

# Thoughts on UOCAVA Voting

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# Outline

Introduction

Remote voting


Security

Risk assessment



# UOCAVA voters

How should soldiers  
and overseas citizens  
best exercise their  
right to vote?



# Remote voting

Remote voting has many flavors:

- ▶ Ballots sent to voter by: mail | internet
- ▶ Ballots are: paper | electronic | both
- ▶ Voters are: supervised | unsupervised
- ▶ Ballot “marked” by: voter | kiosk | voter PC
- ▶ Ballots returned by: mail | internet | both
- ▶ Auditing: none | moderate | comprehensive

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**My recommendation**



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We should give UOCAVA voters the **best possible paper ballot system** we can manage!



# Evaluation criteria for remote voting systems

Availability and usability

Cost

Staffing requirements

Security and auditability

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# Remote voting already has known security problems

Unsupervised remote voting vulnerable to **vote-selling**, **bribery**, and **coercion**.



Communication with voter, and transmission of ballots, may be unreliable/manipulable.  
I believe remote voting should be allowed:

- ▶ **only as needed**
- ▶ **for at most 5% of voters**

UOCAVA voting meets these criteria.

# Internet voting has additional security problems

Platform insecurity (both client and server)

Network insecurity

Set of attackers enlarged from:

just those who can touch paper ballots, to  
anyone on the planet with a computer

Attacks can be automated, executed on a  
massive scale, and done so anonymously



## Platform insecurity (both client and server)

Modern computer systems only provide modest security — they are **puzzle boxes** rather than vaults.

Once adversary solves the puzzle, he can open it (and all others like it).



## Internet voting

*We may view **internet voting** as voting on a contraption consisting of a collection of such puzzle boxes, all connected by untraceable wires to every possible adversary on the planet.*

## Internet voting


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## Network insecurity

Most serious problem may be DDOS attack, which can make remote internet voting system simply **unavailable** to UOCAVA voters.



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— *a failure of democracy.*

# Net benefit – a proposed metric

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$$= \text{benefit} - \text{loss}$$

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= % new voters given franchise

–

% voters losing franchise through fraud

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(We'll use *expected values* here, although you can't justify using probabilities on adversarial actions!)



# Benefit

What is plausible *benefit*? (Worked example)

Suppose UOCAVA voters are 2% of registered eligible voters.

Suppose that new technology enables increase in franchise by 1% .

(E.g. suppose increase from 0.5% to 1.5% )

(I consider this an optimistic estimate!)

**We'll estimate (potential) benefit as 1%.**



# Loss

Can we estimate % voters we expect to lose franchise through fraud?



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Fact:

If adversary determines election outcome,  
*all* voters are disenfranchised!

We no longer have a democracy in action...



# Hall of Shame Factor

What is “loss” when  
election is stolen?

Just the 100% loss of  
franchise?

Let's add an additional

**Hall of Shame Factor**

(HOSF), for stolen  
elections. (Not only  
shame, but if elections  
are (or could be) stolen,  
voters may get cynical  
and not vote again!)



# Loss

Suppose we let  $\text{HOSF} = 4$   
(something between 1 and 10)

Then loss for a stolen election is  
 $100\% * \text{HOSF} = 400\%$ .

Expected loss

= expected % voters disenfranchised by fraud

=  $\text{Prob}(\text{Adv steals election})$

\*  $100\%$  \*  $\text{HOSF}$

=  $400\% * \text{Prob}(\text{Adv steals election})$



## Prob(Adv steals election)

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Prob(Adv steals election)} = & \\ & \text{Prob(election is close enough)} * \\ & \text{Prob(Adv attacks voting system)} * \\ & \text{Prob(attack succeeds)}\end{aligned}$$



## How often are elections “close”?


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Empirically  $\text{Prob}(\text{MOV} \leq x\%) = x\%$ .

2008 Congressional election data:



## How often are elections “close enough” for fraud?

Suppose UOCAVA votes are 1.5% of total.

If security were truly terrible, and Adv controlled all cast UOCAVA votes, then Adv could steal election 1.5% of the time (when  $\text{MOV} \leq 1.5\%$ ), by casting all UOCAVA votes for his candidate, who would otherwise lose.

So, in this example,

**Prob(election is close enough) = 1.5%**



# Will Adversary attack voting system?

Is the Pope Catholic?

Will someone pick up \$20 left on sidewalk?

There is **nothing to deter attacker** – Adv can attack anonymously over the Internet until he succeeds.

Do you know of any computer systems that have never been attacked?

**$\text{Prob}(\text{Adv will attack voting system}) = 100\%$**





Some may say “Adversary won’t attack”



## Will Adv succeed in attack?

Would you even know?

If there are no audits, no one will be the wiser, and he can continue successful attack method in each election.

Days are past for IIB election management.

(IIB = Ignorance Is Bliss)

(Also known as WIDKWHM policy.)



## Will Adv succeed in attack?

Large institutions (banks, Google) are successfully attacked all the time. They have much better staff and budgets!

Bob Morris (NSA) said: “You will always underestimate the effort the enemy will make to break your system.”

A bigger attack than you expected!




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(They lost.)

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We do not currently have the technology to make internet voting secure (and may never).

We can't make such technology appear by wishful thinking, just trying hard, making analogies with other fields, or running pilots.

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$\text{Prob}(\text{Adv succeeds}) = 100\%$





## Expected loss

Expected loss

$$\begin{aligned} &= 400\% * \text{Prob}(\text{Adv steals election}) \\ &= 400\% * \text{Prob}(\text{election close}) \\ &\quad * \text{Prob}(\text{Adv attacks}) \\ &\quad * \text{Prob}(\text{attack succeeds}) \\ &= 400\% * 1.5\% * 100\% * 100\% \\ &= 6\% \end{aligned}$$

# What's the net benefit or loss?

Net benefit

= 1% gain

—

6% loss

= - 5% net loss

One step forward, six steps backward.

## Risk Assessment Conclusion

Based on this risk assessment, we expect Internet voting for UOCAVA voters to **disenfranchise many more voters than it would franchise.**

The apparent gains in franchise for internet voting are **misleading and illusory—the apparent gains are more than cancelled by the risks.**

Argument is robust — conclusion remains the same even if numbers are varied significantly. In addition, there may be a DDOS attack with probability near 100%.



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Ben says firmly,  
“A government election is something you don’t want to do over the Internet.”



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(Just too risky!)

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**Friends don’t let friends drive drunk!**









# The End



## What about “end-to-end” internet voting?

An “end-to-end” voting system provides additional auditing capabilities for voters and others to detect when the election has “gone awry.”

Without paper ballots, an E2E voting system doesn’t provide much in the way of a **recovery mechanism** to determine and restore the correct election outcome once a problem is detected.

