)))$, where $\widetilde{\mathsf{H}} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{W}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$ is a random function to output randomness w and $\mathsf{DetSampDom}$ is a deterministic function of $\mathsf{SampDom}$ [BDF$^+$11]. From **Condition 1**, H' is indistinguishable from H.

To find a preimage of his challenge y, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ programs H' that outputs y with probability ϵ (semi-constant distribution). In the signing queries, if $\mathsf{H}'(r_i, m_i)$ outputs y, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ aborts this game. A bound on the statistical distance between the random function and the programmed one with the semi-constant distribution is $\frac{8}{3}(q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^4 \epsilon^2$ [Zha12, Corollary 4.3]. When $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}$ wins the EUF-CMA game, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ can win the INV game with probability $(1 - \epsilon)^{q_{\mathrm{sign}}} \epsilon \approx \epsilon - q_{\mathrm{sign}} \epsilon^2$. Minimizing the bound $\frac{1}{\epsilon}\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}} + \left(q_{\mathrm{sign}} + \frac{8}{3}(q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^4\right)\epsilon$ gives the following [Zha12, Theorem 5.3]:

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}) \leq 2\sqrt{\left(q_{\mathrm{sign}} + \frac{8}{3}\left(q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1\right)^4\right)\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}})} \tag{1}$$

Application of Lifting Theorem [YZ21]: Yamakawa and Zhandry gave the lifting theorem for search-type games. As an application of the lifting theorem, they showed $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}NMA}}_{\mathsf{Sig}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma}}) \leq (2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}NMA}}_{\mathsf{Sig}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma}^c})$, where $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma}^c}$ is an EUF-NMA adversary making classical queries to H [YZ21, Corollary 4.10]. For a hash-and-sign signature $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}]$, they showed that $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}) \leq 4q_{\mathrm{sign}}\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}NMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma}})$ holds [YZ21, Theorem 4.11]. Extending the results of [YZ21] using the security proof in the ROM, we have the following bound:

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}) \leq 4q_{\mathrm{sign}}(q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)(2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}})$$

Reduction from EUF-NMA for WPSF [CD20]: The security proofs mentioned above hold only if the underlying TDF is PSF. Unfortunately, some TDFs cannot satisfy some conditions. To relax the conditions on TDFs, Chailloux and Debris-Alazard proposed a reduction from the EUF-NMA-security of the probabilistic hash-and-sign. [9] The authors assumed a WPSF with **Condition 3** and a weaker version of **Condition 2**, that is, there is a bound δ on the average of statistical distance $\delta_{\mathsf{F}, \mathsf{I}} = \Delta(\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}), \mathsf{I}(\mathsf{U}(\mathcal{Y})))$ over all $(\mathsf{F}, \mathsf{I}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ (see details in Section 5.1). Let $\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}$ be a WPSF. The EUF-NMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma}}$ replaces the random function H by H', which outputs $\mathsf{H}(r, m)$ with $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{DetSampDom}(\mathsf{F}, w))$ with $\frac{1}{2}$. A bound on the advantage of distinguishing H from H' is $\frac{8\pi}{\sqrt{3}}q_{\mathrm{qro}}^{3/2}\sqrt{\delta}$. The authors gave the following reduction [CD20, Theorem 2]:

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}) \leq \frac{1}{2}\left(\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}NMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}, \mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma}}) + \frac{8\pi}{\sqrt{3}}q_{\mathrm{qro}}^{\frac{3}{2}}\sqrt{\delta} + q_{\mathrm{sign}}\left(\delta + \frac{q_{\mathrm{sign}}}{|\mathcal{R}|}\right)\right) \tag{2}$$

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[9] The authors of [CD20] defined a problem called *claw with random function problem*; however, the definition of this problem is identical to that of the EUF-NMA game for the hash-and-sign.

Reduction from Collision-resistance [BDF⁺11]: We introduce a reduction from the CR of $\mathsf{T_{psf}}$ to the sEUF-CMA security of $\mathsf{HaS[T_{psf}, H]}$. Let us assume that the CR adversary $\mathcal{B}_{cr}$ given F simulates the sEUF-CMA game for $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$. For a random function $\widetilde{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{W}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, $\mathcal{B}_{cr}$ replaces the random function H as $H'(r, m) = F(\mathsf{DetSampDom}(F, \widetilde{H}(r, m)))$, where H and H' are indistinguishable from **Condition 1**. Also, the CR adversary simulates the signing oracle using **Conditions 2** and **3**. If $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ wins by (m^*, r^*, x^*), then $F(x^*) = H'(r^*, m^*) = F(x')$ holds for $x' = \mathsf{DetSampDom}(F, \widetilde{H}(r^*, m^*))$. When $x^* \neq x'$, $\mathcal{B}_{cr}$ can obtain a collision pair (x^*, x'). From **Condition 4**, $x^* \neq x'$ holds with probability $1 - 2^{-\omega(\log n)}$, and the following inequality holds [BDF⁺11, Theorem 2]:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sEUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS[T_{psf},H]}}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) \leq \frac{1}{1 - 2^{-\omega(\log n)}} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{CR}}_{\mathsf{T_{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{cr}) \tag{3}$$

4 New Security Proof

The main theorem is as follows:

Theorem 4.1 (INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA (Main Theorem)). *For any quantum* EUF-CMA *adversary* $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ *of* $\mathsf{HaS[T_{wpsf}, H]}$ *issuing at most* q_{sign} *classical queries to the signing oracle and* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, *there exist an* INV *adversary* $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ *of* $\mathsf{T_{wpsf}}$ *and a* PS *adversary* $\mathcal{D}_{ps}$ *of* $\mathsf{T_{wpsf}}$ *issuing* q_{sign} *sampling queries such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS[T_{wpsf},H]}}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) \leq (2q_{qro} + 1)^2 \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{INV}}_{\mathsf{T_{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T_{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{ps})$$

$$+ 3q'_{sign}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{sign} + q_{qro} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}, \tag{4}$$

where q'_{sign} *is the total number of queries to* H *in all the signing queries, and the running times of* $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ *and* $\mathcal{D}_{ps}$ *are about that of* $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$.

We present a proof sketch first and the detailed proof later.

Proof Sketch. We prove the main theorem via two reductions; EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA and INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-NMA:

EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA: We modify the EUF-CMA game to be simulated by the EUF-NMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$. Since $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ cannot make queries to the signing oracle, he needs to simulate the oracle by $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$ and $x_i \leftarrow \mathsf{SampDom}(F)$ with reprogramming $\mathsf{H}^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto F(x_i)}$ as in the existing security proofs. Therefore, we first modify the EUF-CMA game such that we can adaptively reprogram H using the tight adaptive reprogramming technique [GHHM21]. In answering a signing query m, a preimage $x \leftarrow I(y)$ for uniformly chosen $y \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$ is computed and H is reprogrammed as $\mathsf{H}^{(r,m) \mapsto y}$. The AR adversary (see Fig. 7) can simulate the original and modified EUF-CMA games, and we can use the bound of Lemma 2.1.

Next, we modify the game such that signatures are generated by $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$ and $x_i \leftarrow \mathsf{SampDom}(F)$ in the signing oracle. The PS advantage (see Definition 2.5) gives a bound on the advantage gap.

Finally, the EUF-NMA adversary can simulate the modified EUF-CMA game. Hence, a tight reduction holds in EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA.

INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-NMA: We use the measure-and-reprogram technique [DFM20]. The INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ given a challenge (F, y) runs the two-stage simulator $\mathcal{S}$ of the EUF-NMA game played by $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$. In the first stage, $\mathcal{S}$ observes one of the random oracle queries $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ makes. Let (r', m') be the observed value and H is reprogrammed as $\mathsf{H}' = \mathsf{H}^{(r',m') \mapsto y}$. In the second stage, $\mathcal{S}$ runs $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ again with H', and obtains (m^*, r^*, x^*). After running $\mathcal{S}$, $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ outputs x^* as a preimage of y. From Lemma 2.2, a reduction with a security loss $(2q_{qro} + 1)^2$ holds in INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-NMA.

Remark 4.1. We have the following tight reduction in EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA.

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS[T_{wpsf},H]}}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EUF\text{-}NMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS[T_{wpsf},H]}}(\mathcal{A}_{nma}) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T_{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{ps})$$

$$+ 3q'_{sign}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{sign} + q_{qro} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}} \tag{5}$$

Compared with the similar bound of Eq. (2) [CD20], the requirement for the TDF is weaker, and there are no square-root terms related to **Condition 2**.

Remark 4.2. The **relaxed Condition 2**, that is, $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{PS}}_{T_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{ps}})$ is negligible, is also necessary for reductions of EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA in the ROM. As shown in Section 3.2, an adversary who cannot generate real signatures simulates the signing oracle by SampDom; therefore, honestly generated signatures and simulated ones should be indistinguishable. Therefore, we conjecture that EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA holds in the QROM whenever the same reduction holds in the ROM.

Remark 4.3. If the underlying TDF is PSF, we have

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathrm{HaS}[T_{\mathrm{psf}},H]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}) \leq (2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2 \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{T_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}) + 3q_{\mathrm{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$$

$$\leq (2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2 \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{OW}}_{T_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{ow}}) + 3q_{\mathrm{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}},$$

since $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{PS}}_{T_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps}}) = 0$ holds from **Condition 2** and $q'_{\mathrm{sign}} = q_{\mathrm{sign}}$ holds from **Condition 3**. The above bounds are tighter than existing ones for $\mathrm{HaS}[T_{\mathrm{psf}}, H]$ (see Table 2), which implies that the probabilistic hash-and-sign gives a better bound than the deterministic one even if the underlying TDF is PSF.

Remark 4.4. Grilo et al. showed a tight reduction of EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA in the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, assuming that the underlying ID scheme is honest verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) [GHHM21, Theorem 3]. Also, Don et al. gave a generic reduction in the Fiat-Shamir transform of arbitrary ID schemes with a security loss $(2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2$ [DFMS19, Theorem 8]. The above reductions use the same techniques of adaptive reprogramming in the QROM (Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2) and their combination has the same security loss as Theorem 4.1.

