# Elements of Symmetric Cryptography in the NIST Threshold Call

Virtual presentation<sup>†</sup> on January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2024

### **@ ALPSY** Research Retreat

Workshop on Algebraic Aspects in the Design and Cryptanalysis of Modern Symmetric Cryptography

(Hosted by Innsbruck University @ Obergurgl, Austria)

<sup>†</sup> Luís Brandão: at NIST as a Foreign Guest Researcher (non-employee), contractor from Strativia. Presented from Maryland, USA. Expressed opinions are from the speaker/author and should not be construed as official NIST views.

## This presentation

### Thank you Christian for the invitation to give this talk!

We appreciate the opportunity to connect with the International research community!

### **Goal/angle:**

- Highlight possibilities of useful research contribution/collaboration
- ► Convey perspective from NIST projects: Threshold Crypto, Circuit Complexity, ...

Slides will be made available

## Outline

- 1. NIST Crypto Intro
- 2. The "Threshold Call" (at a high level)
- 3. Symmetric Crypto in the Threshold Call
- 4. Circuit Complexity
- 5. Concluding remarks

Legend: Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology.

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## NIST:

- **Non-regulatory** federal agency (@ U.S. Dept. Commerce)
- Mission: ... innovation ... industrial competitiveness ... measurement science, <u>standards</u>, and technology ... economic security ... quality of life.



NIST name and address plate (source: nist.gov)

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
→ Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG)

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


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→ Cryptographic Technology Group (CTG): research, develop, engineer, and produce <u>guidelines</u>, <u>recommendations</u> and best practices for cryptographic algorithms, methods, and protocols.


## Activities in the "Crypto" Group



Legend: BC = Block Ciphers. CC = Circuit Complexity. Crypto = Cryptography. DS = Digital Signatures. EC = Elliptic Curves. FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standards. IR = Internal or Interagency (denoting that the public NIST report was developed internally at NIST or in an interagency collaboration, respectively. IRB = Interoperable Randomness Beacons. KM = Key Management. LWC = Lightweight Crypto. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Crypto. PQC = Post-Quantum Crypto. RNG = Random-Number Generation. SP 800 = Special Publications in Computer Security. TC = [Multi-Party] Threshold Crypto).

#### More details at https://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/cryptographic-technology

## Activities in the "Crypto" Group



- **Public documentation:** FIPS; Special Publications (SP 800); NIST Reports (IR).
- International cooperation: government, industry, academia, standardization bodies.

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**PEC: Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography** 

MPTC: Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography

**Exploratory** work to assess potential for recommendations, and standardization processes. Main approach: promote development of **reference material**.

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#### PEC: Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography

Crypto (that can be) used to enhance privacy. (Emphasis on non-standardized tools)



Legend: ABE: attribute-based encryption. IBE: identity-based encryption. Inc.: Including. Symm./pub.: symmetric-key or public-key based.

MPTC: Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography

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### MPTC: Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography

- Threshold Schemes for diverse Cryptographic Primitives
  - 1. Split (secret-share) the secret/private-key across multiple parties.
  - 2. Use MPC to perform needed operation (with split key), e.g., decrypt.



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- **LWC:** [standardization] "LightWeight" auth. enc. w/ assoc. data, and hashing

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- ▶ MPTC: [exploratory] "Multi-Party Threshold" schemes for crypto primitives

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- ... (various other projects in the NIST "Crypto group" [CTG])

**The "Threshold Call" (from MPTC+PEC):** to gather **reference material** for public analysis ... aiming for **recommendations** (in a 1st phase), including about PEC.

## Some NIST Crypto "Standardization" Updates

- **Post-Quantum (PQ):** Selected 4 PQC-schemes for standardization.
  - [Aim] Standards in 2024: ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA. (FN-DSA still in development)
  - July 2023: 40 new PQ-signature submissions/candidates under analysis.
- Lightweight (LWC): Selected ASCON for standardization
  - [Aim] Draft Standard in 2024: AEAD and XOF (as a Special Publication: SP 800 series)

Legend: AEAD = Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. DSA = Digital Signature Algorithm. Feb = February. FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standards. Jan = January. KEM = Key Encapsulation Method. LWC = Lightweight Cryptography. ML = Module Lattice-based. MPTC = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography. Oct = October. PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography. PQC = Post-Quantum Cryptography. SLH = Stateless Hash-based. SP = Special Publication (800 series) [in Computer Security]. XOF = Extendable Output Function.

