

Toward Recommendations for Advanced Cryptography

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Presented at:
5th HomomorphicEncryption.org Standards Meeting
September 02, 2022 @ Geneva, Switzerland

This presentation

- ▶ A pre-standards perspective: the *reference material* approach (in the PEC project)
- ▶ A cryptography focus: some PEC tools
- ▶ Considerations about standardization / recommendations (including notes on FHE)

PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography
FHE = Fully-Homomorphic Encryption

Outline

1. NIST-PEC intro
2. PEC tools/nuances
3. Considerations

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NIST: Laboratories → Divisions → Groups

- ▶ **Non-regulatory** federal agency (@ U.S. Dept. Commerce)
- ▶ **Mission:** ... innovation ... industrial competitiveness ... measurement science, standards, and technology ... economic security ... quality of life.




NIST name and address plate (source: nist.gov)


INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY → **Computer Security Division (CSD):**

→ **Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG):** *research, develop, engineer, and produce guidelines, recommendations and best practices for cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.*

Activities in the “Crypto” Group



- ▶ Public documentation: FIPS; Special Publications (SP 800); NIST Reports (IR).
- ▶ International cooperation: government, industry, academia, standardization bodies.

Legend: BC (Block Ciphers); CC (Circuit Complexity); **Crypto** (Cryptography); DS (Digital Signatures); EC (Elliptic Curves); FIPS (Federal Information Processing Standards); IR (Internal or Interagency); IRB (Interoperable Randomness Beacons); KM (Key Management); LWC (Lightweight Crypto); PEC (Privacy-Enhancing Crypto); PQC (Post-Quantum Crypto); RNG (Random-Number Generation); SP 800 (Special Publications in Computer Security); TC ([Multi-Party] Threshold Crypto).

More details at <https://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cryptographic-technology>

On NIST Crypto Standards Development

NIST IR 7977: “NIST Cryptographic Standards and Guidelines Development Process” (2016)

Puts forward various principles to consider:

- ▶ Transparency
- ▶ Integrity
- ▶ Global Acceptability
- ▶ Openness
- ▶ Technical Merit
- ▶ Continuous Improvement
- ▶ Balance
- ▶ Usability
- ▶ Innovation and IP

The NIST Privacy Enhancing Cryptography (PEC) project

- ▶ Within the NIST Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG).
- ▶ PEC \approx cryptography (that can be) used to **enhance privacy**.
Focus on non-standardized high-level special-featured techniques

STPPA series

PEC use-case suite

Encounter metrics

ZKProof collaboration

Workshops

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec>

Goals:

- ▶ Accompany the progress of emerging PEC tools (\approx primitives, protocols, techniques).
- ▶ Develop reference material to support the use of crypto to enable privacy.
- ▶ Evaluate the potential for guidance/standardization about PEC tools.

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec>

Toward Standards for PEC?

It's tempting to just ask: when should PEC be standardized ?

The question deserves some in-depth reflection (what/how/...?)

1. **Domain space:** Identify/clarify/distinguish major techniques: general (e.g., SMPC), particular (e.g., PSI), building blocks (e.g., OT). There is a large space of tradeoffs.
2. **(Mis)understanding:** What do PEC tools actually provide when applied?
3. **Toward standards (?) / alternatives: reference material** (definitions, descriptions, implementations, characterization, applicability); **recommendations & guidelines**

Legend: SMPC = Secure Multiparty Computation. PSI = Private Set Intersection. OT = Oblivious Transfer

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“PEC Tools”


SMPCSecure
Multiparty
Computation**ZKP**Zero-
Knowledge
Proofs**FHE**Fully
Homomorphic
Encryption**PSI**Private
Set
Intersection**GRS**Group and
Ring
Signatures**StE**Structured
Encryption
(Symm./PKI)**PIR**Private
Information
Retrieval**FuE**Functional
Encryption
(Inc. ABE & IBE)

Note: traditional NIST crypto standards cover more-basic primitives. PEC tools (including protocols) require somewhat newer considerations. w.r.t. standards/recommendations.


Legend: Symm./PKI: based on symmetric-key or public-key. ABE: attribute-based encryption; IBE: identity-based encryption.

Ideal functionalities (\mathcal{F})

Ideal world: uses an incorruptible trusted party to define the desired functionality (\mathcal{F}), and thus its security properties.



Real world: A set of procedures that satisfies (*emulates*) the properties of the ideal execution, but without a trusted party.




Utility of ideal functionalities: clear formulation of security; security-proof framework (simulatability); composability assurance; modularity.

