# The ZKProof Process Towards Standardising Zero-Knowledge



Mary Maller, Ethereum Foundation and PQShield, NIST STPPA 25 July 2023

### Physical

- Handwritten signature
- Sealed envelope
- Ballot box
- Identity badge
- Cash

# Digital

- Digital Signature
- Encrypted message
- E-Voting scheme
- Credential system
- Digital account

### Physical

- Handwritten signature
- Sealed envelope
- Ballot box
- Identity badge
- Cash



## Digital

- Digital Signature
- Encrypted message
- E-Voting scheme
- Credential system
- Digital account



### Physical

- Handwritten signature
- Sealed envelope
- Ballot box
- Identity badge
- Cash
- Lie detector



## Digital

- Digital Signature
- Encrypted message
- E-Voting scheme
- Credential system
- Digital account
- Zero-Knowledge proof

Arguably more secure

- Everything I say in zero-knowledge is true.
- I can choose to say nothing at all.
- Everything I do not say is perfectly hidden.



#### Verifiable FHE

### Verifiable mixnets

Verifiable outsourced computation

> Verifiable formal verification

> Attested sensors

Scalable blockchains

### Applications

Scalability:

- We do not want to redo a large computation.
- We care about the outcome being correct.
- We might not even have the original data in full.



Actively secure MPC

Random beacons

Range proofs

Membership proofs

Blind signatures

Code based digital signatures

### Applications

Building block:

- Generally a useful building block for other cryptographic primitives.
- A hammer when you can't think of anything smarter.



### Privacy:

- There is information that must be kept private.
- E.g. whistleblower can say they are an employee without revealing identity.

### Applications

Secret information games

Anonymous cryptocurrency

Whistleblowers

Compliant closed source algorithms

> Anonymous credentials

Solvency proofs



Scalability and Privacy:

- We want to prove a large computation is done correctly.
- We also want to keep some inputs private.

### Applications

Machine learning checks and balances

Blocklists

Storage proofs

Captcha

Persistent pseudonyms

Proof of exploits







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### Applications

#### Vast

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Persistent pseudonyms

Proof of exploits


















- Arithmetise
- Optimise
- Polynomial-ise
- Cryptographically Compile
- Deterministic-ify

Non-Interactive	$\overline{}$
Proof	




- Arithmetise: ullet
  - Define the language. ullet
  - What can people say or not say? ullet
  - How must they say it? •



Customisable Constraint System

- Arithmetise
- Optimise:
  - Humans write constraints badly. lacksquare
  - Programs can optimise human written constraints.
  - Require that the original meaning is not lost.
  - Optimiser inherently tied to constraint system.






•	Arithm	etise

- Optimise
- Polynomial-ise:
  - Information theoretically secure proving  $\bullet$ system.
  - Different proving systems target ulletdifferent constraint systems.
  - This is where the hard mathematics is.  $\bullet$








- Arithmetise
- Optimise
- Polynomial-ise
- Cryptographically Compile:
  - Use a polynomial commitment scheme.
  - Independent from the proving system.
  - Determines many features:
    - Hardness assumption
    - Efficiency
    - Trusted setup
    - Proof size






- Arithmetise
- Optimise
- Polynomial-ise
- Cryptographically Compile
- Deterministic-ify:
  - Replace true randomness with hashes.
  - Assumes hash functions behave like random oracles.

Non-Interactive Proof




### Implementations





- Implementations target different lacksquarelayers of the system.
- Some are more advanced than  $\bullet$ others.
- ZK is used in production for specific lacksquarestatements.
- ZK is quite fast! And getting faster. •
- Currently it requires expert  $\bullet$ knowledge to "talk in zk".







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



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
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



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




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
### The digital language of truth

Can only say verifiable statements





### **Complexity of Cryptographic Primitives**







- ulletcommunity-driven trust ecosystem.
- ulletadvanced enough for standards.
- I joined the editorial team in 2021.  $\bullet$
- ullet





Global movement to standardise and mainstream advanced cryptography by building a


Formed in 2018 after top researchers and developers saw technology becoming

We expect this to be a long process as the community jointly learn best practices.


