

On Devising Recommendations for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Presented* in Singapore, on September 12th, 2023 at

DeCompute 2023

* Luís Brandão: At NIST as a Foreign Guest Researcher (non-employee), Contractor from Strativia.
Expressed opinions are from the speaker and should not be construed as official NIST views. Joint work with René Peralta.

Outline

1. NIST Intro
2. NIST project on PEC and Threshold Crypto
3. The Threshold Call
4. A process toward recommendations

(Slides will be publicly available)

Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography.

Outline

1. NIST Intro
2. NIST project on PEC and Threshold Crypto
3. The Threshold Call
4. A process toward recommendations

Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography.

NIST: Laboratories → Divisions → Groups

- ▶ **Non-regulatory** federal agency (@ U.S. Dept. Commerce)
- ▶ **Mission:** ... innovation ... industrial competitiveness ... measurement science, standards, and technology ... economic security ... quality of life.



NIST name and address plate (source: nist.gov)

NIST: Laboratories → Divisions → Groups

- ▶ **Non-regulatory** federal agency (@ U.S. Dept. Commerce)
- ▶ **Mission:** ... innovation ... industrial competitiveness ... measurement science, standards, and technology ... economic security ... quality of life.




NIST name and address plate (source: nist.gov)



→ **Computer Security Division (CSD):**

→ **Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG):** *research, develop, engineer, and produce guidelines, recommendations and best practices for cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.*

Activities in the “Crypto” Group




Legend: **BC** = Block Ciphers. **CC** = Circuit Complexity. **Crypto** = Cryptography. **DS** = Digital Signatures. **EC** = Elliptic Curves. **FIPS** = Federal Information Processing Standards. **IR** = Internal or Interagency (denoting that the public NIST report was developed internally at NIST or in an interagency collaboration, respectively). **IRB** = Interoperable Randomness Beacons. **KM** = Key Management. **LWC** = Lightweight Crypto. **PEC** = Privacy-Enhancing Crypto. **PQC** = Post-Quantum Crypto. **RNG** = Random-Number Generation. **SP 800** = Special Publications in Computer Security. **TC** = [Multi-Party] Threshold Crypto).

More details at <https://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cryptographic-technology>

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Activities in the “Crypto” Group



- ▶ **Public documentation:** FIPS; Special Publications (SP 800); NIST Reports (IR).
- ▶ **International cooperation:** government, industry, academia, standardization bodies.

Legend: BC = Block Ciphers. CC = Circuit Complexity. **Crypto** = Cryptography. DS = Digital Signatures. EC = Elliptic Curves. FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standards. IR = Internal or Interagency (denoting that the public NIST report was developed internally at NIST or in an interagency collaboration, respectively). IRB = Interoperable Randomness Beacons. KM = Key Management. LWC = Lightweight Crypto. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Crypto. PQC = Post-Quantum Crypto. RNG = Random-Number Generation. SP 800 = Special Publications in Computer Security. TC = [Multi-Party] Threshold Crypto).

More details at <https://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cryptographic-technology>

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Some examples of NIST Crypto Projects

- ▶ **PQC**: [standardization] “**post-quantum**” signatures and key-encapsulation
- ▶ **LWC**: [standardization] “**lightweight**” auth. enc. w/ **assoc. data**, and hashing

Legend: **AEAD** = Auth[enticated] Enc[ryption] w[ith] Assoc[iated] Data. **CTG** = Cryptographic Technology Group. **LWC** = Lightweight Cryptography. **MPTC** = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography. **NIST** = National Institute of Standards and Technology. **PEC** = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography. **PQC** = Post-Quantum Cryptography.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Some examples of NIST Crypto Projects

- ▶ **PQC**: [standardization] “**post-quantum**” signatures and key-encapsulation
- ▶ **LWC**: [standardization] “**lightweight**” auth. enc. w/ **assoc. data**, and hashing
- ▶ **PEC**: [exploratory] “**privacy-enhancing**” (advanced) features/functionality
- ▶ **MPTC**: [exploratory] “**multi-party threshold**” schemes for crypto primitives