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
## **NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes**

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### Calling for submissions of threshold schemes



(And gadgets for modular use)

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### Calling for submissions of threshold schemes for:

• [Cat1] Selected NIST-standardized primitives



► [Cat2] Other primitives (including FHE, IBE/ABE, ZKP)

(And gadgets for modular use)

FHE = Fully-homomorphic encryption. IBE/ABE = Identity/Attribute-based encryption ZKP = Zero-knowledge proof.

### Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Subcategory: Type Families of specifications	<b>NIST</b> references
C1.1: Signing	
C1.2: <b>PKE</b>	
C1.3: <b>2KA</b>	
C1.4: Symmetric	
C1.5: Keygen	

### Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type

#### C1.4: Symmetric AES encipher/decipher, KDM/KC (for 2KE) FIPS 197, SP 800-56C Rev2, ...

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establisment. AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie-Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmtion. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menzes-Qu-Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security). Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

### Category Cat1 of NIST Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes

Too many acronyms, we know. (Legend further below)

Subcategory: Type	Families of specifications	NIST references
C1.1: Signing	EdDSA sign, ECDSA sign, RSADSA sign	FIPS 186-5 (see also NISTIR 8214B)
C1.2: <b>PKE</b>	RSA decrypt, RSA encrypt (a secret value)	SP 800-56B Rev2
C1.3: <b>2KA</b>	ECC-CDH, ECC-MQV	SP 800-56A Rev3
C1.4: Symmetric	AES encipher/decipher, KDM/KC (for 2KE)	FIPS 197, SP 800-56C Rev2,
C1.5: Keygen	ECC keygen, RSA keygen, bitstring keygen	(corresponding references above)

Legend: 2KA: pair-wise key-agreement. 2KE: pair-wise key-establisment, AES: Advanced Encryption Standard. CDH: cofactor Diffie-Hellman. ECC: Elliptic-curve cryptography (or, if used as an adjective, EC-based). ECDSA: Elliptic-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. EdDSA: Edwards-curve Digital Signature Algorithm. Elliptic-curve based Key-Establishment. FIPS: Federal Information Processing Standard. KC: Key-confirmtion. KDM: Key-derivation mechanism. Keygen: Key-generation. MQV: Menezes-Qu-Vanstone. PKE: public-key encryption. RSA: Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (signature and encryption schemes). RSADSA: RSA digital signature algorithm. SP 800: Special Publication (in Computer Security). Note: In the 2nd column, each item within a subcategory is itself called a family of specifications, since it may include diverse primitives or modes/variants.

## Also to be added to Category Cat1

Primitives from NIST draft standards emerging from the PQC and LWC projects:

- ► ML-KEM (KYBER-based) Draft FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based KEM Standard
- ► ML-DSA (DILITHIUM-based) Draft FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based DSA
- SLH-DSA (SPHINCS-based) Draft FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based DSA
- FN-DSA (Falcon-based): Upcoming Draft FIPS

#### > AEAD and XOF standards (ASCON-based): Draft upcoming in 2024

**Legend:** AEAD = Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. DSA = Digital Signature Algorithm. FIPS = Federal Information Processing Standard [Publication]. KEM = Key-Encapsulation Mechanism. ML = Module Lattice. SLH = StateLess hash. XOF = extendable Output Function.

Subcategory: Type

C2.1: Signing

C2.2: PKE

C2.3: Key-agreem.

C2.4: Symmetric

C2.5: Keygen

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

Legend: agreem. = agreement. Keygen = key-generation. PKE = public-key encryption. PRF = pseudorandom function [family]. PRP = pseudorandom permutation [family]. QR = quantum resistant. TF = threshold-friendly. ZKPoK = zero knowledge proof of knowledge.

TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

C2.4: <b>Symmetric</b> TF blockcipher/PRP TF key-derivation / key-confirmation	Encipher/decipher PRF and hash function

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Subcategory: Type

### C2.6: Advanced C2.7: ZKPoK C2.8: Gadgets

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TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives

# C2.6: Advanced TF-QR fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) Decryption; Keygen TF identity-based and attribute-based encryption Decryption; Keygens

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Subcategory: Type Example types of schemes

**Example primitives** 

#### C2.7: **ZKPoK** Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of private key ZKPoK.Generate

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Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
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#### C2.8: **Gadgets** Garbled circuit (GC)

GC.generate; GC.evaluate

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#### TF = threshold friendly. QR = quantum resistant.

Subcategory: Type	Example types of schemes	Example primitives
C2.1: Signing	TF succinct & verifiably-deterministic signatures	Sign
	TF-QR signatures	Sign
C2.2: <b>PKE</b>	TF-QR <b>p</b> ublic- <b>k</b> ey <b>e</b> ncryption (PKE)	Decrypt/Encrypt (a secret value)
C2.3: Key-agreem.	TF Low-round multi-party key-agreement	Single-party primitives
C2.4: Symmetric	TF blockcipher/PRP	Encipher/decipher
	<b>TF</b> key-derivation / key-confirmation	PRF and hash function
C2.5: Keygen	Any of the above	Keygen
C2.6: Advanced	TF-QR fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE)	Decryption; Keygen
	TF identity-based and attribute-based encryption	Decryption; Keygens
C2.7: <b>ZKPoK</b>	Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of private key	ZKPoK.Generate
C2.8: Gadgets	Garbled circuit (GC)	GC.generate; GC.evaluate

Note: While TF-QR is desired for any type of scheme, some examples show just TF to highlight that it is welcome even if not QR.

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## Main components of a submission package

Check	#	ltem
	M1	Written specification (S1–S16)
	M2	Reference implementation (Src1–Src4)
	М3	Execution instructions (X1–X7)
	M4	Experimental evaluation (Perf1–Perf5)
	M5	Additional statements

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A submission package can propose various **objects** (schemes/gadgets). Each **component** will then map all such **objects**.

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Subcategory "C1.4 Symmetric" (with NIST standardized primitives)

- **Enciphering:** AES, ASCON-AEAD
- MAC'ing: HMAC, KMAC, CMAC
- Hashing: SHA2, SHA3, ASCON-XOF

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#### Notes:

- Primitives not designed for threshold-friendliness. How to efficiently thresholdize?
- MPTS 2023: at least one team will submit a Threshold-AES package (based on garbled circuits; might apply stacked garbling [branching] and lookup tables)

Legend: AEAD = Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data. AES = Advanced Encryption Standard. CMAC = Cipher-based MAC. HMAC = Keyed-Hash MAC. KMAC = Keccak-based MAC. MAC = Message Authentication Code. MPTS = Multi Party Threshold Schemes (Workshop). SHA = Secure Hash Algorithm. XOF = extendable Output Function.

- C2.4: Symmetric: Threshold-friendlier symmetric primitives
- C2.8: **Gadgets:** e.g., \*-friendly hashing, for:
  - C2.6: Advanced: Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE), ...
  - C2.7: ZKP: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge

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#### Notes

- In the threshold paradigm: How much more efficient can symmetric crypto get?
- More broadly (advanced crypto): friendliness for MPC, ZKP, FHE, ...

### Example ZKPoKs of interest (related to Cat1)

Related type	Related (sub)sub- category: Primitive	Example ZKPoK (including consistency with public commitments of secret-shares, when applicable)
Keygen	5.1.1: ECC keygen	of discrete-log (s or d) of pub key $Q$
	5.1.2: RSA keygen	of factors $(p, q)$ , or group order $\phi$ , or decryption key $d$
	5.1.3: AES keygen	of secret key $k$ (with regard to secret-sharing commitments)
PKE	5.2.1: RSA encryption	of secret plaintext $m$ (encrypted)
	5.2.2: RSA decryption	of secret-shared plaintext $m$ (after SSO-threshold decryption)
Symmetric	1.4.1: AES enciphering	of secret key $k$ (with regard to plaintext/ciphertext pair)
	1.4.2: Hashing in KDM	of secret pre-image $Z$

#### Source: Table 12 or NISTIR 8214C ipd

Legend: AES = Advanced Encryption Standard. Cat1 = Category 1. ECC = Elliptic-Curve Cryptography. ipd = initial public draft. keygen = key-generation. KDM = key-derivation mechanism. RSA = Rivest-Shamir Adleman. SSO = Secret-shared output. NISTIR = NIST Internal[ly developed, public] Report. ZKPoK = Zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.

