



*Operating System*

# Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider

**FIPS 140-1 Documentation: Security Policy**

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## **Abstract**

This document specifies the security policy for the Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) as described in FIPS PUB 140-1.

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## INTRODUCTION

The Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) is a FIPS 140-1 Level 1 compliant, software-based, cryptographic service provider. Like other cryptographic providers that ship with Microsoft Windows XP, RSAENH encapsulates several different cryptographic algorithms in an easy-to-use cryptographic module accessible via the Microsoft CryptoAPI. Software developers can dynamically link the Microsoft RSAENH module into their applications to provide FIPS 140-1 compliant cryptographic support.

Windows XP does not ship the previously FIPS-140-1 validated Microsoft Base Cryptographic Provider (RSABASE) anymore. There is no loss of functionality as the RSAENH functionality has always been a subset of the RSABASE functionality.

Additionally, the Windows XP SP1 and XP SP2 operating systems ship a validated Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH).

### **Cryptographic Boundary**

The Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider (RSAENH) consists of a single dynamically-linked library (DLL) named RSAENH.DLL. The cryptographic boundary for RSAENH is defined as the enclosure of the computer system on which the cryptographic module is to be executed. The physical configuration of the module, as defined in FIPS PUB 140-1, is Multi-Chip Standalone. It should be noted that the Data Protection API of Microsoft Windows XP is not part of the module and should be considered to be outside the boundary.

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## SECURITY POLICY

RSAENH operates under several rules that encapsulate its security policy.

- RSAENH is supported on Windows XP, XP SP1 and XP SP2.
- RSAENH provides no user authentication; however, it relies on Microsoft Windows XP for the authentication of users.
- RSAENH enforces a single role, Authenticated User, which is a combination of the User and Cryptographic Officer roles as defined in FIPS PUB 140-1.
- All users authenticated by Microsoft Windows XP employ the Authenticated User role.
- All the services provided by the RSAENH DLL are available to the Authenticated User role.
- Keys created within RSAENH by one user are not accessible to any other user via RSAENH.
- RSAENH stores keys in the file system, but relies upon Microsoft Windows XP for the encryption of the keys prior to storage.
- RSAENH supports the following FIPS-approved algorithms: AES, DES, 3DES, HMAC-SHA-1, SHA-1, and RSA; and RSAENH provides the required self-tests for these FIPS-approved algorithms.
- RSAENH supports the following non-FIPS approved algorithms: RC4, RC2, and MD5<sup>1</sup>; and though these algorithms may not be used when operating the module in a FIPS compliant manner, the module provides power-up self-tests to provide extra security for non FIPS users.

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<sup>1</sup> Applications may not use any of these non-FIPS algorithms if they need to be FIPS compliant. To operate the module in a FIPS compliant manner, applications must only use FIPS-approved algorithms.

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## **SPECIFICATION OF ROLES**

RSAENH combines the User and Cryptographic Officer roles (as defined in FIPS PUB 140-1) into a single role called the Authenticated User role. The Authenticated User may access all the services implemented in the cryptographic module.

When an application requests the crypto module to generate keys for a user, the keys are generated, used, and deleted as requested by applications. There are no implicit keys associated with a user, and each user may have numerous keys, both signature and key exchange, and these keys are separate from other users' keys.

### **Maintenance Roles**

Maintenance roles are not supported by RSAENH.

### **Multiple Concurrent Operators**

RSAENH is intended to run on Windows XP, Windows XP SP1 and Windows XP SP2 in Single User Mode. When run in this configuration, multiple concurrent operators are not supported.

Because the module is a DLL, each process requesting access is provided its own instance of the module. As such, each process has full access to all information and keys within the module. Note that no keys or other information are maintained upon detachment from the DLL, thus an instantiation of the module will only contain keys or information that the process has placed in the module.

### **Data Access**

Because an operator acting in the Authenticated User role is provided a separate instance of the module (a separate instantiation of the DLL), the Authenticated User role has complete access to all of the security data items within the module.