Legend: **AEAD** = Auth[enticated] Enc[ryption] w[ith] Assoc[iated] Data. **CTG** = Cryptographic Technology Group.
LWC = Lightweight Cryptography. **MPTC** = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography. **NIST** = National Institute of Standards and Technology. **PEC** = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography. **PQC** = Post-Quantum Cryptography.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Some examples of NIST Crypto Projects

- ▶ **PQC**: [standardization] “**post-quantum**” signatures and key-encapsulation
- ▶ **LWC**: [standardization] “**lightweight**” auth. enc. w/ **assoc. data**, and hashing
- ▶ **PEC**: [exploratory] “**privacy-enhancing**” (advanced) features/functionality
- ▶ **MPTC**: [exploratory] “**multi-party threshold**” schemes for crypto primitives
- ▶ ... (various **other projects** in the NIST “Crypto group” [CTG])

Legend: **AEAD** = Auth[enticated] Enc[ryption] w[ith] Assoc[iated] Data. **CTG** = Cryptographic Technology Group. **LWC** = Lightweight Cryptography. **MPTC** = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography. **NIST** = National Institute of Standards and Technology. **PEC** = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography. **PQC** = Post-Quantum Cryptography.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Some examples of NIST Crypto Projects

- ▶ **PQC**: [standardization] “**post-quantum**” signatures and key-encapsulation
- ▶ **LWC**: [standardization] “**lightweight**” auth. enc. w/ **assoc. data**, and hashing
- ▶ **PEC**: [exploratory] “**privacy-enhancing**” (advanced) features/functionality
- ▶ **MPTC**: [exploratory] “**multi-party threshold**” schemes for crypto primitives
- ▶ ... (various **other projects** in the NIST “Crypto group” [CTG])

The “Threshold Call” (from MPTC+PEC): to gather **reference material** for public analysis ... aiming for **recommendations** (in a 1st phase), including about PEC.

Legend: **AEAD** = Auth[enticated] Enc[ryption] w[ith] Assoc[iated] Data. **CTG** = Cryptographic Technology Group. **LWC** = Lightweight Cryptography. **MPTC** = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography. **NIST** = National Institute of Standards and Technology. **PEC** = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography. **PQC** = Post-Quantum Cryptography.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Outline

1. NIST Intro
2. NIST project on PEC and Threshold Crypto
3. The Threshold Call
4. A process toward recommendations

Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography.

Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography (PEC): NIST Project

Cryptography (that can be) used to **enhance privacy**.

(emphasis on non-standardized tools)


Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography (PEC): NIST Project

Cryptography (that can be) used to **enhance privacy**.

(emphasis on non-standardized tools)

Goals:

1. Accompany the progress of **emerging *PEC tools***.



Legend: ABE: attribute-based encryption. IBE: identity-based encryption. Inc.: including. PEC: privacy-enhancing cryptography. Symm./pub.: symmetric-key or public-key based.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography (PEC): NIST Project

Cryptography (that can be) used to **enhance privacy**.
(emphasis on non-standardized tools)

Goals:

1. Accompany the progress of **emerging *PEC tools***.
2. Promote development of PEC **reference material**.

PEC tools

STPPA (series of talks)

PEC use-case suite


Threshold schemes

ZKProof collaboration

Encounter metrics

Email list (PEC Forum)

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec>



Legend: ABE: attribute-based encryption. IBE: identity-based encryption. Inc.: including. PEC: privacy-enhancing cryptography. Symm./pub.: symmetric-key or public-key based.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography (PEC): NIST Project

Cryptography (that can be) used to **enhance privacy**.
(emphasis on non-standardized tools)

Goals:

1. Accompany the progress of **emerging *PEC tools***.
2. Promote development of PEC **reference material**.
3. **Exploratory work** to assess potential for recommendations, standardization; ...

PEC tools

STPPA (series of talks)

PEC use-case suite

Threshold schemes

ZKProof collaboration

Encounter metrics

Email list (PEC Forum)

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec>

ZKP
Zero-
Knowledge
Proofs

MPC
(Secure)
Multiparty
Computation

FHE
Fully
Homomorphic
Encryption

PSI
Private
Set
Intersection

GRS
Group and
Ring
Signatures

FnE
Functional
Encryption
(Inc. ABE & IBE)

PIR
Private
Information
Retrieval

StE
Structured
Encryption
(Symm./Pub.)

