ACT-IAC
Acquisition Community of Interest (COI)
C-SCRM Acquisition Working Group (AWG)
C-SCRM AWG Purpose and Objectives

Purposes

To convene subject matter experts to exchange information related to cybersecurity and acquisition integrity and provide government with best practices and lessons learned. This Working Group will be the public-private volunteer committee counterpart of the government-only C-SCRM Acquisition Community of Practice (ACoP).

Objectives

Provide a forum for Government-Industry collaboration to drive shared understanding regarding current and future C-SCRM acquisition policies, needs, and opportunities

Develop and build consensus regarding next generation policies, approaches, or techniques that could be implemented across agencies to reduce risk and position both Government and Industry for success

Capture findings and best practices documentation, playbooks, or policy recommendations that can be broadly distributed within the community

Support the Government’s newly established C-SCRM Acquisition Community of Practice (ACoP)
Navigating C-SCRM Compliance Pending FAR Rules

• Agencies are required to meet multiple SCRM-related requirements from various sources without having final FAR rules to require of suppliers
  • GAO Report GAO-21-171
  • IG FISMA metrics 12-16
  • NIST guidance
• Proposed deliverable will focus on developing guidance for how civilian agencies can navigate the challenges of meeting C-SCRM requirements without having final FAR rules.
• Deliverable completion target: March 2024
• Our adversaries are not waiting for a FAR Rule and neither should the government.
Current C-SCRM-related FAR Rules

- **FAR 52.204-21** - Basic Safeguarding of Covered Contractor Information Systems
- **FAR 52.246-26** - Reporting Nonconforming Items
- **FAR 52.204-23** - Prohibition on Contracting for Hardware, Software, and Services Developed or Provided by Kaspersky Lab and Other Covered Entities
- **FAR 52.225-25** - Prohibition on Contracting With Entities Engaging in Certain Activities or Transactions Relating to Iran—Representation and Certifications

**Related to NDAA Section 889:**
- **FAR 52.204-24** - Representation Regarding Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment
- **FAR 52.204-25** - Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment
- **FAR 52.204-26** - Covered Telecommunications Equipment or Services—Representation

There is an open FAR case (FAR Case 2019-018) that would allow agencies to use supplier risk information in sourcing decisions
GAO Audit Recommendations

- **GAO-21-171 Information Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Take. Urgent Action to Manage Supply Chain Risks**
  - establishing executive oversight of ICT activities, including designating responsibility for leading agency-wide SCRM activities;
  - developing an agency-wide ICT SCRM strategy for providing the organizational context in which risk-based decisions will be made;
  - establishing an approach to identify and document agency ICT supply chain(s);
  - establishing a process to conduct agency-wide assessments of ICT supply chain risks that identify, aggregate, and prioritize ICT supply chain risks that are present across the organization;
  - establishing a process to conduct a SCRM review of a potential supplier that may include reviews of the processes used by suppliers to design, develop, test, implement, verify, deliver, and support ICT products and services;
  - developing organizational ICT SCRM requirements for suppliers to ensure that suppliers are adequately addressing risks associated with ICT products and services; and
  - developing organizational procedures to detect counterfeit and compromised ICT products prior to their deployment.
IG FISMA Metrics

  - Metric 12: To what extent does the organization use an organization wide SCRM strategy to manage the supply chain risks associated with the development, acquisition, maintenance, and disposal of systems, system components, and system services?
  - Metric 13: To what extent does the organization use SCRM policies and procedures to manage SCRM activities at all organizational tiers?
  - Metric 14: To what extent does the organization ensure that products, system components, systems, and services of external providers are consistent with the organization’s cybersecurity and supply chain requirements?
  - Metric 15: To what extent does the organization ensure that counterfeit components are detected and prevented from entering the organization’s systems?
  - Metric 16: Provide any additional information on the effectiveness (positive or negative) of the organization’s supply chain risk management program that was not noted in the questions above. Taking into consideration the overall maturity level generated from the questions above and based on all testing performed, is the supply chain risk management program effective?
Challenges

