

NIST Workshop: Improving Trust in the Online Marketplace

Revocation Process

Reasons for Revocation

- Security
 - Key Compromise
 - Malicious or fraudulent usage
- Business
 - Existing certificate replaced with a newer one
 - Subscriber no longer needs the certificate
 - Failure to uphold some portion of the Subscriber Agreement

Distribution of Certificate Status

- Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
 - RFC 5280
 - Digitally signed list of serial numbers of revoked certificates
 - Can contain reason for revocation and a revocation date for each serial number
 - URI in the CDP extension in certificates
 - Serial number listed = Revoked
 - Serial number NOT listed = Valid


Distribution of Certificate Status

- Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
 - RFCs 2560, 5019
 - Client requests status of one or more specific serial numbers
 - Server response is a digitally signed message stating 'good', 'revoked', or 'unknown', OR an unsigned error code.
 - URI to OCSP service in AIA extension

SCVP

- Server-Based Certificate Validation
 - RFC 5055
 - Client outsources path construction and/or validation to a trusted server
 - Not commonly used on the Internet

Revocation and Validation



CRL: <http://example.com/ca.crl>

OCSP: <http://ocsp.example.com/>

CRL Pros / Cons

- Con
 - Grow over time
 - 2007: 158KB
 - 2013: 41MB
 - Single list of “problematic” customers
 - No positive confirmation
- Pro
 - Potentially more efficient for CAs that issue very few certs that are unlikely to be revoked.

OCSP Pros / Cons

- Pro
 - Small, constant size
 - Can provide real-time status
 - Can provide positive confirmation
 - CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements: 8/1/2013
- Con
 - Requires a request/response cycle for each certificate encountered by a client
 - Adds latency to TLS handshake
 - Significant load on OCSP service

Criticisms


- Performance impact
 - <https://revocation-report.x509labs.com/>
- Privacy
- Client not always able to obtain status
 - Captive portals
 - Egress filtering
 - Random network failures
- “It only works when you don’t need it.”

OCSP Stapling

- RFC 6066 (Certificate Status extension)
- Server retrieves and caches OCSP response for its certificate
- Server provides OCSP response to client in TLS handshake

OCSP Stapling

OCSP: <http://ocsp.example.com/>



OCSP Stapling

- Performance Impact
 - No separate connection to OCSP service
 - However, potentially adds additional round trips
- Privacy
 - CA only receives requests from its customers
- Client not always able to obtain Status
 - Client receives OCSP response from the web server
- “It only works when you don’t need it”
 - Attacker has to block web server from getting updated OCSP response

OCSP Stapling: Issues

- Performance
 - Overflow initial congestion window
- Limited to single OCSP response
 - <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-multiple-cert-status-extension/>
- Server support
 - IIS 7, Apache httpd 2.4+, nginx 1.3.7+
- Client support
 - Varies based on platform/library/toolkit

No-Fail vs. Soft-Fail vs. Hard-Fail

- No-Fail: Don't even check for revocation
- Soft-Fail: Client allows TLS handshake to proceed if unable to determine certificate status
- Hard-Fail: Client allows TLS handshake to proceed IFF it can determine the certificate is still valid

Why not Hard-Fail?

- Client priorities and competition
 - Performance
 - “Show the page”
- Potentially creates new DoS vector
- Transition to OCSP Stapling
 - “Must-Staple” extension

Varied Levels of Support

- Clients have differing behaviors
 - Different versions of the same client
 - Same client running on different platforms
- Behavior may depend on version of underlying library/toolkit
- Some clients have implemented their own solutions
- Many non-browser clients do no revocation checking at all

Recommendations

- OCSP Stapling (multiple certificate status)
- CAs should avoid delegated OCSP signing
- Libraries/Toolkits should provide high-level APIs for applications
- Better education/awareness