Legend: ABE: attribute-based encryption. IBE: identity-based encryption. Inc.: including. PEC: privacy-enhancing cryptography. Symm./pub.: symmetric-key or public-key based.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography: NIST project

Cryptographic primitives:



Signing



Encryption




KeyGen



Hashing

etc.

Threshold schemes (for cryptographic primitives):



<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/threshold-cryptography>

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography: NIST project

Cryptographic primitives:



Signing



Encryption



KeyGen




Hashing

etc.

Threshold schemes (for cryptographic primitives):

1. Split (**secret-share**) the secret/private-key across multiple parties.
2. Use **MPC** to perform needed operation (with split key), e.g., sign.
(MPC = secure multiparty computation ... or call it "Threshold Cryptography")



<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/threshold-cryptography>

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography: NIST project

Cryptographic primitives:



Signing



Encryption



KeyGen




Hashing

etc.

Threshold schemes (for cryptographic primitives):

1. Split (**secret-share**) the secret/private-key across multiple parties.
2. Use **MPC** to perform needed operation (with split key), e.g., sign.
(MPC = secure multiparty computation ... or call it "Threshold Cryptography")



- ▶ **“Threshold”** (f): Operation is secure if number of corrupted parties is $\leq f$.
- ▶ **Decentralized** trust about key (**not reconstructed**): avoids single-point of failure.

<https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/threshold-cryptography>

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Outline

1. NIST Intro
2. NIST project on PEC and Threshold Crypto
3. The Threshold Call
4. A process toward recommendations

Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography.


NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

- ▶ NISTIR 8214C: Initial public **draft** (**Jan 2023**) \Rightarrow Revised version (**late 2023**).
- ▶ Submission deadline (expected \approx **2nd-half 2024**)

NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

- ▶ NISTIR 8214C: Initial public **draft** (**Jan 2023**) \Rightarrow Revised version (**late 2023**).
- ▶ Submission deadline (expected \approx **2nd-half 2024**)

Calling for submissions of threshold schemes




(And gadgets for modular use)

NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

- ▶ NISTIR 8214C: Initial public **draft** (**Jan 2023**) \Rightarrow Revised version (**late 2023**).
- ▶ Submission deadline (expected \approx **2nd-half 2024**)

Calling for submissions of threshold schemes for:

- ▶ [Cat1] Selected NIST-standardized primitives
- ▶ [Cat2] Other primitives (including FHE, IBE/ABE, ZKP)
(And gadgets for modular use)



FHE = Fully-homomorphic encryption.

IBE/ABE = Identity/Attribute-based encryption.

ZKP = Zero-knowledge proof.

Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type

C1.1: Signing

C1.2: PKE

C1.3: 2KA

C1.4: Symmetric

C1.5: Keygen

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establishment. AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie–Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmtion. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menezes–Qu–Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security).
Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type	Families of specifications	NIST references
C1.1: Signing	EdDSA sign, ECDSA sign, RSADSA sign	FIPS 186-5 (see also NISTIR 8214B)

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establishment. AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie–Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmtion. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menezes–Qu–Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security). Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type	Families of specifications	NIST references
C1.2: PKE	RSA decrypt, RSA encrypt (a secret value)	SP 800-56B Rev2

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establishment. AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie–Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmtion. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menezes–Qu–Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security).
Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type	Families of specifications	NIST references
C1.4: Symmetric	AES encipher/decipher, KDM/KC (for 2KE)	FIPS 197, SP 800-56C Rev2, ...

