Non-proprietary Security Policy for

FIPS 140-2 Validation

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys) in
Microsoft Windows 10
Windows 10 Pro
Windows 10 Enterprise
Windows 10 Enterprise LTSB
Windows 10 Mobile
Windows Server 2016 Standard
Windows Server 2016 Datacenter
Windows Storage Server 2016
## Change History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Updated By</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>07 DEC 2016</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Tim Myers</td>
<td>First release to validators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 JAN 2017</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Tim Myers</td>
<td>Update based on CMVP comments</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 MAR 2018</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Mike Grimm</td>
<td>Update for build 10.0.14393.1770 (1SUB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 MAY 2018</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Iffat Qamar</td>
<td>Updated Bounded Modules, updated certs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6 AUG 2019</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.4</strong></td>
<td>Garrett Burk</td>
<td>Updates in response to comments</td>
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15 APPENDIX A – HOW TO VERIFY WINDOWS VERSIONS AND DIGITAL SIGNATURES

15.1 HOW TO VERIFY WINDOWS VERSIONS

15.2 HOW TO VERIFY WINDOWS DIGITAL SIGNATURES
1 Introduction

This document specifies the security policy for the Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (CNG.SYS) as described in FIPS PUB 140-2.

The Operational Environments (OEs) are:

1. Windows 10 Enterprise Anniversary Update (x86) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s - Intel Core i3 without AES-NI or PCLMULQDQ or SSSE 3
2. Windows 10 Enterprise Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 3 - Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
3. Windows 10 Enterprise Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 4 – Intel Core i5 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
4. Windows 10 Enterprise Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Microsoft Surface Book – Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
5. Windows 10 Enterprise Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Dell Precision Tower 5810MT - Intel Xeon with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
6. Windows 10 Enterprise Anniversary Update (x64) running on a HP Compaq Pro 6305 - AMD A4 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
7. Windows 10 Pro Anniversary Update (x86) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s - Intel Core i3 without AES-NI or PCLMULQDQ or SSSE 3
8. Windows 10 Pro Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 3 - Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
9. Windows 10 Pro Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Microsoft Surface Pro 4 - Intel Core i5 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
10. Windows 10 Pro Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Microsoft Surface Book - Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
11. Windows 10 Pro Anniversary Update (x64) running on a Dell Precision Tower 5810MT - Intel Xeon with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
12. Windows 10 Anniversary Update [consumer] running on a Microsoft Surface 3 - Intel Atom x7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
13. Windows 10 Anniversary Update (x86) [consumer] running on a Dell Inspiron 660s - Intel Core i3 without AES-NI or PCLMULQDQ or SSSE 3
14. Windows 10 Anniversary Update (x64) [consumer] running on a Dell XPS 8700 - Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
15. Windows 10 Enterprise LT Scalable Edition Update (x86) running on a Dell Inspiron 660s - Intel Core i3 without AES-NI or PCLMULQDQ or SSSE 3
16. Windows 10 Enterprise LT Scalable Edition Update (x64) running on a Dell Precision Tower 5810MT - Intel Xeon with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
17. Windows 10 Enterprise LT Scalable Edition Update (x64) running on a Dell XPS 8700 - Intel Core i7 with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
21. Windows Storage Server 2016 running on a Dell PowerEdge R630 Server - Intel Xeon with AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ and SSSE 3
22. Windows 10 Mobile Anniversary Update running on a Microsoft Lumia 950 - Qualcomm Snapdragon 808 (A57, A53) herein referred to as Windows 10 OEs.

Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is a FIPS 140-2 Level 1 compliant, general-purpose, software-based, cryptographic module residing at kernel mode level of the Windows operating system, specifically, the Windows 10 OEs. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library runs as a kernel mode export driver, and provides cryptographic services, through their documented interfaces, to Windows 10 OEs kernel components.

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library encapsulates several different cryptographic algorithms in an easy-to-use cryptographic module accessible via the Microsoft CNG (Cryptography, Next Generation) API. It also supports several cryptographic algorithms accessible via a FIPS function table request IRP (I/O request packet). Windows 10 OEs kernel mode components can use general-purpose FIPS 140-2 Level 1 compliant cryptography in Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

BitLocker and BitLocker to Go are a good example of usage of the Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library (CNG.SYS). In Figure 1 below, BitLocker functionality is contained in the Full Volume Encryption module (FVEVOL.SYS), which calls CNG.SYS for the actual cryptographic operations. FVEVOL.SYS does not implement any cryptographic operations in and of itself. BitLocker uses FVEVOL.SYS to encrypt/decrypt physical hard drives that are accessed via the MiniPort driver and Partition Manager. Similarly, BitLocker to Go uses FVEVOL.SYS to encrypt/decrypt USB storage devices that are accessed via the USBStor driver and Partition Manager. The FVEVOL.SYS usage of CNG.SYS cryptographic operations is the same for both BitLocker and BitLocker to Go encrypted volumes.

![Figure 1 The BitLocker Stack and Microsoft Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library](image-url)
1.1 List of Cryptographic Module Binary Executables
CNG.SYS – Versions 10.0.14393 and 10.0.14393.1770 for Windows 10 OEs

1.2 Version Info
10.0.14393.1770 for Windows 10 OEs
10.0.14393 for Windows 10 OEs

1.3 Brief Module Description
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is the kernel mode export driver for the Cryptography, Next Generation (CNG) API.

1.4 Validated Platforms
The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library component listed in Section 1.1 was validated using the machine configurations specified in the list of Windows 10 OEs.

1.5 Cryptographic Boundary
The software binary that comprises the cryptographic boundary for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is CNG.SYS. The crypto boundary is also defined by the enclosure of the computer system, on which Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is to be executed. The physical configuration of Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library, as defined in FIPS 140-2, is multi-chip standalone.

2 Security Policy
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library operates under several rules that encapsulate its security policy.

- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is supported on Windows 10 OEs.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library operates in FIPS mode of operation only when used with the FIPS approved version of the Windows OS Loader (winload) validated to FIPS 140-2 under Cert. #2932 or #3502 or Windows Resume (winresume) validated to FIPS 140-2 under Cert. #2933 or #3501 for Windows 10 OEs operating in FIPS mode.
- Windows 10 OEs are operating systems supporting a “single user” mode where there is only one interactive user during a logon session.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is only in its Approved mode of operation when Windows is booted normally, meaning Debug mode is disabled and Driver Signing enforcement is enabled.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library operates in its FIPS mode of operation by setting any one of the following DWORD registry values to 1:
  o HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\Enabled
  o HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy
  o HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\FipsAlgorithmPolicy\MDMEnabled
  o HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Policies\Microsoft\Cryptography\Configuration\Self TestAlgorithms
Changes to the FIPS mode registry setting do not take effect until the Windows OS has been rebooted. The registry security policy settings can be observed with the regedit tool to determine whether the module is in FIPS mode.

- Instead of editing the registry directly, the FIPS Local/Group Security Policy Flag may be enabled. The Windows operating system provides a group (or local) security policy setting, “System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing”, which when enabled, will in turn enable one of the FIPS mode registry settings listed above. Changes to the FIPS mode security policy setting do not take effect until the Windows OS has been rebooted.

- When properly initialized as per the guidance in this section, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library will make the determination that it is validated while under the control of the DriverEntry code block invoked by the Windows OS Loader (winload) or Windows Resume (winresume) (as per FIPS 140-2 IG 9.10). When the determination has been made that the module is validated, the module will operate in its FIPS mode of operation. If the module has not been properly initialized as per the guidance in this section, then the module will make the determination that it is not validated.

- All users assume either the User or Cryptographic Officer roles.

- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides no authentication of users. Roles are assumed implicitly. The authentication provided by the Windows 10 OEs operating system is not in the scope of the validation.

- All cryptographic services implemented within Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library are available to the User and Cryptographic Officer roles.

- In order to invoke the approved mode of operation, the user must call FIPS approved functions. The following diagram illustrates the master components of the module:
Figure 2 Master components
2.1 FIPS 140-2 Approved Algorithms

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements the following FIPS 140-2 Approved algorithms.

- FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 (Cert. # 3347 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 4250 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- FIPS 198-1 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 HMAC (Cert. # 2651 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 3497 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- SP 800-67r1 Triple-DES (2 key legacy-use decryption\(^1\) and 3 key encryption/decryption) in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes (Cert. # 2227 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 2675 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- FIPS 197 AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB128, and CTR modes (Cert. # 4064 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 5295 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- SP 800-38B and SP 800-38C AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM and CMAC modes (Cert. # 4064 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 5295 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- SP 800-38D AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 GCM decryption and GMAC (Cert. # 4064 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 5295 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- SP 800-38E XTS-AES\(^2\) XTS-128 and XTS-256 (Cert. # 4064 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 5295 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- FIPS 186-4 RSA (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS) digital signature generation and verification with 2048 and 3072 moduli; supporting SHA-1\(^3\), SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 (Cert. # 2193 and # 2192 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 2833 and # 2834 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- FIPS 186-4 RSA key-pair generation with 2048 and 3072 moduli (Cert. # 2195 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 2847 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- FIPS 186-4 ECDSA with the following NIST curves: P-256, P-384, P-521 (Cert. # 911 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 1384 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- FIPS 186-4 DSA (Cert. # 1098 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 1371 for version 10.0.14393.1770); the DSA functions of signature generation/verification are not supported by this module. DSA functions are not provided as a service, but parts of the DSA algorithm are required as a prerequisite to the KAS FFC implementation contained in this module, which is why DSA is listed here.
- KAS – SP 800-56A Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) with parameter FB (p=2048, q=224) and FC (p=2048, q=256); key establishment methodology provides 112 bits of encryption strength (Cert. # 92 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 171 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- KAS – SP 800-56A EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) with parameter EC (P-256 w/ SHA-256), ED (P-384 w/ SHA-384), and EE (P-521 w/ SHA-512); key establishment methodology provides between 128 and 256-bits of encryption strength (Cert. # 92 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 171 for version 10.0.14393.1770)
- SP 800-56B RSADP mod 2048 (Cert. # 887 for version 10.0.14393)(Cert. # 1762 for version 10.0.14393.1770)

---

\(^1\) Two-key Triple-DES Decryption is only allowed for Legacy-usage (as per SP 800-131A). The use of two-key Triple-DES Encryption is disallowed.

\(^2\) For XTS-AES, as enforced by policy, the length of the data unit shall not exceed \(2^{20}\) blocks. XTS-AES mode can only be used for the cryptographic protection of data on storage devices.

\(^3\) SHA-1 is only acceptable for legacy signature verification.
2.2 Non-Approved Algorithms

- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements the SHA-1 hash, which is disallowed for use in digital signature generation. It can be used for legacy digital signature verification. Its use is Acceptable for non-digital signature generation applications.
- If HMAC-SHA1 is used, key sizes less than 112 bits (14 bytes) are not allowed for usage in HMAC generation, as per SP 800-131A.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library implements RSA 1024-bits for digital signature generation, which is disallowed. RSA 2048-bits and 3072-bits are also supported, which are Acceptable.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports SP 800-56A Key Agreement using Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) with parameter FA (p=1024, q=160), which is disallowed. The key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength, which is no longer allowed in FIPS mode. (This is in addition to the Approved 112 bits of encryption strength listed above.)
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library has a non-approved algorithm implementation of AES GCM encryption.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports 2-Key Triple-DES Encryption, which is disallowed for usage altogether as of the end of 2015.
- Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library also supports the following non FIPS 140-2 approved algorithms:
  - RSA encrypt/decrypt (disallowed in FIPS mode)
  - MD5 and HMAC-MD5 (allowed in TLS and EAP-TLS)
  - NDRNG (allowed for usage in FIPS mode)
  - RC2, RC4, MD2, MD4 (disallowed in FIPS mode)
  - DES in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes (disallowed in FIPS mode)
  - Legacy CAPI KDF (proprietary; disallowed in FIPS mode)
  - IEEE 1619-2007 XTS-AES (disallowed in FIPS mode)
  - ECDH with Curve25519 (allowed in FIPS mode as per FIPS 140-2 IG D.8 scenario 4). This curve is assumed to provide 128 bits of security strength.\(^5\)

---

\(^4\) This cryptographic module supports the IKEv1 and IKEv2 protocols with SP 800-135 rev 1 KDF primitives, however, the protocols have not been reviewed or tested by the NIST CAVP and CMVP.

2.3 Cryptographic Bypass
Cryptographic bypass is not supported by Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

2.4 FIPS 140-2 Approved Algorithms from Bounded Modules
A bounded module is a FIPS 140 module which provides cryptographic functionality that is relied on by a downstream module. As described in the Integrity Chain of Trust section, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library depends on the following algorithms:

Implemented in Windows OS Loader (module #2932, module #3502):
- CAVP certificate #2833 for FIPS 186-4 RSA PKCS#1 (v1.5) digital signature verification with 2048 moduli; supporting SHA-256
- CAVP certificate #2193 for FIPS 186-4 RSA PKCS#1 (v1.5) digital signature verification with 2048 moduli; supporting SHA-256
- CAVP certificate #4250 for FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-256
- CAVP certificate #3347 for FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-256

Implemented in Windows Resume (module #2933, module #3501):
- CAVP certificate #5295 for FIPS 197 AES CBC 128 and 256, SP 800-38E AES XTS 128 and 256
- CAVP certificate #4064 for FIPS 197 AES CBC 128 and 256, SP 800-38E AES XTS 128 and 256

2.5 Machine Configurations
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library was tested using the machine configurations listed in Section 1.4 - Validated Platforms.

3 Operational Environment
The operational environment for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is Windows 10 OEs running on the software and hardware configurations listed in Section 1.4 - Validated Platforms. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library services are available to all kernel mode components, which are part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).

4 Integrity Chain of Trust
The Windows OS Loader and Windows Resume check the integrity of Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library before starting it. This integrity check is based on the verification of an RSA signature over the binary using a 2048-bit key (Cert. # 2193 and #2833) and a SHA-256 hash (Cert. # 3347 and #4250), and verifying that the signing certificate chains up to a known root authority.
5  Ports and Interfaces

As shown in Figure 3, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module is accessed through one of four logical interfaces. Kernel applications requiring cryptographic services use the BCrypt APIs detailed in Section 7 Services. Entropy sources supply random bits to the random number generator through the entropy APIs. Finally, both kernel mode and user mode random number generators use the SystemPrng interface to obtain seed material for their DRBGs.

![Diagram of Ports and Interfaces](image)

**Figure 3 Relationship of cng.sys to other system components — cryptographic boundary shown in gold**

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The following functions are used by Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library to expose cryptographic functionality to its callers.

- BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider
- BCryptCreateHash
- BCryptCreateMultiHash
- BCryptDecrypt
- BCryptDeriveKey
- BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2
- BCryptDestroyHash
- BCryptDestroyKey
- BCryptDestroySecret
- BCryptDuplicateHash
- BCryptDuplicateKey
- BCryptEncrypt
- BCryptExportKey
- BCryptFinalizeKeyPair
- BCryptFinishHash
- BCryptFreeBuffer
- BCryptGenerateKeyPair
- BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey
- BCryptGenRandom
- BCryptGetProperty
- BCryptHash
- BCryptHashData
- BCryptImportKey
- BCryptImportKeyPair
- BCryptKeyDerivation
- BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider
- BCryptProcessMultiOperations
- BCryptSecretAgreement
- BCryptSetProperty
- BCryptSignHash
- BCryptVerifySignature
- SystemPrng

The following functions are exposed to entropy sources:

- EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForIum
- EntropyProvideData
- EntropyRegisterCallback
- EntropyRegisterSource
- EntropyUnregisterSource

All of these functions are used in the approved mode. Furthermore, these are the only approved functions that this module can perform.
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library has additional export functions described in Section 5.5 Non-Security Relevant Configuration Interfaces.

5.1 Control Input Interface
The Control Input Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library cryptographic export functions enumerated above. Options for control operations are passed as input parameters to these functions.

5.2 Status Output Interface
The Status Output Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions. For each function, the status information is returned to the caller as the return value from the function.

5.3 Data Output Interface
The Data Output Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions.

5.4 Data Input Interface
The Data Input Interface for Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library consists of the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions. Data and options are passed to the interface as input parameters to the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library export functions. Data Input is kept separate from Control Input by passing Data Input in separate parameters from Control Input.