Standards



Standards



- Working groups write specifications for different proving systems.
- Michele Orru is leading a working group on the Fiat-Shamir compiler.
- I am part of a working group targeting the Plonkish constraint system.
- We're open to submitting specifications to e.g. IETF once complete with community backing.






Proof

#### Community

- Yearly in person ZKProof events.
- Active working groups present results.
- People can propose formation of a new working groups.
- Presentations on applications and research in zero-knowledge.
- Discuss what is and is not working organisationally.





### Education

- Maintain a community reference document to comprehend terminology, examples, explanations and recommendations.
- Maintain a list of recommended educational resources for people looking to learn about zero-knowledge.



### **ZKProof Community Reference**

Version 0.3

July 17, 2022

This document is a work in progress.

Feedback and contributions are welcome.

Find the latest version at https://zkproof.org.

Send your comments to editors@zkproof.org.



### **Recent Advances**

### Folding Schemes

#### HyperNova: Recursive arguments for customizable constraint systems

Abhiram Kothapalli $^{\dagger}$ 

Srinath Setty<sup> $\star$ </sup>

<sup>†</sup>Carnegie Mellon University

\*Microsoft Research

**PROTOSTAR:** Generic Efficient Accumulation/Folding for Special-sound Protocols

> Benedikt Bünz Stanford University, Espresso Systems

Binyi Chen Espresso Systems

July 13, 2023

• A proof of a proof of a proof of a proof is faster than just one big proof.

### **Recent Advances**

#### **Experimenting with Collaborative zk-SNARKs: Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Distributed Secrets**

Alex Ozdemir Dan Boneh {aozdemir,dabo}@cs.stanford.edu

#### **EOS: Efficient Private Delegation of zkSNARK Provers**

Alessandro Chiesa UC Berkeley & EPFL Ryan Lehmkuhl  $MIT^*$ 

Sanjam Garg<sup>1</sup>, Aarushi Goel<sup>2</sup>, Abhishek Jain<sup>3</sup>, Guru-Vamsi Policharla<sup>4</sup>, and Sruthi Sekar<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup>UC Berkeley and NTT Research, sanjamg@berkeley.edu <sup>2</sup>NTT Research, aarushi.goel@ntt-research.com <sup>3</sup>Johns Hopkins University, abhishek@cs.jhu.edu <sup>4</sup>UC Berkeley, {guruvamsip, sruthi}@berkeley.edu

### **Distributed** Provers

Pratyush Mishra Aleo & University of Pennsylvania<sup>T</sup> Yinuo Zhang UC Berkeley

#### zkSaaS: Zero-Knowledge SNARKs as a Service

- ZK provers can be  $\bullet$ expensive.
- We can outsource their  $\bullet$ generation to parallel processors.
- We can distribute any ulletprivate data.

### **Recent Advances**

- Lookup tables contain precomputed information. lacksquare
- They are useful in traditional computing languages.
- They are also useful in zk computing languages.

#### Lookup Arguments

#### q:\* Cached quotients for fast lookups

Liam Eagen Blockstream

Dario Fiore IMDEA software institute


Ariel Gabizon Zeta Function Technologies

January 8, 2023

Caulk: Lookup Arguments in Sublinear Time

Arantxa Zapico<sup>\*1</sup>, Vitalik Buterin<sup>2</sup>, Dmitry Khovratovich<sup>2</sup>, Mary Maller<sup>2</sup>, Anca Nitulescu<sup>3</sup>, and Mark Simkin<sup>2</sup>

> <sup>1</sup> Universitat Pompeu Fabra<sup>†</sup> <sup>2</sup> Ethereum Foundation<sup>‡</sup> <sup>3</sup> Protocol Labs<sup>§</sup>



- established proving systems.
- what is seen as highly experimental technology.
- Zero-knowledge is so useful that many startups are taking the risk anyway. •
- The more support we receive, the better our chances of success. •

Thank-you for listening!

### **Final Remarks**

I personally believe we are ready now to write formal specifications for popular and

Without the standards in place, it is difficult for larger companies to justify the risk of