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## SPECIFICATION OF SERVICES

The following list contains all services available to an operator. All services are accessible by all Authenticated Users, the one and only role supported by RSAENH.

### Key Storage Services

The following functions provide interfaces to the cryptomodule's key container functions. Please see the Key Storage description under the Cryptographic Key Management section for more information.

#### **CryptAcquireContext**

The CryptAcquireContext function is used to acquire a programmatic context handle to a particular key container via a particular cryptographic service provider (CSP). This returned handle can then be used to make calls to the selected CSP. Any subsequent calls to a cryptographic function need to reference the acquired context handle.

This function performs two operations. It first attempts to find a CSP with the characteristics described in the *dwProvType* and *pszProvider* parameters. If the CSP is found, the function attempts to find a key container matching the name specified by the *pszContainer* parameter.

With the appropriate setting of *dwFlags*, this function can also create and destroy key containers.

If *dwFlags* is set to CRYPT\_NEWKEYSET, a new key container is created with the name specified by *pszContainer*. If *pszContainer* is NULL, a key container with the default name is created.

If *dwFlags* is set to CRYPT\_DELETEKEYSET, The key container specified by *pszContainer* is deleted. If *pszContainer* is NULL, the key container with the default name is deleted. All key pairs in the key container are also destroyed and memory is zeroized.

When this flag is set, the value returned in *phProv* is undefined, and thus, the CryptReleaseContext function need not be called afterwards.

#### **CryptGetProvParam**

The CryptGetProvParam function retrieves data that governs the operations of the provider. This function may be used to enumerate key containers, enumerate supported algorithms, and generally determine capabilities of the CSP.

#### **CryptSetProvParam**

The CryptSetProvParam function customizes various aspects of a provider's operations. This function is may be used to set a security descriptor on a key container.

#### **CryptReleaseContext**

The CryptReleaseContext function releases the handle referenced by the *hProv* parameter. After a provider handle has been released, it becomes invalid and cannot be used again. In addition, key and hash handles associated with that provider handle may not be used after CryptReleaseContext has been called.

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## Key Generation and Exchange Services

The following functions provide interfaces to the cryptomodule's key generation and exchange functions.

### **CryptDeriveKey**

The CryptDeriveKey function creates cryptographic session keys from a hash value. This function guarantees that when the same CSP and algorithms are used, the keys created from the same hash value are identical. The hash value is typically a cryptographic hash (SHA-1 must be used when operating in FIPS-mode) of a password or similar secret user data.

This function is the same as CryptGenKey, except that the generated session keys are created from the hash value instead of being random and CryptDeriveKey can only be used to create session keys. This function cannot be used to create public/private key pairs.

If keys are being derived from a CALG\_SCHANNEL\_MASTER\_HASH, then the appropriate key derivation process is used to derive the key. In this case the process used is from either the SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, PCT or TLS specification of deriving client and server side encryption and MAC keys. This function will cause the key block to be derived from the master secret and the requested key is then derived from the key block. Which process is used is determined by which protocol is associated with the hash object. For more information see the SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, PCT and TLS specifications.

### **CryptDestroyKey**

The CryptDestroyKey function releases the handle referenced by the *hKey* parameter. After a key handle has been released, it becomes invalid and cannot be used again.

If the handle refers to a session key, or to a public key that has been imported into the CSP through CryptImportKey, this function zeroizes the key in memory and frees the memory that the key occupied. The underlying public/private key pair (which resides outside the crypto module) is not destroyed by this function. Only the handle is destroyed.

### **CryptExportKey**

The CryptExportKey function exports cryptographic keys from a cryptographic service provider (CSP) in a secure manner for key archival purposes.

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A handle to a private RSA key to be exported may be passed to the function, and the function returns a key blob. This private key blob can be sent over a nonsecure transport or stored in a nonsecure storage location. The private key blob is useless until the intended recipient uses the `CryptImportKey` function on it to import the key into the recipient's CSP. Key blobs are exported either in plaintext or encrypted with a symmetric key. If a symmetric key is used to encrypt the blob then a handle to the private RSA key is passed in to the module and the symmetric key referenced by the handle is used to encrypt the blob. Any of the supported symmetric cryptographic algorithm's may be used to encrypt the private key blob (DES, 3DES, RC4 or RC2<sup>2</sup>).