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establishment. AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie–Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmtion. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menezes–Qu–Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security).
Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type	Families of specifications	NIST references
C1.1: Signing	EdDSA sign, ECDSA sign, RSADSA sign	FIPS 186-5 (see also NISTIR 8214B)
C1.2: PKE	RSA decrypt, RSA encrypt (a secret value)	SP 800-56B Rev2
C1.3: 2KA	ECC-CDH, ECC-MQV	SP 800-56A Rev3
C1.4: Symmetric	AES encipher/decipher, KDM/KC (for 2KE)	FIPS 197 , SP 800-56C Rev2 , ...
C1.5: Keygen	ECC keygen, RSA keygen, bitstring keygen	(corresponding references above)

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establishment. AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie–Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmation. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menezes–Qu–Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security). Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

Also to be added to Category Cat1

Primitives specified in NIST draft pubs emerging from the PQC and LWC projects:

- ▶ **ML-KEM** (based on KYBER) [Draft FIPS 203](#): *Module-Lattice-Based KEM Standard*
- ▶ **ML-DSA** (based on DILITHIUM) [Draft FIPS 204](#): *Module-Lattice-Based DSA*
- ▶ **SLH-DSA** (based on SPHINCS) [Draft FIPS 205](#): *Stateless Hash-Based DSA*
- ▶ **Upcoming signature standard** (based on Falcon): Upcoming Draft FIPS pub
- ▶ **Upcoming XOF standard** (based on ASCON): Upcoming Draft FIPS pub

Legend: DSA = digital signature algorithm. FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standard [Publication]. KEM = key-encapsulation method. XOF = extendable output function. ML = Module Lattice. SLH = StateLess hash.

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

Subcategory: Type

C2.1: **Signing**

|

C2.2: **PKE**

C2.3: **Key-agreem.**

C2.4: **Symmetric**

C2.5: **Keygen**

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just **TF** to highlight that it is welcome even if not **QR**.

Legend: agreem. = agreement. Keygen = key-generation. PKE = public-key encryption. PRF = pseudorandom function [family]. PRP = pseudorandom permutation [family]. QR = quantum resistant. TF = threshold-friendly. ZKPoK = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.1: Signing	TF succinct & verifiably-deterministic signatures	Sign
	TF-QR signatures	Sign

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Legend: **agreem.** = agreement. **Keygen** = key-generation. **PKE** = public-key encryption. **PRF** = pseudorandom function [family]. **PRP** = pseudorandom permutation [family]. **QR** = quantum resistant. **TF** = threshold-friendly. **ZKPoK** = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

Subcategory: Type

C2.6: **Advanced**

|

C2.7: **ZKPoK**

C2.8: **Gadgets**

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just **TF** to highlight that it is welcome even if not **QR**.

Legend: **agreem.** = agreement. **Keygen** = key-generation. **PKE** = public-key encryption. **PRF** = pseudorandom function [family]. **PRP** = pseudorandom permutation [family]. **QR** = quantum resistant. **TF** = threshold-friendly. **ZKPoK** = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.6: Advanced 	TF-QR fully-homomorphic encryption TF identity-based and attribute-based encryption	Decryption; Keygen Decryption; Keygens

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Legend: **agreem.** = agreement. **Keygen** = key-generation. **PKE** = public-key encryption. **PRF** = pseudorandom function [family]. **PRP** = pseudorandom permutation [family]. **QR** = quantum resistant. **TF** = threshold-friendly. **ZKPoK** = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.7: ZKPoK	Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of private key	ZKPoK.Generate

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Legend: **agreem.** = agreement. **Keygen** = key-generation. **PKE** = public-key encryption. **PRF** = pseudorandom function [family]. **PRP** = pseudorandom permutation [family]. **QR** = quantum resistant. **TF** = threshold-friendly. **ZKPoK** = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.8: Gadgets	Garbled circuit (GC)	GC.generate; GC.evaluate

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just **TF** to highlight that it is welcome even if not **QR**.