There are two advantages compared with the existing security proofs.

Advantage 1: Wide applications: Our reduction gives security proofs for code-based and MQ-based hash-and-sign signatures. Relaxation of **Condition 2** is necessary for such applications. The existing security proofs replace H with H' at all once, which requires statistical indistinguishability of H and H'. On the other hand, our proof reprograms H in each signing query, and $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{PS}}_{T_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{ps}})$ can bound the advantage gap of games in EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA. Note that $\mathsf{I}(y)$ is not necessarily indistinguishable from SampDom(F). Since the condition to output $\bot$ is arbitrarily defined, the specification of a trapdoor I can be adjusted such that $\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{PS}}_{T_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{ps}})$ is negligible.

Advantage 2: Tighter proof: Our reduction is tighter than the existing ones [Zha12, YZ21] as mentioned in Remarks 4.1 and 4.3. The optimality of our reduction is not guaranteed; however, the multiplicative loss $(2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2$ seems unavoidable in the generic (black-box) reduction when we infer from three facts. First, the reduction incurs the loss $(q_{\mathrm{qro}} + q_{\mathrm{sign}} + 1)$ even in the ROM (see Section 3.2). Second, the security loss of a generic reduction from ROM to QROM using the lifting theorem [YZ21] is at least $(2q_{\mathrm{qro}}+1)^2$. Third, in the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, a generic reduction from arbitrary ID schemes incurs the same security loss as mentioned in Remark 4.4

4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1

EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA: Figs. 10 and 11 show the games and simulations described below.

GAME G_0 (EUF-CMA game): This is the original EUF-CMA game and $\Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] = \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathrm{HaS}[T_{\mathrm{wpsf}},H]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}})$ holds.

GAME G_1 (adaptive reprogramming on H): The signing oracle Sign^H uniformly chooses y_i and reprograms $H := H^{(r_i,m_i) \mapsto y_i}$ until $\mathsf{I}(y_i)$ does not output $\bot$ (see Lines 4 and 5 in Sign^H of G_1). Considering the number of times that $\mathsf{I}(y_i)$ outputs $\bot$, H is reprogrammed for q'_{sign} times.

The AR adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}$ can simulate G_0/G_1 (the top row of Fig. 11). If $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}$ plays AR_0, $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}$ simulates G_0; otherwise it simulates G_1. From Lemma 2.1, we have $\left|\Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{AR}}_H(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ar}}) \leq \frac{3}{2}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{\mathrm{sign}}+q_{\mathrm{qro}}+1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$.

Game: G_0–G_3

1   $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$
2   $(F, I) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
3   $(m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}^{\text{Sign}, |H\rangle}(F)$
4   **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i$ **then**
5   **return** 0
6   **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} H(r^*, m^*)$

$\text{Sign}^H(m_i)$ for G_0–G_2

1   **repeat**
2     $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
3     $x_i \leftarrow I(H(r_i, m_i))$ // G_0
4     $y_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$ // G_1–G_2
5     $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto y_i}$ // G_1
6     $x_i \leftarrow I(y_i)$ // G_1–G_2
7   **until** $x_i \neq \perp$
8   $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto y_i}$ // G_2
9   **return** (r_i, x_i)

$\text{Sign}^H(m_i)$ for G_3

1   $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
2   $x_i \leftarrow \text{SampDom}(F)$
3   $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto F(x_i)}$
4   **return** (r_i, x_i)

Fig. 10: Games for EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA

$\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}^{|H_b\rangle}()$ simulates G_0/G_1

1   $(F, I) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
2   $(m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}^{\text{Sign}, |H_b\rangle}(F)$
3   **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i$ **then**
4   **return** 0
5   **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} H_b(r^*, m^*)$

$\text{Sign}^{H_b, \text{Repro}}(m_i)$

1   **repeat**
2     $r_i \leftarrow \text{Repro}(m_i)$
3     $x_i \leftarrow I(H_b(r_i, m_i))$
4   **until** $x_i \neq \perp$
5   **return** (r_i, x_i)

$\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}^{|H_b\rangle}()$ simulates G_1/G_2

1   $H' := H_b$
2   $(F, I) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
3   $(m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}^{\text{Sign}, |H'\rangle}(F)$
4   **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i$ **then**
5   **return** 0
6   **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} H'(r^*, m^*)$

$\text{Sign}^{H', \text{Repro}}(m_i)$

1   **repeat**
2     $r_i \leftarrow \text{Repro}(m_i)$
3     $x_i \leftarrow I(H_b(r_i, m_i))$
4   **until** $x_i \neq \perp$
5   **repeat**
6     $y_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$
7     $x_i \leftarrow I(y_i)$
8   **until** $x_i \neq \perp$
9   $H' := H'^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto y_i}$
10   **return** (r_i, x_i)

$\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}}^{\text{Sample}_b}(F)$ simulates G_2/G_3

1   $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$
2   $(m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}^{\text{Sign}, |H\rangle}(F)$
3   **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i$ **then**
4   **return** 0
5   **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} H(r^*, m^*)$

$\text{Sign}^{H, \text{Sample}_b}(m_i)$

1   $(r_i, x_i) \leftarrow \text{Sample}_b()$
2   $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto F(x_i)}$
3   **return** (r_i, x_i)

$\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}}^{|H\rangle}(F)$ simulates G_3

1   $H' := H$
2   $(m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}^{\text{Sign}, |H'\rangle}(F)$
3   **if** $\exists i : m^* = m_i$ **then**
4   **return** 0
5   **return** $F(x^*) \stackrel{?}{=} H'(r^*, m^*)$

$\text{Sign}^{H'}(m_i)$

1   $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$
2   $x_i \leftarrow \text{SampDom}(F)$
3   $H' := H'^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto F(x_i)}$
4   **return** (r_i, x_i)

Fig. 11: Simulations for EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA

GAME G_2 (changing the timing of adaptive reprogramming on H): The adaptive reprogramming is executed only at the end of the signing oracle. That is, after generating y_i satisfying $I(y_i) \neq \perp$, the challenger reprograms $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto y_i}$ (see Line 8 in Sign^H of G_2).

As shown in the second row of Fig. 11, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$ can simulate G_1/G_2. Instead of using his challenge H_b, $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$ uses H' controlled by $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$. H' returns whatever H_b outputs except on $\{(r_i, m_i)\}_{i \in [q_{\text{sign}}]}$.

If $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$ plays AR_0 ($H_b = H_0$), $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$ simulates G_1, because H' is reprogrammed in Lines 2 and 9 of $\text{Sign}^{H', \text{Repro}}$ (corresponds to Line 5 in Sign^H of G_1). Otherwise ($H_b = H_1$), $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$ simulates G_2, because H' is reprogrammed only in Line 9 of $\text{Sign}^{H', \text{Repro}}$ (corresponds to Line 8 in Sign^H of G_2). Thus, $\left| \Pr\left[G_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr\left[G_2^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] \right| \leq \text{Adv}_H^{\text{AR}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}) \leq \frac{3}{2} \sqrt{\frac{q'_{\text{sign}} + q_{\text{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$ holds.

GAME G_3 (simulating the signing oracle by SampDom): Signatures are generated by $r_i \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$ and $x_i \leftarrow \text{SampDom}(F)$ in the signing oracle. We show that the PS adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}}$ can simulate G_2 and G_3 as in the third row of Fig. 11. The reprogramming $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto y_i}$ is identical to $H := H^{(r_i, m_i) \mapsto F(x_i)}$ (see Line 8 in Sign^H of G_2). Therefore, if $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}}$

ADVERSARY: $\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}(F)$	SIMULATOR: $\mathcal{S}(\theta)$ for $\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}(F)$
1 $(m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}(F)$	1 $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{X}}$
2 **return** (m^*, r^*, x^*)	2 $(r', m') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}}()$
	3 $H' := H^{(r',m')\mapsto\theta}$
	4 $x' \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H'\rangle}}(\theta)$
	5 **return** (m', r', x')

Fig. 12: A two-stage simulator $\mathcal{S}$ for EUF-NMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$

plays PS_0, the procedures of the original and simulated G_2 are the same. If $\mathcal{D}_{ps}$ plays PS_1, he obviously simulates G_3. Thus, we have $\left|\Pr\left[G_2^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \text{Adv}_{T_{wpsf}}^{PS}(\mathcal{D}_{ps})$.

We show that the EUF-NMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ can simulate G_3 as in the bottom row of Fig. 11. In the simulation $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ uses H' which outputs whatever H outputs except on $\{(r_i, m_i)\}_{i\in[q_{sign}]}$. When $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ wins the EUF-CMA game by submitting (m^*, r^*, x^*), $F(x^*) = H'(r^*, m^*)$ holds. From $m^* \neq m_i$ for all $i \in [q_{sign}]$, $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ wins his game since $H'(r^*, m^*) = H(r^*, m^*)$ holds. Hence, $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ can perfectly simulate G_3 with the same number of queries and almost the same running time as $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$, and $\Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \leq \text{Adv}_{HaS[T_{wpsf},H]}^{EUF-NMA}(\mathcal{A}_{nma})$ holds.

Summing up, we have Eq. (5).

INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-NMA: We use Lemma 2.2. Let $\mathcal{S}$ be a two-stage algorithm that runs $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ in the EUF-NMA game shown in Fig. 12. The INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ runs $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ indirectly by $\mathcal{S}$. Since y is uniformly chosen in the INV game, $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ can set the input for $\mathcal{S}$ as $\theta := y$. In the first stage, $\mathcal{S}_1$ observes one of the quantum queries to H made by $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ at random to obtain (r', m'). Then, H is reprogrammed as $H' := H^{(r',m')\mapsto\theta}$. In the second stage, $\mathcal{S}_2$ runs $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ with reprogrammed H' and outputs $(m', r', x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H'\rangle}(F)$.

