

Electing a University President using Open-Audit Voting: Analysis of real-world use of Helios*

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Abstract

In March 2009, the Université catholique de Louvain elected its President using a custom deployment of the Helios web-based open-audit voting system. Out of 25,000 potential voters, 5000 registered, and almost 4000 voted in each round of the election. The precision of the voting system turned out to be crucial: in the first round, the leader came short of winning the election by only 2 votes.

In this work, we document the new version of Helios used in this election, the specifics of the UCL deployment, and the lessons learned in this deployment. We offer suggestions on running future open-audit elections. We note at least one interesting conclusion: while it is often assumed that open-audit voting will lead to more complaints and potentially a denial-of-service attack on the auditing process, we found that, instead, complaints are likely to be more easily handled in open-audit elections because evidence and counter-evidence can be presented.

1 Background and Introduction

Over the last 25 years, cryptographers have developed election protocols that promise a radical paradigm shift: election results can be verified entirely by public observers, all the while preserving voter secrecy. These protocols are said to provide two properties: *ballot casting assurance* [3], where each voter gains personal assurance that their vote was correctly captured, and *universal verifiability*, where any observer can verify that all captured votes were properly tallied. Some have used the term “open-audit elections” to indicate that anyone, even a public observer with no special role in the election, can act as auditor.

Unfortunately, though some important test elections have been held in recent years, notably using the Scantegrity [7] and Prêt-à-Voter [8] systems, none have had significant stakes yet. As a result, public awareness of open-audit elections remains unfortunately low. Even voting experts who recognize that open-audit elections are “the way we’ll all vote in the future” seem to envision a *very distant* future, not one we should consider for practical purposes yet.

The UCL Opportunity. In 2008, the Université catholique de Louvain (UCL) in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, decided to open up its University President selection process to all members of the University, including faculty, students, and staff, via a secret-ballot election conducted through the Internet. With 25,000 eligible voters participating in an election without precedent, there was both a challenge and an opportunity. The challenge lay in providing a trustworthy result of an election with such high stakes. The opportunity to try something new was motivated by two important factors: (i) the UCL’s cryptography department was consulted and given the opportunity to run the election, and (ii) the absence of precedent combined with a general distrust of typical computer-based voting made a novel, publicly verifiable approach particularly appealing.

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Helios. Helios, [2], one of the first web-based open-audit voting system, was released in 2008. Given the simplicity and universality of the web, Helios was immediately a clear candidate for the UCL election. However, Helios was not ready for immediate deployment at UCL, because:

- Helios 1.0 was based on mixnets, which could not be used in an election in which votes receive different weights according to the voter’s category, while election results per category need to remain unknown.
- Helios 1.0 required Google App Engine to run, which, though not a problem in theory, posed a number of problems for integration with a European University given European privacy laws.
- Helios 1.0 verifiability was implemented as a proof-of-concept, and was not scalable to rapid tallying of tens of thousands of votes, nor designed to help solving potential voter complaints.
- Helios 1.0 only implemented single-key decryption, meaning that one party would have to be trusted not to decrypt individual votes.

Low-coercion Elections. In a secret-ballot election, the coercion threat must be considered: if an adversary can force a voter to cast a vote a certain way, or even to randomize her vote, the election can be bought. Remote voting is, by nature, vulnerable to coercion, since an adversary can simply watch a voter’s every move or, in many practical cases, simply purchase from the voter her authentication credentials and vote entirely in her place. Some solutions to the problem have been proposed [17], but all require at least one truly private interaction between the voter and the election authority.

A number of elections can be considered “low-coercion,” a term introduced by the Helios paper. In these elections, ballot secrecy is important, because people might be peer-pressured into voting one way or another, but actual coercion is an unlikely concern because voters often have an effectively private space at home, or because the stakes are not quite high enough to warrant bribes or threats. A University President election is precisely the kind of election that is likely low-coercion: most voters do not physically reside with other voters, and even if peer pressure is applied, money or bribes are usually out of scope. This provides an opportunity to achieve most of the important properties of open-audit voting without the full complexity of a National election.