5.5 Non-Security Relevant Configuration Interfaces
These are not cryptographic functions. They are used to configure cryptographic providers on the system, and are provided for informational purposes. Please see https://msdn.microsoft.com for details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumAlgorithms</td>
<td>Enumerates the algorithms for a given set of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptEnumProviders</td>
<td>Returns a list of CNG providers for a given algorithm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptRegisterConfigChangeNotify</td>
<td>This is deprecated beginning with Windows 10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptResolveProviders</td>
<td>Resolves queries against the set of providers currently registered on the local system and the configuration information specified in the machine and domain configuration tables, returning an ordered list of references to one or more providers matching the specified criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptAddContextFunctionProvider</td>
<td>Adds a cryptographic function provider to the list of providers that are supported by an existing CNG context.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptRegisterProvider</td>
<td>Registers a CNG provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptUnregisterProvider</td>
<td>Unregisters a CNG provider.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCryptUnregisterConfigChangeNotify</td>
<td>Removes a CNG configuration change event handler. This API differs slightly between User-Mode and Kernel-Mode.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Specification of Roles

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides User and Cryptographic Officer roles (as defined in FIPS 140-2). These roles share all the services implemented in the cryptographic module.

When a kernel mode component requests the crypto module to generate keys, the keys are generated, used, and deleted as requested. There are no implicit keys associated with a kernel component. Each kernel component may have numerous keys.

### 6.1 Maintenance Roles

Maintenance roles are not supported.

### 6.2 Multiple Concurrent Interactive Operators

There is only one interactive operator in Single User Mode. When run in this configuration, multiple concurrent interactive operators are not supported. This configuration is set by disabling user switching and disabling remote desktop access.

1. Open the Group Policy Editor by right-clicking the Start menu and selecting Run. Type `gpedit.msc` in the Run box and click OK.
3. On the right side of the window, open “Hide entry points for Fast User Switching” and set the Enabled option. Click the OK button.
4. Open System Properties by right-clicking the Start menu and selecting System. Click the Remote Settings link.
5. Select the “Don’t allow remote connections to this computer” option. Click the OK button.

### 6.3 Operator Authentication

The module does not provide authentication. Roles are implicitly assumed based on the services that are executed.
7 Services
The following list contains all services available to an operator. All services are accessible to both the User and Crypto Officer roles. In addition, there is zeroization (see Section 9 Security Relevant Data Items).

All of the services enumerated in this section are Approved services except Section 7.16 Non-Approved Services.

7.1 Power Up and Power Down
7.1.1 DriverEntry
Each Windows 10 OEs driver must have a standard initialization routine DriverEntry in order to be loaded. The Windows OS Loader and Windows Resume are responsible to call the DriverEntry routine. The DriverEntry routine must have the following prototype.

```c
NTSTATUS (*PDRIVER_INITIALIZE) (
    IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject,
    IN PUNICODE_STRING RegistryPath);
```

The input DriverObject represents the driver within the Windows 10 OEs system. Its pointer allows the DriverEntry routine to set an appropriate entry point for its DriverUnload routine in the driver object.

The RegistryPath input to the DriverEntry routine points to a counted Unicode string that specifies a path to the driver's registry key `\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\CNG`.

7.1.2 DriverUnload
It is the entry point for the driver's unload routine. The pointer to the routine is set by the DriverEntry routine in the DriverUnload field of the DriverObject when the driver initializes. An Unload routine is declared as follows:

```c
VOID (*PDRIVER_UNLOAD) (
    IN PDRIVER_OBJECT DriverObject);
```

When the driver is no longer needed, the Windows 10 OEs Kernel is responsible to call the DriverUnload routine of the associated DriverObject.

7.2 Algorithm Providers and Properties
7.2.1 BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider
```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE *phAlgorithm,
    LPCWSTR pszAlgId,
    LPCWSTR pszImplementation,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function has four parameters: algorithm handle output to the opened algorithm provider, desired algorithm ID input, an optional specific provider name input, and
optional flags. This function loads and initializes a CNG provider for a given algorithm, and returns a handle to the opened algorithm provider on success.

Unless the calling function specifies the name of the provider, the default provider is used.

The calling function must pass the BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE_HMAC_FLAG flag in order to use an HMAC function with a hash algorithm.

7.2.2 **BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

This function closes an algorithm provider handle opened by a call to BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function.

7.2.3 **BCryptSetProperty**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSetProperty(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE   hObject,
    LPCWSTR pszProperty,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptSetProperty() function sets the value of a named property for a CNG object. The CNG object is a handle, the property name is a NULL terminated string, and the value of the property is a length-specified byte string.

7.2.4 **BCryptGetProperty**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGetProperty(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE   hObject,
    LPCWSTR pszProperty,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptGetProperty() function retrieves the value of a named property for a CNG object. The CNG object is a handle, the property name is a NULL terminated string, and the value of the property is a length-specified byte string.

7.2.5 **BCryptFreeBuffer**

```c
VOID WINAPI BCryptFreeBuffer(
    PVOID   pvBuffer);
```

Some of the CNG functions allocate memory on caller’s behalf. The BCryptFreeBuffer() function frees memory that was allocated by such a CNG function.
7.3 Random Number Generation

7.3.1 BCryptGenRandom

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenRandom(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    PUCHAR  pbBuffer,
    ULONG   cbBuffer,
    ULONG   dwFlags);

The BCryptGenRandom() function fills a buffer with random bytes. The random number generation algorithm is:

- BCRYPT_RNG_ALGORITHM. This is the AES-256 counter mode based random generator as defined in SP 800-90A.

During the function initialization, a seed is obtained from the output of the SystemPrng function. This provides the necessary entropy for the DRBG available through this function.

7.3.2 SystemPrng

BOOL SystemPrng(
    unsigned char   *pbRandomData,
    size_t          cbRandomData );

The SystemPrng() function fills a buffer with random bytes. It generates these bytes by taking the output of a cascade of two SP 800-90A AES-256 counter mode based DRBGs in kernel-mode and four cascaded SP 800-90A AES-256 DRBGs in user-mode; all are seeded from the Windows entropy pool. The Windows entropy pool is populated from the following sources:

- An initial entropy value provided by the Windows OS Loader (Cert. #2932 and #3502) at boot time.
- The values of the high-resolution CPU cycle counter at times when hardware interrupts are received.
- Random values gathered from the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), if one is available on the system.
- Random values gathered by calling the RDRAND CPU instruction, if supported by the CPU.

The Windows DRBG infrastructure located in cng.sys continues to gather entropy from these sources during normal operation, and the DRBG cascade is periodically reseeded with new entropy.

7.3.3 EntropyRegisterSource

NTSTATUS EntropyRegisterSource(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE * phEntropySource,
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_TYPE     entropySourceType,
    PCWSTR                  entropySourceName );

This function is used to obtain a handle that can be used to contribute randomness to the Windows entropy pool. The handle is returned in the phEntropySource parameter. For this function, entropySource must be set to ENTROPY_SOURCE_TYPE_HIGH_PUSH, and entropySourceName must be a Unicode string describing the entropy source.
7.3.4 EntropyUnregisterSource

NTSTATUS EntropyRegisterSource(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE hEntropySource);
This function is used to destroy a handle created with EntropyRegisterSource().

7.3.5 EntropyProvideData

NTSTATUS EntropyProvideData(
    ENTROPY_SOURCE_HANDLE hEntropySource,
    PCBYTE pbData,
    SIZE_T cbData,
    ULONG entropyEstimateInMilliBits);
This function is used to contribute entropy to the Windows entropy pool. hEntropySource must be a handle returned by an earlier call to EntropyRegisterSource. The caller provides cbData bytes in the buffer pointed to by pbData, as well as an estimate (in the entropyEstimateInMilliBits parameter) of how many millibits of entropy are contained in these bytes.

7.3.6 EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForIum

VOID EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForIum(BOOLEAN fPerformCallbacks);
This function will trigger a kernel DRBG reseed for the cng.sys inside the IUM (Isolated User Mode) environment. If called inside the IUM environment, it triggers a reseed from one or more of the entropy pools of the system. If called inside the normal world (non-IUM) environment, this function does nothing.

7.4 Key and Key-Pair Generation

7.4.1 BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    PUCHAR pbKeyObject,
    ULONG cbKeyObject,
    PUCHAR pbSecret,
    ULONG cbSecret,
    ULONG dwFlags);
The BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function generates a symmetric key object for use with a symmetric encryption or key derivation algorithm from a supplied key value. The calling application must specify a handle to the algorithm provider created with the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider() function. The algorithm specified when the provider was created must support symmetric key encryption or key derivation.
7.4.2 **BCryptGenerateKeyPair**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptGenerateKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    ULONG dwLength,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The `BCryptGenerateKeyPair()` function creates an empty public/private key pair. After creating a key using this function, call the `BCryptSetProperty()` function to set its properties. The key pair can be used only after `BCryptFinalizeKeyPair()` function is called.

7.4.3 **BCryptFinalizeKeyPair**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptFinalizeKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The `BCryptFinalizeKeyPair()` function completes a public/private key pair import or generation. The key pair cannot be used until this function has been called. After this function has been called, the `BCryptSetProperty()` function can no longer be used for this key.

7.4.4 **BCryptDuplicateKey**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDuplicateKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phNewKey,
    PUCHAR pbKeyObject,
    ULONG cbKeyObject,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The `BCryptDuplicateKey()` function creates a duplicate of a symmetric key.

7.4.5 **BCryptDestroyKey**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroyKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey);
```

The `BCryptDestroyKey()` function destroys the specified key.

