

Information-theoretic security with asymmetries

Tim Beyne and Yu Long Chen

COSIC, KU Leuven, Belgium
name.lastname@esat.kuleuven.be

Abstract. In this paper, we study the problem of lower bounding any given cost function depending on the false positive and false negative probabilities of adversaries against indistinguishability security notions in symmetric-key cryptography. We take the cost model as an input, so that this becomes a purely information-theoretical question.

We propose power bounds as an easy-to-use alternative for advantage bounds in the context of indistinguishability with asymmetric cost functions. We show that standard proof techniques such as hybrid arguments and the H-coefficient method can be generalized to the power model, and apply these techniques to the PRP-PRF switching lemma, the Even-Mansour (EM) construction, and the sum-of-permutations (SoP) construction.

As the final and perhaps most useful contribution, we provide two methods to convert single-user power bounds into multi-user power bounds, and investigate their relation to the point-wise proximity method of Hoang and Tessaro (Crypto 2016). These methods are applied to obtain tight multi-user power bounds for EM and SoP.

Keywords: Information theoretic security · Asymmetrical statistical costs · Power bounds · Multi-user security

1 Introduction

In the formal security analysis of cryptographic systems, the power of an adversary is always measured by the *advantage* that it achieves over a naive approach to attacking the system. For example, for indistinguishability games, the advantage of an adversary is the probability that it correctly identifies the real oracle, minus the probability that it mistakes the ideal oracle for the real one.

Traditionally, starting with the work of Goldwasser and Micali [14], a cryptosystem is considered to be secure if the advantage of all adversaries is a negligible function of the security parameter. However, in order to translate formal analysis into practical guidance, concrete estimates are often necessary. For example, at Crypto 1994, Bellare, Kilian and Rogaway [3] studied the security of the cipher block chaining mode, quantifying precisely how the advantage depends on the number of queries made by the adversary. A complete concrete treatment of symmetric-key cryptography was given by Bellare et al. [2], and concrete security has since become the norm in symmetric-key cryptography [4, 5, 25]. In the

same direction of bringing formal analysis closer to reality, Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [1] have proposed that advantages should be bounded in a multi-user security model. Similarly, but in the context of symmetric-key provable security, a multi-key security model was proposed by Mouha and Luykx [21] at Crypto 2015. Many other refinements of the security model have been proposed, for example taking into account computational aspects such as preprocessing [13] and memory limitations [12].

There is one aspect of the security model that has not been subject to further refinement: the notion of advantage itself. In this paper, we argue that it can be useful to measure the power of adversaries in a different way because security games often exhibit asymmetric statistical costs. For example, in a real attack, the value of the target must always be weighted against processing costs. If the expected gains of the attack (for example measured in dollars) are negative, then the adversary will not proceed. Conversely, if the value of the target is immense, then making mistakes matters little to the adversary. In other words, we argue that – given a realistic cost model – security bounds should allow users (and adversaries) to predict the expected gain or loss of attacking the system, i.e. provide a *concrete* answer to the question ‘is the attack worthwhile?’

In this paper, we study this question in the indistinguishability setting for symmetric-key constructions and take the cost model as an input, so that it becomes a purely information-theoretical problem: what is the optimal trade-off between false positives and false negatives, for a given cost function? This issue is intrinsically related to multi-user security, because the presence of multiple users implicitly tilts the cost function towards more tolerance for statistical errors. Indeed, standard definitions such as [21] consider it sufficient to compromise the security of a single user.

Related work. For information-theoretic indistinguishability games, the maximum possible advantage is equal to the statistical distance between the transcript distributions produced over the course of the game. Several alternative distances or contrast functions have been considered in previous work, but this was always for purely technical reasons. For example, Dai, Hoang and Tessaro [9] show that using the χ^2 -divergence can be a powerful tool to obtain tighter bounds on the statistical distance.

Perhaps not surprisingly, alternatives to the statistical distance have proven to be useful to obtain multi-user security bounds from single-user bounds. If users are independent, then a folklore result says that the multi-user advantage is at most u times larger than the single-user advantage. There are currently only a handful of known ways to avoid this factor without resorting to a dedicated multi-user security analysis (such as for example done in [16] for the sum-of-permutations construction). At Crypto 2016, Hoang and Tessaro [17] have shown that *point-wise proximity* can sometimes be lifted from the single-user to the multi-user setting. This technique was refined to *approximate point-wise proximity* by the same authors at Eurocrypt 2017 [18]. The only other general method is the squared-ratio method from Crypto 2023 by Chen, Choi and Lee [7].

However, all of these methods still have significant limitations. The squared-ratio method is limited to independent users, and it only reduces the multi-user security loss to a factor \sqrt{u} and cannot avoid a factor of u loss for bad events. Point-wise proximity can be used to show that there is no multi-user security degradation and is applicable even when there are dependencies between users such as in the ideal permutation model, but it comes with technical limitations. For example, the bound must be a super-linear function of the number of queries. Some of the technical limitations can be overcome using approximate point-wise proximity, at the cost of making proofs more difficult.

Perhaps the most important limitation of all of these techniques is that they require a detailed analysis of transcript probabilities, which is typically much more difficult. Single-user hybrid proofs, on the contrary, are easy to understand because the advantages for intermediate steps add up and are easy to bound by analyzing the probabilities of bad events. This is an important reason why the statistical distance remains popular, despite the fact that it does not lift well to multi-user bounds.

Contribution. We propose *power bounds* as an easy-to-use alternative for advantage bounds in the context of indistinguishability. These bounds limit the statistical power (one minus the false negative rate) of any statistical test in terms of its false positive rate. A power bound implicitly lower bounds the cost of all distinguishing attacks *in any cost model*. It is shown that standard proof techniques (such as hybrid arguments, bounding bad events and the H-coefficient method) have natural counterparts for power bounds. To demonstrate that these bounds are no more difficult to obtain than advantage bounds for many constructions, we derive power bounds for the Even-Mansour and sum-of-permutations constructions. It is also shown that ‘good’ (linear) power bounds automatically lift to the multi-user setting. This allows us to deduce the first tight multi-user advantage bound for the sum-of-permutations construction.

From a probability theorist’s point of view, we essentially apply the Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing to information-theoretic security and explore the consequences. As we explain in Section 3, this classical theory describes hypothesis tests as a decision-theoretic problem based on two types of errors. The first error probability is the false positive rate α , i.e. the probability that the null hypothesis is falsely rejected. The second error probability is the false negative rate β , or the probability that the alternative hypothesis is incorrectly rejected. A power bound is simply any upper bound of the form $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ (in statistics, $1 - \beta$ is called the power of a test, which is equal to the probability that the null hypothesis is correctly rejected).

As the error probabilities α and β are both determined by the critical region of the hypothesis test, and the adversaries’ cost is increasing in α and β , there is a trade-off between them. For any statistical cost function \mathcal{C} of the error probabilities α and β , the power bound implies the lower bound $\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) \geq \mathcal{C}(\alpha, 1 - f(\alpha))$. This bound is tight if f is tight. Traditional advantages only yield a tight bound if \mathcal{C} is a symmetric function. More precisely, the maximum advantage attack minimizes the cost function $\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha + \beta$. However, in

many practical applications, the cost function \mathcal{C} is not symmetric in α and β . For example, it could take the form $\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) = w_\alpha \alpha + w_\beta \beta$, where w_α and w_β are positive weights that for instance express the cost of false positives and false negatives in dollars.

It may seem nontrivial to obtain power bounds for realistic constructions, but in Section 4 we show that standard proof techniques can be generalized. For example, Theorem 4 shows that the power bound of a hybrid system with non-decreasing power bounds f and g is given by $g \circ f$. Theorem 5 shows how bad events can be ruled out by bounding their probabilities in the usual way. The widely used H-coefficient technique of Patarin [23] and its generalization by Chen and Steinberger [6] are extended to power bounds by Theorem 7. An interesting aspect of our extension is that it suggests that the H-coefficient technique should not be over-used, in the sense that one should avoid excluding bad events to the point that the probability ratio for good transcripts becomes greater than one. As our applications show, this is often feasible and results in better power bounds – which in turn is important to obtain a good multi-user bound.

Our first applications beyond the PRP-PRF switching lemma, which we use as a running example, are presented in Section 5. We first consider the classical Even-Mansour construction [11], arguably the simplest construction to build a pseudorandom permutation from a public permutation. Given an n -bit permutation π , as well as an n -bit key K , the Even-Mansour construction $\text{EM}_K[\pi]$ is defined by

$$\text{EM}_K[\pi](M) = \pi(M \oplus K) \oplus K.$$

A tight power bound for Even-Mansour can be obtained by a simple hybrid argument. If the ideal world is taken as the null hypothesis, then the power bound we obtain is given by (with $N = 2^n$)

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{2qp}{N}},$$

where q is the number of construction queries and p is the number of queries made to π . This implies the standard advantage bound, but provides more detailed information in the face of asymmetric statistical costs. An important difference in our security proof is the way the bad events are defined. They are defined in a way such that they never appear in the real world, unlike in traditional proofs for advantage bounds of the Even-Mansour construction such as [21].

