

A New Conditional Cube Attack on Reduced-Round Ascon-128a in Nonce-misuse Setting

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Aim


Evaluate Ascon-128a (non-primary) variant in nonce-misuse setting via conditional cube attacks

Table 1: Summary of cube attacks on ASCON-128a

| Attack type | Method | Rounds ¹ (12, 8, 12) | Data | Time | Memory | Nonce misuse | Ref. |
|----------------|------------------|------------------------------------|------------|--------------|----------|--------------|------------|
| Key recovery | Conditional cube | 6,*,* | 2^{40} | 2^{40} | - | No | [LDW17] |
| | Cube | 7,*,* | $2^{77.2}$ | $2^{103.92}$ | - | No | [LDW17] |
| | Cube | 7,*,* | 2^{64} | 2^{123} | - | No | [RHSS21] |
| | Cube | 7,5,* | 2^{33} | 2^{97} | - | Yes | [LZWW17] |
| | Conditional cube | *,7,* | 2^{117} | 2^{118} | 2^{32} | Yes | this study |
| Forgery | Cube | *,*,5 | 2^{17} | 2^{17} | - | Yes | [LZWW17] |
| | Cube | *,*,6 | 2^{33} | 2^{33} | - | Yes | [LZWW17] |
| State-recovery | Conditional cube | *,7,* | 2^{117} | 2^{118} | - | Yes | this study |


Conditional Cube Variables, Ordinary Cube Variables **With True Conditions**

- There are $p+q$ cube variables, $V_1, \dots, V_p, U_1, \dots, U_q$.




Conditional Cube Variables, Ordinary Cube Variables With True Conditions

- There are $p+q$ cube variables, $v_1, \dots, v_p, u_1, \dots, u_q$.



Conditional Cube Variables, Ordinary Cube Variables **With *False* Conditions**

- There are $p+q$ cube variables, $v_1, \dots, v_p, u_1, \dots, u_q$.




Theorem 2 – EUROCRYPT 2017*

- Assume that there are p conditional cube variables v_1, \dots, v_p and q ordinary cube variables u_1, \dots, u_q , where
 - (1) $p, q \geq 1$ and $q = 2^{n+1} - 2p + 1$
 - or (2) $q = 0$ and $p = 2^n + 1$
- If the conditions are true, then the term $v_1 v_2 \dots v_p u_1 u_2 \dots u_q$ will not appear in the output polynomials of $(n+2)$ -round function, where the degree of each round is 2.

We will consider the case that $p=1$ and $q=63$ and $n=5$.


*Senyang Huang, Xiaoyun Wang, Guangwu Xu, Meiqin Wang, and Jingyuan Zhao, "Conditional cube attack on reduced-round keccak sponge function," EUROCRYPT 2017

ASCONE-128a with 7-Round Encryption



In case that $|A| \neq 0$

Our target is to recover 192-bit secret state ($S_0[2], S_0[3], S_0[4]$) ASCON-128a with 7-Round Encryption



In case that $|A| \neq 0$

Selection of cube variables.

- Pattern-A: 64 cube variables (1 conditional, 63 ordinary) to recover 38 bits out of 192-bit secret state.
- Pattern-B: 64 cube variables (1 conditional, 63 ordinary) to recover 19 bits out of 192-bit secret state.