7.5 **Key Entry and Output**

7.5.1 **BCryptImportKey**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptImportKey(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hImportKey,
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    PUCHAR pbKeyObject,
    ULONG cbKeyObject,
    PUCHAR pbInput,
    ULONG cbInput,
    ULONG cbOutput,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The `BCryptImportKey()` function imports a public/private key pair from a blob.
The `BCryptImportKey()` function imports a symmetric key from a key blob.

- **hAlgorithm** [in] is the handle of the algorithm provider to import the key. This handle is obtained by calling the `BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider` function.

- **hImportKey** [in, out] is not currently used and should be NULL.

- **pszBlobType** [in] is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB that is contained in the `pbInput` buffer. `pszBlobType` can be one of `BCRYPT_AES_WRAP_KEY_BLOB`, `BCRYPT_KEY_DATA_BLOB` and `BCRYPT_OPAQUE_KEY_BLOB`.

- **phKey** [out] is a pointer to a BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE that receives the handle of the imported key that is used in subsequent functions that require a key, such as `BCryptEncrypt`. This handle must be released when it is no longer needed by passing it to the `BCryptDestroyKey` function.

- **pbKeyObject** [out] is a pointer to a buffer that receives the imported key object. The `cbKeyObject` parameter contains the size of this buffer. The required size of this buffer can be obtained by calling the `BCryptGetProperty` function to get the `BCRYPT_OBJECT_LENGTH` property. This will provide the size of the key object for the specified algorithm. This memory can only be freed after the `phKey` key handle is destroyed.

- **cbKeyObject** [in] is the size, in bytes, of the `pbKeyObject` buffer.

- **pbInput** [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the key BLOB to import.

The `cbInput` parameter contains the size of this buffer.

The `pszBlobType` parameter specifies the type of key BLOB this buffer contains.

- **cbInput** [in] is the size, in bytes, of the `pbInput` buffer.

- **dwFlags** [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. No flags are currently defined, so this parameter should be zero.

### 7.5.2 `BCryptImportKeyPair` Function

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptImportKeyPair(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hImportKey,
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE *phKey,
    UCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    ULONG   cbKeyObject,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The `BCryptImportKeyPair()` function is used to import a public/private key pair from a key blob.
7.5.2 **BCryptImportKey**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptImportKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,  // [in] handle of the algorithm provider to import the key. This handle is obtained by calling the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider function.
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hImportKey,  // [in, out] not currently used and should be NULL.
    void const *const pbInput,  // [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the key BLOB to import. The cbInput parameter contains the size of this buffer. The pszBlobType parameter specifies the type of key BLOB this buffer contains.
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,  // [in] is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB that is contained in the pbInput buffer. This can be one of the following values:
    BCRYPT_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB, BCRYPT_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB, BCRYPT_ECCPRIVATE_BLOB,
    BCRYPT_ECCPUBLIC_BLOB, BCRYPT_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB,
    BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB, BCRYPT_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB, LEGACY_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB,
    LEGACY_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB, LEGACY_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB, LEGACY_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB.
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   phKey,  // [out] is a pointer to a BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE that receives the handle of the imported key. This handle is used in subsequent functions that require a key, such as BCryptSignHash. This handle must be released when it is no longer needed by passing it to the BCryptDestroyKey function.
)
```

**pszBlobType [in]** is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB to import. This can be one of the following values:

- `BCRYPT_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_ECCPRIVATE_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_ECCPUBLIC_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB`.

**phKey [out]** is a pointer to a BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE that receives the handle of the imported key. This handle is used in subsequent functions that require a key, such as BCryptSignHash. This handle must be released when it is no longer needed by passing it to the BCryptDestroyKey function.

**cbInput [in]** contains the size, in bytes, of the pbInput buffer.

**dwFlags [in]** is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This can be zero or the following value: `BCRYPT_NO_KEY_VALIDATION`.

7.5.3 **BCryptExportKey**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptExportKey(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,  // [in] handle of the key to be exported.
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hExportKey,  // [in, out] not currently used and should be set to NULL.
    LPCWSTR pszBlobType,  // [in] is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB to export. This can be one of the following values:
    BCRYPT_AES_WRAP_KEY_BLOB,
    BCRYPT_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB, BCRYPT_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB, BCRYPT_ECCPRIVATE_BLOB,
    BCRYPT_ECCPUBLIC_BLOB, BCRYPT_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB,
    BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB, BCRYPT_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB, LEGACY_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB,
    LEGACY_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB, LEGACY_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB, LEGACY_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB.
    UCHAR    pbOutput,  // [in, out] is the address of a buffer to receive the exported key.
    ULONG   cbOutput, // [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This can be zero or the following value: BCRYPT_NO_KEY_VALIDATION.
    ULONG   pcbResult, // [in, out] is the address of a buffer to receive the size of the exported key.
    ULONG   dwFlags);  // [in, out] is the address of a buffer to receive the size of the exported key.
```

The **BCryptExportKey()** function exports a key to a memory blob that can be persisted for later use.

**hKey [in, out]** is not currently used and should be set to NULL.

**pszBlobType [in]** is a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an identifier that specifies the type of BLOB to export. This can be one of the following values:

- `BCRYPT_AES_WRAP_KEY_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_ECCPRIVATE_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_ECCPUBLIC_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_PUBLIC_KEY_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB`
- `BCRYPT_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_DH_PUBLIC_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_DH_PRIVATE_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB`
- `LEGACY_RSAPUBLIC_BLOB`.

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**7.6 Encryption and Decryption**

**7.6.1 BCryptEncrypt**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptEncrypt(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    UCHAR   *pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    UCHAR   *pbIV,
    ULONG   cbIV,
    UCHAR   *pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptEncrypt() function encrypts a block of data of given length.

- **hKey** [in, out] is the handle of the key to use to encrypt the data. This handle is obtained from one of the key creation functions, such as BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey, BCryptGenerateKeyPair, or BCryptImportKey.

- **pbInput** [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the plaintext to be encrypted. The cbInput parameter contains the size of the plaintext to encrypt. For more information, see Remarks.

- **cbInput** [in] is the number of bytes in the pbInput buffer to encrypt.

- **pPaddingInfo** [in, optional] is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the dwFlags parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and authenticated encryption modes (i.e. AES-CCM and AES-GCM). It must be NULL otherwise.
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\[ pbIV \text{[in, out, optional]} \] is the address of a buffer that contains the initialization vector (IV)\(^6\) to use during encryption. The \( cbIV \) parameter contains the size of this buffer. This function will modify the contents of this buffer. If you need to reuse the IV later, make sure you make a copy of this buffer before calling this function. This parameter is optional and can be NULL if no IV is used. The required size of the IV can be obtained by calling the BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT BLOCK LENGTH property. This will provide the size of a block for the algorithm, which is also the size of the IV.

\( cbIV \text{[in]} \) contains the size, in bytes, of the \( pbIV \) buffer.

\( pbOutput \text{[out, optional]} \) is the address of a buffer that will receive the ciphertext produced by this function. The \( cbOutput \) parameter contains the size of this buffer. For more information, see Remarks.

If this parameter is NULL, this function will calculate the size needed for the ciphertext and return the size in the location pointed to by the \( pcbResult \) parameter.