The second application we consider is the sum-of-permutations construction proposed by Bellare et al. [4] and Hall et al. [15]. The SoP construction turns block ciphers into pseudorandom functions with security beyond the birthday-bound barrier, i.e., above $2^{n/2}$. Given an n -bit (keyed) pseudorandom permutation π , the sum-of-permutations is defined by

$$\text{SoP}[\pi](M) = \pi(0||M) + \pi(1||M).$$

Again, interestingly from a technical point of view, our approach requires that the bad events only happen in one of the two worlds – but this is almost always possible by redefining the events.

Our final and perhaps most useful contribution from a proof-technical point of view are two methods to convert single-user power bounds into multi-user power bounds. Both are presented in Section 6. The first method is based on the observation that linear power bounds imply point-wise proximity as defined by Hoang and Tessaro [17] *and*, conversely, point-wise proximity implies a linear power bound. This equivalence allows us to lift linear single-user power bounds to multi-user power bounds, though the technical conditions from [17] related to the dependence of the bound on the number of queries still apply. We apply this result to obtain the multi-user power bound of the EM construction. Another consequence of this result is that our proof techniques for power bounds can be used to obtain point-wise proximity estimates in an easier way.

The second and more interesting method is proposed in Section 6.2. It still assumes that the single-user power bound is linear, and additionally assumes that users are independent. The latter condition is satisfied for standard model proofs. The benefit of this method is that it completely removes the technical conditions related to the dependence of the bound on the number of queries that are required by the proof of Hoang and Tessaro [17] – without making the analysis more complicated, as done in [18]. Since it applies to linear power bounds, this result can also be understood as a way to obtain tighter point-wise proximity estimates with fewer assumptions. We apply the second method to the sum-of-permutations construction to obtain multi-user power bounds. Our bound implies the first tight advantage bound for this construction. This should be compared to previous partial results by Shen and Hoang [16] based on a dedicated multi-user analysis, and Choi et al. [8] relying on the modular squared-ratio technique. Shen and Hoang have established a bound that is independent of the number of users u and is of the form $\sqrt{n}q/N$. However, their analysis is dedicated and based on the χ^2 -method, which requires calculating the expectation. Therefore, their approach cannot be easily applied to more difficult constructions. Moreover, their bound is not quite tight, as there is still a loss by a factor \sqrt{n} . Choi et al. avoid this loss, but their bound still contains terms of the form $\sqrt{u}q^2/N^2$ and relies on an irregular security model where the ideal world oracle is forbidden to output zero (and with a difficult proof).

2 Notation

Throughout this paper, we work with probabilities on a finite sample space \mathcal{T} with its power set $2^{\mathcal{T}}$ as the space of events. In this context, a probability distribution is a function $P : 2^{\mathcal{T}} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that $P(\mathcal{T}) = 1$. In information-theoretical security proofs, \mathcal{T} is typically the set of all possible transcripts that can be produced during the course of some security game.

In the following, we will consider indistinguishability security games. In terms of probability theory, a deterministic information-theoretical distinguisher is the same as a hypothesis test between two transcript distributions P and Q . Traditionally, indistinguishability insecurity is measured by the statistical distance

$$\Delta(P; Q) = \max_{\mathcal{R} \subseteq \mathcal{T}} |P(\mathcal{R}) - Q(\mathcal{R})|.$$

This is the same as the maximum *advantage* over all possible distinguishers, i.e. hypothesis tests with critical region \mathcal{R} . It is not difficult to see that the maximum is achieved for some \mathcal{R} with $P(\mathcal{R}) \geq Q(\mathcal{R})$.

Although advantages are symmetric, in our setting, the choice of either P or Q as the null hypothesis is actually important. In Section 3 we will introduce other measures of insecurity that are not symmetrical in P and Q . For this reason, we will use the phrase ‘distinguisher from P to Q ’ to emphasize that P is taken to be the null hypothesis.

3 Asymmetrical statistical costs

In the Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing [22], distinguishing between two distributions P and Q is interpreted as a statistical decision problem. The goal is to minimize two types of statistical errors. Assume that P is the null hypothesis, and Q the alternative – i.e. a distinguisher from P to Q . For every hypothesis test, there exists a critical region \mathcal{R} such that the null hypothesis is rejected if the sample is in \mathcal{R} .

The first type of errors are *false positives*: the null hypothesis P is rejected, even though it is true. Note that, as is common practice, we consider rejecting the null hypothesis a positive outcome. The probability of these errors is equal to $\alpha = P(\mathcal{R})$. The error probability α is also called the significance level of the test. The second type of errors are *false negatives*, meaning that the null hypothesis is accepted in spite of the alternative being true. The false negative probability is $\beta = 1 - Q(\mathcal{R})$. The probability $1 - \beta = Q(\mathcal{R})$ is called the *power* of the test.

The advantage of a distinguisher with critical region \mathcal{R} is equal to $Q(\mathcal{R}) - P(\mathcal{R}) = (1 - \beta) - \alpha$. In Section 3.1, we argue why it is interesting to upper bound the *power* of distinguishers rather than just their advantage. A few basic properties of power bounds are discussed in Section 3.2. A first application to the PRP-PRF switching lemma is given in Section 3.3.

3.1 Bounding the power of a hypothesis test

Since choosing a smaller critical region \mathcal{R} decreases α but increases β , there exists a trade-off between the two types of errors. From a decision-theoretic point of view, one should choose \mathcal{R} to minimize some application-dependent cost function $\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta)$. It is reasonable to assume that \mathcal{C} is non-decreasing in both arguments. An example is the function

$$\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) = \alpha + \beta.$$

Minimizing this expression with respect to \mathcal{R} is equivalent to maximizing the advantage, since $\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) = 1 - (Q(\mathcal{R}) - P(\mathcal{R}))$. However, in many applications, the cost function \mathcal{C} is not symmetric in α and β .

Example 1 (Asymmetrical costs). Suppose a malicious actor wants to deploy a critical vulnerability at scale, but does not know which targets are vulnerable¹.

¹ Realistic examples are provided by weak-key attacks on block ciphers.

For simplicity, assume that half of all users are vulnerable. To test for vulnerability, the actor develops a distinguishing attack. In practice, exploiting the vulnerability comes at some cost (for example computational) that can often be expressed in monetary terms. Assume that the marginal cost is \$1. If the value of an average target is \$10, then the cost function is

$$\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) = \$9\alpha + \$1\beta.$$

The cost of a false negative is the \$1 marginal cost of exploiting the vulnerability. Every false positive comes at a \$9 cost, i.e. a \$10 opportunity cost (missed target) minus a \$1 saving because the vulnerability does not have to be used. This example ignores the costs of the distinguisher itself. In the information-theoretical setting, one can conservatively assume that these costs do not depend on α and β . In the computational setting, this may not be the case. \triangleright

Let f be an increasing function so that $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ for all possible distinguishers from P to Q with false positive rate α and false negative rate β . For any non-decreasing cost function \mathcal{C} , one has a corresponding lower bound

$$\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) \geq \mathcal{C}(\alpha, 1 - f(\alpha)).$$

Hence, after minimizing with respect to α , our upper bound $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ gives a lower bound on the cost of any distinguisher – no matter how costs are defined. This is one reason why we argue that power bounds are the right way to deal with asymmetrical statistical costs. There are also more concrete reasons for investigating power bounds. For example, it can be shown that in some cases single-user power bounds lift to multi-user bounds without loss of tightness. These applications will be discussed in Section 3.4.

3.2 Some properties of power bounds

Before we begin analyzing specific problems, a few properties of power bounds are worth pointing out. First, given a bound of the form $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ for distinguishers from P to Q , one can always deduce a bound on the statistical distance:

$$\Delta(P; Q) = \max_{\mathcal{R}} |Q(\mathcal{R}) - P(\mathcal{R})| \leq \sup_{\alpha} f(\alpha) - \alpha.$$

Indeed, the maximum is achieved for some \mathcal{R} such that $Q(\mathcal{R}) \geq P(\mathcal{R})$ and if $P(\mathcal{R}) = \alpha$, then $Q(\mathcal{R}) \leq f(\alpha)$. The advantage is symmetric in P and Q , so one might conclude that – for the purpose of deriving advantage bounds – the choice of the null hypothesis matters little. However, this is not the case: a good choice of the null hypothesis can make multi-user security proofs much simpler.

Since it so important throughout this paper, it is worth discussing the asymmetry between the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis in more detail. If the problem was symmetric, then one would expect the best distinguisher from Q to P to be obtained by replacing the critical region of the best distinguisher from P to Q by its complement. The best possible critical region is characterized

by Theorem 1, i.e. the Neyman-Pearson lemma. In this result, \mathcal{R}_t is the optimal critical region among all tests from P to Q with false positive rate $P(\mathcal{R}_t)$. The false positive rate can be decreased by reducing the threshold t .

Theorem 1 (Neyman-Pearson lemma). *Let P and Q be distributions on a finite set \mathcal{T} with probability mass functions p and q . For all $t > 0$, let*

$$\mathcal{R}_t = \left\{ x \in \mathcal{T} \mid p(x) \leq t q(x) \right\}.$$

If \mathcal{S} is a subset of \mathcal{T} such that $P(\mathcal{S}) \leq P(\mathcal{R}_t)$, then $Q(\mathcal{S}) \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_t)$.

