

# Threshold Cryptography in MP-SPDZ


MPTS 2023: NIST Workshop on Multi-Party Threshold Schemes 2023

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
# Imagine a Magic Black Box Between a Set of Parties



## Parties

- ▶ Have handles to values
- ▶ Don't know the values
- ▶ Can input values
- ▶ Can agree on computations creating new values
- ▶ Can agree on outputting values

# Secure Multiparty Computation: Black Box as Protocol



Wanted:  $f(x, y, z)$

- ▶ Computation on secret inputs
- ▶ Replace black box
- ▶ Central questions in MPC
  - ▶ How many honest parties?
  - ▶ Dishonest parties still follow the protocol?
- ▶ MP-SPDZ supports  $> 40$  protocol variants across all properties

## Unifying MPC: Basic Operations

	Addition	Multiplication
Communication	<i>x</i>	✓
Shamir/Replicated	Add shares	Reshare
SPDZ/TinyOT	Add shares/MACs	Beaver

## Unified C++ Interface

```
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)  
    sum[i] = a[i] + b[i];  
  
protocol.init_mul();  
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)  
    protocol.prepare_mul(a[i], b[i]);  
protocol.exchange();  
for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)  
    product[i] = protocol.finalize_mul();
```

- ▶ Addition is straightforward
- ▶ Similar for multiplication would lead to sequential execution
- ▶ Prepare/exchange/finalize minimal interface for parallel execution

## C++ Templating

```
Rep3<Rep3Share<Z2<64>>> proto;  
Rep3<Rep3Share<gfp_<0, 2>>> proto;  
Shamir<ShamirShare<gfp_<0, 2>>> proto;  
Shamir<ShamirShare<gf2n>>> proto;  
Beaver<SemiShare<Z2<64>>> proto;  
Beaver<SemiShare<gfp_<0, 2>>> proto;  
Beaver<LowGearShare<gfp_<0, 2>>> proto;  
Beaver<HighGearShare<gfp_<0, 2>>> proto;
```

- ▶ Share type defines protocol variant
- ▶ Share types are templated on domain
- ▶ Maximal code reuse across variants

# Threshold ECDSA with Black-Box MPC

## ECDSA Signature

$$s = k^{-1}(H(M) + sk \cdot r_x)$$

where

- ▶  $k$  secret randomness in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$
- ▶  $r_x$  a coordinate of  $kG$  in group of order  $p$

## Black-Box MPC

- ▶ Use black box for secret key  $sk$  and  $k$
- ▶ Need to publish  $kG$  but not  $k$
- ▶ Secret sharing scheme over  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  implies one over the group with local conversion

## MP-SPDZ Domain Interface for EC Group

- ▶ Uses OpenSSL for EC functionality
- ▶ 200 lines of code
- ▶ 7 static members, 10 overloaded operators, 4 constructors, (de)serialization

```
P256Element P256Element::operator +(const P256Element& other) const
{
    P256Element res;
    assert(EC_POINT_add(curve, res.point, point, other.point, 0) != 0);
    return res;
}
```



## ECDSA in MP-SPDZ (Simplified)

$$s = k^{-1}(H(M) + sk \cdot r_x)$$

```
Scalar hash = hash_to_scalar(message);  
Share<Scalar> k, b, c;  
get_random_triple(k, b, c);  
Share<Scalar> k_inv = b / open(c);  
Scalar r_x = open(Share<P256Element>(k)).x();  
Scalar s = open(mul(k_inv, hash + sk * rx));
```

## Supported Protocols

Name	Honest Majority	Malicious	
Rep3	Y	N	<a href="https://ia.cr/2016/768">https://ia.cr/2016/768</a>
Mal-Rep3	Y	Y	<a href="https://ia.cr/2017/816">https://ia.cr/2017/816</a>
Shamir	Y	N	<a href="https://ia.cr/2000/037">https://ia.cr/2000/037</a>
Mal-Shamir	Y	Y	<a href="https://ia.cr/2017/816">https://ia.cr/2017/816</a>
Semi	N	N	<a href="https://ia.cr/2016/505">https://ia.cr/2016/505</a>
MASCOT	N	Y	<a href="https://ia.cr/2016/505">https://ia.cr/2016/505</a>
ATLAS	N	N	<a href="https://ia.cr/2021/833">https://ia.cr/2021/833</a>
Rep4	N	Y	<a href="https://ia.cr/2020/1330">https://ia.cr/2020/1330</a>
SPDZ-wise Rep3	N	Y	<a href="https://ia.cr/2018/570">https://ia.cr/2018/570</a>

## Links

<https://github.com/data61/MP-SPDZ>

<https://ia.cr/2020/521>

<https://ia.cr/2019/889>

<https://mp-spdz.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ecdsa.html>

<https://twitter.com/mkskeller>