\( cbOutput \text{[in]} \) contains the size, in bytes, of the \( pbOutput \) buffer. This parameter is ignored if the \( pbOutput \) parameter is NULL.

\( pcbResult \text{[out]} \) is a pointer to a ULONG variable that receives the number of bytes copied to the \( pbOutput \) buffer. If \( pbOutput \) is NULL, this receives the size, in bytes, required for the ciphertext.

\( dwFlags \text{[in]} \) is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. The allowed set of flags depends on the type of key specified by the \( hKey \) parameter. If the key is a symmetric key, this can be zero or the following value: BCRYPT BLOCK_PADDING. If the key is an asymmetric key, this can be one of the following values: BCRYPT PAD NONE, BCRYPT PAD OAEP, BCRYPT PAD PKCS1.

### 7.6.2 BCryptDecrypt

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDecrypt(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PUCHAR   pbIV,
    ULONG   cbIV,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptDecrypt() function decrypts a block of data of given length.

---

\(^6\) The IV being passed into the BCryptEncrypt() API needs to be generated by a validated cryptographic module or an approved DRBG.
*hKey* [in, out] is the handle of the key to use to decrypt the data. This handle is obtained from one of the key creation functions, such as BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey, BCryptGenerateKeyPair, or BCryptImportKey.

*pInput* [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the ciphertext to be decrypted. The cbInput parameter contains the size of the ciphertext to decrypt. For more information, see Remarks.

*cbInput* [in] is the number of bytes in the pInput buffer to decrypt.

*pPaddingInfo* [in, optional] is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the dwFlags parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and authenticated encryption modes (i.e. AES-CCM and AES-GCM). It must be NULL otherwise.

*pIV* [in, out, optional] is the address of a buffer that contains the initialization vector (IV) to use during decryption. The cbIV parameter contains the size of this buffer. This function will modify the contents of this buffer. If you need to reuse the IV later, make sure you make a copy of this buffer before calling this function. This parameter is optional and can be NULL if no IV is used. The required size of the IV can be obtained by calling the BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT_BLOCK_LENGTH property. This will provide the size of a block for the algorithm, which is also the size of the IV.

*cbIV* [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pIV buffer.

*pOutput* [out, optional] is the address of a buffer to receive the plaintext produced by this function. The cbOutput parameter contains the size of this buffer. For more information, see Remarks.

If this parameter is NULL, this function will calculate the size required for the plaintext and return the size in the location pointed to by the pcbResult parameter.

*cbOutput* [in] is the size, in bytes, of the pOutput buffer. This parameter is ignored if the pOutput parameter is NULL.

*pcbResult* [out] is a pointer to a ULONG variable to receive the number of bytes copied to the pOutput buffer. If pOutput is NULL, this receives the size, in bytes, required for the plaintext.

*dwFlags* [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. The allowed set of flags depends on the type of key specified by the hKey parameter. If the key is a symmetric key, this can be zero or the following value: BCRYPT_BLOCK_PADDING. If the key is an asymmetric key, this can be one of the following values: BCRYPT_PAD_NONE, BCRYPT_PAD_OAEP, BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1.
7.7 Hashing and Message Authentication

7.7.1 BCryptCreateHash

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCreateHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE   hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE  *phHash,
    PUCHAR   pbHashObject,
    ULONG    cbHashObject,
    PUCHAR   pbSecret,
    ULONG    cbSecret,
    ULONG    dwFlags);

The BCryptCreateHash() function creates a hash object with an optional key. The optional key is used for HMAC, AES GMAC and AES CMAC.

hAlgorithm [in, out] is the handle of an algorithm provider created by using the BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider function. The algorithm that was specified when the provider was created must support the hash interface.

phHash [out] is a pointer to a BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE value that receives a handle that represents the hash object. This handle is used in subsequent hashing functions, such as the BCryptHashData function. When you have finished using this handle, release it by passing it to the BCryptDestroyHash function.

pbHashObject [out] is a pointer to a buffer that receives the hash object. The cbHashObject parameter contains the size of this buffer. The required size of this buffer can be obtained by calling the BCryptGetProperty function to get the BCRYPT_OBJECT_LENGTH property. This will provide the size of the hash object for the specified algorithm. This memory can only be freed after the hash handle is destroyed.


pbSecret [in, optional] is a pointer to a buffer that contains the key to use for the hash. The cbSecret parameter contains the size of this buffer. If no key should be used with the hash, set this parameter to NULL. This key only applies to the HMAC, AES GMAC and AES CMAC algorithms.

cbSecret [in, optional] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbSecret buffer. If no key should be used with the hash, set this parameter to zero.

dwFlags [in] is not currently used and must be zero.

7.7.2 BCryptHashData

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptHashData(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
    P UCHAR  pbInput,
    ULONG    cbInput,
    ULONG    dwFlags);
The BCryptHashData() function performs a one way hash on a data buffer. Call the BCryptFinishHash() function to finalize the hashing operation to get the hash result.

### 7.7.3 BCryptDuplicateHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDuplicateHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE *phNewHash,
    UCHAR pbHashObject,
    ULONG cbHashObject,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptDuplicateHash() function duplicates an existing hash object. The duplicate hash object contains all state and data that was hashed to the point of duplication.

### 7.7.4 BCryptFinishHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptFinishHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash,
    UCHAR pbOutput,
    ULONG cbOutput,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

The BCryptFinishHash() function retrieves the hash value for the data accumulated from prior calls to BCryptHashData() function.

### 7.7.5 BCryptDestroyHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroyHash(
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE hHash);
```

The BCryptDestroyHash() function destroys a hash object.

### 7.7.6 BCryptHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    UCHAR pbSecret,
    ULONG cbSecret,
    UCHAR pbInput,
    ULONG cbInput,
    UCHAR pbOutput,
    ULONG cbOutput);
```

The function BCryptHash() performs a single hash computation. This is a convenience function that wraps calls to the BCryptCreateHash(), BCryptHashData(), BCryptFinishHash(), and BCryptDestroyHash() functions.
7.7.7 **BCryptCreateMultiHash**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptCreateMultiHash(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hAlgorithm,
    BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE *phHash,
    ULONG nHashes,
    UCHAR pbHashObject,
    ULONG cbHashObject,
    UCHAR pbSecret,
    ULONG cbSecret,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

`BCryptCreateMultiHash()` is a function that creates a new MultiHash object that is used in parallel hashing to improve performance. The MultiHash object is equivalent to an array of normal (reusable) hash objects.

- **hAlgorithm** [in out] is the handle of an algorithm provider. See the `BCryptCreateHash()` description above for details.

- **phHash** [out] is a pointer to the hHash handle to be returned by this function. This hHash handle can be freed using the `BCryptDestroyHash()` function. Use of this particular hHash in `BCryptDuplicateHash()` is currently not supported by the default algorithm provider.

- **nHashes** [in] nHashes is the number of entries in the array. nHashes must be at least 1. The default provider implements an upper bound of 64 hash states.

- **pbHashObject** [out, optional] is a pointer to a buffer that receives the hash object. See the `BCryptCreateHash()` description above for details.

- **cbHashObject** [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbHashObject buffer.

- **pbSecret** [in, optional] specifies the key (if any) for all of the hash computations that will be done using this MultiHash object. The secret is used for all of the array entries.

- **cbSecret** [in] is the size in bytes of the pbSecret buffer.

- **dwFlags** [in] is not currently used and must be zero.