Proof. The result is well known, but we provide the proof for completeness to help the reader familiarize with our notation. The definition of \mathcal{R}_t implies the following inequalities:

$$\begin{aligned} Q(\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}_t) &\leq \frac{1}{t} P(\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}_t), \\ P(\mathcal{R}_t \setminus \mathcal{S}) &\leq t Q(\mathcal{R}_t \setminus \mathcal{S}). \end{aligned}$$

It follows from $\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{R}_t \cap \mathcal{S}) \cup (\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}_t)$ that

$$Q(\mathcal{S}) = Q(\mathcal{R}_t \cap \mathcal{S}) + Q(\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}_t) \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_t \cap \mathcal{S}) + \frac{1}{t} P(\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}_t)$$

The condition $P(\mathcal{S}) \leq P(\mathcal{R}_t)$ implies that $P(\mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{R}_t) \leq P(\mathcal{R}_t \setminus \mathcal{S})$. Hence,

$$Q(\mathcal{S}) \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_t \cap \mathcal{S}) + \frac{1}{t} P(\mathcal{R}_t \setminus \mathcal{S}) \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_t \cap \mathcal{S}) + Q(\mathcal{R}_t \setminus \mathcal{S}).$$

It follows that $Q(\mathcal{S}) \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_t)$, as claimed. \square

Let \mathcal{R}_t^* denote the optimal critical region for tests from Q to P . Assume, without loss of generality, that the boundary $p(x) = tq(x)$ contains no points x . In this case, the complement of \mathcal{R}_t^* is equal to $\mathcal{R}_{1/t}$. The asymmetry of the problem is then clear from the fact that, in most cases, $\mathcal{R}_{1/t} \neq \mathcal{R}_t$. Nevertheless, equality always holds in the singular case $t = 1$. This corresponds to $\alpha = \beta$, maximizing the advantage.

Despite the asymmetry of hypothesis testing, a power bound for distinguishers from P to Q can always be converted to a power bound for distinguishers from Q to P . The idea is to take the complement of the critical region, as above. For all the power bounds that we prove in this paper, the following result provides an essentially tight bound when P and Q swapped. Note, however, that the two bounds will typically be completely different.

Theorem 2. *If f is an increasing function such that $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ for all distinguishers from P to Q with false positive and false negative rates α and β , then every distinguisher from Q to P with false positive and false negative rates α' and β' satisfies $1 - \beta' \leq 1 - f^{-1}(1 - \alpha')$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{T} denote the sample space of P and Q . Let us construct a test from Q to P by using $\mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{R}$ as the rejection region. Since $Q(\mathcal{R}) \leq f(P(\mathcal{R}))$ for any set \mathcal{R} , we have

$$\alpha' = Q(\mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{R}) = 1 - Q(\mathcal{R}) \geq 1 - f(P(\mathcal{R})),$$

Since f is increasing, it follows that $P(\mathcal{R}) \geq f^{-1}(1 - \alpha')$. Hence,

$$1 - \beta' = P(\mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{R}) = 1 - P(\mathcal{R}) \leq 1 - f^{-1}(1 - \alpha').$$

This is the desired result. \square

3.3 Example: PRP-PRF switching lemma

The PRP-PRF switching lemma [3, 5, 19] is one of the most widely used results for proving the birthday-bound security of symmetric-key constructions. The lemma bounds the advantage of distinguishing a uniform random function ρ from a uniform random permutation π on a domain of size N and using q queries as $q(q-1)/N$. Theorem 3 gives an upper bound of the form $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ for this problem.

Theorem 3. *Let ρ be a uniform random function and π a uniform random permutation, both on a domain of size N . For every distinguisher from ρ to π with error probability α and power $1 - \beta$ that makes at most $q \leq \sqrt{2N} + 1$ queries,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}}.$$

Proof. Since the resulting bound is non-decreasing in q , we can assume that the distinguisher never queries duplicate inputs. Hence, under the null hypothesis, the transcript consists of q outputs of ρ . In the ideal world, it consists of q outputs of π . Let P denote the distribution of transcripts for ρ . The probability that a transcript is in the rejection region \mathcal{R} is equal to

$$\alpha = P(\mathcal{R}) \geq \frac{|\mathcal{R}|}{N^q},$$

since every input-output pair occurs with probability $1/N$, independently of other pairs. Here, we use the fact that the rejection region does not contain transcripts with duplicate inputs. Let Q denote the distribution of transcripts for π . The probability that the transcript is in the rejection region \mathcal{R} is

$$1 - \beta = Q(\mathcal{R}) \leq \frac{(N - q)!}{N!} |\mathcal{R}|.$$

Indeed, there are $(N - q)!$ permutations with q specified outputs, assuming the outputs are distinct. Hence, every transcript contains q distinct outputs has probability $(N - q)!/N!$ under Q . If two of the outputs in a transcript are equal, then its probability is always zero. Hence, we obtain an upper bound.

The lower bound on $1 - \beta$ and the upper bound on α can now be combined to obtain the result. Substituting the upper bound $|\mathcal{R}| \leq N^q \alpha$ into the upper bound on $1 - \beta$ yields

$$1 - \beta \leq N^q \frac{(N - q)!}{N!} \alpha.$$

The simplified bound follows from the inequality

$$N^q \frac{(N - q)!}{N!} \leq \prod_{i=1}^{q-1} \frac{1}{1 - \frac{i}{N}} \leq \frac{1}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^{q-1} \frac{i}{N}} = \frac{1}{1 - \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}},$$

where the second inequality only works if $q(q - 1) < 2N$. \square

Despite the fact that the PRP-PRF switching lemma is quite simple, it already leads to several interesting conclusions. Figure 1 compares Theorem 3 to the bound obtained from the advantage, which corresponds to

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{q(q - 1)}{2N}. \quad (1)$$

As can be seen from Figure 1, the gap between both bounds is proportional to $1 - \alpha$. This means that it is considerably more difficult to achieve a low error probability α than one might expect from the advantage bound. Taking a closer look at the problem reveals why this is the case. The only way to reject the null hypothesis that the primitive is a uniform random function, is to note the *absence of collisions*. However, there is always a chance that the absence of collisions is just bad luck. Hence, if one wants to be highly confident (low α) in the decision, the power cannot be too high.




Fig. 1. Comparison of the advantage-based bound for the PRP-PRF switching lemma and Theorem 3. The relative tightness loss increases as q decreases.

If the null and alternative hypothesis are swapped, i.e. the null hypothesis is that the primitive is a uniform random permutation, then the results are completely different. By Theorem 2, for this case we have

$$1 - \beta \leq 1 - \left(1 - \frac{q(q - 1)}{2N}\right) (1 - \alpha) \leq \frac{q(q - 1)}{2N} + \left(1 - \frac{q(q - 1)}{2N}\right) \alpha.$$

It turns out that this is essentially tight, and for a good reason: if even a single collision is observed, then the null hypothesis can be rejected with certainty (power equal to one). This case corresponds to the first term in the bound. The overall power of the test still depends on α , but only in a trivial way: if no collision occurs, then the decision is down to random guessing. This corresponds to the second term in the bound.

In Section 6, we will see that Theorem 3 implies a multi-user security bound that does not incur a security loss. However, if the advantage bound is used or if one chooses the uniform random permutation as the null hypothesis, then the resulting multi-user advantage bound would be worse by a factor equal to the number of users. In the next section, we discuss the applications of power bounds – including multi-user security – in more detail.

3.4 Applications of power bounds

Power bounds can be used to lower bound the cost of an attack in any given cost model. In this section, we illustrate the practical relevance of asymmetric cost models using three case-studies. In each case, we use counter mode as the motivating example. Counter mode is widely used, including in TLS 1.3 as a component of the AES-GCM mode [24]. It can be shown that the power bound for distinguishers from an ideal encryption algorithm to counter mode is the same as the PRP-PRF switching bound:

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}},$$

where $\sigma < \sqrt{2N}$ is the total number of blocks encrypted. The proof of this result relies on a hybrid argument, and will be given as Example 2 in Section 4.1.

In the examples below, we are interested in determining the concrete *security margin* offered by counter mode against arbitrary information-theoretic adversaries. This is a question that must be answered, for example, to determine acceptable data-limits. The current data limits for TLS are based on the analysis of Luykx and Patterson [20], which relies on mac-security and indistinguishability advantage bounds for AES-GCM. In TLS, the number of verification queries is equal to one so that it is sufficient to consider confidentiality. There are several ways to quantify confidentiality. The following examples discuss two commonly used approaches: indistinguishability and message-recovery security. The first approach based on indistinguishability is not a realistic model for applications such as TLS and mainly serves to illustrate the use of power bounds to lower bound the cost of attacks.

Indistinguishability. The analysis of Luykx and Patterson [20] uses indistinguishability advantages as a proxy for the confidentiality security margin of AES-GCM. For instance, for a security margin of 2^{-30} , they argue that at most 2^{40} records of length 2^{14} bytes can be safely encrypted. It is natural to ask what the meaning of this security margin 2^{-30} is, and if it is sufficient or too conservative. We argue that no conclusion can be made without additional context.