When the predicate is $F(x) \overset{?}{=} H(r, m)$, we have the following inequality for any $(\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \in \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}$ from Lemma 2.2:

$$\Pr\left[(r', m') = (\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \wedge F(x') = y : (r', m') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}}(), x' \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H'\rangle}}(y)\right]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{(2q_{qro} + 1)^2} \Pr\left[(r^*, m^*) = (\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \wedge F(x^*) = H(r^*, m^*) : (m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}(F)\right].$$

By summing up over all $(\hat{r}, \hat{m}) \in \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Pr\left[F(x') = y : (r', m') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}}(), x' \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H'\rangle}}(y)\right]$$

$$\geq \frac{1}{(2q_{qro} + 1)^2} \Pr\left[F(x^*) = H(r^*, m^*) : (m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}(F)\right]. \quad (6)$$

Notice that the probability in the RHS of Eq. (6) is the EUF-NMA advantage, that is, $\Pr\left[F(x^*) = H(r^*, m^*) : (m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{nma}^{H}(F)\right] = \text{Adv}_{HaS[T_{wpsf},H]}^{EUF-NMA}(\mathcal{A}_{nma})$. The LHS satisfies: $\text{Adv}_{T_{wpsf}}^{INV}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}) \geq \Pr\left[F(x') = y : (r', m') \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_1^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H\rangle}}(), x' \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_2^{\mathcal{A}_{nma}^{|H'\rangle}}(y)\right]$. Hence, we have

$$\text{Adv}_{HaS[T_{wpsf},H]}^{EUF-NMA}(\mathcal{A}_{nma}) \leq (2q_{qro} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}_{T_{wpsf}}^{INV}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}). \quad (7)$$

From Eqs. (5) and (7), we have Eq. (4). $\qquad\qquad\square$

4.2 Extension to sEUF-CMA Security

If F is injective, $HaS[T_{wpsf}, H]$ is sEUF-CMA-secure.

Corollary 4.1 (INV ⇒ sEUF-CMA). *Suppose that F of T_{wpsf} is an injection. For any quantum sEUF-CMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ of $HaS[T_{wpsf}, H]$ issuing at most q_{sign} classical queries to the signing oracle and q_{qro} (quantum) random oracle queries to $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, there exist an INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ of T_{wpsf} and a PS adversary $\mathcal{D}_{ps}$ of T_{wpsf} issuing q_{sign} sampling queries such that*

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{sEUF-CMA}}_{HaS[T_{wpsf}, H]}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) \leq (2q_{qro} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}^{\text{INV}}_{T_{wpsf}}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}) + \text{Adv}^{\text{PS}}_{T_{wpsf}}(\mathcal{D}_{ps})$$

$$+ 3q'_{sign}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{sign} + q_{qro} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}},$$

where q'_{sign} is the total number of queries to H in all the signing queries, and the running times of $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{ps}$ are about that of $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$.

Proof. The sEUF-CMA game outputs 0 if $\exists i, (m^*, r^*, x^*) = (m_i, r_i, x_i)$. Since F is injective, $(m^*, r^*) = (m_i, r_i)$ implies $x^* = x_i$. Therefore, the condition to output 0 is re-stated as: if $\exists i, (m^*, r^*) = (m_i, r_i)$. We show that EUF-NMA ⇒ sEUF-CMA with the same bound as Eq. (5) holds.

In the games defined in Theorem 4.1 (see Fig. 10), the same bound on $\left| \Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] \right|$ holds. In the simulation of G_3 (see the bottom row of Fig. 11), $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ makes $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ use the H' reprogrammed on $\{(r_i, m_i)\}_{i \in [q_{sign}]}$ instead of the original H. If $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ playing sEUF-CMA game outputs (m^*, r^*, x^*) such that $F(x^*) = H'(r^*, m^*)$, where $H'(r^*, m^*) \neq H(r^*, m^*)$, $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ cannot win his game. Since $(m^*, r^*) \neq (m_i, r_i)$ for any i, $H'(r^*, m^*) = H(r^*, m^*)$ holds and $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ can win his game. Therefore, $\mathcal{A}_{nma}$ can simulate G_3 and $\Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{A}_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{EUF-NMA}}_{HaS[T_{wpsf}, H]}(\mathcal{A}_{nma})$ holds. Hence, EUF-NMA ⇒ sEUF-CMA holds with the same bound as Eq. (5). □ □

5 Applications of New Security Proof

This section shows the applications of Theorem 4.1 (the main theorem) to some code-based and MQ-based hash-and-sign signatures. We briefly review the underlying TDFs of the signatures in Appendix A. Note that in lattice-based cryptography, all the practical and provable secure hash-and-sign signatures use collision-resistant PSFs given by the GPV framework [GPV08]. Since the tight reduction in the QROM already exists for the GPV framework [BDF⁺11], it is unnecessary to apply Theorem 4.1.

5.1 Code-based Cryptography

Application to the Modified CSF Signature: Dallot [Dal07] proposed a modification to the CFS signature, that is, adaption of the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry. Let $T_{cfs} = (\text{Gen}_{cfs}, F_{cfs}, I_{cfs})$ be the underlying TDF of the modified CFS signature. Note that F_{cfs} is injective and Morozov et al. gave a reduction INV ⇒ sEUF-CMA in the ROM [MRSX18, Theorem 3.1]. From the injection of F_{cfs}, we show that the modified CFS signature is sEUF-CMA-secure also in the QROM, assuming that T_{cfs} is non-invertible.

Proposition 5.1 (INV ⇒ sEUF-CMA (Modified CFS Signature)). *For any quantum sEUF-CMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ of $HaS[T_{cfs}, H]$ issuing at most q_{sign} classical queries to the signing oracle and q_{qro} (quantum) random oracle queries to $H \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, there exists an INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ of T_{cfs} such that*

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{sEUF-CMA}}_{HaS[T_{cfs}, H]}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) \leq (2q_{qro} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}^{\text{INV}}_{T_{cfs}}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}) + 3q'_{sign}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{sign} + q_{qro} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}},$$

where q'_{sign} is the total number of queries to H in all the signing queries, and the running time of $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ is about that of $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$.

Proof. Since $\mathsf{F}_{cfs} : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is injective, we can apply Corollary 4.1. Outputs of $\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}_{cfs})$ follow $\mathsf{U}(\mathcal{X})$, since a domain value of F_{cfs} can be sampled by $x \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{X}$. From the injection of F_{cfs}, $x := \mathsf{I}_{cfs}(y)$ for $y \leftarrow_\$ \{y \in \mathcal{Y} : \exists x, \mathsf{F}_{cfs}(x) = y\}$ follows $\mathsf{U}(\mathcal{X})$. Hence, $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T}_{cfs}}(\mathcal{D}_{ps}) = 0$ holds and we obtain the claimed bound. $\qquad\qquad\square \qquad\qquad\square$

Application to Wave: Wave is a practical and unbroken hash-and-sign signature [DST19]. Wave's TDF T_{wave} satisfies conditions of *average trapdoor PSF (ATPSF)* [CD20, Definition 2] that is a special case of WPSF satisfying:

1. There is a bound δ on the average of $\delta_{\mathsf{F},\mathsf{I}}$ over all $(\mathsf{F},\mathsf{I}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, that is, $\mathbb{E}_{\mathsf{F},\mathsf{I}}(\delta_{\mathsf{F},\mathsf{I}}) \leq \delta$, where $\delta_{\mathsf{F},\mathsf{I}} = \Delta(\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}), \mathsf{I}(\mathsf{U}(\mathcal{Y})))$ is a statistical distance between $\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F})$ and $\mathsf{I}(y)$ for $y \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}$ (**relaxed Condition 2**).
2. $\mathsf{I}(y)$ outputs x satisfying $\mathsf{F}(x) = y$ for any $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ (**Condition 3**).

Wave adopts the probabilistic hash-and-sign (without retry) to apply the reduction of EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA by Chailloux and Debris-Alazard [CD20] (see Section 3.2). We show that Wave is EUF-CMA-secure assuming that Wave's TDF $\mathsf{T}_{wave} = (\mathsf{Gen}_{wave}, \mathsf{F}_{wave}, \mathsf{I}_{wave})$ is non-invertible.

Proposition 5.2 (INV $\Rightarrow$ EUF-CMA (Wave)). *For any quantum EUF-CMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$ of $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{wave}, \mathsf{H}]$ issuing at most q_{sign} classical queries to the signing oracle and q_{qro} (quantum) random oracle queries to $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, there exists an INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ of T_{wave} such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{wave},\mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{cma}) \leq (2q_{qro} + 1)^2 \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{wave}}(\mathcal{B}_{inv}) + q_{sign}\delta + 3q_{sign}\sqrt{\frac{q_{sign} + q_{qro} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}},$$

where the running time of $\mathcal{B}_{inv}$ is about that of $\mathcal{A}_{cma}$.

Proof. Since T_{wave} is WPSF, we can apply Theorem 4.1. From **Condition 3**, the total number of random oracle queries q'_{sign} equals that of signing queries q_{sign}. Also, the advantage $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T}_{wave}}(\mathcal{D}_{ps})$ is statistically bounded by $q_{sign}\delta$ [CD20, Proposition 1]. Substitution of $q'_{sign} = q_{sign}$ and $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T}_{wave}}(\mathcal{D}_{ps}) = q_{sign}\delta$ to Eq. (4) yields the claimed bound. $\quad\square \quad\square$

Compared with the existing reduction using Eq. (2) [CD20], the factor of δ is not a square root in our reduction. Also, its security can be proved on the basis of hardness assumption of the syndrome decoding since there is a tight reduction from the syndrome decoding to the INV of T_{wave} [CD20, Proposition 8].

5.2 Multivariate-quadratic-based Cryptography

Many schemes based on the UOV [KPG99] and HFE [Pat96] signatures have been proposed. Sakumoto et al. proposed modifications of the schemes adopting the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry, and the modified schemes are EUF-CMA-secure in the ROM [SSH11]. We prove that the modified UOV/HFE signatures are EUF-CMA-secure in the QROM if their TDFs are non-invertible. By the proof, we can show the EUF-CMA security of concrete signature schemes based on these two schemes, including Rainbow [DCP+20], QR-UOV [FIKT21], and GeMSS [CFM+20]. Also, we prove the EUF-CMA security of MAYO [Beu21] whose TDF is quite different from the original UOV signature.