Voting over the Internet. Many voting security experts believe that voting over the Internet is the most troubling of all proposed voting system evolutions [16]. Even if one sets aside the risk of coercion (as UCL did, given the low-coercion setting), there remains the problem of the end user’s computer and the relatively widespread compromise of consumer operating systems, e.g. the numerous and well documented botnets [1]. Helios 2.0, like its predecessor, does little to specifically counter the threat of client-side operating-system or web-browser compromise; a specifically targeted virus could surreptitiously change a user’s vote and mask all of the verifications performed via the same computer to cover its tracks.

In this deployment, UCL believed that the likelihood of such an advanced attack against the UCL election was extremely unlikely. UCL also made available a set of secured client machines for voters who wished to use an official voting machine. It should be noted, however, that UCL and the authors do not endorse the use of Helios 2.0 for large, high-stakes, governmental elections where the threat of a targeted virus would be far more realistic.

Organization. In Section 2, we detail Helios 2.0, a series of upgrades to Helios developed specifically to fulfill the needs of a large open-audit election like UCL. In Section 3, we consider the organizational aspects and specific customizations needed for the UCL 2009 Election and, in Section 4, we discuss the statistics of the election and make recommendations for improving open-audit elections at UCL and other universities in the future.

2 Helios 2.0

In response to UCL’s needs, we improved Helios and released Helios 2.0, available as open-source software ¹. The details of Helios 1.0 can be found in the original paper [2], though we summarize the important points here.

Helios 1.0 is a web-based open-audit voting system. Votes are encrypted, using the *browser-based ballot encryption program*, with El-Gamal encryption of a plaintext representation of the choices. Once loaded, this ballot

¹hosted at <http://github.com/benadida/helios>

encryption single-page web application does not access the network again until the vote is encrypted and ready for casting. Encryption is specifically achieved within the web browser using LiveConnect to access the Java Virtual Machine from JavaScript, enabling vote encryption in 3 or 4 seconds on a typical configuration. Ballot casting assurance is achieved using the Benaloh cast-or-audit voting protocol [6] implemented in part by the *ballot verifier* which ensures that an audited ballot indeed corresponds to the fingerprint generated before the cast-or-audit choice. A Sako-Kilian [22] / Benaloh [5] *mixnet* provably shuffles the votes, then the election server decrypts the shuffled votes and tallies the results. An *election verification program* downloads all encrypted votes, shuffled votes, decrypted ballots and proofs, and verifies that the election was run correctly.

Helios 2.0 uses the same techniques for web-browser-based encryption, but otherwise provides significant updates to the rest of the protocol.

2.1 Homomorphic Tallying

Helios 2.0 shifts from mixnet-based to homomorphic tallying [9], because homomorphic tallying is easier to implement efficiently, and thus easier to verify, especially when a third party writes verification code. We use Exponential El-Gamal, a variant of El-Gamal [12] where one encrypts g^m rather than m in order to achieve an additive homomorphism, because it is easier to implement than alternative additively homomorphic schemes such as Paillier [20]. (Decryption requires a discrete logarithm computation, though with a relatively small exponent that ensures that the computation is, in fact, quite tractable.) In addition, El-Gamal lends itself quite easily to distributed decryption with joint key generation, where other additively homomorphic systems like Paillier are significantly more complicated. For simplicity and ease of discrete-logarithm computation, we use a single ciphertext for each option of each election question, rather than attempt multi-answer encoding with the more involved proofs of correct ballot form [4]. A ballot is then composed of:

- a ciphertext for each available answer to each election question,
- a disjunctive zero-knowledge proof [10] that each such ciphertext encodes either a 0 or a 1, and
- a disjunctive zero-knowledge proof that the homomorphic sum of all ciphertexts for a given question is the encryption of one out of $0, 1, \dots, max$ for a pre-set maximum (ensuring that between 0 and max answers are selected for each question.)