Public RSA keys are also exported using this function. A handle to the RSA public key is passed to the function and the public key is exported, always in plaintext as a blob. This blob may then be imported using the `CryptImportKey` function.

Symmetric keys may also be exported encrypted with an RSA key using the `CryptExportKey` function. A handle to the symmetric key and a handle to the public RSA key to encrypt with are passed to the function. The function returns a blob (SIMPLEBLOB) which is the encrypted symmetric key.

Symmetric keys may also be exported by wrapping the keys with another symmetric key. The wrapped key is then exported as a blob and may be imported using the `CryptImportKey` function.

### **CryptGenKey**

The `CryptGenKey` function generates a random cryptographic key. A handle to the key is returned in *phKey*. This handle can then be used as needed with any CryptoAPI function requiring a key handle.

The calling application must specify the algorithm when calling this function. Because this algorithm type is kept bundled with the key, the application does not need to specify the algorithm later when the actual cryptographic operations are performed.

### **CryptGenRandom**

The `CryptGenRandom` function fills a buffer with random bytes. The random number generation algorithm is the SHS based RNG from FIPS 186. During the function initialization, a seed, to which SHA-1 is applied to create the output random, is created based on the collection of all the data listed in the Miscellaneous section.

### **CryptGetKeyParam**

The `CryptGetKeyParam` function retrieves data that governs the operations of a key.

### **CryptGetUserKey**

The `CryptGetUserKey` function retrieves a handle of one of a user's public/private key pairs.

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<sup>2</sup> Note that RC2 and RC4 may not be used while operating RSAENH in a FIPS compliant manner.

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### **CryptImportKey**

The CryptImportKey function transfers a cryptographic key from a key blob into a cryptographic service provider (CSP).

Private keys may be imported as blobs and the function will return a handle to the imported key.

A symmetric key encrypted with an RSA public key is imported into the CryptImportKey function. The function uses the RSA private key exchange key to decrypt the blob and returns a handle to the symmetric key.

Symmetric keys wrapped with other symmetric keys may also be imported using this function. The wrapped key blob is passed in along with a handle to a symmetric key, which the module is supposed to use to unwrap the blob. If the function is successful then a handle to the unwrapped symmetric key is returned.

The CryptImportKey function recognizes a new flag CRYPT\_IPSEC\_HMAC\_KEY. The flag allows the caller to supply the HMAC key material of size greater than 16 bytes. Without the CRYPT\_IPSEC\_HMAC\_KEY flag, the CryptImportKey function would fail with NTE\_BAD\_DATA if the caller supplies the HMAC key material of size greater 16 bytes. For importing a HMAC key, the caller should identify the imported key blob as the PLAINTEXTKEYBLOB type and use CALG\_RC2 as the key Algorithm identifier.

### **CryptSetKeyParam**

The CryptSetKeyParam function customizes various aspects of a key's operations. This function is used to set session-specific values for symmetric keys.

### **CryptDuplicateKey**

The CryptDuplicateKey function is used to duplicate, make a copy of, the state of a key and returns a handle to this new key. The CryptDestroyKey function must be used on both the handle to the original key and the newly duplicated key.

## **Data Encryption and Decryption Services**

The following functions provide interfaces to the cryptomodule's data encryption and decryption functions.

### **CryptDecrypt**

The CryptDecrypt function decrypts data previously encrypted using CryptEncrypt function.

### **CryptEncrypt**

The CryptEncrypt function encrypts data. The algorithm used to encrypt the data is designated by the key held by the CSP module and is referenced by the hKey parameter.

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## Hashing and Digital Signature Services

The following functions provide interfaces to the cryptomodule's hashing and digital signature functions.

