


ABAC for ABM

- Issues
 - Need a sending rule per ABM address
 - Usability – loss of messaging semantics
- Solution
 - One rule per <attribute,value>
 - Any address can be formed with allowed attributes
 - Policy specialization
 - Specifies per user sending policy
 - List of attributes a user is allowed to route on

Strawman Architecture



ABE

- Emerging pairing-based cryptosystems that allow encryption and decryption using attributes (rules)
- Ciphertext Policy ABE (CP-ABE) [BSW07]
 - A pairing-based cryptosystem that allows encrypting data with attribute rules
 - Only users who possess keys for attributes that satisfy the attribute rule can decrypt the data
 - Supports string and numerical attributes and monotonic attribute rules
- **Protects against collusion**


ABE for ABM

- Encrypt using “attribute rules” and public parameters
 - Use the same attributes used to target messages
- Attribute rules are disjunctive normal forms and define **reading policy**
- **{Reading policy} = {Receiving policy} – correctness**
 - Translate receiving policy into a reading policy
- Ex: (“Position_val_Faculty”) AND (Salary > 150000)
- An Attribute Authority (AA) issues attribute keys to each user based on the enterprise database
 - E.g., “Faculty” attribute has a key

ABE for ABM

- Issues
 - No Revocation
 - Key Management
- Solution
 - Short-lived keys
 - One expiry attribute per user [BSW07]. Key Validity period is maximum tolerable vulnerability window

High Level Architecture




Protocol Steps


The protocols for the ABM system are given in terms of three “paths”

- Policy specialization path
- Messaging and address resolution path
- Attribute keying path


Policy Specialization Path



Messaging and Address Resolution Path



Attribute Keying Path



Security and Privacy Analysis

- Enforcement of sending, read, and receiving policies
 - S/MIME to authenticate sender to ABM server
 - Vulnerability windows: receive subset of read
- Component compromise and collusion
 - MTA or ABM server
 - Clients
- Privacy
 - What should senders and receivers know?

Efficiency Analysis

- Measure costs on each path and try to estimate latencies for mid-size enterprises
- Must conjecture the attributes and types of policies that will be used
- Implementation uses the CP-ABE library [BSW07].

Encryption Time

Equality – e.g., (Position = Faculty), Relational – e.g., (Salary > 150000)

		Number of Relational Literals			
		0	2	4	6
Number of Equality Literals	0		1.53s	3.00s	4.49s
	1	0.05s	1.55s	3.05s	4.56s
	2	0.07s	1.57s	3.08s	4.56s
	3	0.09s	1.59s	3.09s	4.60s
	4	0.12s	1.61s	3.12s	4.61s
	5	0.14s	1.65s	3.16s	4.64s
	6	0.17s	1.66s	3.17s	4.63s

Decryption times averaged 352ms.




Key Generation Time

Boolean – e.g., (Position_VAL_Faculty), Numerical – e.g., (Salary = 150000)

		Number of Boolean Attributes						
		0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Number of Numerical Attributes	0		0.05s	0.07s	0.10s	0.12s	0.20	0.17s
	1	0.86s	0.87s	0.88s	0.90s	0.93s	0.95s	0.97s
	2	1.67s	1.68s	1.69s	1.70s	1.73s	1.76s	1.78s
	3	2.44s	2.48s	2.49s	2.52s	2.54s	2.57s	
	4	3.26s	3.28s	3.29s	3.32s	3.34s	3.35s	
	5	4.05s	4.07s	4.09s	4.12s			
	6	4.87s	4.89s	4.92s				



AA Scalability



Other Results Summary

- Policy Specialization
 - Latency proportional to number of rules
 - < 1 second for 150 rules
 - < 12 seconds for 700 rules
- Address Resolution
 - With access control and without confidentiality
 - < 400ms for a 60K RDB
 - < 8 seconds for 60K XML DB

Conclusions

- Messaging (email) based on attributes collected from an enterprise database is feasible and deployable for mid-size enterprises.
- Access control and confidentiality are manageable using attribute-based security mechanisms.
- Improved ABE schemes with better revocation properties are needed.
- Privacy management of attributes needs to be better understood before deploying ABM and ABE.