

## Bit-flipping Decoder Failure Rate Estimation for $(v,w)$ -regular Codes

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## Context: Code-based KEMs with iterative decoding

- Current 4th round candidate BIKE is built on sparse QC random codes (QC-MDPC)
  - QC-MDPCs are decoded with an iterative, fixed point procedure
  - Achieved DFR depends on **both** the **code** and the **decoder** choice
- Decoding failures reveal information on the private key, breaking IND-CCA2
  - Estimating DFR in closed-form has proven to be challenging
  - [WWW23]: estimates of DFR for BIKE w/ **BGF** decoder were optimistic

## Contributions

1. Closed form estimate of avg. DFR for  $(v, w)$ -regular codes w/ **2-iteration BF decoder**
2. Analyze the code parameters for a IND-CCA2 QC-MDPC scheme
  - Accepted at IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2024)

## $(v, w)$ -regular codes

- Binary block codes with length  $n$ , dimension  $k$  and redundancy  $n - k = r$
- Each column  $h_{:,j}$  of the parity check matrix  $H$  has Hamming weight  $\text{wt}(h_{:,j}) = v$
- Each row of  $h_{i,:}$  the parity check matrix  $H$  has Hamming weight  $\text{wt}(h_{i,:}) = w = \frac{n}{r}v$

## QC-MDPC codes

- Subset of  $(v, w)$ -regular codes with  $H$  defined tiling  $p \times p$  circulant matrices,  $v \approx \sqrt{n}$
- Both BIKE and LEDAcrypt use  $n = n_0p$ ,  $r = p$  codes,  $w = n_0v$ ,  $p$  prime,  $\text{ord}_p(2) = p - 1$ 
  - BIKE uses  $n_0 = 2$
  - LEDAcrypt uses  $n_0 \in \{2, 3, 4\}$  codes

# Iterative syndrome decoding: find $e$ , given $H$ and $s = He^T$ 4

Toy example:  $n = 10, r = 5, v = 2, w = 4, wt(e) = 2$

p.c. matrix  $H$

1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0

1
1
1
1
0

$S$

error  $e$

0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
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iter = 0 completed iter.s; invariant  $\mathbf{s}_{(\text{iter})} = \mathbf{H}(\mathbf{e} \oplus \bar{\mathbf{e}}_{(\text{iter})})^T$

p.c. matrix H

1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0

1
1
1
1
0

$\mathbf{S}_{(\text{iter})}$

error est.  $\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{(\text{iter})}$

0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
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upc

2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2
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Flip  $\bar{e}_{(iter),j}$  if  $upc_j \geq th$

iter = 0 completed iter.s; invariant  $s_{(iter)} = H(e \oplus \bar{e}_{(iter)})^T$

p.c. matrix H

1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0

1
1
1
1
0

$S_{(iter)}$

error est.  $\bar{e}_{(iter)}$

1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
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upc

2	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	1	2
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# Update $s$ as $s \oplus h_{:,j}$ if $\bar{e}_{(iter),j}$ was flipped

iter = 0 completed iter.s; invariant  $s_{(iter)} = H(e \oplus \bar{e}_{(iter)})^T$

p.c. matrix H

1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0

1
0
1
0
0

$S_{(iter)}$

error est.  $\bar{e}_{(iter)}$

1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
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**Increment iter, if  $s_{(iter)} = 0 \Rightarrow e \oplus \bar{e}_{(iter)} = 0$  return  $\bar{e}_{(iter)} = 0$**

iter = 0 completed iter.s; invariant  $s_{(iter)} = H(e \oplus \bar{e}_{(iter)})^T$

p.c. matrix H

1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0

1
0
1
0
0

$s_{(iter)}$

error est.  $\bar{e}_{(iter)}$

1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1
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## Outline of the method