In order to achieve high security with efficient modular exponentiation, all operations were performed in a subgroup of order q of \mathbb{Z}_p^* where p and q are 2048 and 256 bit long primes, respectively.

Tallying and Election Verification in the Browser. In order to make the simplest use case as easy as possible, Helios 2.0 includes a web-based *election tallying program* and *election verification program*, using the same Javascript & HTML technology as the ballot verification program. This approach does not scale well to more than a few dozen votes, given browser limitations, so UCL implemented its own, high-speed, offline tallier and verifier (See Section 3).

2.2 Distributed Decryption

Another significant update to Helios was the addition of distributed decryption to ensure that multiple trustees are required for decryption. This ensures that only the homomorphic tally of all votes is decrypted, never an individual ballot. Two options were available:

- having each trustee generate a typical El-Gamal public key using the same (p, q, g) parameters, and combining the public keys using simple multiplication, or
- having each trustee generate a typical El-Gamal public key using the same (p, q, g) parameters, then have each trustee generate and publish a Lagrange coefficient to enable threshold decryption [13, 21].

Because the second approach is a little bit tricky to implement securely, with an additional step in the interaction between trustees to generate the Lagrange coefficients, we opted for the slightly less robust, but just as secure, first option. UCL used a notary public to handle backups of keys to ensure robustness (see Section 3.) We note that robust key generation, though crucial, is not entirely novel in this space: at least one other voting system, ADDER [18], already implements distributed key generation.

2.3 Machine Interface for Modular Authentication

By default, Helios authenticates users by email address and an election-specific password. This password is generated by Helios upon voter registration and sent by email to each participant. For UCL and other large institutions which already have an institution-wide authentication infrastructure, a better approach would be to plug into the pre-existing authentication infrastructure.

To enable this approach in a modular fashion, Helios 2.0 enables a separate, trusted server to submit ballots on behalf of voters. Thus, this trusted server can perform voter authentication however it sees fit, then submit the results of this authentication action to Helios 2.0 at ballot submission time. We use the standard OAuth protocol [19] (in so-called “2-legged mode”) to authenticate a call from the UCL authentication system to the Helios backend server. The use of OAuth effectively sends an HMAC [15] of the request using a shared secret between the two servers (See Figure 1.)




Figure 1: An API for modular authentication in Helios 2.0.

It occurred to the team that a better long-term design will likely be the separation of the ballot preparation server from the ballot submission server, so that preparing the ballot is independent of the eventual authentication required at submission time. We did not have time to implement this modular architecture for the UCL election, but we intend to do so with Helios 3.0.

Security Implications. If a server is able to authoritatively claim that a ballot comes from a particular voter, then there is always the chance of ballot stuffing. In fact, this exact same problem exists with Helios 1.0: the Helios server itself could stuff the ballot box near the end of the day. In the case of an open-audit voting system, as described in the original Helios paper, the simple defense against this is to ensure that the voter list is published at the end of the election for verification during an audit phase. It is expected that ballot stuffing would be detected at this time.

In the case of Helios 2.0, the additional server is not introduced for security reasons, but rather for modularity of the authentication implementation. The trust relationship hasn't changed: we expected the set of Helios servers not to stuff the ballot, and we verify this during the audit phase and after the election results are published by publishing the voter list.

2.4 Standalone Open-Source Distribution

Helios 1.0 was built against the Google App Engine ² “cloud”-based hosting environment, with the goal of rapid development, deployment and scalability. Though, in theory, an open-audit voting system does not depend on the individual or organization hosting the software, there are a number of reasons to make the Helios software independent of a proprietary platform:

²<http://code.google.com/appengine/>

- some organizations have policies against running software outside of their network,
- some organizations, in particular UCL, are not US-based and are subject to laws that complicate the use of a US-based hosting service,
- though it isn't technically required in an open-audit system, many people are more comfortable with a completely open-source codebase they can install themselves.