### Other considerations on Symmetric Crypto

- Threshold Deterministic-EdDSA (in Cat 1): secret nonce is the SHA3-hashing of a secret key. A threshold-friendlier PRF would be useful.
- ► {PQC,LWC} vs. initial {MPTC,PEC} processes: different expectations.
- Analysis of Threshold Call submissions to focus more on reduction proofs / provable MPC, rather than on unproven heuristic constructions.
- Symmetric Crypto is also of interest to other NIST projects (e.g., Circuit Complexity, next slides).

# Outline


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### The NIST Circuit Complexity project

- A project (René, Meltem, Luís) in the NIST "Crypto Group".
- Why? "... Optimization of circuits leads to efficiency improvement in a wide range of algorithms."
- ▶ Open to host foreign guest researchers (1<sup>+</sup> year)



https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/circuit-complexity

Virtual presentation @ ALPSY Research Retreat (Austria Luis Brandão, 2024-Jan-04


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
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- Why? "... Optimization of circuits leads to efficiency improvement in a wide range of algorithms."
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### Main goals:

- 1. **Improve understanding** of the circuit complexity of Boolean functions (BFs) and vectorial BFs
- 2. **Develop new techniques** for constructing better circuits for use by academia and industry.







Virtual presentation @ ALPSY Research Retreat (Austria Luis Brandão, 2024-Jan-04

### **Boolean circuits as reference material**

#### The NIST circuit library

#### **AES Implementations**

**SHA256** 

**Finite field multiplication** 

**Binary polynomial multiplication** 

**Boolean functions** 

Linear maps

### Example list of circuits of one type (AES)

#### **AES Implementations**

AES S-Boxes	Links	#ANDs	#XOR + #XNOR	#Gates	Depth	AND-Depth
S-Box 1	SLP, Graph	32	83	115	28	6
S-Box 2	<u>SLP</u>	32	81	113	27	6
S-Box 3	SLP, Graph	34	94	128	16	4
S-Box inverse 1	<u>SLP</u>	34	87	121	21	4
S-Box inverse 2	SLP, Graph	34	93	127	16	4

AES Cipher	Links	#ANDs	#XNOR	#XOR	#Gates	Depth	AND-Depth
AES-128(k,m)	<u>SLP</u>	6400	844	21 356	28 600	326	60
AES-128(0,m)	<u>SLP</u>	5120	1620	14 652	21 392	325	60

The AES circuit above is constructed using: (i) the S-Box implementation "forward 2"

(doi:10.1007/s00145-012-9124-7 further improved in 2013 by 2 XORs); and (ii) the MixColumn circuit by Maximov in 2019 (ia.cr/2019/833).

(Example: AES SBox with 32 AND gates)

#### We'd like to expand this library

Virtual presentation @ ALPSY Research Retreat (Austria Luis Brandão, 2024-Jan-04

### Some research interest in circuit complexity

- 1. AND-optimization of Boolean functions
- 2. AND-optimization of vectorial Boolean functions
- 3. XOR-optimization of linear maps
- 4. Recurrence relations for binary polynomial multiplication

### Lots of interesting fundamental research to do:

- ▶ We haven't departed much from {AND, XOR, 1} basis.
- Can AES SBox be implemented with fewer than 32 AND gates?
- OMA: Prove that  $x_0 * f(x_1, ..., x_n)$  requires one more AND gate than f.

### **Circuit File Format: Upcoming Reference**

We intend to specify a reference (not a "standard") for a circuit file format.

Toy example:

Figure 1. Circuit for the majority of three bits

```
1 begin CIRCUIT MAJ3
2 # Description: The majority of three bits
3 Inputs: x1:x3; Outputs: y1; Internal:t1:t3
4 GateSyntax: GateName Output Inputs
5 begin SLP
6 XOR t1 x1 x2; XOR t2 x1 x3; AND t3 t1 t2; XOR y1 t3 x1
7 end SLP end CIRCUIT
```

The colors distinguishing between input, intermediate and output variables are used as an aid, but is not required to interpret the circuit. The line numbers on the left are part of the file format. Both the colors and the line numbers can appear automatically when opening the file in an text editor that can interpret the circuit format.