To illustrate this, we introduce a hypothetical cost model for indistinguishability and demonstrate how to use analyze the profitability of adversaries in this model using the counter mode power bound. The cost model depends on several important parameters such as the value T of correctly distinguishing the target and the cost E associated with a false positive. These costs should be adjusted based on the prior probability of the real and ideal world respectively. For example, the adversary might seek to minimize the average cost

$$\mathcal{C}(\alpha, \beta) = C + \alpha E - (1 - \beta)T \geq C + E \left(\alpha - \min \left\{ 1, \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon} \right\} \frac{T}{E} \right),$$

with C the fixed cost of the distinguisher and $\varepsilon = \sigma(\sigma - 1)/(2N)$. Here, we have used that $1 - \beta \leq 1$, i.e. the power bound should not exceed one. This model is not necessarily realistic – a more detailed model should account for other factors such as risk aversion – but it is sufficient to obtain a meaningful interpretation of the security margin. Note that the analysis below also applies to the left-or-right variant of indistinguishability, where the adversary must determine which one of two distinct messages was encrypted. In this case, T is the reward in case of a correct guess, and E is the cost of an incorrect guess.

If $T/E \geq 1 - \varepsilon$, then the minimum cost is $C - T + (1 - \varepsilon)E$. Otherwise, it is C . Indeed, $\alpha \mapsto \alpha - \min\{1, \alpha/(1 - \varepsilon)\}T/E$ is piecewise linear with minimum at $\alpha = 1 - \varepsilon$ when $T/E \geq 1 - \varepsilon$. Hence, as illustrated in Figure 2, the attack is profitable (has a negative cost) if and only if $(T - C)/E > 1 - \varepsilon$. This is different from the result that one obtains based on the standard advantage bound, as shown in Figure 2. Indeed, the power bound $1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \varepsilon$ obtained from the advantage (*cf.* Equation (1)) suggests that the attack is profitable whenever $T > C/\varepsilon$, but this is often too conservative. For instance, suppose $C = \$1$, $T = \$2048$ and $E = \$5000$. Since $(T - C)/E < 1/2$, the bound above suggests that the attack is not profitable unless $\varepsilon \geq 1/2$, corresponding to 2^{54} records of length 2^{14} bytes. However, the advantage bound suggests that the attack is profitable as long as $\$2048 > \$1/\varepsilon$, or equivalently $\varepsilon > 2^{-11}$. Hence, an analysis based on the advantage bound would incorrectly suggest that only 2^{49} records may be safely encrypted.

It can be argued that for many applications that rely on confidentiality, indistinguishability is mostly used as a proxy for the worst case rather than as a realistic security model. Hence, in the next paragraph we discuss the more practical message-recovery security model.

Message-recovery security. Suppose that an unknown message can take 2^b possible values, with $b \geq 0$ not necessarily an integer. Message-recovery security can be defined by a game in which the adversary must output a list of $\alpha 2^b$ candidate values for this unknown message, in other words, the adversary eliminates the remaining $(1 - \alpha)2^b$ values. The message may be partially known or even chosen by the adversary, and the adversary is given access to the encryption of other chosen messages. In the most extreme case, we require that messages must be recovered uniquely, i.e. $\alpha = 2^{-b}$.




Fig. 2. Shaded areas correspond to values of T and E for which the attack is profitable based on the tight power bound (left) or on the advantage bound (right). Results are shown for two different values of ε .

It is easy to see that a message-recovery attack implies a distinguisher from an ideal encryption scheme to the real encryption mode. Indeed, the distinguisher can run the message-recovery attack to recover a known message that was sampled uniformly at random from a set of size 2^b . If the key-recovery attack cuts this down to $\alpha 2^b$ candidates, then the probability that the distinguisher incorrectly concludes that the ideal world is real, is at most $\alpha 2^b / 2^b = \alpha$. The probability that the distinguisher correctly identifies the real world, i.e. the power $1 - \beta$, is the probability that the message-recovery attack succeeds. Hence, for counter mode, the success probability of a message-recovery attack is at most

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}},$$

for $\sigma < \sqrt{2N}$. Here, α represents the factor by which the number of message candidates is reduced. For example, if the adversary has to uniquely recover b bits that can take an arbitrary value, then $\alpha = 2^{-b}$. The main takeaway from this bound is that if $\varepsilon = \sigma(\sigma - 1)/2N < 1$, then the probability of successfully recovering the message is $2^{-b}(1 + \varepsilon + \mathcal{O}(\varepsilon^2))$. This should be compared with the standard advantage bound, which yields an upper bound of $2^{-b} + \varepsilon$. In contrast, the power bound from above shows that recovering a large number of message bits is effectively infeasible as long as $\sigma < \sqrt{2N}$. In this setting, the data limits proposed by Luykx and Patterson are too conservative.

Multi-user security. In Section 6 of this paper, we show that upper bounds of the form $1 - \beta \leq c\alpha$ automatically imply tight multi-user security power bounds in the standard model. As shown above in Section 3.2, this in turns implies tight multi-user advantage bounds. For example, our Theorem 13 implies the following informal statement. From a probability theory point of view, the number of queries q mentioned in the claim below is simply a restriction on the probability space.




Fig. 3. Success probability for a b -bit message recovery attack on counter mode. The dashed lines correspond to power bounds obtained from standard advantage bounds. The bottom black line is the baseline success probability of uninformed guessing (2^{-b}).

Claim (Informal). *Given a single-user power bound $1 - \beta \leq c(q) \alpha$ for q queries, the multi-user power bound for u independent and identical users making a total of q queries is given by*

$$1 - \beta' \leq \alpha' \max_{q_1 + \dots + q_u \leq q} \prod_{i=1}^q c(q_i),$$

where α' and β' are the multi-user false positive and negative rates, respectively.

Variants of this result with some dependency between the users, such as a shared public cryptographic primitive, will also be obtained. Given the strength of such results, one might expect power bounds $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$ to be much more difficult to prove. However, this is not the case: it will be shown in Section 4 that common proof techniques for advantages such as hybrid arguments and the H-coefficient method have analogues for power bounds. These techniques will help to simplify proofs – including that of Theorem 3.

4 Proof techniques

In this section, we extend the most commonly used proof techniques to the asymmetric setting. More precisely, in Section 4.1 we show how to use hybrid arguments with power bounds. Hybrid arguments are often used to exclude ‘bad events’, so we discuss this specific case in Section 4.2 and illustrate it by giving an alternative and shorter proof of Theorem 3. Finally, Section 4.3 extends the H-coefficient method of Patarin [23].

4.1 Hybrid arguments

Probably the most widely used technique in provable security is the ‘hybrid argument’, or equivalently the triangle inequality for the total variation distance.

That is, for distributions P , Q and X on the same domain,

$$\Delta(P; Q) \leq \Delta(P; X) + \Delta(X; Q).$$

Power bounds are not additive. However, as shown by Theorem 4, the hybrid argument has a natural generalization: the power bound for distinguishers from P to Q is the functional composition of the bounds for distinguishers from P to X and from X to Q .

Theorem 4. *Let P , Q and X be distributions on a common domain. If every distinguisher from P to X with false positive and negative rates α_1 and β_1 satisfies $1 - \beta_1 \leq f(\alpha_1)$, and if every distinguisher from X to Q with false positive and negative rates α_2 and β_2 satisfies $1 - \beta_2 \leq g(\alpha_2)$ with f and g non-decreasing, then for all distinguishers from P to Q*

$$1 - \beta \leq g(f(\alpha)),$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. The proof is straightforward. Since f and g are non-decreasing functions,

$$1 - \beta = Q(\mathcal{R}) \leq g(X(\mathcal{R})) \leq g(f(P(\mathcal{R}))) \leq g(f(\alpha)),$$

where we choose $\alpha_1 = P(\mathcal{R})$, $\beta_1 = 1 - X(\mathcal{R})$, $\alpha_2 = X(\mathcal{R})$ and $\beta_2 = 1 - Q(\mathcal{R})$. \square

An interesting consequence of Theorem 4 is that when multiple hybrid arguments are applied sequentially, in general the order matters. This is again related to the asymmetry of hypothesis testing.

Example 2 (Counter mode). To illustrate Theorem 4, we prove the security of the nonce-based counter mode based on a uniform random permutation π (see Figure 4). Let us take an ideal encryption scheme as the null hypothesis, with transcript distribution P . The transcript distribution of counter mode will be denoted by Q . To prove a power bound, define an intermediate transcript distribution X equal to the distribution of transcripts produced by counter mode based on a uniform random function ρ .

Under the assumption that nonces are unique, the input to the random function ρ is always fresh. Hence, it is clear that P and X are actually indistinguishable. That is, $1 - \beta_1 \leq f(\alpha_1)$ with $f(\alpha_1) = \alpha_1$ for all distinguishers from P to X with false positive rate α_1 and false negative rate β_1 . Indeed, recall that $1 - \beta_1 = \alpha_1$ corresponds to pure guessing. By a standard reduction argument, any distinguisher from X to Q can be turned into a distinguisher from ρ to π that makes at most σ queries, where σ is the total number of blocks encrypted with counter mode. Hence, by Theorem 3, every distinguisher from X to Q with false positive rate α_2 and false negative rate β_2 satisfies $1 - \beta_2 \leq g(\alpha_2)$, where

$$g(\alpha_2) = \frac{\alpha_2}{1 - \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}}.$$




Fig. 4. Nonce-based counter mode using a uniform random permutation π .