Pattern-A


Pattern-A

38 conditions of Pattern-A

| Column | Condition | Column | Condition | Column | Condition |
|--------|--------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|--------|-------------------------------|
| 0 | $k_0[0] = k_1[0] = k_2[0] = 0$ | 19 | $k_0[19] = k_1[19] = k_2[19] = 0$ | 47 | $k_1[47] = k_2[47]$ |
| 1 | $k_0[1] = k_1[1] = k_2[1]$ | 21 | $k_2[21] = 0$ | 48 | $k_1[48] = k_2[48]$ |
| 2 | $k_1[2] = k_2[2]$ | 22 | $k_0[22] = k_1[22]$ | 51 | $k_2[51] = 0$ |
| 3 | $k_0[3] = k_1[3]$ | 23 | $k_2[23] = 0$ | 53 | $k_0[53] = k_1[53] = k_2[53]$ |
| 4 | $k_0[4] = k_1[4]$ | 25 | $k_0[25] = k_1[25]$ | 54 | $k_1[54] = k_2[54]$ |
| 6 | $k_0[6] = k_1[6] = k_2[6]$ | 26 | $k_0[26] = k_1[26]$ | 55 | $k_1[55] = k_2[55]$ |
| 9 | $k_0[9] = k_1[9] = k_2[9]$ | 28 | $k_0[28] = k_1[28] = k_2[28] = 0$ | 57 | $k_2[57] = 0$ |
| 11 | $k_1[11] = k_2[11]$ | 31 | $k_0[31] = k_1[31]$ | 60 | $k_1[60] = k_2[60]$ |
| 12 | $k_2[12] = 0$ | 42 | $k_2[42] = 0$ | | |
| 18 | $k_1[18] = k_2[18]$ | 44 | $k_0[44] = k_1[44]$ | | |

Pattern-A

Propagation of Cube Variables through Constant Addition and S-box (Round 1)



$$\begin{aligned}
 y_0 &= x_4x_1 + x_3 + x_2x_1 + x_2 + x_1 \quad x_0 + x_1 + x_0 \\
 y_1 &= x_4 + x_3x_2 + x_3x_1 + x_3 + x_2x_1 + x_2 + x_1 + x_0 \\
 y_2 &= x_4x_3 + x_4 + x_2 + x_1 + 1 \\
 y_3 &= x_4 \quad x_0 + x_4 + x_3 \quad x_0 + x_3 + x_2 + x_1 + x_0 \\
 y_4 &= x_4x_1 + x_4 + x_3 + x_1x_0 + x_1
 \end{aligned}$$

Pattern-B

Pattern-B

19 conditions of Pattern-B

| Column | Condition | Column | Condition |
|--------|--------------------------------|--------|--------------------------|
| 1 | $k_0[1] = k_1[1] = k_2[1] = 1$ | 49 | $k_1[49] = k_2[49] + e1$ |
| 2 | $k_0[2] = k_1[2] = k_2[2]$ | 54 | $k_1[54] = k_2[54]$ |
| 4 | $k_0[4] = k_1[4]$ | 55 | $k_1[55] = k_2[55]$ |
| 5 | $k_0[5] = k_1[5] + a1$ | 56 | $k_1[56] = k_2[56] + f1$ |
| 7 | $k_0[7] = k_1[7] = k_2[7]$ | 63 | $k_1[61] = k_2[61] + g1$ |
| 10 | $k_0[10] = k_1[10] + b1$ | | |
| 26 | $k_0[26] = k_1[26]$ | | |
| 27 | $k_0[27] = k_1[27] + c1$ | | |
| 32 | $k_0[32] = k_1[32] + d1$ | | |
| 48 | $k_1[48] = k_2[48]$ | | |

Pattern-A + Pattern-B
+ Shifts of Pattern-B

Pattern A
(38 conditions)

Column 0 : $k_0[0]=k_1[0]=k_2[0]=0$
 Column 1 : $k_0[1]=k_1[1]=k_2[1]$
 Column 2 : $k_0[2]=k_1[2]$
 Column 3 : $k_0[3]=k_1[3]$
 Column 4 : $k_0[4]=k_1[4]$
 Column 5 :
 Column 6 : $k_0[6]=k_1[6]=k_2[6]$
 Column 7 :
 Column 8 :
 Column 9 : $k_0[9]=k_1[9]=k_2[9]$
 Column 10 :
 Column 11 : $k_1[11]=k_2[11]$
 Column 12 : $k_2[12]=0$
 Column 13 :
 Column 14 :
 Column 15 :

Pattern B
(19 conditions)

