

Accordion mode based on Hash-Encrypt-Hash

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Previous constructions
- 3 New constructions

Introduction


- Tweakable block ciphers are block ciphers that include a tweak (public input) as one of their parameters
- Accordion mode: tweakable block cipher mode, variable input length strong pseudorandom permutation (VIL-SPRP)
- Advantages over modes in SP 800-38 series (AES-GCM), (ex. nonce-misuse resistance, support for short tags, nonce hiding, and key commitment)

Introduction

- Derived functions and Applications: Encrypting with associated data (AEAD); Tweakable Encryption; Deterministic Authenticated Encryption (DAE)
- We survey SOTA and study a method based on the Hash-Encrypt-Hash paradigm, inspired by HCTR



HCTR



Survey of VIL Tweakable Block Ciphers, no BBB security


Name	Year	Security	Efficiency
EME	2003	$7q^2 a^2 / 2^n$	$(2m + 2)BC$
CMC	2003	$7q^2 a^2 / 2^n$	$(2m + 1)BC$
XCB	2004	$8q^2 a^2 / 2^n$	$(m + 1)BC + 2HF$
OCB1	2004	$9.5q^2 a^2 / 2^n + 2^{n-\tau} / 2^n$	$(m + 2)BC$
HCTR	2005	$q^3 a^2 / 2^n$	$mBC + 2HF$
HCH	2006	$7q^2 a^2 / 2^n$	$(m + 3)BC + 2HF$
HSE	2007	$5q^2 a^2 / 2^n$	$mBC + 2HF$
Adiantum	2018	$q^2 a / 2^{116}$	$BC + SC$ (output: $m - 1$ blocks) $+ 2HF$
THCTR	2018	$2qa / 2^n + 2qa^2 / 2^{n+s^*}$	$mTBC + 3HF$
Deck-based	2019	$q^2 / 2^{127}$	$2VIL - SC + 2HF$
HCTR2	2021	$1.5q^2 a^2 / 2^n$	$mBC + 2HF$
TIE-plus	2022	$q^2 a^2 / 2^n \ell + q^2 a^2 (1 - 1/\ell) / 2^n + 2q^2 a / 2^n$	$2mMF + mPERM$
ACCOR-S	2024	$q^2 a^2 / 2^{129}$	$mBC + 2HF$

Survey of VIL Tweakable Block Ciphers, BBB security

Name	Year	Security	Efficiency
LBC1	2011	$3q^2 a^2 / 2^{2n}$	$(m-1)(n, n) - \text{TBC} + 4\text{HF}$
TCT ₂	2013	$qa^2 / 2^n + 6a^3 q^3 / (2^{2n-2} - a^3 q^3) + 1296q^3 / (2^{2n-2} - 216q^3)$	$(6m + 6)\text{BC} + (7m + 7)\text{HF}$
ZMAC	2017	$2.5q^2 a^2 / 2^{n+\min\{s,n\}} + 4q / 2^n$	$(6 + m)\text{TBC}$
ZCZ	2018	$3q^2 a^2 / 2^{2n+1}$	$(2m + 6 + m/n)\text{TBC} + 4\text{HF}$
ACCOR-L	2024	$qa\ell / 2^{128}$	$m\text{BC} + 2\text{HF}$

2

ACCOR-HEH



Key schedule

INPUT: 256-bit master key K_I

OUTPUT: 128-bit key K_x , 256-bit key K_y , 256-bit key K_z

1

$$K_x = \text{AES}_{256}^E(K_I, 1) \quad (K_x \neq 0)$$

2


$$K_y = \text{AES}_{256}^E(K_I, 2) \parallel \text{AES}_{256}^E(K_I, 3)$$

3


$$K_z = \text{AES}_{256}^E(K_I, 4) \parallel \text{AES}_{256}^E(K_I, 5)$$

There is a variant where hash of the tweak is used in the key-derivation function.

ACCOR-S




ACCOR-L



ACCOR-L (256-bit SPRP, 384-bits of subkeys)


Figure: Two AES-based Feistel-like rounds, needs further analysis, especially against the related key (RK) attacks. Easy to add more rounds, will be amortised over long messages.



Main additional properties

Property	ACCOR-HEH	ACCOR-S	ACCOR-L
TS	UL	UL	UL
Min ML	1 block	1 block	2 blocks
Max ML	UL	2^{20} blocks	2^{30} blocks
MKS	Yes	Yes	Yes
CtxCom	Yes ³	Yes ³	Yes ³

- TS: Tweak Size; UL unlimited
- ML: Message Length
- MKS: Multi-key Security
- CtxCom: Context Commitment Security

³Variante where hash of the tweak is used in the key-derivation function 

Comparison

Construction	Message Length (a)	Number of queries (q)	Total data processed (σ)	Advantage
ACCOR-S	34 MB	$24 \cdot 2^{20}$	2^{45} B	2^{-40}
ACCOR-L	34 GB	2^{54}	2^{88} B	

$$\sigma = qa$$

$$\text{ACCOR-S: } q^2 a^2 / 2^{129}$$

$$\text{ACCOR-L: } qa / 2^{124}$$