By Theorem 4, the bounds from P to X and from X to Q can be combined to obtain the following bound for any distinguisher from P to Q :

$$1 - \beta \leq g(f(\alpha)) = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{\sigma(\sigma-1)}{2N}},$$

where α is the false positive rate and β the false negative rate. ▷

4.2 Excluding bad events

Let P be a distribution on \mathcal{T} and E an event with nonzero probability. We denote the distribution of P conditioned on E by P_E . That is,

$$P_E(A) = \frac{P(A \cap E)}{P(E)},$$

for all subsets A of \mathcal{T} . For distinguishers from P to P_E , we have the following result. In Theorem 5, the event E is denoted by $\mathcal{T} \setminus B$. This refers to the fact that, when proving power bounds, B is a ‘bad event’ that we would like to exclude from consideration.

Theorem 5. *Let P be a distribution on \mathcal{T} and let $B \subseteq \mathcal{T}$ be some event with $P(B) \leq \varepsilon$. For all distinguishers from P to $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon},$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. Let \mathcal{R} be the critical region of the distinguisher. By definition,

$$1 - \beta = P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}(\mathcal{R}) = \frac{P(\mathcal{R} \setminus B)}{P(\mathcal{T} \setminus B)} \leq \frac{P(\mathcal{R})}{1 - P(B)} \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon},$$

where we use $\alpha = P(\mathcal{R})$ and $P(B) \leq \varepsilon$ in the last inequality. ◻

Let us stress again that the choice of P as the null hypothesis in Theorem 5 is essential. Swapping P and $P_{\mathcal{T}\setminus B}$ would result in a significantly worse bound of the form $1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \varepsilon$. Despite its simplicity, Theorem 5 often simplifies proofs considerably. We illustrate this by giving a significantly shorter proof of Theorem 3. The proof in Example 3 is more intuitive, and more similar to typical proofs of advantage bounds for distinguishers between uniform random functions and uniform random permutations.

Example 3. As in Theorem 3, let ρ be a uniform random function and π a uniform random permutation. Assume that q distinct queries are made, and let \mathcal{T} denote the set of all possible transcripts of length q . Denote the distribution of transcripts for ρ by P and the distribution of transcripts for π by Q . Intuitively, the only difference between ρ and π is that collisions may occur between the outputs of ρ but not between the outputs of π . Formally, if B is the set of all transcripts that contain a collision, then $Q = P_{\mathcal{T}\setminus B}$. Since every pair of outputs of ρ collides with probability $1/N$, the union bound gives

$$P(B) \leq \frac{1}{N} \binom{q}{2} = \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}.$$

Hence, by Theorem 5, for all distinguishers from P to Q ,

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}},$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate. ▷

4.3 H-coefficient technique

Many security proofs in symmetric-key cryptography rely on the *H-coefficient* technique of Patarin [23]. In this section, we develop asymmetric variants of this result that can be used to prove power bounds.

First, we recall the classical H-coefficient theorem as described by Chen and Steinberger [6]. In the following, $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_g \sqcup \mathcal{T}_b$ denotes a partition of \mathcal{T} into subsets \mathcal{T}_g and \mathcal{T}_b . These are typically called ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sets of transcripts. To simplify the statement, we reformulate it in terms of distributions rather than probability mass functions.

Theorem 6 (H-coefficient technique). *Let P and Q be distributions on $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_g \sqcup \mathcal{T}_b$. If $Q(\mathcal{T}_b) \leq \varepsilon_b$ and $P(E) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(E)$ for all $E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_g$, then*

$$\Delta(P; Q) \leq \varepsilon_g + \varepsilon_b.$$

Proof. Since our description is slightly more general than that of Chen and Steinberger [6], we give a proof for completeness. The partition of \mathcal{T} induces a partition of any critical region $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_g \sqcup \mathcal{R}_b$ with $\mathcal{R}_g = \mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{T}_g$ and $\mathcal{R}_b = \mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{T}_b$. The advantage is equal to

$$\Delta(P; Q) \leq \max_{\mathcal{R}} Q(\mathcal{R}) - P(\mathcal{R}) = \max_{\mathcal{R}} Q(\mathcal{R}_b) + Q(\mathcal{R}_g) - P(\mathcal{R}_g) - P(\mathcal{R}_b),$$

where the maximum is over all \mathcal{R} such that $Q(\mathcal{R}) \geq P(\mathcal{R})$. Using the fact that $Q(\mathcal{R}_b) \leq \varepsilon_b$ and $P(\mathcal{R}_b) \geq 0$, one gets

$$\Delta(P; Q) \leq \varepsilon_b + \max_{\mathcal{R}} Q(\mathcal{R}_g) - P(\mathcal{R}_g) \leq \varepsilon_b + \varepsilon_g \max_{\mathcal{R}} Q(\mathcal{R}_g),$$

The result follows from the fact that $Q(\mathcal{R}_g) \leq 1$. \square

In most applications of Theorem 6, the lower bound $P(E) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(E)$ for subsets E of \mathcal{T}_g is obtained by lower bounding the ratio

$$\frac{p(\tau)}{q(\tau)} \geq 1 - \varepsilon_g,$$

for all transcripts τ in \mathcal{T}_g with $q(\tau) \neq 0$. More generally, however, it is sufficient to bound the expectation of $\min\{1, p(\tau)/q(\tau)\}$ for a random variable τ with distribution Q . This is the special case described by Chen and Steinberger [6] and is known as the expectation method.

The following theorem extends the H-coefficient technique to our setting, so that it can be used to obtain bounds of the form $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha)$. The proof is only slightly more complicated.

Theorem 7. *Let P and Q be distributions on $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_g \sqcup \mathcal{T}_b$. If $Q(\mathcal{T}_b) \leq \varepsilon_b$ and $P(E) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(E)$ for all $E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_g$, then for every distinguisher from P to Q ,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \varepsilon_b + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_g},$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. Let \mathcal{R} be the critical region of the distinguisher. As in the proof of Theorem 6, the partition of \mathcal{T} induces a partition $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_g \sqcup \mathcal{R}_b$. By definition,

$$1 - \beta = Q(\mathcal{R}) = Q(\mathcal{R}_g) + Q(\mathcal{R}_b) \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_g) + \varepsilon_b.$$

To deal with the term $Q(\mathcal{R}_g)$, we will divide by $\alpha = P(\mathcal{R})$. It can be assumed that $\alpha \neq 0$, since if $P(\mathcal{R}) = 0$ then also $Q(\mathcal{R}_g) = 0$ so that the bound holds. Dividing by α gives

$$Q(\mathcal{R}_g) = \alpha \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)}{P(\mathcal{R})} = \alpha \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)}{P(\mathcal{R}_g) + P(\mathcal{R}_b)} \leq \alpha \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)}{(1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(\mathcal{R}_g) + P(\mathcal{R}_b)},$$

where we have used $P(\mathcal{R}_g) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(\mathcal{R}_g)$. The result follows from the obvious lower bound $P(\mathcal{R}_g) \geq 0$, since the result is trivial for $Q(\mathcal{R}_g) = 0$ and

$$Q(\mathcal{R}_g) \leq \alpha \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)}{(1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(\mathcal{R}_g)} \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_g}.$$

Plugging this into the bound $1 - \beta \leq Q(\mathcal{R}_g) + \varepsilon_b$ yields the result. \square

There is an important difference in how we will apply Theorem 7 compared to typical uses of the H-coefficient theorem. In proofs of advantage bounds, Q is often chosen as the ideal world transcript distribution. This makes it easier to obtain the bound $Q(\mathcal{T}_b) \leq \varepsilon_b$, but it is not a good way to deal with bad events in the asymmetric setting. Instead, as we will see in Section 5, it is often easier to take P as the ideal world transcript distribution and exclude bad events using a hybrid argument.

More generally, it is our view that Theorem 7 should be used sparingly and with great care when proving power bounds. In particular, one should avoid using the term ε_b to deal with bad events that could have been excluded using a hybrid argument. Indeed, this is an additive term that worsens the multi-user bound. This contrasts with proofs of advantage bounds, where it is not uncommon to use Theorem 6 to exclude bad events from the ideal world that are just as likely to happen in the real world. In Section 5, we will encounter an example of this in the context of the Even-Mansour construction.

4.4 Hybrid with the H-coefficient technique

In this section, we provide a solution to the problem of the constant term ε_b introduced in Theorem 7. This approach works in general when the bad events only happen in one of the two worlds, but this can be achieved in many cases by redefining the events. Indeed, suppose $1 - \beta \leq f_1(\alpha) \leq \alpha/(1 - \varepsilon_g)$ for distinguishing from the ideal world *without bad events*. If $1 - \beta \leq f_2(\alpha)$ for distinguishing the ideal world without bad events from the actual ideal world, then one gets

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{f_2(\alpha)}{1 - \varepsilon_g}.$$

For most of the practical constructions, if such bad events exist, then these usually only appear in the ideal world. However, our approach below can also handle the case when the bad events only appear in the real world.