### **CryptCreateHash**

The `CryptCreateHash` function initiates the hashing of a stream of data. It returns to the calling application a handle to a CSP hash object. This handle is used in subsequent calls to `CryptHashData` and `CryptHashSessionKey` in order to hash streams of data and session keys. SHA-1 and MD5 are the cryptographic hashing algorithms supported. In addition, a MAC using a symmetric key is created with this call and may be used with any of the symmetric block ciphers support by the module (DES, 3DES, RC4 or RC2). For creating a HMAC hash value, the caller specifies the `CALG_HMAC` flag in the `AlgId` parameter, and the HMAC key using a `hKey` handle obtained from calling `CryptImportKey`.

A `CALG_SCHANNEL_MASTER_HASH` may be created with this call. If this is the case then a handle to one of the following types of keys must be passed in the `hKey` parameter, `CALG_SSL2_MASTER`, `CALG_SSL3_MASTER`, `CALG_PCT1_MASTER`, or `CALG_TLS1_MASTER`. This function with `CALG_SCHANNEL_MASTER_HASH` in the `ALGID` parameter will cause the derivation of the master secret from the pre-master secret associated with the passed in key handle. This key derivation process is done in the method specified in the appropriate protocol specification, SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, PCT 1.0, or TLS. The master secret is then associated with the resulting hash handle and session keys and MAC keys may be derived from this hash handle. The master secret may not be exported or imported from the module. The key data associated with the hash handle is zeroized when `CryptDestroyHash` is called.

### **CryptDestroyHash**

The `CryptDestroyHash` function destroys the hash object referenced by the `hHash` parameter. After a hash object has been destroyed, it can no longer be used. When a hash object is destroyed, the crypto module zeroizes the memory within the module where the hash object was held. The memory is then freed.

If the hash handle references a `CALG_SCHANNEL_MASTER_HASH` key then, when `CryptDestroyHash` is called, the associated key material is zeroized also.

All hash objects should be destroyed with the `CryptDestroyHash` function when the application is finished with them.

### **CryptGetHashParam**

The `CryptGetHashParam` function retrieves data that governs the operations of a hash object. The actual hash value can also be retrieved by using this function.

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### **CryptHashData**

The CryptHashData function adds data to a specified hash object. This function and CryptHashSessionKey can be called multiple times to compute the hash on long data streams or discontinuous data streams. Before calling this function, the CryptCreateHash function must be called to create a handle of a hash object.

### **CryptHashSessionKey**

The CryptHashSessionKey function computes the cryptographic hash of a key object. This function can be called multiple times with the same hash handle to compute the hash of multiple keys. Calls to CryptHashSessionKey can be interspersed with calls to CryptHashData. Before calling this function, the CryptCreateHash function must be called to create the handle of a hash object.

### **CryptSetHashParam**

The CryptSetHashParam function customizes the operations of a hash object. For creating a HMAC hash associated with a hash object identified the hHash handle, the caller uses the CryptSetHashParam function with the HP\_HMAC\_INFO flag to specify the necessary SHA-1 algorithm using the CALG\_SHA1 flag in the input HMAC\_INFO structure. There is no need for the caller to specify the HMAC inner or outer strings as the CSP is using the inner and outer string values as documented in the Draft FIPS for HMAC as its default values.

### **CryptSignHash**

The CryptSignHash function signs data. Because all signature algorithms are asymmetric and thus slow, the CryptoAPI does not allow data be signed directly. Instead, data is first hashed and CryptSignHash is used to sign the hash. The crypto module supports signing with RSA. The X9.31 format may be specified by a flag.

### **CryptVerifySignature**

The CryptVerifySignature function verifies the signature of a hash object. Before calling this function, the CryptCreateHash function must be called to create the handle of a hash object. CryptHashData or CryptHashSessionKey is then used to add data or session keys to the hash object. The crypto module supports verifying RSA signatures. The X9.31 format may be specified by a flag.

After this function has been completed, only CryptDestroyHash can be called using the hHash handle.

### **CryptDuplicateHash**

The CryptDuplicateHash function is used to duplicate, make a copy of, the state of a hash and returns a handle to this new hash. The CryptDestroyHash function must be used on both the handle to the original hash and the newly duplicated hash.

