



# Speed-ups of Elliptic Curve-Based Schemes

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# Outline



- ECDSA signature scheme
- Fast ECDSA signature scheme
- Speed-ups:
  - ECDSA fast verification
  - ECDSA certificate verification and ECC-based key agreement (ECDH, ECMQV)
  - Batch ECDSA verification
- How to get from ECDSA to Fast ECDSA

# ECDSA signature scheme

## System-wide parameters

Elliptic curve of prime order  $n$  with generator  $G$ . Hash function  $h$ .

## Signature generation

INPUT: Message  $m$ , private key  $d$ .

OUTPUT: Signature  $(r, s)$ .

### ACTIONS:

1. Compute  $e := h(m)$ .
2. Select random  $k \in [1, n-1]$ .
3. Compute  $R := kG$  and map  $R$  to  $r$ .
4. Compute  $s := k^{-1}(e + dr) \bmod n$ .
5. If  $r, s \in [1, n-1]$ , return  $(r, s)$ ; otherwise, go to Step 2.

## Initial set-up

Signer A selects private key  $d \in [1, n-1]$  and publishes its public key  $Q = dG$ .

## Signature verification

INPUT: Message  $m$ , signature  $(r, s)$ ;  
Public signing key  $Q$  of Alice.

OUTPUT: Accept or reject signature.

### ACTIONS:

1. Compute  $e := h(m)$ .
2. Check that  $r, s \in [1, n-1]$ . If verification fails, return 'reject'.
3. Compute  $R' := s^{-1}(eG + rQ)$ .
4. Check that  $R'$  maps to  $r$ .  
If verification succeeds, return 'accept'; otherwise return 'reject'.

Non-repudiation: Verifier knows the true identity of the signing party, since the public signing key  $Q$  is bound to signing party Alice.

# Fast ECDSA signature scheme

## System-wide parameters

Elliptic curve of prime order  $n$  with generator  $G$ . Hash function  $h$ .

## Signature generation

INPUT: Message  $m$ , private key  $d$ .

OUTPUT: Signature  $(R, s)$ .

### ACTIONS:

1. Compute  $e := h(m)$ .
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## Initial set-up

Signer A selects private key  $d \in [1, n-1]$  and publishes its public key  $Q = dG$ .

## Signature verification

INPUT: Message  $m$ , signature  $(R, s)$ ;  
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### ACTIONS:

1. Compute  $e := h(m)$ .
2. Map  $R$  to  $r$ .
3. Check that  $r, s \in [1, n-1]$ . If verification fails, return 'reject'.
4. Check that  $R = s^{-1}(eG + rQ)$ . If verification succeeds, return 'accept'; otherwise return 'reject'.

Non-repudiation: Verifier knows the true identity of the signing party, since the public signing key  $Q$  is bound to signing party Alice.

# Fast ECDSA signature scheme

## Computational aspects

### Ordinary signature verification

#### ACTIONS:

- ...
3. Compute  $R' := (e s^{-1}) G + (r s^{-1}) Q$ .
  4. Check that  $R'$  maps to  $r$ .
- ...

### Fast signature verification

#### ACTIONS:

- ...
2. Map  $R$  to  $r$ .
  4. Check that  $R = (e s^{-1}) G + (r s^{-1}) Q$ .
- ...

## Ordinary signature verification

Compute expression  $R' := (e s^{-1}) G + (r s^{-1}) Q$ .

Cost: *full-size* linear combination of *known* point  $G$  and *unknown* point  $Q$ .

## Fast signature verification

Evaluate expression  $\Delta := s^{-1} (e G + r Q) - R$  and check that  $\Delta = O$ ,  
by verifying instead

$$\mu \Delta := (\mu e s^{-1}) G + (\mu r s^{-1}) Q - \mu R = O \text{ for suitable } \mu \in [1, n-1].$$

Speed-up: 40% for prime curves and binary non-Koblitz curves.

# Fast ECDSA and speed-ups

Speed-ups for the following curves:

- NIST prime curves, ‘Suite B’ curves, Brainpool curves
- NIST random binary curves

**Fast verification of ECDSA signatures ([2]):**

40% speed-up compared to ordinary approach

**ECDSA certificate verification + Static ECDH/ECMQV ([6]):**

Speed-up incremental cost ECDSA verify compared to separate approach: -

2.4x speed-up (compared to ordinary ECDSA verify)

1.7x (compared to Fast ECDSA verify)

Simple side channel resistance virtually for free

**Batch verification of ECDSA signatures ([3]):**

Dependent on number of signatures involved.

# ECDSA vs. Fast ECDSA

## Security of Fast ECDSA

Both schemes are equally secure: ECDSA has signature  $(r, s)$  if and only if Fast ECDSA has signature  $(R, s)$  where  $R$  maps to  $r$ .

## ECDSA signature verification

- Convert ECDSA signature  $(r, s)$  to Fast ECDSA signature  $(R, s)$
- Verify Fast ECDSA signature  $(R, s)$

### Note:

- Conversion generally yields *pair*  $(R, -R)$  of *candidate points* that map to  $r$ .
- Verification involves trying out all those candidate points not discarded based on some side constraints (the so-called *admissible points*).

### How to ensure only one admissible point:

- Generate ECDSA signature with  $k$  such that y-coordinate of  $R:=kG$  can be prescribed. (If necessary, change the sign of  $k$ .)
- Use the fact that  $(r, s)$  is a valid ECDSA signature if and only if  $(r, -s)$  is.

Conversion of ECDSA to Fast Verify friendly format: via simple post-processing

# Further reading

1. ANSI X9.63-2001, 'Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography,' American National Standard for Financial Services, American Bankers Association, November 20, 2001.
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3. M. Bellare, J.A. Garay, T. Rabin, 'Fast Batch Verification for Modular Exponentiation and Digital Signatures,' in *Proceedings of Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT'98*, K. Nyberg, Ed., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1403, pp. 236-250, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1998.
4. FIPS Pub 186-2, *Digital Signature Standard (DSS)*, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2, US Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Maryland, USA, January 27, 2000. (Includes change notice, October 5, 2001.)
5. NIST SP800-56a, *Recommendation for Pair-wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography*, March 8, 2007.
6. R. Struik, 'Combined Verifications and Key Computations,' draft.