Theorem 8. *Let P and Q be distributions on $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_g \sqcup \mathcal{T}_b$. If $P(\mathcal{T}_b) \leq \varepsilon_b$, $Q(\mathcal{T}_b) = 0$, and $P(E) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(E)$ for all $E \subseteq \mathcal{T}_g$ with $\varepsilon_b + \varepsilon_g < 1$, then for every distinguisher from P to Q ,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_b - \varepsilon_g},$$

where α is the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Note that this result is the general case that can be applied to most practical constructions.

Proof. Let \mathcal{R} be the critical region of the distinguisher. As before, the partition of \mathcal{T} induces a partition $\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_g \sqcup \mathcal{R}_b$. Define B as the transcripts where the ‘bad events’ occur, which is the set of transcripts that we would like to exclude from consideration. If every distinguisher from P to $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ satisfies $1 - \beta_1 \leq f_1(\alpha_1)$

and every distinguisher from $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ to Q satisfies $1 - \beta_2 \leq f_2(\alpha_2)$, then based on Theorem 4 every distinguisher from P to Q satisfies

$$1 - \beta \leq f_2(f_1(\alpha)).$$

Hence, it is sufficient to find f_1 for distributions P and $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ and f_2 for distributions $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ and Q . We will first start with f_1 . By Theorem 5, we obtain

$$1 - \beta_1 = P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}(\mathcal{R}) \leq \frac{\alpha_1}{1 - \varepsilon_b}.$$

Now it remains to find f_2 , note that taking $B = \mathcal{T}_b$, we have

$$1 - \beta_2 = Q(\mathcal{R}) = Q(\mathcal{R}_g).$$

To deal with the term $Q(\mathcal{R}_g)$, we will divide by $\alpha_2 = P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}(\mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b)$. It can be assumed that $\alpha_2 \neq 0$, since if $P(\mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b) = 0$ then also $Q(\mathcal{R}_g) = 0$ so that the bound holds. Dividing by α_2 gives

$$Q(\mathcal{R}_g) = \alpha_2 \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)}{P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}(\mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b)} = \alpha_2 \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g) \cdot P(\mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b)}{P(\mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b)} \leq \alpha_2 \frac{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)}{Q(\mathcal{R}_g)(1 - \varepsilon_g)} = \frac{\alpha_2}{1 - \varepsilon_g},$$

where we have used $P(\mathcal{R} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b) = P(\mathcal{R}_g) \geq (1 - \varepsilon_g)Q(\mathcal{R}_g)$ and $P(\mathcal{T} \setminus \mathcal{T}_b) \leq 1$. Plugging f_1 and f_2 into Theorem 4, yields

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \varepsilon_b)(1 - \varepsilon_g)} \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_b - \varepsilon_g},$$

using the fact that $1/(1 - x) \times 1/(1 - y) \leq 1/(1 - x - y)$. \square

4.5 Converting power bounds to advantage bounds

In Section 3.2, it was already explained how power bounds can be turned into advantage bounds in general. If the methods from Sections 4.2 to 4.4 are used, then one often obtains a power bound for distinguishers from P to Q of the form

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_1} + \varepsilon_2, \quad (2)$$

with $\varepsilon_2 = 0$ in the best case. Since the bounds we obtain in Sections 5 and 6 are all of this form, it is useful to show here that (2) implies

$$\Delta(P; Q) \leq \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2.$$

To see this, note that the power is at most one. Hence, by applying the general principle from Section 3.2 to (2), we get

$$\Delta(P; Q) \leq \max_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \min \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_1} + \varepsilon_2 - \alpha, 1 \right\} \leq \max_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \min \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1 - \varepsilon_1} - \alpha, 1 \right\} + \varepsilon_2,$$

Since $1 - \varepsilon_1 \leq 1$, the maximum is achieved at $\alpha = 1 - \varepsilon_1$. Hence, the advantage is upper bounded by $1 - (1 - \varepsilon_1) + \varepsilon_2 = \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2$.

5 Applications

In this section, we apply the proof techniques from Section 4 to more complicated constructions. More precisely, in Section 5.1 we derive power bounds for the Even-Mansour construction [11] using a simple hybrid argument. Compared to traditional proofs of advantage bounds for this construction such as [21], our bad events are defined in a more careful way so that the H-coefficient method is not necessary. In Section 5.2, we obtain power bounds for the sum-of-permutations construction [4, 15].

5.1 Even-Mansour construction

The Even-Mansour EM construction [11] is used to build a secure pseudorandom permutation based on a public permutation. We consider the version that only uses a single key, but our analysis carries over to the case with two keys.

Let n be a non-negative integer and π a permutation on $\{0, 1\}^n$. The Even-Mansour construction is a family of permutations $\text{EM}_K[\pi] : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ indexed by a key K in $\{0, 1\}^n$ and based on the permutation π . Given a plaintext M , the corresponding ciphertext is equal to

$$\text{EM}_K[\pi](M) = \pi(M \oplus K) \oplus K,$$

with \oplus the exclusive-or operation on bitstrings of length n . Theorem 9 gives an upper bound on the power of any distinguisher for the EM construction, with EM as the alternative hypothesis. The security model for the Even-Mansour construction is the standard sprp security notion with oracle access to the public permutation π , so we do not describe it in detail here. Queries made to π are called primitive queries, the others are construction queries.

Theorem 9. *Let n be a non-negative integer, $N = 2^n$, K a uniform random variable on $\{0, 1\}^n$ and π a uniform random permutation on $\{0, 1\}^n$. For every distinguisher (with oracle access to π) from a uniform random permutation to $\text{EM}_K[\pi]$ that makes q construction queries and p primitive queries,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{2pq}{N}},$$

where α is the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Compare Theorem 9 to the bound obtained from the advantage [11, 17], which corresponds to

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{2pq}{N}.$$

As in the case of the PRP-PRF switching lemma, the gap between both bounds is proportional to $1 - \alpha$. As before, it is considerably more difficult to achieve a low error probability α than one might expect from the advantage bound. From our bound, low α means that the power cannot be too high.

Proof of Theorem 9. Since the resulting bound is non-decreasing in q and p , we can assume that the distinguisher never queries duplicate inputs. Every transcript contains the result of at most q construction queries and at most p primitive queries, both bidirectional and suitably ordered. We also include the key in the transcript; this can only improve the distinguisher. In terms of the security game, the keys are disclosed after the distinguisher finishes its interaction with the oracles but before it outputs its decision. In the ideal world the key is a uniform random dummy.

Let P denote the distribution of transcripts for the uniform random permutation and Q the distribution of transcripts for Even-Mansour. Intuitively, the property that distinguishes Even-Mansour from a uniform random permutation is that if the input of a construction query collides with the input of a primitive query, then the output of this construction query must collide with the output of the primitive query. One has a similar property for the outputs.

Formally, let B be the set of all transcripts containing a construction query (M, C) and a primitive query (u, v) so that one of the following conditions holds:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{BAD}_1: M \oplus u = K \text{ and } C \oplus v \neq K, \\ \text{BAD}_2: M \oplus u \neq K \text{ and } C \oplus v = K. \end{aligned}$$

Readers familiar with the proof of Mouha and Luykx [21] or other proofs in the advantage setting will note that our bad events are defined differently, and this is important. The goal of our bad events is to bring the ideal world closer to the real world. Hence, we only want to exclude events that do not happen in the real world. In particular, we use a hybrid argument with $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ as the intermediate transcript distribution.

To apply Theorem 5, we need to bound $P(B)$. Since the dummy key is uniform random and independent of all queries, there are at most pq keys satisfying BAD_1 . A similar argument can be made for BAD_2 . Hence, by the union bound,

$$P(B) \leq \frac{2pq}{N}.$$

Hence, by Theorem 5, for all distinguishers from P to $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$,

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{2pq}{N}} := f(\alpha),$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate. To complete the proof, we still need to verify that $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B} = Q$. First, it is easy to see that $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ and Q have the same support. The result then follows from the observation that all transcripts in the support have the same probability. The theorem follows by applying Theorem 4 with $g(\alpha) = \alpha$ and f as above. \square

5.2 Sum-of-permutations construction

The sum-of-permutations construction was first proposed by Bellare et al. [4] and by Hall et al. [15]. This construction is used to build a pseudorandom function

from a block cipher. In this section, we consider the variant based on a single permutation with domain separation. The easier variant with two independent block ciphers is analyzed in the full version of this paper.

Let n be a non-negative integer and π a permutation on n bits. The sum-of-permutations construction is a family of functions $\text{SoP}[\pi] : \{0, 1\}^{n-1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ based on the (secret) permutation π . For an input M in $\{0, 1\}^{n-1}$, it returns

$$\text{SoP}[\pi](M) = \pi(0\|M) \oplus \pi(1\|M).$$

In practice, π is instantiated with a block cipher and one relies on its prp security to replace it by a uniform random permutation using a hybrid argument.

The security model for the sum-of-permutations construction is the standard prf security notion, i.e. the construction is compared to a uniform random function on $\{0, 1\}^{n-1}$. Theorem 10 gives an upper bound on the power of any test that distinguishes SoP from a uniform random function.