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## **CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT**

The RSAENH cryptomodule manages keys in the following manner.

### **Key Material**

RSAENH can create and use keys for the following algorithms: RSA Signature, RSA Key Exchange, RC2, RC4, DES, 3DES, and AES. Each time an application links with RSAENH, the DLL is instantiated and no keys exist within. The user application is responsible for importing keys into RSAENH or using RSAENH's functions to generate keys.

See MSDN Library\Platform SDK\Windows Base Services\Security\CryptoAPI 2.0\CryptoAPI Reference\CryptoAPI Structures\Cryptography Structures for more information about key formats and structures.

### **Key Generation**

Random keys can be generated by calling the `CryptGenKey()` function. Keys can also be created from known values via the `CryptDeriveKey()` function. DES, 3DES, and AES keys are generated following the techniques given in FIPS PUB 186-2, Appendix 3, Random Number Generation.

See MSDN Library\Platform SDK\Windows Base Services\Security\CryptoAPI 2.0\CryptoAPI Reference\CryptoAPI Functions\Base Cryptography Functions\Key Generation and Exchange Functions for more information.

### **Key Entry and Output**

Keys can be both exported and imported out of and into RSAENH via `CryptExportKey()` and `CryptImportKey()`. Exported private keys may be encrypted with a symmetric key passed into the `CryptExportKey` function. Any of the symmetric algorithms supported by the crypto module may be used to encrypt private keys for export (AES, DES, 3DES, RC4 or RC2). When private keys are generated or imported from archival, they are covered with the Microsoft Windows XP Data Protection API (DPAPI) and then outputted to the file system in the covered form.

Symmetric key entry and output is done by exchanging keys using the recipient's asymmetric public key. Symmetric key entry and output may also be done by exporting a symmetric key wrapped with another symmetric key.

See MSDN Library\Platform SDK\Windows Base Services\Security\CryptoAPI 2.0\CryptoAPI Reference\CryptoAPI Functions\Base Cryptography Functions\Key Generation and Exchange Functions for more information.

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## Key Storage

RSAENH does not provide persistent storage of keys. While, it is possible to store keys in the file system, this functionality is outside the scope of this validation. The task of protecting (or encrypting) the keys prior to storage in the file system is delegated to the Data Protection API (DPAPI) of Microsoft Windows XP. The DPAPI is a separate component of the operating system that is outside the boundaries of the cryptomodule but relies upon RSAENH for all cryptographic functionality. This section describes this functionality for information purposes only.

When a key container is deleted, the file is zeroized before being deleted. RSAENH offloads the key storage operations to the Microsoft Windows XP operating system, which is outside the cryptographic boundary. Because keys are not persistently stored inside the cryptographic module, private keys are instead encrypted by the Microsoft Data Protection API (DPAPI) service and stored in the Microsoft Windows XP file system. Keys are zeroized from memory after use. As an exception, the key used for power up self-testing is stored in the cryptographic module.

When an Authenticated User requests a keyed cryptographic operation from RSAENH his/her keys are retrieved from the file system.

If the MasterKeyLegacyCompliance registry key value is set to the non-default non-zero value, Windows XP DPAPI uses a two-phase algorithm for encrypting the Secret Key (SK) used to encrypt data. Therefore in the local user case of the MasterKeyLegacyCompliance mode, the SK is protected by a local LSA secret. SYSKEY should be enabled to prevent access to this key. Refer to NT4/win2k documentation for info on SYSKEY. If there is a Windows 2000 Domain Controller associated with the user, then Phase 2 occurs by default regardless of the MasterKeyLegacyCompliance.

### MasterKeyLegacyCompliance Phase 1: Local Agent

In the first phase, the system encrypts the secret locally, relying on the service run as Local System to protect secrets. This protection encrypts the data both as it travels on the wire and also blinds the data from the DC. Thus, the encryption ensures that no remote user (even a "phase 2" remote recovery agent) can decrypt the data independent from the local system.

