Analyzing the Leakage Resistance of the NIST’s Lightweight Crypto Standardization Process Finalists

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April 8, 2022

Security against side-channel attacks has been explicitly mentioned by the NIST as a target in the ongoing standardization process for lightweight cryptography. In this talk, we will analyze the leakage resistance of 9 out of the 10 candidates selected as finalists of the competition.

Our analysis follows two main steps:

First, we use a framework introduced by Bellizia et al. in order to evaluate the high-level leakage properties of the candidates’ modes of operations [BBC+20]. This high-level analysis allows us to observe that 6 candidates can only/mostly rely on (expensive) implementation-level countermeasures. By contrast, 3 candidates (namely Ascon, ISAP and Romulus-T) have leakage-resistant features enabling so-called leveled implementations, where different parts of the implementations require different (more or less expensive) implementation-level countermeasures.

Second, we investigate the hardware performances of these 3 leakage-resistant modes of operation and evaluate their leveled implementation. For Ascon and Romulus-T, we protect the Key Derivation Function (KDF) and Tag Generation Function (TGF) against Differential Power Analysis (DPA) with Hardware Private Circuits (HPC), a state-of-the-art masking scheme that jointly provides resistance against physical defaults and composability [CGLS21, CS21]. For ISAP, the KDF and KGF are based on a leakage-resilient PRF that embeds a fresh re-keying mechanism such that they only require security against Simple Power Analysis (SPA). The latter is natively (and efficiently) obtained thanks to parallelism in hardware. For all 3 candidates, the bulk of the computation contains an internal re-keying mechanism. Hence SPA security (again achieved with hardware parallelism) guarantees confidentiality with leakage. This part of the implementation can even leak in an unbounded manner if only integrity with leakage is required.

We conclude that more than the quantitative comparison of the finalists, the main criteria that should guide the NIST in selecting a lightweight cryptography standard (if leakage is deemed important) are qualitative. The limited relevance of quantitative comparisons at this stage of the competition follows from two facts. For ciphers that rely on comparable countermeasures (like Ascon and Romulus-T), the performance gap is limited and predictable from simple proxies (and both are easier to protect than the AES). For ciphers that rely on different countermeasures (like ISAP), we currently lack (both theoretical and practical) tools that would allow a definitive comparison (e.g., with masking). By contrast, these three ciphers have different quantitative features, leading to at least two clear questions that could (and we think, should) guide the final selection:

- Is confidentiality with decryption leakage wanted? Ascon, ISAP and Romulus-T all reach the top of the hierarchy in [GPPS19] for integrity with leakage (coined CIML2). The leveled

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1 Excluding Grain-128AEAD, which cannot be captured with such a mode vs. primitive granularity.
implementation of Ascon only provides confidentiality with encryption leakages and misuse-resilience (coined CCAmL1). The leveled implementations of ISAP and Romulus-T can additionally provide confidentiality with decryption leakages and misuse-resilience (coined CCAmL2) at the cost of being two-pass (and can reach CCAmL1 in a single pass).

- **Flexibility or simplicity for the KDF and KGF?** Ascon and Romulus-T require DPA countermeasures like masking to protect their KDF and TGF. Implementing masking securely is a sensitive process that requires expertise. But it comes with a lot of flexibility: countermeasures do not always have to be deployed, different security vs. performance tradeoffs can be considered and one can have different security levels in encryption and decryption. ISAP relies on a re-keying mechanism so that only SPA security is needed for the whole implementation, which is easy to obtain in hardware. But it has no flexibility (the overheads of the leakage-resilient PRF have to be paid even if side-channel security is not a concern).\(^2\)

A slightly longer-term question relates to the choice between permutations and Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs). While the same leakage-resistant features can be obtained at somewhat similar costs from permutations and sponges, these two building blocks come with some differences. On the one hand, TBC-based designs seem more amenable to security analyzes in the standard model [BGP\(^+\)20, BGPS21], while permutations currently require idealized assumptions [DM19, GPPS20]. On the other hand, TBC-based schemes enable performing an inverse-based tag verification that can leak in full [BPPS17] while permutation-based schemes require masking [BMPS21] or additional computations [DM21] for securing this part of their design against leakage.

**Acknowledgments.** Gaëtan Cassiers and François-Xavier Standaert are respectively research fellow and senior research associate of the Belgian fund for scientific research (FNRS-F.R.S.). This work has been funded in parts by European Union via the ERC project 724725 (acronym SWORD).

**References**


\(^2\) Security in low-end embedded software implementations is unclear both for masking and re-keying, which can both be the target of strong attacks in low-noise contexts: see [BS21] for masking and [KPP20, BBC\(^+\)20] for re-keying. We believe the understanding of low-noise leakages is not stable enough for being used as a guiding criteria.