Application to the Modified UOV Signature: Let $\mathsf{T}_{uov} = (\mathsf{Gen}_{uov}, \mathsf{F}_{uov}, \mathsf{I}_{uov})$ be a TDF used in the modified UOV signature. The trapdoor I_{uov} is divided into two functions; I^1_{uov} and I^2_{uov}; therefore, the signing procedure is different from the others. Fig. 13 shows a signature generation of the modified UOV signature. I^1_{uov} chooses z at the beginning. I^2_{uov} finds a preimage x corresponding to z and $\mathsf{H}(r, m)$ (see the full description in Appendix A.4). Preimages generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{uov}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ are uniform over $\mathcal{X}$, and they are indistinguishable from $x \leftarrow \mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}_{uov})$. From this fact, we show the EUF-CMA security of the modified UOV signature in the QROM.

```
HaS[T_uov, H].Sign(I_uov, m)

1  z ← I¹_uov()
2  repeat
3     r ←$ R
4     x ← I²_uov(z, H(r, m))
5  until x ≠ ⊥
6  return (r, x)
```

```
Sample₀()

1  z_i ← I¹_uov()
2  repeat
3     r_i ←$ R
4     y_i ←$ Y
5     x_i ← I²_uov(z_i, y_i)
6  until x_i ≠ ⊥
7  return (r_i, x_i)
```

Fig. 13: A signature generation algorithm of the modified UOV signature.

Fig. 14: Sample_0 for the modified UOV in the PS game.

Proposition 5.3 (INV ⇒ EUF-CMA (Modified UOV Signature)). *For any quantum* EUF-CMA *adversary* $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{cma}}$ *of* $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}}, \mathsf{H}]$ *issuing at most* q_{sign} *classical queries to the signing oracle and* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, *there exists an* INV *adversary* $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{inv}}$ *of* $\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}}$ *such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}},\mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{cma}}) \le (2q_{\mathsf{qro}} + 1)^2 \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{inv}}) + 3q'_{\mathsf{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{\mathsf{sign}} + q_{\mathsf{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}},$$

where q'_{sign} *is the total number of queries to* H *in all the signing queries, and the running time of* $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{inv}}$ *is about that of* $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{cma}}$.

Proof. We modify Sample_0 of the PS game as in Fig. 14. Then, $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{ps}}$ playing the modified PS game can simulate G_2 ($b = 0$) and G_3 ($b = 1$) in the proof of Theorem 4.1 (see the third row of Fig. 11). Hence, we can apply Theorem 4.1 to the modified UOV scheme. Since preimages generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ are indistinguishable from outputs of $\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{uov}})$, $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{ps}}) = 0$ holds. Substitution of $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PS}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{uov}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{ps}}) = 0$ to Eq. (4) yields the claimed bound. □ □

If Rainbow [DCP⁺20] and QR-UOV [FIKT21] make the same modification as the modified UOV signature, we can apply Proposition 5.3 to these schemes.

Application to the Modified HFE Signature: Let $\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}} = (\mathsf{Gen}_{\mathsf{hfe}}, \mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{hfe}}, \mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{hfe}})$ be a TDF used in the modified HFE scheme. As in the modified UOV signature, preimages generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ are uniform over $\mathcal{X}$, and they are indistinguishable from $x \leftarrow \mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{hfe}})$. Therefore, the modified HFE signature is EUF-CMA secure as follows:

Proposition 5.4 (INV ⇒ EUF-CMA (Modified HFE Signature)). *For any quantum* EUF-CMA *adversary* $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{cma}}$ *of* $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}}, \mathsf{H}]$ *issuing at most* q_{sign} *classical queries to the signing oracle and* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, *there exists an* INV *adversary* $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{inv}}$ *of* $\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}}$ *such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}},\mathsf{H}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{cma}}) \le (2q_{\mathsf{qro}} + 1)^2 \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{inv}}) + 3q'_{\mathsf{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{\mathsf{sign}} + q_{\mathsf{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}},$$

where q'_{sign} *is the total number of queries to* H *in all the signing queries, and the running time of* $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{inv}}$ *is about that of* $\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{cma}}$.

Proof. Since preimages generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{hfe}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ and outputs of $\mathsf{SampDom}(\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{hfe}})$ are indistinguishable, we have the same bound as Proposition 5.3. □ □

Since GeMSS [CFM⁺20] takes the same modification, we can apply Proposition 5.4 to GeMSS.