### MasterKeyLegacyCompliance Recovery setup

1. Agent has data D1 to encrypt
2. Agent uses secret key SK encrypt D1
3. Agent stores SK in the user hive ACLed to local agent
4. Agent has encrypted E{D1}

### MasterKeyLegacyCompliance Initiate recovery

1. Agent has E{D1} to decrypt
2. Agent retrieves secret key SK from user hive
3. Agent uses secret key SK to decrypt E{D1}

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#### 4. Agent has unencrypted D1

##### Phase 2: Remote Agent

In the second phase, the encrypted secret is sent from the networked Windows XP machine to a Windows 2000 domain controller (DC) for an identification stamp and second encryption, if another Windows DC which is more version-compatible with the Windows XP machine is not available. This second encryption will ensure that a roaming user profile is not self-contained, but needs an interactive logon to successfully recover the master key.

Recovery setup with the cooperation of a Windows 2000 DC

5. User sends data D2 to remote agent
6. Agent uses secret monster key K, random R2, HMACs to derive SymKeyM.
7. Use SymKeyM to MAC {userid, D2} -> m{userid, D2}
8. Agent uses secret monster key K, random R3, HMACs to derive SymKeyK.
9. Use SymKeyK to encrypt { m{userid, D2} , R2 }
10. Agent returns recovery field E{ m{userid, D2}, R2 }, R3 to User
11. User stores recovery field E{ m{userid, D2}, R2 }, R3

Initiate recovery with the cooperation of a Windows 2000 DC

5. User sends recovery field E{ m{userid, D2}, R2 }, R3 to remote agent
6. Agent uses secret monster key K, HMACs with R3 to re-derive SymKeyK.
7. SymKeyK used to decrypt m{userid, D2}, R2
8. Agent uses secret monster key K, HMACs with R2 to re-derive SymKeyM.
9. SymKeyM used to check MAC on {userid, D2}.
10. Agent returns D2 if userid matches current recovery requestor.

These phases can be nested such that  $D2 = E\{D1\}$ , which allows neither of the agents to recover the data barring collusion.

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By default, Windows XP DPAPI does not run in the MasterKeyLegacyCompliance mode. The Windows XP SK protection does not depend on a LSA secret. As in the case Windows 2000 DPAPI, Windows XP DPAPI uses a hash of the user's logon password to protect the SK. Windows XP has the local user account logon password backup and recovery support to address the unlikely situation where the user forgets his/her password and therefore is unable to gain access to the SK. The Windows XP local user account logon password backup and recovery support allows a local user to use a public key to encrypt the user's logon password hash. The private key corresponding to the public key is stored off-line on a floppy disk in a physically secure manner. During the logon password recovery, Windows XP uses the private key to recover the forgotten password and the SK, while asking the user to supply a new password for logon password resetting and re-encrypting the SK.

### **Key Archival**

RSAENH does not directly archive cryptographic keys. The Authenticated User may choose to export a cryptographic key labeled as exportable (cf. "Key Input and Output" above), but management of the secure archival of that key is the responsibility of the user.

### **Key Destruction**

All keys are destroyed and their memory location zeroized when the Authenticated User calls CryptDestroyKey on that key handle. Private keys that reside outside the cryptographic boundary (ones stored by the operating system in encrypted format in the Windows XP DPAPI system portion of the OS) are destroyed when the Authenticated User calls CryptAcquireContext with the CRYPT\_DELETE\_KEYSET flag.

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## SELF-TESTS

RSAENH provides all of the FIPS 140-1 required self-tests. As required, the module performs some of its self-tests upon power up and other self-tests upon encountering a specific condition (key pair or random number generation). Note that RSAENH also provides self-tests for non-FIPS approved algorithms, and though not required, RSAENH provides these tests for extra security. Finally, it should be noted that non-FIPS approved algorithms should not be used if operating RSAENH in a FIPS compliant manner.