7.7.8 **BCryptProcessMultiOperations**

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptProcessMultiOperations(
    BCRYPT_HANDLE hObject,
    BCRYPT_MULTI_OPERATION_TYPE operationType,
    PVOID pOperations,
    ULONG cbOperations,
    ULONG dwFlags);
```

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The BCryptProcessMultiOperations() function is used to perform multiple operations on a single multi-object handle such as a MultiHash object handle. If any of the operations fail, then the function will return an error.

*hObject* [in out] is the hObject handle referring to the multi-object.

*operationType* [in] specifies the type of operation structure being passed in the pOperations/cbOperations buffer.

*pOperations* [in] is a pointer that must point to a valid array of the specified type; e.g. alignment requirements must be met.

*cbOperations* [in] must be nonzero and a multiple of the sizeof of the specified type.

*dwFlags* [in] is not currently nonzero and must be zero.

Each element of the operations array specifies an operation to be performed on/with the hObject.

For hash operations, there are two operation types:

- Hash data
- Finalize hash

These correspond directly to BCryptHashData() and BCryptFinishHash(). Each operation specifies an index of the hash object inside the hObject MultiHash object that this operation applies to. Operations are executed in any order or even in parallel, with the sole restriction that the set of operations that specify the same index are all executed in-order.

### 7.8 Signing and Verification

#### 7.8.1 BCryptSignHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSignHash(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PUCHAR   pbInput,
    ULONG   cbInput,
    PUCHAR   pbOutput,
    ULONG   cbOutput,
    ULONG   *pcbResult,
    ULONG   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptSignHash() function creates a signature of a hash value.

*hKey* [in] is the handle of the key to use to sign the hash.

*pPaddingInfo* [in, optional] is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the *dwFlags* parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and must be NULL otherwise.
**7.8.1** BCryptSignHash

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSignHash(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    PBUFFER           pbInput,
    ULONG           cbInput,
    PBUFFER           pbOutput,
    ULONG           cbOutput,
    ULONG           cbSignature,
    ULONG           dwFlags,
    ULONG*          pcbResult
);
```

The BCryptSignHash() function creates a digital signature from the data in the pbInput buffer. The signature is stored in the pbOutput buffer. The cbSignature parameter contains the size of the signature. The dwFlags parameter specifies additional flags that influence the operation of this function. The allowed values for dwFlags depend on the type of key specified by the hKey parameter. If the key is a symmetric key, this parameter is not used and should be set to zero. If the key is an asymmetric key, this can be one of the following values: BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1, BCRYPT_PAD_PSS.

Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is disallowed for digital signature generation. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.

**7.8.2** BCryptVerifySignature

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptVerifySignature(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE   hKey,
    VOID    *pPaddingInfo,
    PUCHAR   pbHash,
    ULONG   cbHash,
    PUCHAR   pbSignature,
    ULONG   cbSignature,
    ULONG   dwFlags
);
```

The BCryptVerifySignature() function verifies that the specified signature matches the specified hash. The hKey parameter is the handle of the key to use to decrypt the signature. This must be an identical key or the public key portion of the key pair used to sign the data with the BCryptSignHash function.

The pPaddingInfo parameter is optional and is a pointer to a structure that contains padding information. The actual type of structure this parameter points to depends on the value of the dwFlags parameter. This parameter is only used with asymmetric keys and must be NULL otherwise.

pbHash is the address of a buffer that contains the hash of the data. The cbHash parameter contains the size of this buffer.

The cbSignature parameter contains the size of the signature.

dwFlags is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. The allowed set of flags depends on the type of key specified by the hKey parameter. The allowed flags are:

- BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1
- BCRYPT_PAD_PSS

Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is disallowed for digital signature generation. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.
pbSignature [in] is the address of a buffer that contains the signed hash of the data. The BCryptSignHash function is used to create the signature. The cbSignature parameter contains the size of this buffer.

cbSignature [in] is the size, in bytes, of the pbSignature buffer. The BCryptSignHash function is used to create the signature.

Note: this function accepts SHA-1 hashes, which according to NIST SP 800-131A is disallowed for digital signature generation. SHA-1 is currently legacy-use for digital signature verification.

### 7.9 Secret Agreement and Key Derivation

#### 7.9.1 BCryptSecretAgreement

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptSecretAgreement(
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE       hPrivKey,
    BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE       hPubKey,
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE    *phAgreedSecret,
    ULONG                   dwFlags);
```

The BCryptSecretAgreement() function creates a secret agreement value from a private and a public key. This function is used with Diffie-Hellman (DH) and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) algorithms.

- **hPrivKey** [in] The handle of the private key to use to create the secret agreement value.
- **hPubKey** [in] The handle of the public key to use to create the secret agreement value.
- **phSecret** [out] A pointer to a BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE that receives a handle that represents the secret agreement value. This handle must be released by passing it to the BCryptDestroySecret function when it is no longer needed.
- **dwFlags** [in] A set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This must be zero.

#### 7.9.2 BCryptDeriveKey

```c
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDeriveKey(
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE hSharedSecret,
    LPCWSTR              pwszKDF,
    BCryptBufferDesc     *pParameterList,
    P UCHAR pbDerivedKey,
    ULONG                cbDerivedKey,
    ULONG                *pcbResult,
    ULONG                dwFlags);
```

The BCryptDeriveKey() function derives a key from a secret agreement value.

- **hSharedSecret** [in, optional] is the secret agreement handle to create the key from. This handle is obtained from the BCryptSecretAgreement function.
- **pwszKDF** [in] is a pointer to a null-terminated Unicode string that contains an object identifier (OID) that identifies the key derivation function (KDF) to use to derive the key. This can be one of the following strings: BCRYPT_KDF_HASH (parameters in pParameterList: KDF_HASH_ALGORITHM,
KDF_SECRET_PREPEND, KDF_SECRET_APPEND), BCRYPT_KDF_HMAC (parameters in pParameterList:
KDF_HASH_ALGORITHM, KDF_HMAC_KEY, KDF_SECRET_PREPEND, KDF_SECRET_APPEND),
BCRYPT_KDF_SP80056A_CONCAT (parameters in pParameterList: KDF_ALGORITHMID,
KDF_PARTYUINFO, KDF_PARTYVINFO, KDF_SUPPPUBINFO, KDF_SUPPPRIVINFO).

pParameterList [in, optional] is the address of a BCryptBufferDesc structure that contains the KDF
parameters. This parameter is optional and can be NULL if it is not needed.

Note: When supporting a key agreement scheme that requires a nonce, BCryptDeriveKey uses
whichever nonce is supplied by the caller in the BCryptBufferDesc. Examples of the nonce types are
found in Section 5.4 of http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Ar2.pdf

When using a nonce, a random nonce should be used. And then if the random nonce is used, the
entropy (amount of randomness) of the nonce and the security strength of the DRBG has to be at least
one half of the minimum required bit length of the subgroup order.

For example:

    for KAS FFC, entropy of nonce must be 112 bits for FB, 128 bits for FC.
    for KAS ECC, entropy of the nonce must be 128 bits for EC, 182 for ED, 256 for EF.

pbDerivedKey [out, optional] is the address of a buffer that receives the key. The cbDerivedKey
parameter contains the size of this buffer. If this parameter is NULL, this function will place the required
size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by the pcbResult parameter.

cbDerivedKey [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the pbDerivedKey buffer.

pcbResult [out] is a pointer to a ULONG that receives the number of bytes that were copied to the
pbDerivedKey buffer. If the pbDerivedKey parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size,
in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by this parameter.

dwFlags [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This can be zero or
KDF_USE_SECRET_AS_HMAC_KEY_FLAG. The KDF_USE_SECRET_AS_HMAC_KEY_FLAG value must only
be used when pwszKDF is equal to BCRYPT_KDF_HMAC. It indicates that the secret will also be used as
the HMAC key. If this flag is used, the KDF_HMAC_KEY parameter must not be specified in
pParameterList.

7.9.3  BCryptDestroySecret
NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDestroySecret(
    BCRYPT_SECRET_HANDLE   hSecret);
The BCryptDestroySecret() function destroys a secret agreement handle that was created by using the
BCryptSecretAgreement() function.
7.9.4 **BCryptKeyDerivation**

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptKeyDerivation(
    _In_        BCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hKey,
    _In_opt_    BCryptBufferDesc *pParameterList,
    _Out_writes_bytes_to_(cbDerivedKey, *pcbResult) PUCHAR pbDerivedKey,
    _In_        ULONG                cbDerivedKey,
    _Out_       ULONG                *pcbResult,
    _In_        ULONG                dwFlags);

The BCryptKeyDerivation() function executes a Key Derivation Function (KDF) on a key generated with BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function. It differs from the BCryptDeriveKey() function in that it does not require a secret agreement step to create a shared secret.

*hKey* [in] is a handle to a key created with the BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey function.

*pParameterList* [in] is the algorithm-specific parameter list for the selected KDF.

*pbDerivedKey* [out] is the address of a buffer that receives the key. The *cbDerivedKey* parameter contains the size of this buffer.

*cbDerivedKey* [in] contains the size, in bytes, of the *pbDerivedKey* buffer.

*pcbResult* [out] is a pointer to a ULONG that receives the number of bytes that were copied to the *pbDerivedKey* buffer. If the *pbDerivedKey* parameter is NULL, this function will place the required size, in bytes, in the ULONG pointed to by this parameter.

