


# Compact asymmetric authentication using hash-based signatures

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# Key Generation


Private Key



Public Key


# Signature Generation

Signature for message 1101



# Signature Verification


Signature for message 1101



Public Key


# Winternitz OTS

Private Key




Public Key


# Winternitz OTS



# Merkle ('80) OTS




# OTS Chains






# Merkle Tree Key Generation



# Merkle Tree Signature



# Security

- Transparent security properties
- Requirements
  - $H$  must be collision-resistant
  - $F$  must be pseudorandom (preimage resistant)
- Analyses
  - The Provable Security of Graph-Based One-Time Signatures and Extensions to Algebraic Signature Schemes* [Hevia, Micciancio '02]
  - On the Security of the Winternitz One-Time Signature Scheme* [Buchmann, Dahmen, Ereth, Hulsing, Ruckert, '11]
- Post-Quantum Security
  - Unique strength

# Summary

- Lamport, Winternitz, Merkle

  - Private key ~ 128 bits

  - Public key ~ 256 bits

  - Signatures ~ 860+ bytes

  - Key generation ~ 1 second (to sign  $10^6$  messages)

  - Signature generation - fast

  - Signature verification – fast

- Two levels of signatures

  - Double sizes of signatures and keys, double verification time

  - Number of signatures increases to  $10^{12}$

  - CMSS - An Improved Merkle Signature Scheme* [Buchmann, Garcia, Dahmen, Doring, Klintsevich '06]

# Energy Usage

- *Power Consumption Evaluation of Efficient Digital Signature Schemes for Low Power Devices* [Seys and Preneel, '06]

**Communication cost** of MTS ~ 10-100x **worse** than that of ECDSA

Energy cost of MTS **verification** ~ 30x **better** than ECDSA


Energy cost of MTS **signature generation** **about the same** as ECDSA

But MTS efficiency goes down as number of signatures increases


Conclusion: ECDSA 2-7x less efficient, but easier to manage

# Implementation Compactness


## ECDSA



## Hash-based signatures



# Secure Boot




# Executable sizes on linux-2.6

	Size (Bytes)			Count
	Average	Min	Max	
GRUB module	6,706	690	98,304	168
Kernel module	35,968	3,272	1,179,608	2499
/sbin	50,356	333	756,784	123
/bin	58,747	63	926,536	101
/usr/sbin	42,362	64	828,304	229
/lib/*.so*	120,266	3,704	1,432,968	80
/usr/lib/*.so*	541,390	218	49,214,336	850
Kernel	2,420,384			

Source: debian vmlinuz-2.6.32-5-amd64



# Secure Hardware Systems



# Standards

	Compact Implementation	Fast Implementation
<i>H</i>	SHA-2	SHA-2
<i>F</i>	SHA-2	AES
KDF	SP 800-108 with SHA-2	SP 800-108 with AES

- Flexible signature format, with minimal mandatory-to-implement
- X.509/PKIX specification
  - But ASN.1 should not be used for signature format
  - Compact implementations benefit from uniformity (e.g. no RSA signatures)

# Conclusions

- Hash-based signatures can be valuable for authenticating trusted systems software and hardware components
- Attractive and well-understood security properties
- Good fit into standards
- May be useful in other areas
  - Low-power wireless

Thank you.