### Power-up

The following FIPS-approved algorithm tests are initiated upon power-up

- AES 128 ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- AES 192 ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- AES 256 ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- AES 128 CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- AES 192 CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- AES 256 CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- DES ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- DES CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- 3DES ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- 3DES CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- 3DES 112 ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- 3DES 112 CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- SHA-1 hash KAT
- SHA-1 HMAC hash KAT
- RSA sign/verify power up test
- Software integrity test via DESMAC checksum of DLL image

The following non-FIPS approved algorithms power-up tests include (may not be used in FIPS-mode)

- RC4 encrypt/decrypt KAT
- RC2 CBC encrypt/decrypt KAT
- RC2 ECB encrypt/decrypt KAT
- MD5 hash KAT

### Conditional

The following are initiated at key generation and random number generation respectively:

- RSA pairwise consistency test
- Continuous random number generator test

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## MISCELLANEOUS

The following items address requirements not addressed above.

### **Cryptographic Bypass**

A cryptographic bypass is not supported in RSAENH.

### **Operator Authentication**

RSAENH provides no authentication of operators. However, the Microsoft Windows XP, Windows XP SP1 and Windows XP SP2 operating system upon which it runs does provide authentication, but this is outside of the scope of RSAENH's FIPS validation. The information about the authentication provided by Microsoft Windows XP is for informational purposes only. Microsoft Windows XP requires authentication from a trusted computer base (TCB<sup>3</sup>) before a user is able to access system services. Once a user is authenticated from the TCB, a process is created bearing the Authenticated User's security token. All subsequent processes and threads created by that Authenticated User are implicitly assigned the parent's (thus the Authenticated User's) security token. Every user that has been authenticated by Microsoft Windows XP is naturally assigned the Authenticated User role when he/she accesses RSAENH.

### **ModularExpOffload**

The ModularExpOffload function offloads modular exponentiation from a CSP to a hardware accelerator. The CSP will check in the registry for the value HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Cryptography\ExpoOffload that can be the name of a DLL. The CSP uses LoadLibrary to load that DLL and calls GetProcAddress to get the OffloadModExpo entry point in the DLL specified in the registry. The CSP uses the entry point to perform all modular exponentiations for both public and private key operations. Two checks are made before a private key is offloaded. Note that to use RSAENH in a FIPS compliant manner, this function should only be used if the hardware accelerator is FIPS validated.

### **Operating System Security**

The RSAENH cryptomodule is intended to run on Windows XP, Windows XP Service Pack 1 and Windows XP Service Pack 2 in Single User Mode.

When an operating system process loads the cryptomodule into memory, the cryptomodule runs a DES MAC on the cryptomodule's disk image of RSAENH.DLL, excluding the DES MAC, checksum, and export signature resources. This MAC is compared to the value stored in the DES MAC resource. Initialization will only succeed if the two values are equal.

Each operating system process creates a unique instance of the cryptomodule that is wholly dedicated to that process. The cryptomodule is not shared between processes.

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<sup>3</sup> The TCB is the part of the operating system that is designed to meet the security functional requirements of the Controlled Access Protection Profile, which can be found at <[http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/protection\\_profiles/index.html](http://www.radium.ncsc.mil/tpep/library/protection_profiles/index.html)>. At this time, Windows XP has not been evaluated.

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Each process requesting access is provided its own instance of the module. As such, each process has full access to all information and keys within the module. Note that no keys or other information are maintained upon detachment from the DLL, thus an instantiation of the module will only contain keys or information that the process has placed in the module.

### **The Collection of Data Used to Create a Seed for Random Number**

To create a seed for its random number generator, RSAENH concatenates many different source of information. Each piece of information is concatenated together, and the resulting byte stream is hashed with SHA-1 to produce a 20-byte seed value that is used in generating random numbers (according to FIPS 186-2 appendix 3.1 with SHA-1 as the G function).