*dwFlags* [in] is a set of flags that modify the behavior of this function. This must be zero.

7.9.5 **BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2**

NTSTATUS WINAPI BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2(
    BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE hPrf,
    PUCHAR pbPassword,
    ULONG cbPassword,
    PUCHAR pbSalt,
    ULONG cbSalt,
    ULONGLONG cIterations,
    PUCHAR pbDerivedKey,
    ULONG cbDerivedKey,
    ULONG dwFlags);

The BCryptDeriveKeyPBKDF2() function derives a key from a hash value by using the password based key derivation function as defined by SP 800-132 PBKDF and IETF RFC 2898 (specified as PBKDF2).

*hPrf* [in] is the handle of an algorithm provider that provides the pseudo-random function.
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library

*pbPassword* [in, optional] is a pointer to a buffer that contains the password parameter for the PBKDF2 key derivation algorithm.

*cbPassword* [in] is the length, in bytes, of the data in the buffer pointed to by the *pbPassword* parameter.

*pbSalt* [in, optional] is a pointer to a buffer that contains the salt argument for the PBKDF2 key derivation algorithm.

*cbSalt* [in] is the length, in bytes, of the salt argument pointed to by the *pbSalt* parameter.

*cIterations* [in] is the iteration count for the PBKDF2 key derivation algorithm.

*pbDerivedKey* [out] is a pointer to a buffer that receives the derived key.

*cbDerivedKey* [in] is the length, in bytes, of the derived key returned in the buffer pointed to by the *pbDerivedKey* parameter.

*dwFlags* [in] This parameter is reserved and must be set to zero.

### 7.10 Deprecation

#### 7.10.1 Bit Strengths of DH and ECDH

Through the year 2010, implementations of DH and ECDH were allowed to have an acceptable bit strength of at least 80 bits of security (for DH at least 1024 bits and for ECDH at least 160 bits). From 2011 through 2013, 80 bits of security strength was considered deprecated, and was disallowed starting January 1, 2014. As of that date, only security strength of at least 112 bits is acceptable. ECDH uses curve sizes of at least 256 bits (that means it has at least 128 bits of security strength), so that is acceptable. However, DH has a range of 1024 to 4096 and that changed to 2048 to 4096 after 2013.

#### 7.10.2 SHA-1

From 2011 through 2013, SHA-1 could be used in a deprecated mode for use in digital signature generation. As of Jan. 1, 2014, SHA-1 is no longer allowed for digital signature generation, and it is allowed for legacy use only for digital signature verification.

### 7.11 Show Status Services

The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have the same Show Status functionality, which is, for each function, the status information is returned to the caller as the return value from the function.

### 7.12 Self-Test Services

The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have the same Self-Test functionality, which is described in Section 10 Self-Tests.

### 7.13 Service Inputs / Outputs

The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have service inputs and outputs as specified in Section 5 Ports and Interfaces and as described in detail above.
### 7.14 Mapping of Services, Algorithms, and Critical Security Parameters

The following table maps the services to their corresponding algorithms and critical security parameters (CSPs).

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Algorithms</th>
<th>CSPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Up and Power Down</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm Providers and Properties</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generation</td>
<td>AES-256 CTR DRBG NDRNG (allowed, used to provide entropy to DRBG)</td>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed AES-CTR DRBG Entropy Input AES-CTR DRBG V AES-CTR DRBG Key</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key and Key-Pair Generation</td>
<td>RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, AES, and HMAC (RC2, RC4, and DES cannot be used in FIPS mode.)</td>
<td>Symmetric Keys Asymmetric Public Keys Asymmetric Private Keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
<td>SP 800-38F AES Key Wrapping (128, 192, and 256)</td>
<td>Symmetric Keys Asymmetric Public Keys Asymmetric Private Keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>Triple-DES with 2 key (encryption disallowed) and 3 key in ECB, CBC, CFB8 and CFB64 modes; AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in ECB, CBC, CFB8, CFB128, and CTR modes; AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM, CMAC, and GMAC modes; AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 GCM decryption; XTS-AES XTS-128 and XTS-256; SP 800-56B RSADP mod 2048; IEEE 1619-2007 XTS-AES (non-FIPS Approved algorithm) (RC2, RC4, RSA, and DES, which cannot be used in FIPS mode)</td>
<td>Symmetric Keys Asymmetric Public Keys Asymmetric Private Keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashing and Message Authentication</td>
<td>FIPS 180-4 SHS SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512; FIPS 180-4 SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 HMAC; AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 in CCM, CMAC, and GMAC; MD5 and HMAC-MD5 (allowed in TLS and EAP-TLS); MD2 and MD4 (disallowed in FIPS mode)</td>
<td>Symmetric Keys (for HMAC, AES CCM, AES CMAC, and AES GMAC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Signing and Verification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIPS 186-4 RSA (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS) digital signature generation and verification with 2048 and 3072 modulus; supporting SHA-1⁷, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512</th>
<th>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric ECDSA Public keys</th>
<th>Asymmetric ECDSA Private keys</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIPS 186-4 ECDSA with the following NIST curves: P-256, P-384, P-521</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Secret Agreement and Key Derivation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KAS – SP 800-56A Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement; Finite Field Cryptography (FFC)</th>
<th>DH Private and Public Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KAS – SP 800-56A EC Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement</td>
<td>ECDH Private and Public Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP 800-108 Key Derivation Function (KDF) CMAC-AES (128, 192, 256), HMAC (SHA1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP 800-132 PBKDF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP 800-135 IKEv1 and IKEv2 KDF primitives</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy CAPI KDF (cannot be used in FIPS mode)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Show Status

| None | None |

### Self-Tests

| See Section 10 Self-Tests for the list of algorithms | None |

### Zeroization

| None | All CSPs |

---

### 7.15 Mapping of Services, Export Functions, and Invocations

The following table maps the services to their corresponding export functions and invocations.

| Table 3 |
|---|---|---|
| **Service** | **Export Functions** | **Invocations** |
| Power Up and Power Down | Driver Entry, Driver Unload | This service is fully automatic. The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed upon startup of this module. |
| Algorithm Providers and Properties | BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider, BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider, BCryptSetProperty, BCryptGetProperty | The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is... |

---

⁷ SHA-1 is only acceptable for legacy signature verification.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generation</td>
<td>BcryptGenRandom</td>
<td>The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SystemPrng</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EntropyRegisterSource</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EntropyUnregisterSource</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EntropyProvideData</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EntropyPoolTriggerReseedForLum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key and Key-Pair Generation</td>
<td>BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey</td>
<td>The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptGenerateKeyPair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptFinalizeKeyPair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDuplicateKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDestroyKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
<td>BCryptImportKey</td>
<td>The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptImportKeyPair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptExportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>BCryptEncrypt</td>
<td>The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDecrypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashing and Message Authentication</td>
<td>BCryptCreateHash</td>
<td>The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptHashData</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDuplicateHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptFinishHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptDestroyHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptCreateMultiHash</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptProcessMultiOperations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing and Verification</td>
<td>BCryptSignHash</td>
<td>The User / Cryptographic Officer does not take any actions to explicitly start this service. This service is executed whenever one of these exported functions is called.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BCryptVerifySignature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 7.16 Non-Approved Services

The following table lists other non-security relevant or non-approved APIs exported from the crypto module.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCryptDeriveKeyCapi</td>
<td>Derives a key from a hash value. This function is provided as a helper function to assist in migrating from legacy Cryptography API (CAPI) to CNG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslDecryptPacket</td>
<td>Supports Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol functionality. These functions are non-approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslEncryptPacket</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SslExportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SsslFreeObject</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SsslImportKey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SsslLookupCipherLengths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SsslLookupCipherSuiteInfo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SsslOpenProvider</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8  Authentication
See Section 6.3 Operator Authentication.