Next slides: various PEC tools, with simplified illustrations of ideal functionalities.

SMPC (or MPC): Secure Multiparty Computation

Multiple parties with privacy constraints can securely compute a function over their private inputs.

Illustration of an ideal MPC functionality




- ▶ Privacy of local inputs/outputs
- ▶ Correctness of the computation
- ▶ Guaranteed output delivery (common nuances: security-with-abort; fairness) ...

ZKPoK: Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge

Prove knowledge of a secret (called *witness*), without disclosing it to the verifier.

Specific example: illustration of a ZKPoK ideal functionality for “*I know one password whose hash is in your (username-indexed) database*” (ensures ZK and soundness)




Example applications:

- ▶ correct behavior in SMPC/FHE
- ▶ knowledge of secret key wrt public key
- ▶ regulatory compliance over encrypted data

PSI: Private Set Intersection

Two parties find their common elements, without revealing the others



Examples: private contact discovery, leaked-password check, multi-state vote registration


Nuances:

- ▶ May leak the length of the lists; more than 2 parties; ...
- ▶ Computation over the intersection (special case of MPC)

FHE: Fully Homomorphic Encryption

A server computes over data encrypted by a client. Later the client decrypts the result.

Illustration of an ideal functionality



- ▶ Tuple of operations: keygen, encrypt, homom-eval (add, mult, ...), decrypt
- ▶ Public-key vs. secret-key encryption
- ▶ Various other internal notions: bootstrapping, key-switching, ...

PEC tools come in various flavors

- ▶ **MPC:** very general; multi-party; many tradeoffs (system model, thresholds, etc.)
 - The NIST Multi-Party Threshold Crypto [project](#) covers some MPC tools/use-cases
- ▶ **ZKPs:** many proposed schemes (various assumptions, trusted setups ...); specialized proofs vs. proofs for NP ... also many tradeoffs.
 - NIST-PEC engaged with [ZKProof.org](#) to promote development of reference material
- ▶ **PSI:** a more concrete MPC app; still a protocol (often 2-parties) with messages
 - NIST-PEC is interested in reference material (concrete applications)
- ▶ **FHE:** apparently simpler scope; not multi-party; smaller diversity of assumptions?
 - NIST has been an “observer”

How do these differences warrant differentiated “standardization” approaches?

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
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Adoptability of standards

- ▶ *“Not every conceivable possibility is suitable for standardization”*
- ▶ *“Need to focus on high need and high potential for adoption”*
- ▶ *Best practices; minimum defaults; interoperability; innovation.*



If/when compliance is required, a standard can be *impractical* if the technique:

- ▶ is obsolete/outdated, or cannot be corrected/withdrawn/replaced (when it should);
- ▶ incompatible with validation (required for NIST “essential” crypto)

Note there is also a cost to maintain standards: revise, deprecate, validate, etc.

How should NIST-PEC promote FHE?

A conceivable **NIST Report on FHE** could cover/acknowledge the following.


1. FHE as a tuple of algorithms; possible nuances (symmetric and pubkey)
2. Security formulation (intended properties, games, ...) and variety of options
3. Main approaches/concepts, e.g.: lattices/assumptions, bootstrapping, paradigm for homomorphic operations (over Booleans, Fields, ...)
4. State-of-the-art efficiency: what is already practical; what is not
5. Applications that hint at adoptability of a future standard
6. External standardization initiatives, including working groups in SDOs

How helpful would such a report be for stakeholders and for further progress?

Upcoming NIST Report on PEC

- ▶ Enumerate and explain various “PEC tools”
- ▶ Acknowledge their terminology, building blocks, nuances
- ▶ Distill insights useful toward “recommendations”

A draft will be open for public comments



Concluding remarks

- ▶ NIST-PEC appreciates community initiatives that strive for reaching a consensus about recent/advanced (not NIST-standardized) crypto techniques.
- ▶ NIST-PEC would take into consideration a potential “standard” emerging from the community ... [this is not a promise of producing a standard].
- ▶ NIST standards, such as FIPS and SP 800, are open to all / free of charge.
- ▶ Other points of interest: PQC and Threshold compatibility; adoptability potential, ...
- ▶ What role should NIST-PEC take: observer? report on FHE? more reference material?

Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

More resources about the NIST-PEC project:

- ▶ **Website:** <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec>
- ▶ **Forum:** <https://list.nist.gov/pec-forum>
- ▶ **Email:** crypto-privacy@nist.gov

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