Legend: **agreem.** = agreement. **Keygen** = key-generation. **PKE** = public-key encryption. **PRF** = pseudorandom function [family]. **PRP** = pseudorandom permutation [family]. **QR** = quantum resistant. **TF** = threshold-friendly. **ZKPoK** = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Category Cat2 of the NIST “Threshold” Call

TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.1: Signing	TF succinct & verifiably-deterministic signatures	Sign
	TF-QR signatures	Sign
C2.2: PKE	TF-QR public-key encryption (PKE)	Decrypt/Encrypt (a secret value)
C2.3: Key-agreem.	TF Low-round multi-party key-agreement	Single-party primitives
C2.4: Symmetric	TF blockcipher/PRP	Encipher/decipher
	TF key-derivation / key-confirmation	PRF and hash function
C2.5: Keygen	Any of the above	Keygen
C2.6: Advanced	TF-QR fully-homomorphic encryption	Decryption; Keygen
	TF identity-based and attribute-based encryption	Decryption; Keygens
C2.7: ZKPoK	Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of private key	ZKPoK.Generate
C2.8: Gadgets	Garbled circuit (GC)	GC.generate; GC.evaluate

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Legend: agreem. = agreement. Keygen = key-generation. PKE = public-key encryption. PRF = pseudorandom function [family]. PRP = pseudorandom permutation [family]. QR = quantum resistant. TF = threshold-friendly. ZKPoK = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

Main components of a submission package

Check	#	Item
<input type="checkbox"/>	M1	Written specification (S1–S16)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M2	Reference implementation (Src1–Src4)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M3	Execution instructions (X1–X7)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M4	Experimental evaluation (Perf1–Perf5)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M5	Additional statements

Main components of a submission package

Check	#	Item
<input type="checkbox"/>	M1	Written specification (S1–S16)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M2	Reference implementation (Src1–Src4)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M3	Execution instructions (X1–X7)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M4	Experimental evaluation (Perf1–Perf5)
<input type="checkbox"/>	M5	Additional statements

The revised version of the call will detail better each component.

A submission package can propose various objects (schemes/gadgets).
Each component will then map all such objects.

Outline

1. NIST Intro
2. NIST project on PEC and Threshold Crypto
3. The Threshold Call
4. A process toward recommendations

Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography.

Assorted notes about the process

- ▶ **Setup:** A gathering of **reference material** (not a **competition** for a selection).
- ▶ **Expected:** The process will clarify relevant system models, best practices, ...
- ▶ **Aim:** **Devise recommendations** about advanced cryptography (PEC + MPTC)
(Will support future standardization processes.)
PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Crypto
MPTC = Multi-Party Threshold Crypto
- ▶ **Ample room for participation:** Give feedback → Submit → Analyze
- ▶ **It's time:** Consider starting to organize a future submission (team, scope, ...)

Some technical notes

1. **Submission focuses**
2. **Threshold profile**
3. **Active security**
4. **Adaptive security**
5. **Modularity**
6. **Post-vs-Pre quantum crypto**
7. **Concrete implementation**

Some technical notes

1. **Submission focuses:** can specify a family of schemes (in various subcategories).
2. **Threshold profile:** open to choice: number of parties; dishonest proportion; ...
3. **Active security:** it is required, though open to diverse security formulations.
4. **Adaptive security:** at least “argued for” for major safety properties,
5. **Modularity:** modularize gadgets; encouraged proactive resharing module; ...
6. **Post-vs-Pre quantum crypto:** both in scope; pre-QC requires justification.
7. **Concrete implementation:** e.g., inc. communication (e.g., broadcast? P2P?).

Community participation

Various areas / possible synergies:

- ▶ Scope of the call is of interest to various crypto communities: MPC, ZKP, FHE, ...
- ▶ Work developed with other SDOs and in community efforts is also welcome.

(SDO = Standards Development Organization)

Community participation

Various areas / possible synergies:

- ▶ Scope of the call is of interest to various crypto communities: MPC, ZKP, FHE, ...
- ▶ Work developed with other SDOs and in community efforts is also welcome.

(SDO = Standards Development Organization)

Some variables:

- ▶ How will the community compose teams? (How to avoid effort duplication?)
- ▶ How will the scope of the call be covered? (primitives / models / approaches)

Community participation

Various areas / possible synergies:

- ▶ Scope of the call is of interest to various crypto communities: MPC, ZKP, FHE, ...
- ▶ Work developed with other SDOs and in community efforts is also welcome.