Column 0 :
 Column 1 : $k_0[1]=k_1[1]=k_2[1]$
 $k_2[1]=1$
 Column 2 : $k_0[2]=k_1[2]=k_2[2]$
 Column 3 :
 Column 4 : $k_0[4]=k_1[4]$
 Column 5 : $k_0[5]=k_1[5]+a1$
 Column 6 :
 Column 7 : $k_0[7]=k_1[7]=k_2[7]$
 Column 8 :
 Column 9 :
 Column 10 : $k_0[10]=k_1[10]+b1$
 Column 11 :
 Column 12 :
 Column 13 :
 Column 14 :
 Column 15 :

Pattern B $\ggg 5$
(19 conditions)

Column 0 :
 Column 1 :
 Column 2 : $k_1[2]=k_2[2]$
 Column 3 :
 Column 4 :
 Column 5 :
 Column 6 : $k_0[6]=k_1[6]=k_2[6]$
 $k_2[6]=1$
 Column 7 : $k_0[7]=k_1[7]=k_2[7]$
 Column 8 :
 Column 9 : $k_0[9]=k_1[9]$
 Column 10 : $k_0[10]=k_1[10]+b1$
 Column 11 :
 Column 12 : $k_0[12]=k_1[12]=k_2[12]$
 Column 13 :
 Column 14 :
 Column 15 : $k_0[15]=k_1[15]+a2$

Pattern B $\ggg 12$
(19 conditions)

Column 0 :
 Column 1 :
 Column 2 : $k_1[2]=k_2[2]$
 Column 3 : $k_1[3]=k_2[3]$
 Column 4 : $k_1[4]=k_2[4]$
 Column 5 :
 Column 6 :
 Column 7 :
 Column 8 :
 Column 9 : $k_1[9]=k_2[9]$
 Column 10 :
 Column 11 :
 Column 12 :
 Column 13 : $k_0[13]=k_1[13]=k_2[13]=1$
 Column 14 : $k_0[14]=k_1[14]=k_2[14]$
 Column 15 :

Pattern B $\ggg 2$
(19 conditions)

Column 0 :
 Column 1 :
 Column 2 :
 Column 3 : $k_0[3]=k_1[3]=k_2[3]$
 $k_2[3]=1$
 Column 4 : $k_0[4]=k_1[4]=k_2[4]$
 Column 5 :
 Column 6 : $k_0[6]=k_1[6]$
 Column 7 : $k_0[7]=k_1[7]$
 Column 8 :
 Column 9 : $k_0[9]=k_1[9]=k_2[9]$
 Column 10 :
 Column 11 :
 Column 12 : $k_0[12]=k_1[12]$
 Column 13 :
 Column 14 :
 Column 15 :

Pattern A
(38 conditions)

Column 16:
Column 17:
Column 18: $k_1[18]=k_2[18]$
Column 19: $k_0[19]=k_1[19]=k_2[19]=0$
Column 20:
Column 21: $k_2[21]=0$
Column 22: $k_0[22]=k_1[22]$
Column 23: $k_2[23]=0$
Column 24 :
Column 25: $k_0[25]=k_1[25]$
Column 26: $k_0[26]=k_1[26]$
Column 27:
Column 28: $k_0[28]=k_1[28]=k_2[28]=0$
Column 29:
Column 30:
Column 31: $k_0[31]=k_1[31]$

Pattern B
(19 conditions)

Column 16:
Column 17:
Column 18:
Column 19:
Column 20:
Column 21:
Column 22:
Column 23:
Column 24 :
Column 25:
Column 26: $k_0[26]=k_1[26]$
Column 27: $k_0[27]=k_1[27] + c1$
Column 28:
Column 29:
Column 30:
Column 31:

Pattern B \ggg^5
(19 conditions)

Column 16:
Column 17:
Column 18:
Column 19:
Column 20:
Column 21:
Column 22:
Column 23:
Column 24 :
Column 25:
Column 26:
Column 27:
Column 28:
Column 29:
Column 30:
Column 31: $k_0[31]=k_1[31]$

Pattern B \ggg^{12}
(19 conditions)