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Sign^H(m_i) for G'_2
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1  r_i ←_$ R
2  y_i ←_$ Y
3  x_i ← I_mayo(y_i)
4  if x_i = ⊥ then
5      abort
6  H := H^(r_i,m_i)↦y_i
7  return (r_i, x_i)
```

Fig. 15: A signing oracle for G'_2 in the application of Theorem 4.1 to MAYO.

Application to MAYO: MAYO is a signature scheme adopting the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry and its TDF is based on UOV [Beu21]. Let $T_{mayo} = (Gen_{mayo}, F_{mayo}, I_{mayo})$ be a TDF used in MAYO. $HaS[T_{mayo}, H]$.Sign has an interesting property related to **Condition 2**. If $HaS[T_{mayo}, H]$.Sign outputs a preimage x *without retry*, x is uniformly distributed over X, and it is indistinguishable from $x \leftarrow SampDom(F_{mayo})$. Let τ be a bound on the probability that I_{mayo} outputs $\bot$, which induces the retry in the signature generation. MAYO offers 'no leakage' parameter sets that satisfy $\tau \leq 2^{-65}$.

Proposition 5.5 (INV ⇒ EUF-CMA (MAYO)). *For any quantum* EUF-CMA *adversary* A_{cma} *of* $HaS[T_{mayo}, H]$ *issuing at most* q_{sign} *classical queries to the signing oracle and* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* $H \leftarrow_$ Y^{R×M}$, *there exists an* INV *adversary* B_{inv} *of* T_{mayo} *such that*

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{EUF\text{-}CMA}_{HaS[T_{mayo},H]}(A_{cma}) \leq \frac{(2q_{qro}+1)^2}{1-q_{sign}\tau}\mathrm{Adv}^{INV}_{T_{mayo}}(B_{inv}) + 3q'_{sign}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{sign}+q_{qro}+1}{|R|}},$$

where q'_{sign} *is the total number of queries to* H *in all the signing queries, and the running time of* B_{inv} *is about that of* A_{cma}.

Proof. We apply Theorem 4.1 with defining an intermediate game G'_2 as in Fig. 15. G'_2 is the same as G_2 except that G'_2 aborts and outputs 0 if I_{mayo} outputs $\bot$. Since I_{mayo} outputs $\bot$ with probability τ, the probability that G'_2 does not abort while q_{sign} signing queries is at least $1 - q_{sign}\tau$. Therefore, $\Pr\left[G_2^{A_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{1-q_{sign}\tau}\Pr\left[G'_2{}^{A_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$ holds. If I_{mayo} does not output $\bot$ in G'_2, the signing oracle of G'_2 can be simulated by $SampDom(F_{mayo})$. Therefore, the adversary of G_3 perfectly simulates the signing oracle in the case that G'_2 does not abort by using his oracle, and the view of the adversary is identical in the simulated one with the case that G'_2 does not abort. Hence, $\Pr\left[G'_2{}^{A_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \leq \Pr\left[G_3^{A_{cma}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$ holds. We thus have $\mathrm{Adv}^{EUF\text{-}CMA}_{HaS[T_{mayo},H]}(A_{cma}) \leq \frac{1}{1-q_{sign}\tau}\mathrm{Adv}^{EUF\text{-}NMA}_{HaS[T_{mayo},H]}(A_{nma})$, which yields the claimed bound. □ □

6 Provable Security of Hash-and-Sign with Prefix Hashing in Multi-key Setting

We show that the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry is M-EUF-CMA-secure when *prefix hashing* [DHK+21] is adopted. In prefix hashing, the hash function H includes a small unpredictable part of the verification key. Let $H : U×R×M → Y$ be a hash function and $HaS^{ph}[T, H, E]$ be a signature scheme adopting the probabilistic hash-and-sign with retry and prefix hashing, where $E : Y^X → U$ is a deterministic function to extract a small unpredictable part of F into a key ID $u \in U$. We assume that $E(F)$ is uniform over U for $(F, I) \leftarrow Gen(1^\lambda)$. [10] For a message m, $HaS^{ph}[T, H, E]$.Sign repeats $r \leftarrow R$ and $x \leftarrow I(H(E(F), r, m))$ until $x \neq \bot$, and outputs (r, x). For a verification key F, a message m, and a signature (r, x), $HaS^{ph}[T, H, E]$.Vrfy verifies by $F(x) \stackrel{?}{=} H(E(F), r, m)$.

We have the following as an extension of Theorem 4.1 (we show the proof in Appendix B.1).

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[10] If unpredictable parts do not exist or are computationally expensive to include in H, a fixed nonce can be used instead (the nonce is put in the verification key).

GAME: ST$_b$	NewKey$_0$()	NewKey$_1$()
1 $(F, I) \leftarrow \text{Gen}'(1^\lambda)$	1 $(F_j, I_j) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$	1 $L_j \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_L$
2 $b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{st}}^{\text{NewKey}_b}(F)$	2 **return** F_j	2 $R_j \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_R$
3 **return** b^*		3 $F_j := L_j \circ F \circ R_j$
		4 **return** F_j

Fig. 16: A sandwich transformation (ST) game.

Theorem 6.1 (M-INV ⇒ M-EUF-CMA). *For any quantum* M-EUF-CMA *adversary* $\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}$ *of* $\text{HaS}^{\text{ph}}[T_{\text{wpsf}}, H, E]$ *with* q_{key} *keys and issuing at most* q_{sign} *classical queries to the signing oracle and* q_{qro} *(quantum) random oracle queries to* $H \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, *there exist an* M-INV $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}$ *of* T_{wpsf} *with* q_{inst} *instances and an* M-PS *adversary* $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}$ *of* T_{wpsf} *with* q_{key} *instances and issuing* q_{sign} *sampling queries such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HaS}^{\text{ph}}[T_{\text{wpsf}}, H, E]}^{\text{M-EUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}) \leq (2q_{\text{qro}} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}_{T_{\text{wpsf}}}^{\text{M-INV}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}) + \text{Adv}_{T_{\text{wpsf}}}^{\text{M-PS}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m})$$

$$+ 3q'_{\text{sign}} \sqrt{\frac{q'_{\text{sign}} + q_{\text{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}} + \frac{q_{\text{key}}^2}{|\mathcal{U}|}, \tag{8}$$

where q'_{sign} *is a bound on the number of random oracle queries to* H *in all the signing queries,* $\mathbb{E}(q_{\text{inst}}) \leq q_{\text{key}} \left(\frac{|\mathcal{U}|}{|\mathcal{U}| - q_{\text{key}} + 1} \right)$ *over all* $(F, I) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, *and the running times of* $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}$ *and* $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}$ *are about that of* $\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}$.

Also, we have the following (see the proof of Lemma 7.2 in Appendix B.3).

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HaS}^{\text{ph}}[T_{\text{psf}}, H, E]}^{\text{M-sEUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}) \leq \frac{1}{1 - 2^{-\omega(\log n)}} \text{Adv}_{T_{\text{psf}}}^{\text{M-CR}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}^m}) + \frac{q_{\text{key}}^2}{|\mathcal{U}|}$$

7 Generic Method for Single-key to Multi-key Reduction.

There are trivial reductions with bounds; $\text{Adv}_T^{\text{M-INV}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}) \leq q_{\text{inst}} \text{Adv}_T^{\text{INV}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}})$ and $\text{Adv}_T^{\text{M-CR}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}^m}) \leq q_{\text{inst}} \text{Adv}_T^{\text{CR}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{cr}})$. If the adversaries can target multiple instances simultaneously, equality may hold in these inequalities. If we do not assume any security property on the underlying TDF, we cannot deny the feasibility of such attacks. To solve this problem, we propose a generic method for the single-key to multi-key reductions, that is, INV ⇒ M-EUF-CMA and CR ⇒ M-EUF-CMA.

Let $\{F_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{key}}]}$ be verification keys generated by Gen of a TDF T in the M-EUF-CMA game. Let us consider the following procedure producing $\{F_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{key}}]}$ from a single key F as follows: Given a verification key $F : \mathcal{X}' \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}'$ generated by Gen' of another TDF T', simulates multiple verification keys $\{L_j \circ F \circ R_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{key}}]}$ by choosing $L_j : \mathcal{Y}' \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $R_j : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}'$. Let $\mathcal{D}_L$ and $\mathcal{D}_R$ be distributions of L_j and R_j. We note that the domains and the ranges of F and F_j's may differ.

We define a new game to give a bound on the distinguishing advantage of $\{F_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{key}}]}$ and $\{L_j \circ F \circ R_j\}_{j \in [q_{\text{key}}]}$.

Definition 7.1 (Sandwich Transformation (ST) Game). *Let* T *and* T' *be TDFs. Using a game given in* Fig. 16, *we define an advantage function of an adversary playing the* ST *game against* T *and* T' *as* $\text{Adv}_{T, T'}^{\text{ST}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{st}}) = \left| \Pr \left[\text{ST}_0^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{st}}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{ST}_1^{\mathcal{D}_{\text{st}}} \Rightarrow 1 \right] \right|$.

Note that we use a term, *valid* preimage, in this section. A *valid* preimage is a preimage that satisfies some conditions, e.g., *shortness* in lattice-based and code-based cryptography.

We have the following single-key to multi-key reductions assuming some conditions on L_j and R_j (see the proofs in Appendices B.2 and B.3).

Lemma 7.1 (INV ⇒ M-EUF-CMA). *Suppose that verification keys in the* M-EUF-CMA *game are simulated by* $\{\mathsf{L}_j \circ \mathsf{F} \circ \mathsf{R}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{key}}]}$ *that satisfy:*

1. $\mathsf{L}_j \colon \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Y}$ *is a bijection.*
2. *For any valid preimage x of F_j, $\mathsf{R}_j(x)$ is a valid preimage of F ($\mathsf{R}_j \colon \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}'$).*

For any quantum M-EUF-CMA *adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}$ of* $\mathsf{HaS}^{\mathrm{ph}}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{E}]$ *with q_{key} keys and issuing at most q_{sign} classical queries to the signing oracle and q_{qro} (quantum) random oracle queries to $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, there exist an* INV *adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ of $\mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{wpsf}}$ with q_{inst} instances, an* M-PS *adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps^m}}$ of $\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}$ with q_{key} instances and issuing q_{sign} sampling queries, and an* ST *adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}$ of $(\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}, \mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{wpsf}})$ issuing q_{key} new key queries such that*

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}EUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}^{\mathrm{ph}}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{E}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}) \leq (2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2 \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{\mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}) + \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}PS}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps^m}})$$

$$+ \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{ST}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{wpsf}}, \mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}) + 3q'_{\mathrm{sign}} \sqrt{\frac{q'_{\mathrm{sign}} + q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1}{|\mathcal{R}|}} + \frac{q^2_{\mathrm{key}}}{|\mathcal{U}|},$$

where q'_{sign} is a bound on the number of random oracle queries to H in all the signing queries, $\mathbb{E}(q_{\mathrm{inst}}) \leq q_{\mathrm{key}} \left(\frac{|\mathcal{U}|}{|\mathcal{U}| - q_{\mathrm{key}} + 1} \right)$ over all $(\mathsf{F}, \mathsf{I}) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, and the running times of $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$, $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{ps^m}}$, and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}$ are about that of $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}$.