- **FAR 52.246-26** ("Reporting Nonconforming Items") addresses counterfeits, but excludes commercial products and commercial services or medical devices subject to FDA reporting requirements.
- **DFARS 252.246-7007** ("Contractor Counterfeit Electronic Part Detection and Avoidance System") and **DFARS 252.246-7008** ("Sources of Electronic Parts") are applicable within the DoD to commercial products, electronic parts, or assemblies containing electronic parts.
Potential Solutions

- Options at all levels
  - Government-wide requirements (FAR rules, etc.)
  - Agency-level policies
  - Program-level or system-level requirements
- Specific guidance
  - Development of considerations
  - Development of evaluation criteria
  - Development of contract language
  - Establish a minimum bar
  - Establish tiers of requirements (high/medium/low)
- Pros and cons of various approaches
Proposed Workstream

Vetting Vendors Using US Government Restricted Vendor Lists

• Acquisition restrictions information (e.g. Section 889, export control, import restrictions, FCC restricted vendors, and GIDEP) is available and scattered across different agencies

• Deliverable focus a summary of these lists including what agency has the authority to add/remove companies, who maintains the list, what the impact is to acquisitions and if the product is already in the US Gov't inventory or in use in the federal government.

• Deliverable completion: November
Identifying Restricted Vendors

US Government Restricted Vendor Partial List of Lists

- Kaspersky Prohibition
- Section 889
- FCC Covered List
- Section 1260H list
- TikTok prohibition
- Potential FASC exclusion and removal orders
Identifying Restricted Vendors

Sanctions List Search

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) and all other sanctions lists administered by OFAC, including the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List, the List of Foreign Financial Institutions Subject to Correspondent Account or Payable-Through Account Sanctions and the Non-SDN Proliferation Sanctions List. Given the number of lists that now reside in the Sanctions List Search tool, it is strongly recommended that users pay close attention to the program codes associated with each returned record. These program codes indicate how a true hit on a returned value should be treated. The Sanctions List Search tool uses approximate string matching to identify possible matches between word or character strings as entered into Sanctions List Search and any name or name component as it appears on the SDN List and/or the various other sanctions lists. Sanctions List Search has a “sodium” bar that may be used to set a threshold (i.e., a confidence rating) for the closeness of any potential match returned as a result of a user’s search. Sanctions List Search will detect certain misspellings or other incorrectly entered text, and will return near or propername matches, based on the confidence rating set by the user via the sodium bar. Sanctions List Search also displays a “similar” list of any matches found, which are displayed in descending order of similarity. The user may then choose to view the report to see the list of similar items and/or the various other sanctions lists. Use of Sanctions List Search is not a substitute for undertaking appropriate due diligence. The use of Sanctions List Search does not limit any criminal or civil liability for any such undertaking as a result of, or in reliance on, such use.

Download the SDN List | Sanctions List Search: Rules for use | Visit the OFAC Website | Program Code Key

Consolidated Screening List

Screen potential buyers and end-users to comply with U.S. Government regulations.

Use the Consolidated Screening List Search Engine.

The Consolidated Screening List (CSL) is a list of parties for which the United States Government maintains restrictions on certain exports, reexports, or transfers of items. Below, under “Tools” are links to the CSL search engine, downloadable CSL files, and the CSL Application Programming Interface (API), all consisting of the consolidation of multiple export screening lists of the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury.

Learn more about recent Russia sanctions and other export control updates.
Challenges

Vetting Vendors Using US Government Restricted Vendor Lists
- There are multiple sources to check
- 889 includes affiliates and there are a lot
- Not all lists are easy to find
- Some lists are not publicly available
- Searches are normally single entity verification if it is on the list
- Adequately using the information is cumbersome
Potential Solution

- What agency has the authority to add/remove companies?
- Is the restriction limited to the company or does it apply to affiliates?
- Who maintains the list?
- How often is the list updated?
- Is the list exportable?
- What is the impact to acquisitions and if the product is already in the US Gov't inventory or in use in the federal government?
Thank you for attending!