- The process ID of the current process requesting random data
- The thread ID of the current thread within the process requesting random data
- A 32bit tick count since the system boot
- The current local date and time
- The current system time of day information consisting of the boot time, current time, time zone bias, time zone ID, boot time bias, and sleep time bias
- The current hardware-platform-dependent high-resolution performance-counter value
- The information about the system's current usage of both physical and virtual memory, and page file
- The local disk information including the numbers of sectors per cluster, bytes per sector, free clusters, and clusters that are available to the user associated with the calling thread
- A hash of the environment block for the current process
- Some hardware CPU-specific cycle counters
- The system processor performance information consisting of Idle Process Time, Io Read Transfer Count, Io Write Transfer Count, Io Other Transfer Count, Io Read Operation Count, Io Write Operation Count, Io Other Operation Count, Available Pages, Committed Pages, Commit Limit, Peak Commitment, Page Fault Count, Copy On Write Count, Transition Count, Cache Transition Count, Demand Zero Count, Page Read Count, Page Read Io Count, Cache Read Count, Cache Io Count, Dirty Pages Write Count, Dirty Write Io Count, Mapped Pages Write Count, Mapped Write Io Count, Paged Pool Pages, Non Paged Pool Pages, Paged Pool Allocated space, Paged Pool Free space, Non Paged Pool Allocated space, Non Paged Pool Free space, Free System page table entry, Resident System Code Page, Total System Driver Pages, Total System Code Pages, Non Paged Pool Look aside Hits, Paged Pool Lookaside Hits, Available Paged Pool Pages, Resident System Cache Page, Resident Paged Pool Page, Resident System Driver Page, Cache manager Fast Read with No Wait, Cache manager Fast Read with Wait, Cache manager Fast Read Resource Missed, Cache manager Fast Read Not Possible, Cache manager Fast Memory Descriptor List Read with No Wait, Cache manager Fast Memory Descriptor List Read with Wait, Cache manager Fast Memory Descriptor List Read Resource Missed, Cache manager Fast Memory Descriptor List Read Not Possible, Cache manager Map Data with No Wait, Cache manager Map Data with Wait, Cache manager Map Data with No Wait Miss, Cache manager Map Data Wait Miss, Cache manager Pin-Mapped Data Count, Cache manager Pin-Read with No Wait, Cache manager Pin Read with Wait, Cache manager Pin-Read with No Wait Miss, Cache manager Pin-Read Wait Miss, Cache manager Copy-Read with No Wait, Cache manager Copy-

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Read with Wait, Cache manager Copy-Read with No Wait Miss, Cache manager Copy-Read with Wait Miss, Cache manager Memory Descriptor List Read with No Wait, Cache manager Memory Descriptor List Read with Wait, Cache manager Memory Descriptor List Read with No Wait Miss, Cache manager Memory Descriptor List Read with Wait Miss, Cache manager Read Ahead IOs, Cache manager Lazy-Write IOs, Cache manager Lazy-Write Pages, Cache manager Data Flushes, Cache manager Data Pages, Context Switches, First Level Translation buffer Fills, Second Level Translation buffer Fills, and System Calls

- The system exception information consisting of Alignment Fix up Count, Exception Dispatch Count, Floating Emulation Count, and Byte Word Emulation Count
- The system lookaside information consisting of Current Depth, Maximum Depth, Total Allocates, Allocate Misses, Total Frees, Free Misses, Type, Tag, and Size
- The system interrupt information consisting of context switches, deferred procedure call count, deferred procedure call rate, time increment, deferred procedure call bypass count, and asynchronous procedure call bypass count
- The system process information consisting of Next Entry Offset, Number Of Threads, Create Time, User Time, Kernel Time, Image Name, Base Priority, Unique Process ID, Inherited from Unique Process ID, Handle Count, Session ID, Page Directory Base, Peak Virtual Size, Virtual Size, Page Fault Count, Peak Working Set Size, Working Set Size, Quota Peak Paged Pool Usage, Quota Paged Pool Usage, Quota Peak Non Paged Pool Usage, Quota Non Paged Pool Usage, Page file Usage, Peak Page file Usage, Private Page Count, Read Operation Count, Write Operation Count, Other Operation Count, Read Transfer Count, Write Transfer Count, and Other Transfer Count

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## **FOR MORE INFORMATION**

For the latest information on Windows XP, Windows XP SP1 and Windows XP SP2, check out our World Wide Web site at <http://www.microsoft.com/windows>.