1. Derive the distribution of the syndrome weight  $\text{wt}(s)$ ,  $\Pr(\mathcal{W}_t = y)$
2. Derive the probability distribution of number of discrepancies between the error  $e$  and its estimate  $\bar{e}_{(1)}$  added ( $d_+$ ) and removed ( $d_-$ ) by the first iteration
3. Partition error estimate  $\bar{e}_{(1)}$  bits after first iteration in classes, derive  $\Pr(\mathcal{E}_{(2)} = d)$ , and the DFR as  $1 - \Pr(\mathcal{E}_{(2)} = 0)$

## Bonus from code-specific knowledge (if available)

- [Til18, BBC<sup>+</sup>23]: Given a specific  $H$  compute  $\tau(H)$  s.t. for all  $0 \leq x \leq \tau(H)$   $\Pr(\mathcal{E}_{(2)} = 0 | \mathcal{E}_{(1)} = x) = 1$ , i.e., if  $\text{wt}(e \oplus \bar{e}_{(1)}) \leq \tau(H)$  the 2nd iteration converges to  $s = 0$

## Method - Step 1

- Compute distribution of the r.v.  $\mathcal{W}_t$  modeling  $w_t(s) = wt(He^T)$ , i.e., the syndrome weight of a weight- $t$  error  $e$  through a  $(v, w)$ -regular p.c. matrix  $H$

## Working assumption

- Rows of  $H$  are independently and uniformly random drawn from the set of binary vectors with length  $n$  and  $w$  asserted bits


## Strategy

- $\mathcal{W}_t$  derived as the result of  $t$  steps on a non-homogeneous Markov Chain (MC):
  - MC steps model the effect of adding an asserted bit to  $e \Rightarrow$  column of  $H$  to  $s$
  - MC transition probabilities derived counting the number of flips taking place in  $s$
  - Initial distribution, i.e.,  $\mathcal{W}_0$  is simply  $\Pr(\mathcal{W}_0 = 0) = 1$


# Numerical validation of the distribution of $\mathcal{W}_t$

$(v, n_0v)$  regular codes with  $n = n_0r$ ,  $\text{wt}(e) = t$ ,  $10^9$  samples per pt. (sim +, model  $\times$ )

$n_0 = 2, r = 2200, v = 11, t = 18$



$n_0 = 4, r = 13397, v = 83, t = 66$



## Method - Step 2



- Model #discrepancies between  $e$  and  $\bar{e}_{(1)}$ , split into added ( $d_+$ ) and removed ( $d_-$ ), as random variables:  $\delta_+(d_+) = \Pr(d_+ \text{ discrepancies added})$  and  $\delta_-(d_-)$

## Strategy

- Knowing  $\mathcal{W}_t$ , compute  $\Pr(+ \text{ discrepancies added} | \mathcal{W}_t = w)$  for all  $w \in \{0, \dots, n - k\}$  through counting arguments
- Compute probability  $p_{\text{unsat}|b}$  that a p.c. equation is unsatisfied, given that a bit involved in it  $e_j$  is equal to  $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- Compute probability distribution of  $u_{pc_j}$  given that  $e_j$  is equal to  $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- For any 1st iteration threshold  $\text{th}_{(1)}$  of choice, compute  $\delta_+(d_+)$  and  $\delta_-(d_-)$ 
  - Note: The number of discrepancies after the 1st it. is:  $\mathcal{E}_{(1)} = t - d_- + d_+$

# Numerical validation of $\delta_+(d_+)$ and $\delta_-(d_-)$

$n_0 = 4$ ,  $p = 13397$ ,  $n = n_0 p$ ,  $k = (n_0 - 1)p$ ,  $v = 83$ ,  $t = 66$ ,  $10^5$  samples per point





(sim +, model x, technique from [BBC+23] x)