Theorem 10. *Let $N = 2^n$ with $n \geq 12$. For every distinguisher from a uniform random function to the $\text{SoP}[\pi]$ construction instantiated with a uniform random permutation π , making $q \leq N/58$ queries,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q}{N}},$$

where α is the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. The transcript consists of q input-output pairs. Since the resulting bound is non-decreasing in q , we can assume that all the inputs are distinct. Let P denote the distribution of transcripts for a uniform random function ρ , and Q the distribution for $\text{SoP}[\pi]$.

Intuitively, the only difference between ρ and $\text{SoP}[\pi]$ is that the zero bitstring 0^n may be output by ρ but not by $\text{SoP}[\pi]$. Formally, let B be the set of all transcripts that contain a zero bitstring. In particular, we use a hybrid argument with $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ as the intermediate transcript distribution. Since every output of ρ appears with probability $1/N$, we have

$$P(B) \leq \frac{q}{N}.$$

Hence, by Theorem 5, for all distinguishers from P to $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$,

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q}{N}} := f(\alpha),$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate. To complete the proof, we still need to show that $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ and Q are equal. For this, we rely on a result of Dutta, Nandi, and Saha [10, Section 3.3], which shows that $Q(E) \geq P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}(E)$ for all events E . However, it is easy to see that $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ and Q have the same support, so we can conclude that $P_{\mathcal{T} \setminus B}$ and Q are equal. The theorem follows by applying Theorem 4 with $g(\alpha) = \alpha$ and f as above. \square

6 Multi-user security

In this section, we propose two methods to convert single-user power bounds into multi-user power bounds. The first method is based on the idea of point-wise proximity due to Hoang and Tessaro [17], and is described in Section 6.1. However, one limitation of this method is that the power bound must satisfy some nontrivial conditions. Therefore, in Section 6.2, we propose another method that requires users to be independent but that avoids the limitations of point-wise proximity.

6.1 From point-wise proximity

In this section, we present a first method to convert single-user power bounds into multi-user power bounds. It based on the point-wise proximity method of Hoang and Tessaro [17]. Unlike the method that we propose in Section 6.2, it is also applicable when there is some dependency between different users, such as a shared primitive. However, it has limitations of its own: the power bound must be linear and the dependence on the number of queries must satisfy some nontrivial conditions. In addition, the result in Section 6.2 yields a slightly better bound.

Let us recall the definition of point-wise proximity [17, Definition 1]. Two probability mass functions p and q on a set \mathcal{T} satisfy ε -point-wise proximity if, for all x in \mathcal{T} ,

$$q(x) - p(x) \leq \varepsilon q(x).$$

Note that this is equivalent to a ratio bound of the form $p(x)/q(x) \geq 1 - \varepsilon$, the same as in the H-coefficient method (see Section 4.3). The following result shows that *in some cases* a power bound implies point-wise proximity. The converse is also true: point-wise proximity always implies a strong power bound. This follows from Theorem 7 with $\varepsilon_{\mathbf{b}} = 0$. However, direct point-wise proximity estimates are more difficult to obtain because this requires analyzing the probabilities of individual transcripts.

Theorem 11. *If every distinguisher from P to Q with false positive and negative rates α and β satisfies $1 - \beta \leq \alpha/(1 - \varepsilon)$, then the probability mass functions of P and Q satisfy ε -point-wise proximity.*

Proof. By the given power bound, we have $Q(\mathcal{R}) \leq P(\mathcal{R})/(1 - \varepsilon)$ for all critical regions \mathcal{R} , including $\mathcal{R} = \{x\}$. Hence, if p and q are the probability mass functions of P and Q respectively, then

$$(1 - \varepsilon)q(x) \leq p(x).$$

Equivalently, $q(x) - p(x) \leq \varepsilon q(x)$. □

From the point of view of Theorem 11, power bounds may be used as an efficient way to prove point-wise proximity estimates. For example, a typical

point-wise proximity estimate for the PRP-PRF switching problem is not to different from the proof of Theorem 3 – computing the probability of every transcript. However, to derive a power bound, we can simply exclude collisions using a hybrid argument as in Example 3.

In this section, our main interest in Theorem 11 is that Hoang and Tessaro [17, §3.3] have shown that a single-user point-wise proximity estimate can be turned into a multi-user point-wise proximity estimate.

Multi-user security of EM. To illustrate how this works, consider the multi-user security of the Even-Mansour construction. The bound follows immediately from the single-user bound, since the proof of Theorem 9 already established point-wise proximity (by Theorem 11). This is formalized in Theorem 12.

Theorem 12. *Let $N = 2^n$ with $n \geq 1$, K_1, \dots, K_u independent uniform random variables on $\{0, 1\}^n$ and π_1, \dots, π_u independent uniform random permutations on $\{0, 1\}^n$. For every distinguisher (with oracle access to π_1, \dots, π_u) from u independent uniform random permutations to the $\text{EM}_{K_i}[\pi_1], \dots, \text{EM}_{K_i}[\pi_u]$ constructions that makes in total q construction queries and p primitive queries,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{4q(p+q)}{N}}.$$

where α is the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. Let us recall from the proof of Theorem 9 that P is the distribution of transcripts for ideal world (π_I, π) and Q is the distribution of transcripts for real world $(\text{EM}_K[\pi], \pi)$. From Theorem 9 and Theorem 11, the probability mass functions of P and Q satisfy $\epsilon(p, q)$ -point-wise proximity with $\epsilon(p, q) = \frac{2qp}{N}$. Since this bound satisfies (i) $\epsilon(x, y) + \epsilon(x, z) \leq \epsilon(x, y + z)$, for all non-negative integers x, y, z , and (ii) $\epsilon(\cdot, z)$ and $\epsilon(z, \cdot)$ are non-decreasing functions for every non-negative integer z , [17, Lemma 3] give us that

$$q(x) - p(x) \leq 2 \cdot \frac{2q(p+q)}{N} q(x).$$

The result follows since point-wise proximity implies a strong power bound. \square

We note that this bound is essentially the same as the one from Theorem 9, with an additional factor two and the additive term q . This additive term plays a significant role for the case of the EM construction. The $O(q^2/N)$ term takes into account collisions on the keys across multiple users, which allows to easily distinguish and is therefore tight.

We would like to stress once more the importance of giving security using power bounds, as opposed to advantage bounds. The bound obtained from the dedicated analysis by Mouha and Luykx [21] corresponds to

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{2q(p+q)}{N},$$

and the bound obtained by naively using the hybrid argument in the classical advantage setting [17] on the single-user result corresponds to

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{2uq(p+q)}{N}.$$

The gap between these bounds and ours is proportional to $1 - \alpha$. The lower the value of α , the more important the power bound becomes compared to the advantage bounds.

6.2 Independent users

In this section, we provide an alternative way to deduce multi-user power bounds from single-user power bounds. It requires the assumption that users are independent, but it gives a tighter bound than point-wise proximity and more importantly does not make any assumptions about how the single-user bound depends on the number of queries. It is, however, necessary to assume that the single-user power bound is linear in the false positive rate. That is, $f(\alpha) \leq a(q)\alpha$, with a an arbitrary function of the number of queries q . This means that our result in this section can also be understood as a way to obtain point-wise proximity bounds without assumptions on $\varepsilon(q) = 1 - 1/a(q)$.

In the multi-user setting with u users, it can be assumed that P and Q are distributions on a set $\mathcal{T} = \mathcal{T}_1 \times \mathcal{T}_2 \times \dots \times \mathcal{T}_u$. Although this implies that queries for different users are kept in separate parts of the transcript, this does not mean that we neglect their order. Indeed, the queries may be numbered. If the u users are independent, then P and Q are related to the marginal single user distributions P_1, \dots, P_u and Q_1, \dots, Q_u as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} P(E_1 \times E_2 \times \dots \times E_u) &= P_1(E_1)P_2(E_2) \dots P_u(E_u), \\ Q(E_1 \times E_2 \times \dots \times E_u) &= Q_1(E_1)Q_2(E_2) \dots Q_u(E_u). \end{aligned}$$

This will be denoted by $P = P_1 \otimes P_2 \otimes \dots \otimes P_u$ and $Q = Q_1 \otimes Q_2 \otimes \dots \otimes Q_u$.

In the multi-user setting, it is important to be precise about the dependence of the single-user bound on the number of queries. For this reason, in the following results, we always mention the number of queries made by the distinguisher and write $1 - \beta \leq f(\alpha; q)$ if that number is q . From the point of view of probability theory, this is simply a restriction on the critical region of the hypothesis test. The precise definition of this restriction does not actually matter for the theorems that we prove.

In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 13. Despite the independence assumption, which is rather strong from a probability theory point of view, the proof is subtle. There are two issues that we have to address:

- (i) Although users are independent, the critical region is *not* a product of subsets of $\mathcal{T}_1, \dots, \mathcal{T}_u$. Indeed, from the Neyman-Pearson lemma (Theorem 1), we see that there is no reason to expect this for the optimal test. This corresponds to the fact that the adversary can, of course, use the result of a query for one user as the input to a query for another user.

- (ii) Although the total number of queries is fixed to q , we do not know the number of queries made to each user individually. This means that the critical region can contain, *for every user*, transcripts with up to q queries. In fact, this is precisely why a naive hybrid argument leads to a loss proportional to the number of users.