For these reasons, Helios 2.0 was built to run on a completely free/open-source software stack, using the Python programming language [26], the Django web toolkit for Python [24], and the PostgreSQL database [25].

2.5 Improved User Interface

The Helios 1.0 user interface was functional but usable mostly by people with a deep understanding of cryptographic voting. In Helios 2.0, the interface was modified to take into account that many users would not be voting experts:

- A progress bar along the top of the voting interface keeps the user informed of how many steps they've completed and how many are left to complete.
- Technical language, in particular as it pertains to the audit phase, was cut out in preference of more typical voting language.
- During cryptographic operations that can take a few seconds, a "please wait" message was added to prevent user confusion over whether the application "hung."
- Significant testing across browser platforms was performed to ensure proper Java capability for cryptographic operations and notify the user in case of a compatibility issue.

The test election at UCL, detailed in Section 3, helped debug and improve this user interface with the help of a few thousand users, the UCL help desk, and a number of in-person user-observation sessions.

2.6 Additional Tweaks

A number of small tweaks and feature updates were added to Helios 2.0 to fulfill UCL's needs.

Minimum Number of Answers. Helios 1.0 allowed for multiple answers to a given question, up to a pre-set maximum. The UCL election was set up to require an active choice, with "blank vote" one of the options. This ensured that voters would not cast a blank vote by mistake, given that blank votes can cause a stalemate by contributing to the number of votes needed to gain an absolute majority, without contributing to any candidate's total. This feature was implemented by allowing an election designer to designate a *minimum number of answers* for a given question. Then, the proof of ballot correctness was tweaked to limit the number of clauses in the disjunctive zero-knowledge proof so that the sum of all ciphertexts must be one of $min, min + 1, \dots, max$. In particular, if min is set to 1, then at least one option must be selected from the available answers.

Standalone Verifier. The Helios 1.0 ballot verifier, written in HTML and JavaScript, depended on the Helios back-end server to look up the election parameters and ensure that a ballot was properly encrypted. In Helios 2.0, we built a standalone, static HTML & JavaScript ballot verifier that can be deployed on any web server with a given election's parameters wired directly into the verifier file. This allows a number of parties to publish a web-accessible verifier, so that voters have their choice of trusted entity to verify the proper encryption of their ballot. In the UCL election, Harvard and the École Normale Supérieure de Cachan hosted such verification programs (see Figure 2.)

Formal Verification Specifications. In order to facilitate the creation of third-party verification tools, Helios 2.0 provides a formal specification document of the verification procedure, including the documentation of all data models and algorithms. The specification can be found at <http://www.heliosvoting.org/>.




Figure 2: Harvard hosts a ballot verifier for the first round of the UCL Election.

Substantiation of Complaints Helios 1.0 provided an unauthenticated web bulletin board, which might open the path for unsubstantiated complaints by voters who either did not correctly record their vote receipt, or would like to raise suspicions about the validity of the bulletin board content. Therefore, we decided to provide voters with a document digitally signed by the voting server for each important stage of the election: at registration time, and before the web bulletin board audit phase. These documents would provide each voter a way to prove to the election commission, if it is ever needed, that she actually register for the election, but that this registration was lost by the registration server, or that a vote that was verified during the web bulletin board phase was modified in the tallying phase. While these signed documents allow each voter to substantiate potential complaints, they also allow the election commission to require the voter to provide these documents and to decide accordingly the credit that needs to be given to such complaints.

Providing the voters with signed documents raised the question of the verification of these signatures. The verification of signed pdf documents appeared to be the most usable procedure in the UCL IT environment.

