Quantum-Resistance in the Upcoming NIST Call for Threshold Schemes

Presented* at Real-World PQC

March 26, 2023 | Tokyo (Japan)

Suggested reading: NISTIR 8214C ipd: NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes (Initial Public Draft) [Jan. 2023]

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Intro: NIST has various Crypto Projects

- PQC: [standardization] "post-quantum" secure signatures and KEM/PKE
- LWC: [standardization] "lightweight" AEAD and hashing
- PEC: [exploratory] "privacy-enhancing" (advanced) features/functionalities
- MPTC: [exploratory] "multi-party threshold" schemes for crypto primitives
- ... (various other projects in the "Crypto group" [CTG])

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Legend: AEAD = Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. CTG = Cryptographic Technology Group. Laboratory. KEM = Key Encapsulation Mechanism. LWC = Lightweight Cryptography. MPTC = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography. NIST = National In-sti-tute of Standards and Technology. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography. PKE = public-key encryption. PQC = Post-Quantum Cryptography.

Intro: NIST has various Crypto Projects

- ▶ PQC: [standardization] "post-quantum" secure signatures and KEM/PKE
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The "Threshold" call (from MPTC+PEC): to gather **reference material** for public analysis ... aiming for **recommendations** (in a 1st phase), including about PEC.

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The NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

NISTIR 8214C ipd (initial public draft) — public comments till 2023-April-10

Calling for threshold schemes for diverse primitives:

Cat1: Selected NIST-standardized primitives – In EdDSA, ECDSA, RSA, AES, ECC-KE, ...

- Cat2: Primitives in schemes not specified by NIST
 - Interest in threshold friendliness and quantum resistance
 - Including from schemes with advanced features (e.g., FHE, IBE, ZKP)

Legend: AES = Advanced Encryption Standard. EC = Elliptic curve. ECC-KE = EC cryptography (based) key-exchange. FHE = fully-homomorphic encryption. EdDSA = Edwards-Curve digital signature algorithm. ECDSA = EC digital signature algorithm. IBE = identity-based encryption. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology. RSA = Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. ZKP = zero-knowledge proofs.

Subcategory: Type

C2.1: Signing

C2.2: PKE

C2.3: Key-agreem.

C2.4: Symmetric

C2.5: Keygen

Note: While TF-QR is a desired combination for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.1: Signing	TF succinct & verifiably-deterministic signatures TF-QR signatures	Sign Sign

Note: While TF-QR is a desired combination for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Subcategory: Type

C2.6: Advanced C2.7: ZKPoK C2.8: Gadgets

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Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
•••••B••J••Jp•		

C2.6: Advanced TF-QR fully-homomorphic encryption Decryption; Keygen TF identity-based and attribute-based encryption Decryption; Keygens

Note: While TF-QR is a desired combination for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Subcategory: Type Example types of schemes

Example primitives

C2.7: **ZKPoK** Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of private key ZKPoK.Generate

Note: While TF-QR is a desired combination for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
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C2.8: **Gadgets** Garbled circuit (GC)

GC.generate; GC.evaluate

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Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.1: Signing	TF succinct & verifiably-deterministic signatures	Sign
	TF-QR signatures	Sign
C2.2: PKE	TF-QR p ublic- k ey e ncryption (PKE)	Decrypt/Encrypt (a secret value)
C2.3: Key-agreem.	TF Low-round multi-party key-agreement	Single-party primitives
C2.4: Symmetric	TF blockcipher/PRP	Encipher/decipher
	TF key-derivation / key-confirmation	PRF and hash function
C2.5: Keygen	Any of the above	Keygen
C2.6: Advanced	TF-QR fully-homomorphic encryption	Decryption; Keygen
	TF identity-based and attribute-based encryption	Decryption; Keygens
C2.7: ZKPoK	Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of private key	ZKPoK.Generate
C2.8: Gadgets	Garbled circuit (GC)	GC.generate; GC.evaluate

Note: While TF-QR is a desired combination for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Welcome/needed interaction by the PQC community

1. Feedback about the call: [comments by 2023-Apr-10]

- a. The structure and scope of the call (which primitives should be submitted)
- b. Notes on (in)compatibility between QR, TF and advanced features
- c. Security properties, cautionary recommendations / suggested requirements

 $\label{eq:constraint} \mbox{Legend: } QR = q \mbox{uantum resistance. } TF = threshold friendliness. \\ PQC = Post-Q \mbox{uantum Cryptography.}$

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- a. The structure and scope of the call (which primitives should be submitted)
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2. Concrete submissions:

- Specification, implementation (open source), reproducible, ...

3. Public scrutiny of submitted schemes:

- Evaluation comments (can impact subsequent recommendations)

 $\label{eq:logithtic} \textbf{Legend: } \textbf{QR} = \textbf{q} \textbf{u} \textbf{antum resistance}, \ \textbf{TF} = \textbf{threshold friendliness}, \ \textbf{PQC} = \textbf{Post-Quantum Cryptography}.$

Thank you for your attention! Questions?

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March 26, 2023 @ Tokyo (Japan) — luis.brandao@nist.gov

- ▶ NISTIR 8214C ipd: NIST First Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes (Initial Public Draft)
- Public comments: by email nistir-8214C-comments@nist.gov, till 2023-Apr-10
- PEC Website: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/pec
- PEC-Forum: https://list.nist.gov/PEC-forum
- MPTC Website: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/threshold-cryptography
- MPTC-Forum: https://list.nist.gov/MPTC-forum