The main idea of the proof is to establish the result first under the assumption that every transcript in the critical region contains exactly q_i queries to user i . This is easy, and essentially follows the point-wise proximity proof. To deal with the second problem above, we partition the critical region into subsets that each contain only transcripts with a specific number of queries to every user. The new idea here is that power bounds apply to distributions, which is different from the perspective of probability mass functions that is adopted when using point-wise proximity. This allows us to keep track of the probability of all the sets in the partition, and is the reason why our result does not require any assumptions (such as super-linearity) on the query-dependence.

Theorem 13. *For $i = 1, \dots, u$, let P_i and Q_i be distributions on the same domain. If every distinguisher from P_i to Q_i making q queries satisfies $1 - \beta_i \leq a_i(q) \alpha_i$ for false positive and negative rates α_i and β_i , then for every distinguisher from $P_1 \otimes P_2 \otimes \dots \otimes P_u$ to $Q_1 \otimes Q_2 \otimes \dots \otimes Q_u$ making q queries, it holds that*

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha \max_{q_1 + \dots + q_u = q} \prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i),$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

The following lemma establishes the first part of our claim, namely a power bound for distinguishers that make a predetermined number of queries to every user.

Lemma 1. *For $i = 1, \dots, u$, let P_i and Q_i be distributions with the same domain. If every distinguisher from P_i to Q_i making q queries satisfies $1 - \beta_i \leq a_i(q) \alpha_i$ for false positive and negative rates α_i and β_i , then for every distinguisher from $P_1 \otimes P_2 \otimes \dots \otimes P_u$ to $Q_1 \otimes Q_2 \otimes \dots \otimes Q_u$ that makes q_i queries to user i ,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha \prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i),$$

with α the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. Theorem 11 shows that the bounds $1 - \beta_i \leq a_i(q) \alpha_i$ establish point-wise proximity between P_i and Q_i . Put more simply, for every event E_i ,

$$Q_i(E_i) \leq a_i(q_i) P_i(E_i).$$

Since $P = P_1 \otimes \dots \otimes P_u$ and $Q = Q_1 \otimes \dots \otimes Q_u$, multiplying these bounds gives

$$Q(E_1 \times \dots \times E_u) \leq \prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i) P(E_1 \times \dots \times E_u)$$

Since this bound works when the events E_i are singletons, it works for every transcript. Hence, if \mathcal{R} is the critical region, then also $Q(\mathcal{R}) \leq \alpha P(\mathcal{R})$. \square

The first part of the proof is now complete. Using Lemma 1, we can now proceed with the partition argument.

Proof of Theorem 13. The idea of the theorem is to apply Lemma 1. However, we must first partition the critical region \mathcal{R} according to the number of queries that were made for each user. Let $\mathcal{R}_{q_1, \dots, q_u}$ be the subset of \mathcal{R} containing all transcripts with q_i queries for user i . This gives the following partition of \mathcal{R} :

$$\mathcal{R} = \bigsqcup_{q_1 + \dots + q_u = q} \mathcal{R}_{q_1, \dots, q_u}.$$

In terms of probabilities, we have

$$1 - \beta = Q(\mathcal{R}) = \sum_{q_1 + \dots + q_u = q} Q(\mathcal{R}_{q_1, \dots, q_u}),$$

where $Q = Q_1 \otimes \dots \otimes Q_u$. Lemma 1 shows that

$$Q(\mathcal{R}_{q_1, \dots, q_u}) \leq P(\mathcal{R}_{q_1, \dots, q_u}) \prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i).$$

By taking the maximum and using linearity, we obtain

$$1 - \beta \leq \left(\max_{q_1 + \dots + q_u = q} \prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i) \right) \sum_{q_1 + \dots + q_u = q} P(\mathcal{R}_{q_1, \dots, q_u}) \leq \alpha \max_{q_1 + \dots + q_u = q} \prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i).$$

This is the desired result. \square

Note that our result achieves a better point-wise proximity estimate compared to the results of Hoang and Tessaro [17]. Indeed, in our case, the function $a(q)$ can be an arbitrary function, while the $\varepsilon(q)$ function in [17] needs to be super-linear. The main reason is because we maximize over all $q_1 + \dots + q_u = q$ to pull $\prod_{i=1}^u a_i(q_i)$ out of the summation in the last step of our proof, which is natural from the point of view of power bounds. Indeed, in the case when $\varepsilon(q) = q/N + c$ with c some small constant, then Hoang and Tessaro's result does not hold any more since $q_1/N + c + q_2/N + c > (q_1 + q_2)/N + c$, whereas our result still works.

To illustrate Theorem 13, we prove a multi-user variant of the PRP-PRF switching lemma. The power bound we prove in the following example implies the strongest possible advantage bound. This is unlike the pointwise proximity method of Hoang and Tessaro [17], which loses a factor of two.

Example 4. In the multi-user variant of the PRP-PRF switching lemma, we have independent uniform random permutations π_1, \dots, π_u and independent uniform

random functions ρ_1, \dots, ρ_u . In Theorem 3 (and in Example 3) we showed that for all distinguishers from ρ_i to π_i making at most q_i queries,

$$1 - \beta_i \leq \frac{\alpha_i}{1 - \frac{q_i(q_i-1)}{2N}},$$

where α_i is the false positive rate and β_i the false negative rate. By Theorem 13, we get the overall power bound

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha \max_{q_1+\dots+q_u \leq q} \prod_{i=1}^u \frac{1}{1 - \frac{q_i(q_i-1)}{2N}} \leq \max_{q_1+\dots+q_u \leq q} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^u \frac{q_i(q_i-1)}{2N}}.$$

Here we have used the fact that $1/(1-x) \times 1/(1-y) \leq 1/(1-x-y)$. Clearly, $\sum_{i=1}^u q_i(q_i-1) \leq q(q-1)$. Hence, we get the bound

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q(q-1)}{2N}},$$

which is exactly the same as the single-user bound. \triangleright

Multi-user security of SoP Finally, we consider the multi-user security of SoP. The easier variant with two independent block ciphers is analyzed in the full version of this paper.

Theorem 14. *Let $N = 2^n$ with $n \geq 12$. For every distinguisher from u independent uniform random functions to multiple $\text{SoP}[\pi_i]$ constructions instantiated with independent uniform random permutations π_1, \dots, π_u , making in total $q < N$ queries and at most $N/58$ queries per user,*

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q}{N}}.$$

where α is the false positive rate and β the false negative rate.

Proof. The ideal world consists of independent uniform random functions ρ_1, \dots, ρ_u . In Theorem 10 we showed that for all distinguishers from ρ_i to $\text{SoP}[\pi_i]$ making at most q_i queries,

$$1 - \beta_i \leq \frac{\alpha_i}{1 - \frac{q_i}{N}},$$

where α_i is the false positive rate and β_i the false negative rate. From Theorem 10 we obtain the upper bound

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha \max_{q_1+\dots+q_u \leq q} \prod_{i=1}^u \frac{1}{1 - \frac{q_i}{N}} \leq \max_{q_1+\dots+q_u \leq q} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \sum_{i=1}^u \frac{q_i}{N}},$$

using the fact that $1/(1-x) \times 1/(1-y) \leq 1/(1-x-y)$. Therefore, we obtain the following bound:

$$1 - \beta \leq \frac{\alpha}{1 - \frac{q}{N}},$$

which is exactly the same as the single-user bound. \square

We note that this bound is the same as the one in Theorem 10. To our knowledge, this is the first time a tight multi-user security bound of the SoP construction is proven. This is a significant improvement over the previous result by Choi et al. [8], which corresponds to (assuming the ideal world never outputs 0^n)

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{26u^{1/2}q^2}{N^2} + \frac{49u^{1/2}(n+1)^2}{N},$$

and the bound obtained by naively using the hybrid argument on the single-user results obtained by Dutta et al. [10]:

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{uq}{N}.$$

The dedicated multi-user analysis of Hoang and Shen [16] yields the bound

$$1 - \beta \leq \alpha + \frac{8n^{1/2}q}{N}.$$

We see that Theorem 14 improves the corresponding advantage bound by a factor of $8n^{1/2}$, which was left as an open problem by Hoang and Shen. One can argue that the improvement is small, with the caveat that this can be important in the concrete setting. Nevertheless, the SoP construction has evaded simple multi-user security proofs for nearly two decades and many previous articles have attempted to make relatively small improvements as a side-result.

Importantly, unlike the dedicated proof from [16], our proof is modular in the sense that we can instantly get tight multi-user security from tight single-user security. Also note that both the χ^2 -method (used by Hoang and Shen) and the square-ratio method (used by Choi et al.) require calculating the expectation, which is usually more difficult. In contrast, our technique is easy to apply to more difficult constructions. It is worth highlighting that there is currently no modular solution for the multi-user security of the SoP construction using other methods. As Chen et al. [7] have already pointed out, this is because of the fact that the advantage bound of SoP is dominated by the bad event that the ideal world returns a zero output, while this cannot happen in the real world. This event gives a term uq/N for the multi-user security using the squared-ratio method [7]. Choi et al.'s result [8] is based on a different security model where the ideal world is forbidden to return 0^n as output. It is not certain whether this assumption about the model can have a major impact on practical applications. When using power bounds, no additional assumptions need to be made.

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