3 Organization of the UCL Election

3.1 Election parameters generation

Key generation. In an election based on homomorphic tallying, the confidentiality of the votes fundamentally relies on the secrecy of the private key that is used to decrypt the tally, but that could also maliciously be used to decrypt individual votes. In order to improve the control of the decryption process, the election private key was generated and stored in a distributed way, by trustees selected from various voter groups (students, administrative staff, . . .), but also from the invited external experts from the election commission.

Producing keys in a distributed way for trustees raises interesting challenges, however, specifically when the trustees do not have a background in computer science: how can we convince the trustees that the key they are producing is really random and not chosen in advance, that no extra copy of the key is made, or that the outputs they provide at tally time do not also contain their private key (hidden in the randomness of some proofs, for instance)?

Our solution to this conundrum was to distribute the trust between multiple parties without requiring trustees to become experts themselves. A meeting with the election commission was organized, together with several experts in computer science. Several laptops were brought, from which the hard disk drives were removed and wireless network cards disabled. Then, those laptops were boot up using standard linux live-CDs, and the key generation code, kept as simple as possible, was loaded on the machines through USB sticks, after inspection by the external experts. Keys were then generated and stored on the USB sticks, the laptops shut down, and the linux live-CDs destroyed. A similar procedure was followed when those keys were used for decryption.

migration, thereby avoiding the shortcomings of repeated changes and giving voters the maximal amount of time to become accustomed to all changes.

4.3 Open-audit and the right to complain

Open-audit election empowers the voter to complain. Often seen as a risk of potential denial of service attacks, it turned out not to be the case. We believe this is due to the two following reasons:

- (i) Complaints can be traced: server logs could be extracted and analyzed;
- (ii) By giving each voter access to signed receipts for any interaction she has with the voting system, we give her the possibility – and therefore the obligation – to present proofs and arguments for her complain. While allowing for legitimate complaints, this largely mitigates the risk of fake complaints.

Of the few complaints we did receive, the baseless complaints were easily countered by viewing the logs and noticing that the voter's claims were, in fact, excuses for having missed either the registration or voting period.

4.4 Trustees and Cryptographic Expertise

We found one particularly difficult issue: the key generation and partial decryption by the trustees. In an ideal world, each trustee would consult their own cryptography expert and develop their own source code for key generation and partial decryption. In fact, it is likely more important for trustees to develop their own key generation code than their own verification code, since verification can be performed many times, while safe key generation and partial decryption must be done right the first time around. Unfortunately, in practice, it is very difficult to expect this much expertise from multiple trustees who are selected to be as independent from each other as possible (and can therefore not be selected from the same or related CS labs).

As described earlier, our approach was to distribute the key-generation and decryption code trust among a few members of the election commission. We can imagine other models once the Helios system is further standardized: a long-standing, published open-source key generation and partial decryption package might be available for all trustees to download and install on their own computer systems. Even in this case, however, trustees need notable technical savvy. We believe finding ways to ensure a more direct line of trust for trustees is an important next step in open-audit election operations.

5 Conclusion

With a winner declared without controversy or significant number of complaints, we believe the UCL President Election of 2009, the first significant-outcome, multi-thousand-voter open-audit election that we know of, was a success. A number of lessons on open-audit voting emerged. The ease with which frivolous complaints were countered was, to us, the most surprising, in that it is a data point against the commonly held view that allowing for complaints would inevitably lead to more problems. The significant operational advantage of having no plaintext data on the servers was useful, and we expected this, though it was significantly more useful than we initially thought.

The biggest lesson, of course, is that no matter the voting system, each election is a significant project on its own. One cannot simply install a piece of software and expect an election to run smoothly. When thinking about each election as an individual project with project managers, operational constraints and costs, we find that open-audit voting is promising. Secrecy is preserved, but evidence of proper function is available at every step. Though we recommend further studies, our initial impression is that running an open-audit election is easier and more predictable than classic elections.

An important next step in applied research on open-audit voting systems will be the ability to easily customize each part of the process, for example using some kind of interactive menu for the election manager. More research and development work in that direction is required.

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