## Method - Step 3

- Obtain the second iteration DFR as  $1 - \Pr(\mathcal{E}_{(2)} = 0)$

## Strategy



- Partition positions of  $\bar{e}_{(1)}$  into  $\mathbf{J}_{a,b}$ ,  $a, b \in \{0, 1\}$ ,  $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{e}_j$ ,  $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{e}_j \oplus \bar{e}_{(1),j}$ ; for each  $\mathbf{J}_{a,b}$ :
- Derive the probability that a p.c. equation involving  $\bar{e}_{(1),j}$ ,  $j \in \mathbf{J}_{a,b}$  becomes/stays unsat after the first iteration
- Derive the UPC value distribution in the second iteration for  $\bar{e}_{(1),j}$ ,  $j \in \mathbf{J}_{a,b}$
- Combine the above with the distributions of  $|\mathbf{J}_{a,b}|$  (obtained from the ones of  $d_+$  and  $d_-$ ) to obtain  $\Pr(\mathcal{E}_{(2)} = d)$



$(v, 2v)$ -regular LDPC codes,  $v \in \{9, 11, 13, 15, 17\}$ ,  $\frac{k}{n} = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $t = 18$ , parallel decoder w/ thresholds,  $\text{th1} = \text{th2} = \lceil \frac{v+1}{2} \rceil$ .  $10^8$  decodes or 100 decoding failures per point



# DFR estimate numerical validation - error weight



$(v, 2v)$ -regular LDPC codes,  $t \in \{10, \dots, 39\}$ ,  $\frac{k}{n} = \frac{1}{2}$ ,  $v = 11$ , parallel decoder w/  
thresholds,  $t_{h1} = t_{h2} = \lceil \frac{v+1}{2} \rceil$ .  $10^8$  decodes or 100 decoding failures per point

## Comparison with previous non-extrapolation estimates on 2 iterations decoder

$n_0$	$p$	$v$	$t$	$\min \tau(H)$	LEDAcrypt	This work
2	23371	71	130	10	$2^{-64}$	$2^{-147}$
3	16067	79	83	9	$2^{-64}$	$2^{-139}$
4	13397	83	66	8	$2^{-64}$	$2^{-134}$
2	28277	69	129	11	$2^{-128}$	$2^{-203}$
3	19709	79	82	10	$2^{-128}$	$2^{-198}$
4	16229	83	65	9	$2^{-128}$	$2^{-189}$

- Computations above consider that for all  $0 \leq x \leq \tau(H)$   $\Pr(\mathcal{E}_{(2)} = 0 | \mathcal{E}_{(1)} = x) = 1$
- Computations above done with syndrome independent thresholds
  - Syndrome weight dependent thresholds can also be modeled
  - Employing them yields a more effective decoder, lowering DFR further

## Effects of weak keys

- Weak keys [DGK20, Vas21, ABH<sup>+</sup>22, WWW23] are p.c. matrices defining codes with poor correction capabilities; they are detrimental to the average DFR
- This work provides a technique to estimate the average DFR over all the possible codes (keypairs), employing a 2-iteration BF decoder
  - This matches the IND-CCA2 requirement [HHK17]

## Filtering

- Weak keys from [DGK20, Vas21] can be filtered via pattern-matching
- [BBC<sup>+</sup>20, BBC<sup>+</sup>23]: Weak keys are characterized by  $\tau(H)$  values definitely below average and can be removed discarding codes with  $\tau(H)$  below a chosen threshold  $\bar{\tau}$ 
  - Bonus point: the improvement of the average DFR is automatically quantified in our approach

## Take-away points

- We provide a closed-form method to estimate the average DFR of a random  $(v, w)$ -regular code decoded via 2-iterations parallel BF iterative decoding
- Adopting our approach and tuning BIKE parameters accordingly would yield an IND-CCA2 version of BIKE
- The effect of weak keys is taken into account in our estimates, considering both the case in which they are discarded and the one in which they're not

## Ongoing future directions

- Extend the technique to a higher number of parallel BF decoder iterations
- Complete a performance-security optimized design for LEDAcrypt parameters, with syndrome-weight dependent thresholds

Thank you for the attention!

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