(SDO = Standards Development Organization)

Some variables:

- ▶ How will the community compose teams? (How to avoid effort duplication?)
- ▶ How will the scope of the call be covered? (primitives / models / approaches)

Upcoming: (Sep 26–28) Workshop on Multi-Party Threshold Schemes (MPTS) 2023

<http://csrc.nist.gov/events/2023/mpts2023>

Presented at
DeCompute 2023

Thank you for your attention!

Questions?

On Devising Recommendations for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Presented at DeCompute 2023 | September 12th @ Singapore

Followup comments appreciated: luis.brandao@nist.gov



Threshold Call
(Draft)



MPTS 2023
(Sept. 26–28)



MPTC-Forum
(email list)



PEC-Forum
(email list)

Slide intentionally blank

Example ZKPoKs of interest (related to Cat1)

Related type	Related (sub)sub-category: Primitive	Example ZKPoK (including consistency with public commitments of secret-shares, when applicable)
Signing	C1.1.1/2: EC-signing	of pre-image of deterministic nonce (if applicable)
Keygen	C5.1.1: ECC keygen	of discrete-log (s or d) of pub key Q
	C5.1.2: RSA keygen	of factors (p, q), or group order ϕ , or decryption key d
	C5.1.3: AES keygen	of secret key k (with regard to secret-sharing commitments)
PKE	C1.2.1: RSA encryption	of secret plaintext m (encrypted)
	C1.2.2: RSA decryption	of secret-shared plaintext m (after SSO-threshold decryption)
Symmetric	C1.4.1: AES enciphering	of secret key k (with regard to plaintext/ciphertext pair)
	C1.4.2: Hashing in KDM	of secret pre-image Z

Source: Table 12 or NISTIR 8214C ipd

Vision: techniques demonstrated for these cases also enable more generic cases

Legend: AES = Advanced Encryption Standard. Cat1 = Category 1. ECC = Elliptic-Curve Cryptography. ipd = initial public draft. keygen = key-generation. KDM = key-derivation mechanism. RSA = Rivest-Shamir Adleman. SSO = Secret-Share-Output. NISTIR = NIST Internally developed, public Report. ZKPoK = Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.

Some expected revisions in the call

1. In Cat1, add subcategories for the NIST-selected PQC primitives
2. In Cat2, differentiate better the advanced subcats (e.g., what to thresholdize)
3. Clarify scope of “gadgets” subcategory (and how to motivate them)
4. Detail better some logistic requirements (e.g., code licensing)
5. Include LaTeX template for submission

Public comments received in first phase (April 2023)

Main topics (informal)

- #1 Scope; quantum resistance.
 - #2 Innovation; models.
 - #3 Threshold motivation and alternatives; some expired patents.
 - #4 Mandatory checks; KAT values; implementation complexity.
 - #5 Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).
 - #6 Threshold & oblivious pseudo-random functions (PRF); keygen; robustness; asynchronicity.
 - #7 Shamir Secret-sharing (safe evaluation points)
 - #8 Scope; keygen; adaptive security; key-refresh; bounds; broadcast; thresholds; party's state.
 - #9 Attribute-based encryption (ABE): ciphertext-policy, key-policy, multi-authority.
 - #10 All-or-nothing transform (AONT) and homomorphic encryption.
 - #11 Implementation dependencies, KAT values in randomized multi-party runs.
 - #12 Robustness.
-

<https://csrc.nist.gov/files/pubs/ir/8214/c/ipd/docs/nistir-8214c-ipd-public-feedback.pdf>

Brainstorming on crypto standardization

1. On the **timing & speed** of processes: what is too soon, too late, too slow, and too fast?
2. What **value** is there in still pursuing new standards for **quantum-breakable** primitives?
3. How to handle the standardization tension between **innovation** and **interoperability**?
4. Which crypto functionalities/features make sense to **prioritize** for standardization?
5. What **synergies** to aim for between academia, industry, gov and standards bodies?

Temporary page!

\LaTeX was unable to guess the total number of pages correctly. As there was some unprocessed data that should have been added to the final page this extra page has been added to receive it.

If you rerun the document (without altering it) this surplus page will go away, because \LaTeX now knows how many pages to expect for this document.