Lemma 7.2 (CR ⇒ M-sEUF-CMA). *Suppose that verification keys in the* M-sEUF-CMA *game are simulated by* $\{\mathsf{L}_j \circ \mathsf{F} \circ \mathsf{R}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{key}}]}$ *that satisfy:*

1. $\mathsf{R}_j \colon \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{X}'$ *and* $\mathsf{L}_j \colon \mathcal{Y}' \to \mathcal{Y}$ *are injections.*
2. *For any valid preimage x of F_j, $\mathsf{R}_j(x)$ is a valid preimage of F.*

For any quantum M-sEUF-CMA *adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}$ of* $\mathsf{HaS}^{\mathrm{ph}}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{E}]$ *with q_{key} keys and issuing at most q_{sign} classical queries to the signing oracle and q_{qro} (quantum) random oracle queries to $\mathsf{H} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{Y}^{\mathcal{U} \times \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{M}}$, there exist a* CR *adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}$ of $\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}$ with q_{inst} instances and an* ST *adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}$ of $(\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{psf}})$ issuing q_{key} new key queries such that*

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}sEUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathsf{HaS}^{\mathrm{ph}}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{H}, \mathsf{E}]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}) \leq \frac{1}{1 - 2^{-\omega(\log n)}} \left(\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{CR}}_{\mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}) + \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{ST}}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}) \right) + \frac{q^2_{\mathrm{key}}}{|\mathcal{U}|},$$

where $\mathbb{E}(q_{\mathrm{inst}}) \leq q_{\mathrm{key}} \left(\frac{|\mathcal{U}|}{|\mathcal{U}| - q_{\mathrm{key}} + 1} \right)$ over all $(\mathsf{F}, \mathsf{I}) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, and the running times of $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}$ are about that of $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}$.

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A Review of Trapdoor Functions in Hash-and-sign Signatures

A.1 GPV Framework [GPV08]

Let $T_{gpv} = (Gen_{gpv}, F_{gpv}, I_{gpv})$ be a TDF used in the GPV framework. Gen_{gpv} outputs a full-rank matrix $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ generating a q-ary lattice Λ as F_{gpv} and a matrix B generating $\Lambda_q^{\perp}$ that is orthogonal to Λ modulo q as I_{gpv}. The function F_{gpv} computes $y = xA^T$ for a short vector $x \in \{x \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \|x\| \leq s\sqrt{m}\}$, where s is a Gaussian parameter. The trapdoor I_{gpv} outputs a short vector x for $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ using B. T_{gpv} is collision-resistant PSF (see Definition 2.4) whose security is based on the hardness of the short integer solution (SIS) problem [GPV08, Theorem 4.9].

A.2 Modified CFS Signature [Dal07]

Let $T_{cfs} = (Gen_{cfs}, F_{cfs}, I_{cfs})$ be a TDF used in the modified CFS signature. $\mathcal{X}_{n,\leq t} = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : 0 < hw(x) \leq t\}$ denotes a set of vectors $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ whose Hamming weight, denoted by $hw(x)$, is at most t. Gen_{cfs} generates a parity-check matrix

HaS[T_{uov}, H].Sign(I_{uov}, m)	$I_{uov}^1()$
1 $z^v \leftarrow I_{uov}^1()$	1 $z^v \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}_q^v$
2 **repeat**	2 **return** z^v
3 $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$	
4 $x \leftarrow I_{uov}^2(z^v, H(r, m))$	$I_{uov}^2(z^v, y)$
5 **until** $x \neq \perp$	1 **if** $\{z^o : P(z^v, z^o) = y\} = \varnothing$ **then**
6 **return** (r, x)	2 **return** $\perp$
	3 $z^o \leftarrow_\$ \{z^o : P(z^v, z^o) = y\}$
	4 $x := S^{-1}(z^v, z^o)$
	5 **return** x

Fig. 17: A signature generation algorithm of the modified UOV signature (full description).

$H_0 \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}$ of an (n, k)-binary Goppa code, a random invertible matrix $U \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times(n-k)}$, and a random permutation matrix $P \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n\times n}$, and outputs $H = UH_0P \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}$ as F_{cfs} and (U, H_0, P) as I_{cfs}. On input $x \in \mathcal{X}_{n,\leq t}$, the function F_{cfs} computes a syndrome $y := xH^T \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$. On input $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$, the trapdoor I_{cfs} composed of (U, H_0, P) computes an error vector as follows: It decodes $y(U^{-1})^T$ using H_0 to obtain x', and outputs an error vector $x = x'(P^{-1})^T$; if $y(U^{-1})^T$ is not decodable, it outputs $\perp$. Since the (n, k)-binary Goppa code can decode up to t errors, there is a one-to-one correspondence between $\mathcal{X}_{n,\leq t}$ and $\mathcal{Y}_{dec} = \{y \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k} : y(U^{-1})^T \text{ is decodable}\}$ (decodable syndromes). Therefore, $F_{cfs} : \mathcal{X}_{n,\leq t} \to \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$ is not surjection but injection.

A.3 Wave [DST19]

Let $T_{wave} = (Gen_{wave}, F_{wave}, I_{wave})$ be a TDF used in Wave and $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}$ be a parity-check matrix for an (n, k)-code over $\mathbb{F}_q$. $\mathcal{X}_{n,t} = \{x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n : hw(x) = t\}$ denotes a set of vectors $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ whose Hamming weight is exactly t, where t is chosen such that $F_{wave} : \mathcal{X}_{n,t} \to \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$ is surjection. Gen_{wave} outputs a parity-check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k)\times n}$ for an (n, k)-code over $\mathbb{F}_q$ as F_{wave} and parity-check matrices of generalized $(U, U + V)$-codes as I_{wave}. On input $x \in \mathcal{X}_{n,t}$, the function F_{wave} computes a syndrome $y := xH^T \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$. On input $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-k}$, the trapdoor I_{wave} outputs an element of $\mathcal{X}_{n,t}$. Since a description of I_{wave} is out of the scope of this paper, we omit the description.

   As shown in Section 5.1, T_{wave} is a special case of WPSF that has a statistical property related to **Condition 2** of PSF and satisfies **Condition 3**. We can take a statistical bound on the distinguishing advantage of honestly generated signatures and simulated ones.

A.4 Modified UOV Signature [SSH11]

Let $T_{uov} = (Gen_{uov}, F_{uov}, I_{uov})$ be a TDF used in the modified UOV signatures. Gen_{uov} generates an invertible affine map $S : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^n$ and a multivariate quadratic polynomial $P : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ defined as $P = (P^1, P^2, \dots, P^m)$, where

$$P^k(z^v, z^o) = \sum_{i\in[v+o]} \sum_{j\in[v]} \alpha_{i,j}^k z_i z_j,$$

and outputs $P \circ S$ as F_{uov} and (P, S) as I_{uov}. Variables in P are called vinegar variables $z^v = (z_1, z_2, \dots, z_v) \in \mathbb{F}_q^v$ and oil variables $z^o = (z_{v+1}, z_{v+2}, \dots, z_{v+o}) \in \mathbb{F}_q^o$, where $n = v + o$. On input $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$, the trapdoor I_{uov} computes a preimage $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ as follows: It chooses vinegar variables z^v uniformly at random. Fixing z^v, P becomes a set of linear functions on oil variables z^o. Therefore, it is easy to find a preimage of $P \circ S$ by solving a linear equation system and taking the inverse of S. There is possibly no solution. In the original UOV signature [KPG99], the signing algorithm retakes the vinegar variables z^v. The modified UOV signature fixes vinegar variables z^v and retakes r instead. Fig. 17 shows a full description of the signature generation HaS[T_{uov}, H].Sign.

$$
\begin{array}{l}
\underline{\mathsf{I_{hfe}}(y)} \\
\text{1} \quad y' \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}_q^m \\
\text{2} \quad z := \phi^{-1}(S'^{-1}(y\|y')) \\
\text{3} \quad i \leftarrow_\$ [N] \\
\text{4} \quad \textbf{if } i \notin \big[\,|\{z' : \mathsf{P}(z') = z\}|\,\big] \textbf{ then} \\
\text{5} \qquad \textbf{return } \bot \\
\text{6} \quad z' \leftarrow_\$ \{z' : \mathsf{P}(z') = z\} \\
\text{7} \quad x := S^{-1}(\phi(z')) \\
\text{8} \quad \textbf{return } x
\end{array}
$$

Fig. 18: A trapdoor of the modified HFE signature.

The authors of [SSH11] showed that preimages generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T_{uov}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ are uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}_q^n$. For completeness, we give the proof sketch.

In the beginning, z^v is uniformly chosen (z^v follows $U(\mathbb{F}_q^v)$). By fixing z^v, $\mathsf{P}(z^v, \cdot)$ becomes a set of linear functions containing $o \times o$ matrix whose rank is determined by choice of z^v if solutions exist. When the rank is i, $\mathsf{P}(z^v, \cdot)$ becomes a q^{o-i}-to-1 mapping for each element in the range $\mathbb{F}_q^m$. There are only q^i possible outputs of H satisfying $\{z^o : \mathsf{P}(z^v, z^o) = \mathsf{H}(r, m)\} \neq \emptyset$. When H is a random function, one of the q^i outputs is uniformly chosen after some retries. Once the output is fixed, one of q^{o-i} solutions is uniformly chosen. In this way, z^o follows $U(\mathbb{F}_q^o)$ and thus $x = S^{-1}(z^v, z^o)$ follows $U(\mathbb{F}_q^n)$.

A.5 Modified HFE Signature [SSH11]

Let $\mathsf{T_{hfe}} = (\mathsf{Gen_{hfe}}, \mathsf{F_{hfe}}, \mathsf{I_{hfe}})$ be a TDF used in the modified HFE signature and $\phi : K \to \mathbb{F}_q^n$ be a standard linear isomorphism $\phi(a_0 + a_1 x + \cdots + a_{n-1}x^{n-1}) = (a_0, a_1, \ldots, a_{n-1})$, where $K = \mathbb{F}_q[x]/g(x)$ for an irreducible polynomial $g(x)$ of degree n. $\mathsf{Gen_{hfe}}$ generates invertible affine maps (S, S') over $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ and a central map $\mathsf{P} : K \to K$ defined as

$$
\mathsf{P}(X) = \sum_{\substack{(i,j) \in [n] \times [n] \\ \text{s.t. } q^{i-1}+q^{j-1} < d}} \alpha_{i,j} X^{q^{i-1}+q^{j-1}} + \sum_{\substack{i \in [n] \\ \text{s.t. } q^{i-1} < d}} \beta_i X^{q^{i-1}},
$$

where $\alpha_{i,j}, \beta_i \in K$, and outputs $S' \circ \phi \circ \mathsf{P} \circ \phi^{-1} \circ S$ as $\mathsf{F_{hfe}}$ and (P, S, S') as $\mathsf{I_{hfe}}$. On input $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n-m}$, $\mathsf{I_{hfe}}$ computes a preimage $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ as in Fig. 18.

As in the modified UOV signature, the authors of [SSH11] showed that preimages generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T_{hfe}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ are uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}_q^n$. We give the proof sketch too.

When H is a random function, each $z \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ is chosen with probability $\frac{1}{q^n}$. With probability $\frac{|\{z' : \mathsf{P}(z')=z\}|}{N}$, $\mathsf{I_{hfe}}$ does not output $\bot$ and chooses z' out of $|\{z' : \mathsf{P}(z') = z\}|$ elements, where N is set as d in general. Therefore, for any $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T_{hfe}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ outputs x with probability

$$
\frac{1}{q^n} \cdot \frac{|\{z' : \mathsf{P}(z')=z\}|}{N} \cdot \frac{1}{|\{z' : \mathsf{P}(z')=z\}|} = \frac{1}{q^n N}.
$$

Hence, preimages of $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T_{hfe}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ are uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{F}_q^n$.