Column 16: $k_0[16]=k_1[16] + a3$
Column 17: $k_0[17]=k_1[17] + b3$
Column 18:
Column 19: $k_0[19]=k_1[19]=k_2[19]$
Column 20:
Column 21:
Column 22: $k_0[22]=k_1[22]$
Column 23:
Column 24 :
Column 25:
Column 26:
Column 27:
Column 28:
Column 29:
Column 30:
Column 31:

Pattern B \ggg^2
(19 conditions)

Column 16:
Column 17:
Column 18:
Column 19:
Column 20:
Column 21:
Column 22:
Column 23:
Column 24 :
Column 25:
Column 26:
Column 27:
Column 28: $k_0[28]=k_1[28]$
Column 29: $k_0[29]=k_1[29] + a4$
Column 30:
Column 31:

Pattern A
(38 conditions)

Column 32:
Column 33:
Column 34:
Column 35:
Column 36:
Column 37:
Column 38:
Column 39:
Column 40 :
Column 41:
Column 42: $k_2[42]=0$
Column 43:
Column 44: $k_0[44]=k_1[44]$
Column 45:
Column 46:
Column 47: $k_1[47]=k_2[47]$

Pattern B
(19 conditions)

Column 32: $k_0[32]=k_1[32] +d1$
Column 33:
Column 34:
Column 35:
Column 36:
Column 37:
Column 38:
Column 39:
Column 40 :
Column 41:
Column 42:
Column 43:
Column 44:
Column 45:
Column 46:
Column 47:

Pattern B $\ggg 5$
(19 conditions)

Column 32: $k_0[32]=k_1[32] +d1$
Column 33:
Column 34:
Column 35:
Column 36:
Column 37: $k_0[37]=k_1[37] +b2$
Column 38:
Column 39:
Column 40 :
Column 41:
Column 42:
Column 43:
Column 44:
Column 45:
Column 46:
Column 47:

Pattern B $\ggg 12$
(19 conditions)

Column 32:
Column 33:
Column 34:
Column 35:
Column 36:
Column 37:
Column 38: $k_0[38]=k_1[38] +c3$
Column 39: $k_0[39]=k_1[39] +d3$
Column 40 :
Column 41:
Column 42:
Column 43:
Column 44: $k_0[44]=k_1[44]$
Column 45:
Column 46:
Column 47:

Pattern B $\ggg 2$
(19 conditions)

Column 32:
Column 33:
Column 34: $k_0[34]=k_1[34] +b4$
Column 35:
Column 36:
Column 37:
Column 38:
Column 39:
Column 40 :
Column 41:
Column 42:
Column 43:
Column 44:
Column 45:
Column 46:
Column 47:

Pattern A
(38 conditions)

Column 48 : $k_1[48]=k_2[48]$
 Column 49:
 Column 50:
 Column 51: $k_2[51]=0$
 Column 52:
 Column 53: $k_0[53]=k_1[53]=k_2[53]$
 Column 54: $k_1[54]=k_2[54]$
 Column 55: $k_1[55]=k_2[55]$
 Column 56:
 Column 57: $k_2[57]=0$
 Column 58:
 Column 59:
 Column 60: $k_1[60]=k_2[60]$
 Column 61:
 Column 62:
 Column 63:

Pattern B
(19 conditions)

Column 48 : $k_1[48]=k_2[48]$
 Column 49 : $k_1[49]=k_2[49] + e1$
 Column 50:
 Column 51:
 Column 52:
 Column 53:
 Column 54: $k_1[54]=k_2[54]$
 Column 55: $k_1[55]=k_2[55]$
 Column 56: $k_1[56]=k_2[56] + f1$
 Column 57:
 Column 58:
 Column 59:
 Column 60:
 Column 61: $k_1[61]=k_2[61] + g1$
 Column 62:
 Column 63:

Pattern B \ggg^5
(19 conditions)


Column 48:
 Column 49:
 Column 50:
 Column 51:
 Column 52:
 Column 53: $k_1[53]=k_2[53]$
 Column 54: $k_1[54]=k_2[54]$
 Column 55:
 Column 56 :
 Column 57:
 Column 58:
 Column 59: $k_1[59]=k_2[59] + c2$
 Column 60: $k_1[60]=k_2[60]$
 Column 61: $k_1[61]=k_2[61] + g1$
 Column 62:
 Column 63:

Pattern B \ggg^{12}
(19 conditions)

Column 48:
 Column 49:
 Column 50:
 Column 51:
 Column 52:
 Column 53:
 Column 54:
 Column 55:
 Column 56 :
 Column 57:
 Column 58:
 Column 59:
 Column 60: $k_1[60]=k_2[60]$
 Column 61: $k_1[61]=k_2[61] + g1$
 Column 62:
 Column 63:

Pattern B \ggg^2
(19 conditions)

Column 48:
 Column 49:
 Column 50: $k_1[50]=k_2[50] + c4$
 Column 51: $k_1[51]=k_2[51] + d4$
 Column 52:
 Column 53:
 Column 54:
 Column 55:
 Column 56 : $k_1[56]=k_2[56] + f1$
 Column 57: $k_1[57]=k_2[57] + e4$
 Column 58: $k_1[58]=k_2[58] + f4$
 Column 59:
 Column 60:
 Column 61:
 Column 62:
 Column 63: $k_1[63]=k_2[63] + g4$




The total query-complexity is about 2^{117} to recover 74-bit secret information.

The remaining 118-bit can be found by the exhaustive search with time-complexity 2^{118} .

Key Recovery Attack

Due to 10* padding, not 96 but 97.

Through 2^{32} queries and 2^{97} time,
store (Y_i, T_i) 's with fixed X and Z ,
where $1 \leq i \leq 2^{32}$.




(ONLINE PHASE)


Due to 10* padding, not 96 but 97.

Through 2^{32} queries and 2^{97} time,
store (Y_i, T_i) 's with fixed X and Z ,
where $1 \leq i \leq 2^{32}$.

Find i and j such that $Y_i \oplus T_i = V_j \oplus W_j$ with
about time 2^{96} . **Then, K will be $Y_i \oplus V_j$.**



(ONLINE PHASE)



(OFFLINE PHASE)

Conclusion

- In a nonce-misuse scenario, we showed how to recover a secret state and secret key with data complexity 2^{117} and time complexity 2^{118} when only one round is reduced during the encryption phase.
- The attack does not violate any of the designers' claims. Still of interest to see the resistance of Ascon-128a against nonce-misuse attacks.

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| State-recovery | Conditional cube | *,7,* | 2^{117} | 2^{118} | - | Yes | this study |

Pattern-A

We can show that

- Case 1) one of the column-0 conditions are not true.
 - There is a multiplication between v_0 and v_i for some i ($1 \leq i \leq 63$) after 2 rounds.
 - Case 2) All of the column-0 conditions are true.
 - If any of the column- i conditions ($1 \leq i \leq 63$) is not true, then there is a multiplication between v_0 and v_i after 2 rounds.
- ⇒ These means that If any of the column- i conditions ($0 \leq i \leq 63$) is not true, then there is a multiplication between v_0 and v_j for some j ($1 \leq j \leq 63$) after 2 rounds.
- ⇒ v_0 is the conditional cube variable and v_j 's ($1 \leq j \leq 63$) are ordinary cube variables.

Pattern-B

We can show that

- Case 1) one of the column-1 conditions are not true.
 - There is a multiplication between v_1 and v_i for some i ($0 \leq i \leq 63, i \neq 1$) after 2 rounds.
- Case 2) All of the column-1 conditions are true.
 - If any of the column- i conditions ($0 \leq i \leq 63, i \neq 1$) is not true, then there is a multiplication between v_1 and v_i after 2 rounds.

⇒ These means that If any of the column- i conditions ($0 \leq i \leq 63$) is not true, then there is a multiplication between v_1 and v_j for some j ($0 \leq j \leq 63, j \neq 1$) after 2 rounds.

⇒ v_1 is the conditional cube variable and v_j 's ($0 \leq j \leq 63, j \neq 1$) are ordinary cube variables.