### **Circuit File Format: More examples**

#### AES SBox (G113, A32, D27, AD6)

begin circuit AES-SBOX-FWD-G113-A32-D27-AD6

# Description: AES Sbox Forward # References: Based on doi:10.1007/s00145-012-# Tally: 8 inputs, 8 outputs, 113 gates, 32 AN # Depth(Gate): 27; Depth(AND): 6

Inputs: U0:U7 Outputs: S0:S7 Internal: t1:t105 GateSyntax: GateName Output Inputs

begin SLP XOR t1 U3 U5 XOR t2 U0 U6 XOR t3 U0 U3 XOR t4 U0 U5 ... end SLP end circuit

#### Binary Poly Mult with 11 terms

begin circuit Mult-Binary-Poly-11-terms

# Description: Multiplication of two Binary Polynomials with 11 terms # References: doi:10.1109/TC.2018.2874662 # Tally: 22 inputs, 21 outputs, 186 gates, 78 AND, 108 XOR # Depth(Gate): 7: Depth(AND): 1

# Input polynomials are A = f0 + f1\*X + f2\*X^2 + ... + f10\*X^10 and B # Output polynomial is the product A\*B = h0 + h1\*X + h2\*X^2 + ... + h7 # Coefficients are over GF2

Inputs: f0:f10 g0:g10
Outputs: h0:h20
Internal: t1:t165
GateSyntax: GateName Output Inputs

begin SLP AND t1 f2 g2 AND t2 f2 g0 AND t3 f2 g1

### **Circuit File Format: rationale**

### Why:

- Uniform format for circuits in the NIST Circuit Library
- Interoperability for public calls (e.g., the Threshold Call)
- Include desired features

### Some intended features:

- Human readable/editable .txt format
- Succinct specification of ranges of variables
- Modularity: multiple circuits and subcircuits per file
- Loops and branching: FOR, IF
- Parser to unroll circuits

### Masked Circuits (for block-ciphers)

**Plan: create a library of masked circuits** (When masking, the probing of a single wire does not reveal secret info)

- **Public call:** will ask for masked AES circuits (and maybe others?)
- ▶ **Optimization:** 3 metrics (#rand, #gates, depth) × 3 masking degrees (1,2,3)
- **Timeline:** not before the Multi-Party Threshold Call is published.

**Expected result:** public library; a reference for subsequent side-channel attack experiments/discussion.

See details of project scope at: https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/masked-circuits

# Outline

- 1. NIST Crypto Intro
- 2. The "Threshold Call" (at a high level)
- 3. Symmetric Crypto in the Threshold Call
- 4. Circuit Complexity
- 5. Concluding remarks

Legend: Crypto = Cryptography. NIST = National Institute of Standards and Technology.

### **Selected remarks**

Symmetric Crypto is in scope of the Threshold Call

• Various optimization paradigms: \*-friendly, with  $* \in \{FHE, ZKP, MPC, ...\}$ .

> The process is an **exploration**, before promising standards

- A gathering of reference material (not a competition for a selection).
- Evaluation will aim to devise recommendations for subsequent processes
- Other NIST projects are also interested in symmetric crypto / circuits
- Community participation is essential (feedback; submissions; analyses)

### **NIST** May Have Funds for a Guest Researcher

### Come collaborate in the NIST exploration of Advanced Cryptography

- Conduct joint research with other NIST researchers.
- Bring your perspective into the NIST standardization process.
- Example projects: MPTC, PEC, Circuit Complexity.

PEC = Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography; MPTC = Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography.

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- Initial contacts: {rene.peralta, luis.brandao} @ nist (dot) gov
- Check also online the "Foreign Guest Researcher Program" at nist.gov

# Thank you for your attention! Questions?

### Elements of Symmetric Cryptography in the NIST Threshold Call

Presented at ALPSY Research Retreat | January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2024

We appreciate followup comments: luis.brandao@nist.gov



Threshold Call (IR 8213 ipd)



MPTC project



PEC project



Circuit Complexity

> Virtual presentation @ ALPSY Research Retreat (Austria) Luis Brandão, 2024-Jan-04