A.6 MAYO [Beu21]

Let $\mathsf{T_{mayo}} = (\mathsf{Gen_{mayo}}, \mathsf{F_{mayo}}, \mathsf{I_{mayo}})$ be a TDF used in MAYO. $\mathsf{Gen_{mayo}}$ generates a multivariate quadratic polynomial $\mathsf{P} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ with a subspace $\mathcal{O} \subset \mathbb{F}_q^n$ called *oil space* such that $\mathsf{P}(x) = 0$ for $x \in \mathcal{O}$, and outputs P as $\mathsf{F_{mayo}}$ and a

$$\frac{\mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{mayo}}(y)}{}$$

1 $\mathsf{P}^*(x_1, \ldots, x_k) := \sum_{i \in [k]} E_{i,i} \mathsf{P}(x_i) + \sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{I}} E_{i,j} \mathsf{P}'(x_i, x_j)$

2 $x^v \leftarrow_{\$} (\mathbb{F}_q^{n-m} \times 0^m)^k$

3 **if** $\mathsf{P}^*(x^v + x^o)$ *does not have full rank* **then**

4   **return** $\bot$

5 $x^o \leftarrow_{\$} \{x^o : \mathsf{P}^*(x^v + x^o) = y\}$

6 $x = x^v + x^o$

7 **return** x

Fig. 19: A signature generation algorithm of MAYO (full description).

GAME: M-EUF-NMA

1 **for** $j \in [q_{\mathsf{key}}]$ **do**

2 $(vk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$

3 $(j^*, m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{nma^m}}(\{vk_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathsf{key}}]})$

4 **return** $\mathsf{Sig.Verify}(vk_{j^*}, m^*, \sigma^*)$

Fig. 20: An EUF-NMA game in the multi-key setting.

basis of $\mathcal{O}$ as $\mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$. [11] Let $\mathsf{P}(x) = (p_1(x), \ldots, p_m(x))$, where $p_i(x) : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q$ is a multivariate quadratic polynomial. The polar form of $p(x)$ is defined as

$$p'(x, y) := p(x + y) - p(x) - p(y),$$

which is bilinear. We define the polar form of multivariate quadratic map $\mathsf{P}(x)$ to be $\mathsf{P}'(x, y) = (p_1'(x, y), \ldots, p_m'(x, y))$.

Let $\mathcal{I} = \{(i, j) \in [k] \times [k] : i \leq j\}$ and $\{E_{ij}\}_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{I}}$ be a set of invertible matrices such that $E = \{E_{i,j}\}$ is nonsingular. On input $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_k) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{kn}$ and $\{E_{i,j}\}_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{I}}$, $\mathsf{F}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$ computes $y = \mathsf{P}^*(x) = \sum_{i \in [k]} E_{i,i} \mathsf{P}(x_i) + \sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{I}} E_{i,j} \mathsf{P}'(x_i, x_j)$. In MAYO, $\mathsf{P}^* : \mathbb{F}_q^{kn} \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ is conjectured to be non-invertible. Therefore, the INV game of $\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$ is defined as: given $(\mathsf{P}, \{E_{ij}\}_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{I}}, y)$, find $x^* = (x_1^*, \ldots, x_k^*)$ satisfying $\sum_{i \in [k]} E_{i,i} \mathsf{P}(x_i^*) + \sum_{(i,j) \in \mathcal{I}} E_{i,j} \mathsf{P}'(x_i^*, x_j^*)$ [Beu21, Definition 4]. On input $y \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$, $\mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$ computes x as in Fig. 19. Let x, x^o and x^v be vectors over $\mathbb{F}_q^{kn}$. $\mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$ finds a preimage $x = x^v + x^o$ of y for P^*. In the beginning, x^v is uniformly chosen from $(\mathbb{F}_q^{n-m} \times 0^m)^k \subset \mathbb{F}_q^{kn}$, where 0^m denotes a vector of m 0s. Fixing x^v, $\mathsf{P}^*(x^v + x^o) = y$ becomes a linear system of equations for x^o. $\mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$ outputs $x^v + x^o$ by solving $\mathsf{P}^*(x^v + x^o) = y$ if $\mathsf{P}^*(x^v + x^o)$ has full rank and outputs $\bot$ otherwise.

A preimage x generated by $\mathsf{HaS}[\mathsf{T}_{\mathsf{mayo}}, \mathsf{H}].\mathsf{Sign}$ is uniform over $\mathbb{F}_q^{kn}$ if $\mathsf{I}_{\mathsf{mayo}}$ has never output $\bot$ [Beu21, Lemma 7]. First, x^v is uniformly chosen from $(\mathbb{F}_q^{n-m} \times 0^m)^k$. Next, x^o is uniformly chosen from $\mathcal{O}^k$ since $\mathsf{P}^*(x^v + x^o)$ has full rank. Finally, the output $x = (x^v + x^o)$ follows $\mathsf{U}(\mathbb{F}_q^{kn})$ since $(\mathbb{F}_q^{n-m} \times 0^m) + \mathcal{O} = \mathbb{F}_q^n$.

B   Missing Proofs

B.1   Proof of Theorem 6.1

We prove two reductions; M-EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ M-EUF-CMA and M-INV $\Rightarrow$ M-EUF-CMA, where M-EUF-NMA stands for *multi-key* EUF-NMA. We define an advantage function of the M-EUF-NMA game given in Fig. 20 as $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{Sig}}^{\mathsf{M\text{-}EUF\text{-}NMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{nma^m}}) = \Pr\left[\mathsf{M\text{-}EUF\text{-}NMA}^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$. Without loss of generality, we assume that adversaries make random oracle queries by fixing key ID u as one of the q_{key} verification keys.

---

[11] For the convenience of MAYO's description, the notation of UOV follows [Beu21] which is slightly different from Appendix A.4.

M-EUF-NMA $\Rightarrow$ M-EUF-CMA:

GAME G_0 (M-EUF-CMA game): This is the original M-EUF-CMA game and $\Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] = \text{Adv}_{\text{HaS}^{\text{ph}}[T_{\text{wpsf}},H,E]}^{\text{M-EUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m})$
holds.

GAME G_1 (adaptive reprogramming on H): In answering i-th signing query for k-th verification key, it reprograms H as $H^{\left(E(F_k),r_i^k,m_i^k\right)\mapsto y_i^k}$ for $(r_i^k, y_i^k) \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{Y}$ and computes $x_i^k \leftarrow I_k(y_i^k)$ until $x_i^k \neq \perp$ holds. The AR adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ar}}$ can simulate G_0/G_1. From Lemma 2.1, $\left|\Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \frac{3}{2}q'_{\text{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{\text{sign}}+q_{\text{qro}}+1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$ holds.

GAME G_2 (changing the timing of adaptive reprogramming on H): The adaptive reprogramming is executed only at the end of the signing oracle. Since the number of reprogramming queries decreases, we can use the same technique as in G_1. Therefore, we have $\left|\Pr\left[G_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_2^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \frac{3}{2}q'_{\text{sign}}\sqrt{\frac{q'_{\text{sign}}+q_{\text{qro}}+1}{|\mathcal{R}|}}$.

GAME G_3 (simulating the signing oracle by SampDom): Signatures are generated by $r_i^k \leftarrow_\$ \mathcal{R}$ and $x_i^k \leftarrow \text{SampDom}(F_k)$ in the signing oracle. The M-PS adversary can simulate G_2/G_3. When $\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m}$ plays M-PS$_0$, he simulates G_2; otherwise simulates G_3. We thus have $\left|\Pr\left[G_2^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \text{Adv}_{T_{\text{wpsf}}}^{\text{M-PS}}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{ps}^m})$.

Since the M-EUF-NMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}$ can simulate G_3 by using SampDom, $\Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{cma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HaS}^{\text{ph}}[T_{\text{wpsf}},H,E]}^{\text{M-EUF-NMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m})$
holds.

M-INV $\Rightarrow$ M-EUF-NMA:

GAME G_4 (M-EUF-NMA game): This is the original M-EUF-NMA game and $\Pr\left[G_4^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] = \text{Adv}_{\text{HaS}^{\text{ph}}[T_{\text{wpsf}},H,E]}^{\text{M-EUF-NMA}}(\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m})$
holds.

GAME G_5 (abort with the collision on key IDs): When a collision on the key IDs is detected, G_5 aborts and outputs 0. From the collision probability of uniformly chosen key IDs, $\left|\Pr\left[G_4^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_5^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \leq \frac{q_{\text{key}}^2}{|\mathcal{U}|}$.

We use Lemma 2.2 to show a reduction from the M-INV of T_{wpsf}. The M-INV adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}$ given $\{(F_j, y_j)\}_{j\in[q_{\text{inst}}]}$ runs a two-stage algorithm S for $\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}$ playing G_5 and chooses the input θ for the algorithm from $\{y_j\}_{j\in[q_{\text{inst}}]}$. To simulate G_5 without collision on key IDs, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}$ needs to prepare q_{key} verification keys with different key IDs. The expected number of instances $\mathbb{E}(q_{\text{inst}})$ needed for obtaining q_{key} different key IDs is

$$\sum_{i=1}^{q_{\text{key}}} \frac{|\mathcal{U}|}{|\mathcal{U}| - i + 1} \leq q_{\text{key}}\left(\frac{|\mathcal{U}|}{|\mathcal{U}| - q_{\text{key}} + 1}\right).$$

In the first stage, S_1 observes one of the quantum queries to H at random to obtain (u', r', m'). Since there is no collision on key IDs, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m}$ can understand the target key of the observed random oracle query. If $u' = E(F_{j'})$, H is reprogrammed as $H' := H^{(u',r',m')\mapsto y_{j'}}$. In the second stage, S_2 runs $\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}$ with reprogrammed H' and outputs $(j', m', r', x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}^{|H'\rangle}(\{F_j\}_{j\in[q_{\text{key}}]})$. From Lemma 2.2, we have the following bound:

$$\Pr\left[F_{j'}(x') = y_{j'} : (j', m', r', x') \leftarrow \left(S_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}^{|H\rangle}}(), S_2^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}^{|H'\rangle}}(y_{j'})\right)\right]$$
$$\geq \frac{1}{(2q_{\text{qro}} + 1)^2} \Pr\left[F_{j^*}(x^*) = H(E(F_{j^*}), r^*, m^*) : (j^*, m^*, r^*, x^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}^{|H\rangle}(\{F_j\}_{j\in[q_{\text{key}}]})\right]$$
$$= \frac{1}{(2q_{\text{qro}} + 1)^2} \Pr\left[G_5^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$$

Therefore, we have $\Pr\left[G_5^{\mathcal{A}_{\text{nma}^m}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \leq (2q_{\text{qro}} + 1)^2 \text{Adv}_{T_{\text{wpsf}}}^{\text{M-INV}}(\mathcal{B}_{\text{inv}^m})$.

We obtain Eq. (8) by combining the two reductions. $\qquad\square$

B.2 Proof of Lemma 7.1

We extend the proof of Theorem 6.1 (Appendix B.1). We define G_6 in which verification keys $\{F_j\}_{j\in[q_{\mathrm{key}}]}$ in G_5 are replaced with $\{L_j \circ F \circ R_j\}$ for given $F : \mathcal{X}' \to \mathcal{Y}$ generated by Gen'. The ST adversary $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}$ can simulate G_5/G_6 by setting his challenges as verification keys. If $\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}$ plays ST_0, G_5 is simulated; otherwise, G_6 is simulated. Therefore, $\left|\Pr\left[G_5^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_6^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \le \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{ST}}_{T_{\mathrm{wpsf}},T'_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}})$ holds.

To use Lemma 2.2, we assume that $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ runs a two-stage algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ in G_6 with input θ (see Fig. 8). As in Theorem 6.1, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ can understand the target key of the observed random oracle query. When the observed value is targeted to j'-th verification key, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ sets $\theta := L_{j'}(y)$ as the input to $\mathcal{S}$. Since $L_{j'}$ is bijective (first condition of Lemma 7.1), $L_{j'}(y)$ for $y \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{Y}$ is statistically indistinguishable from random $y' \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{Y}$. When $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv^m}}$ submits x^* for F_{j^*} ($j^* = j'$), $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ outputs $R_{j^*}(x^*)$. Suppose that $L_{j^*}(F(R_{j^*}(x^*))) = L_{j^*}(y)$ holds. Since L_{j^*} is a bijection, $F(R_{j^*}(x^*)) = y$. From the second condition of Lemma 7.1, $R_{j^*}(x^*)$ is valid. Therefore, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}}$ can win the INV game by submitting $R_{j^*}(x^*)$, and we have $\Pr\left[G_6^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] \le (2q_{\mathrm{qro}} + 1)^2 \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{INV}}_{T'_{\mathrm{wpsf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{inv}})$ from Lemma 2.2, which proves this lemma. $\qquad\square$

B.3 Proof of Lemma 7.2

First, we show a reduction M-CR $\Rightarrow$ M-sEUF-CMA extending the single-key version of [BDF$^+$11, Theorem 2].

GAME G_0 (M-sEUF-CMA game): This is the original M-sEUF-CMA game and $\Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] = \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}sEUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathrm{HaS^{ph}}[T_{\mathrm{psf}},H,E]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}})$ holds.

GAME G_1 (abort with collision on key IDs): When a collision of the key IDs is detected, G_1 aborts and outputs 0.
We have $\left|\Pr\left[G_0^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \le \frac{q_{\mathrm{key}}^2}{|\mathcal{U}|}$.

GAME G_2 (replace random function): The random function H is replaced as H' such that

$$H'\left(E\left(F_j\right), r, m\right) = F_j\left(\mathrm{DetSampDom}\left(F_j, \widetilde{H}\left(E\left(F_j\right), r, m\right)\right)\right),$$

where $\mathrm{DetSampDom}$ is a deterministic function of $\mathrm{SampDom}$ and $\widetilde{H} : \mathcal{U}\times\mathcal{R}\times\mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{W}$ is another random function to output randomness for $\mathrm{DetSampDom}$. From **Condition 1** of PSF, $F_j(x)$ is uniform for $x \leftarrow \mathrm{SampDom}(F_j)$. Since H and H' are statistically indistinguishable, $\Pr\left[G_1^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] = \Pr\left[G_2^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{nma^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]$ holds.

The M-CR adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}$ can simulate G_2. As in Theorem 6.1, the expected number of instances is at most $q_{\mathrm{key}}\left(\frac{|\mathcal{U}|}{|\mathcal{U}|-q_{\mathrm{key}}+1}\right)$ over all $(F, I) \leftarrow \mathrm{Gen}(1^\lambda)$. From **Conditions 2** and **3**, the M-CR adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}$ can simulate the signing oracle. In answering the i-th signing query m_i^k for the k-th verification key F_k, he returns (r_i^k, x_i^k), where $r_i^k \leftarrow_{\$} \mathcal{R}$ and $x_i^k := \mathrm{DetSampDom}\left(F_k, \widetilde{H}\left(E\left(F_k\right), r_i^k, m_i^k\right)\right)$. If the M-sEUF-CMA adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma^m}}$ wins by (j^*, m^*, r^*, x^*), $F_{j^*}(x^*) = F_{j^*}(x')$ holds, where $x' = \mathrm{DetSampDom}(F_{j^*}, \widetilde{H}(E(F_{j^*}), r^*, m^*))$. From **Condition 4**, $x^* \neq x'$ holds with probability $1 - 2^{-\omega(\log n)}$, and we have

$$\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}sEUF\text{-}CMA}}_{\mathrm{HaS}[T_{\mathrm{psf}},H]}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathrm{cma}}) \le \frac{1}{1 - 2^{-\omega(\log n)}}\mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}CR}}_{T_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}) + \frac{q_{\mathrm{key}}^2}{|\mathcal{U}|}.$$

Next, we show CR $\Rightarrow$ M-CR.

GAME G_3 (M-CR game): This is the original M-CR game and $\Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] = \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{M\text{-}CR}}_{T_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}})$ holds.

GAME G_4 (replacing verification keys): We replace F_j with $L_j \circ F \circ R_j$. Since the ST adversary can simulate G_3/G_4, we have $\left|\Pr\left[G_3^{\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right] - \Pr\left[G_4^{\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}} \Rightarrow 1\right]\right| \le \mathrm{Adv}^{\mathrm{ST}}_{T_{\mathrm{psf}},T'_{\mathrm{psf}}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}})$.

The CR adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}$ simulates G_4 as follows: Given F, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}$ gives $\{\mathsf{L}_j \circ \mathsf{F} \circ \mathsf{R}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{key}}]}$ to $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}$. When $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}$ submits (x_1^*, x_2^*) for F_{j^*}, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}$ outputs $(\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_1^*), \mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_2^*))$. Suppose that $\mathsf{L}_{j^*}(\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_1^*))) = \mathsf{L}_{j^*}(\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_2^*)))$ holds. Since L_j is injective, $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_1^*)) = \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_2^*))$ holds. From the second condition of Lemma 7.2, $\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_1^*)$ and $\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_2^*)$ are valid. Moreover, we have $\mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_1^*) \neq \mathsf{R}_{j^*}(x_2^*)$ if $x_1^* \neq x_2^*$ since R_j is also injective. Therefore, $\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}$ can win the CR game, and he can perfectly simulate G_4. Therefore, we have

$$\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}}^{\text{M-CR}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr^m}}) \leq \mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{psf}}}^{\text{CR}}(\mathcal{B}_{\mathrm{cr}}) + \mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}_{\mathrm{psf}}, \mathsf{T}'_{\mathrm{psf}}}^{\text{ST}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}}).$$

Combination of the reductions M-CR $\Rightarrow$ M-EUF-CMA and CR $\Rightarrow$ M-CR yields Lemma 7.2. $\qquad\square$

C Use Cases of Generic Method

We show use cases of Lemma 7.2 in lattice-based cryptography and Lemma 7.1 in code-based and MQ-based cryptography. In this paper, we apply the generic method to frameworks of the schemes (e.g., GPV framework [GPV08]) instead of specific schemes (e.g., FALCON [PFH$^+$22]). We will study the applicability to the specific schemes in future works.

Lattice-based Cryptography: We apply the generic method to the GPV framework (see Appendix A.1) [GPV08]. For Lemma 7.2, we design simulation of verification keys by $\{L_j A R_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{key}}]}$ where L_j is an $n \times n$ invertible matrix over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and R_j is an $m \times m$ signed permutation matrix. Note that we require the orthogonality of R_j for $\|x\| = \|x R_j^T\|$ and any integer orthogonal matrices are signed permutation matrices whose non-zero entries are ± 1. Then, the ST advantage $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}, \mathsf{T}'}^{\text{ST}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}})$ is bounded by an advantage of the following problem.

Definition C.1 (Multi-instance Signed Permutation Equivalence (M-SPE)). *Given matrices $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\{G_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{inst}}]}$ $(G_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m})$, do there exist $n \times n$ invertible matrices $\{L_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{inst}}]}$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and $m \times m$ signed permutation matrices $\{R_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{inst}}]}$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$ such that $G_j = L_j G R_j$?*

This problem is a variant of the well-studied problem called *code equivalence* in code-based cryptography [PR97]. The code equivalence is defined as: Given a pair of generator matrices (G, G'), do there exist an invertible matrix L and an isometric matrix R such that $G' = LGR$? There are variations of this problem in terms of R. When R is a permutation matrix (resp., generalized permutation matrix), this problem is called *permutation equivalence* (resp., *linear equivalence*)[SS13].

In lattice-based cryptography, there is a closely related problem called *lattice isomorphism*, that is, given a pair of lattice bases (B, B'), do there exist a unimodular matrix L and an orthogonal matrix R such that $B' = LBR$? The conditions on L and R are required to keep the geometry of lattices; however, it is not necessary for our purpose.

Any variants of the code equivalence listed above are in the complexity class coAM and not conjectured to be NP-hard [PR97]. Also, there are some algorithms for the code equivalence [Leo82, Sen00, Beu20]. It is necessary to confirm that existing algorithms cannot efficiently solve the target instance of M-SPE.

Code-based Cryptography: We apply the generic method to a TDF using a parity-check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$ as in the modified CFS signature and Wave (see Appendices A.2 and A.3). For Lemma 7.1, we simulate verification keys by $\{L_j H R_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{key}}]}$, where L_j is an $m \times m$ invertible matrix over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and R_j is an $n \times n$ generalized permutation matrix over $\mathbb{F}_q$. Note that generalized permutation matrices preserve the Hamming weights of vectors. Then, the ST advantage $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{T}, \mathsf{T}'}^{\text{ST}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{st}})$ is bounded by an advantage of the following problem.

Definition C.2 (Multi-instance Linear Equivalence (M-LE)). *Given generator matrices $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\{G_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{inst}}]}$ $(G_j \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m})$, do there exist $n \times n$ invertible matrices $\{L_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{inst}}]}$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and $m \times m$ generalized permutation matrices $\{R_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathrm{inst}}]}$ over $\mathbb{F}_q$ such that $G_j = L_j G R_j$?*

As with the M-SPE (Definition C.1), it is necessary to confirm that existing algorithms cannot efficiently solve the target instance of M-LE.

Multivariate-quadratic-based Cryptography: We assume a TDF of the modified UOV signature or the modified HFE signature. Let $\mathsf{F} : \mathbb{F}_q^{n'} \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ and $\mathsf{F}_j : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ be functions composed of multivariate quadratic polynomials ($n' \geq n$). For Lemma 7.1, we simulate verification keys by $\{\mathsf{L}_j \circ \mathsf{F} \circ \mathsf{R}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathsf{key}}]}$, where L_j is an invertible affine map over $\mathbb{F}_q$ and R_j is an affine map over $\mathbb{F}_q$. Then, the ST advantage $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{T},\mathsf{T}'}^{\mathsf{ST}}(\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{st}})$ is bounded by an advantage of the following game.

Definition C.3 (Multi-instance Decision Morphism of Polynomials (M-DMP)). *Given functions composed of quadratic polynomials* F *and* $\{\mathsf{F}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathsf{inst}}]}$, *do there exist affine maps* $\{\mathsf{L}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathsf{inst}}]}$ *and* $\{\mathsf{R}_j\}_{j \in [q_{\mathsf{inst}}]}$ *over* $\mathbb{F}_q$ *such that* $\mathsf{F}_j = \mathsf{L}_j \circ \mathsf{F} \circ \mathsf{R}_j$?

The (single-instance) decision morphism of polynomials is proven NP-complete if a general case that both L and R are arbitrary affine maps [PGC98]. If L and R are invertible affine maps, this problem is called *decision isomorphism of polynomials* that is in the complexity class coAM and not conjectured to be NP-hard [PGC98]. Therefore, we recommend using non-invertible affine maps; however, further study of the M-DMP is needed since it has not yet been well studied.