9  Security Relevant Data Items
The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module uses the following security relevant data items.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Relevant Data Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
<td>Keys used for AES or Triple-DES encryption/decryption. Key sizes for AES are 128, 192, and 256 bits, and key sizes for Triple-DES are 192 and 128 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMAC keys</td>
<td>Keys used for HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256, HMAC-SHA384, and HMAC-SHA512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the verification of ECDSA digital signatures. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric ECDSA Private Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the calculation of ECDSA digital signatures. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Public Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the verification of RSA digital signatures. Key sizes are 2048 and 3072 bits. These keys can be produced using RSA Key Generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric RSA Private Keys</td>
<td>Keys used for the calculation of RSA digital signatures. Key sizes are 2048 and 3072 bits. These keys can be produced using RSA Key Generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Seed</td>
<td>A 384 bit secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the seed material for AES-CTR DRBG output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG Entropy Input</td>
<td>A secret value that is at least 256 bits and maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG V</td>
<td>A 128 bit secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES-CTR DRBG key</td>
<td>A 256 bit secret value maintained internal to the module that provides the entropy material for AES-CTR DRBG output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DH Private and Public values</td>
<td>Private and public values used for Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Key sizes are 2048 to 4096 bits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECDH Private and Public values</td>
<td>Private and public values used for EC Diffie-Hellman key establishment. Curve sizes are P-256, P-384, and P-521.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.1 Access Control Policy

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module allows controlled access to the security relevant data items contained within it. The following table defines the access that a service has to each. The permissions are categorized as a set of four separate permissions: read (r), write (w), execute (x), delete (d). If no permission is listed, the service has no access to the item. The User and Cryptographic Officer roles have the same access to keys so roles are not distinguished in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library crypto module</th>
<th>Service Access Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetric encryption/decryption keys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Up and Power Down</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algorithm Providers and Properties</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Number Generation</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key and Key-Pair Generation</td>
<td>wd wd wd wd wd wd wd x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Entry and Output</td>
<td>rw rw rw rw rw rw rw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encryption and Decryption</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashing and Message Authentication</td>
<td>wx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signing and Verification</td>
<td>x x x x x x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secret Agreement and Key Derivation</td>
<td>x x x x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Show Status</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Tests</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeroization</td>
<td>wd wd wd wd wd wd wd wd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9.2 Key Material

When Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library is loaded in the Windows 10 OEs Operating System kernel, no keys exist within it. A kernel module is responsible for importing keys into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library or using Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library’s functions to generate keys.
9.3 Key Generation

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can create and use keys for the following algorithms: RSA, DH, ECDH, ECDSA, RC2, RC4, DES, Triple-DES, AES, and HMAC. However, RC2, RC4, and DES cannot be used in FIPS mode.

Random keys can be generated by calling the BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() and BCryptGenerateKeyPair() functions. Random data generated by the BCryptGenRandom() function is provided to BCryptGenerateSymmetricKey() function to generate symmetric keys. DES, Triple-DES, AES, RSA, ECDSA, DH, and ECDH keys and key-pairs are generated following the techniques given in SP 800-56Ar2 (Section 5.8.1).

Keys generated while not operating in the FIPS mode of operation (as described in section 2) cannot be used in FIPS mode, and vice versa.

9.4 Key Establishment

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use FIPS approved Diffie-Hellman key agreement (DH), Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key agreement (ECDH), RSA key transport and manual methods to establish keys. Alternatively, the module can also use Approved KDFs to derive key material from a specified secret value or password.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use the following FIPS approved key derivation functions (KDF) from the common secret that is established during the execution of DH and ECDH key agreement algorithms:

- BCRYPT_KDF_SP80056A_CONCAT. This KDF supports the Concatenation KDF as specified in SP 800-56A (Section 5.8.1).
- BCRYPT_KDF_HASH. This KDF supports FIPS approved SP800-56A (Section 5.8), X9.63, and X9.42 key derivation.
- BCRYPT_KDF_HMAC. This KDF supports the IPsec IKEv1 key derivation that is non-Approved but is an allowed legacy implementation in FIPS mode when used to establish keys for IKEv1 as per scenario 4 of IG D.8.

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library can use the following FIPS approved key derivation functions (KDF) from a key handle created from a specified secret or password:

- BCRYPT_SP800108_CTR_HMAC_ALGORITHM. This KDF supports the counter-mode variant of the KDF specified in SP 800-108 (Section 5.1) with HMAC as the underlying PRF.
- BCRYPT_SP80056A_CONCAT_ALGORITHM. This KDF supports the Concatenation KDF as specified in SP 800-56Ar2 (Section 5.8.1).
- BCRYPT_PBKDF2_ALGORITHM. This KDF supports the Password Based Key Derivation Function specified in SP 800-132 (Section 5.3).
- BCRYPT_CAPI_KDF_ALGORITHM. This KDF supports the proprietary KDF described at https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379916.aspx

Note that this KDF cannot be used in FIPS mode.
9.4.1 NIST SP 800-132 Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF)

There are two (2) options presented in NIST SP 800-132, pages 8 – 10, that are used to derive the Data Protection Key (DPK) from the Master Key. With the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library, it is up to the caller to select the option to generate/protect the DPK. For example, DPAPI uses option 2a. Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library provides all the building blocks for the caller to select the desired option.

The Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library supports the following HMAC hash functions as parameters for PBKDF:

- SHA-1 HMAC
- SHA-256 HMAC
- SHA-384 HMAC
- SHA-512 HMAC

Keys derived from passwords, as shown in SP 800-132, may only be used in storage applications. In order to run in a FIPS Approved manner, strong passwords must be used and they may only be used for storage applications. The password/passphrase length is enforced by the caller of the PBKDF interfaces at the time the password/passphrase is created and not by this cryptographic module. (This module is not involved in the creation of any password/passphrase.)

For an example of usage, examine Boot Manager’s support for BitLocker® encrypted volumes. In this case, for the password that is used in key derivation, 128 bits of entropy are generated from the system DRBG, then converted into 40 digits (3.2 bits of entropy per digit), which are then broken into groups of five digits that are each multiplied by 11 to create six digit groupings for parity/correctness checking on user entry. This password has 128-bit security. The upper bound for the probability of having this parameter guessed at random is $1/2^{128}$. This probability is not only based on the length of the password, but also the difficulty of guessing it.

9.4.2 NIST SP 800-38F AES Key Wrapping

As outlined in FIPS 140-2 IG, D.2 and D.9, AES key wrapping serves as a form of key transport, which in turn is a form of key establishment. This implementation of AES key wrapping is in accordance with NIST SP 800-38F Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping.

9.5 Key Entry and Output

Keys can be both exported and imported out of and into Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library via BCryptExportKey(), BCryptImportKey(), and BCryptImportKeyPair() functions.

Symmetric key entry and output can also be done by exchanging keys using the recipient’s asymmetric public key via BCryptSecretAgreement() and BCryptDeriveKey() functions.

Exporting the RSA private key by supplying a blob type of BCRYPT_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOB, BCRYPT_RSAFULLPRIVATE_BLOB, or BCRYPT_RSAPRIVATE_BLOB to BCryptExportKey() is not allowed in FIPS mode.
9.6 Key Storage
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library does not provide persistent storage of keys.

9.7 Key Archival
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library does not directly archive cryptographic keys. A user may choose to export a cryptographic key (cf. “Key Entry and Output” above), but management of the secure archival of that key is the responsibility of the user. All key copies inside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library are destroyed and their memory location zeroized after used. It is the caller’s responsibility to maintain the security of Triple DES and HMAC keys when the keys are outside Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library.

9.8 Key Zeroization
All keys are destroyed and their memory location zeroized when the operator calls BCryptDestroyKey() or BCryptDestroySecret() on that key handle.

10 Self-Tests

10.1 Power-On Self-Tests
Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library automatically performs the following power-on (startup) self-tests upon loading of the CNG.SYS driver through its default entry point (DriverEntry).

- HMAC (SHA-1, SHA-256, and SHA-512) Known Answer Tests
- Triple-DES encrypt/decrypt ECB Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt ECB Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt CCM Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt CBC Known Answer Tests
- AES-128 CMAC Known Answer Test
- AES-128 encrypt/decrypt GCM Known Answer Tests
- XTS-AES encrypt/decrypt Known Answer Tests
- RSA sign/verify Known Answer Tests using RSA_SJA256_PKCS1 signature generation and verification
- ECDSA sign/verify Known Answer Tests on P256 curve
- DH secret agreement Known Answer Test with 2048-bit key
- ECDH secret agreement Known Answer Test on P256 curve
- SP 800-90A AES-256 counter mode DRBG Known Answer Tests (instantiate, generate and reseed)
- SP 800-108 KDF Known Answer Test
- SP 800-132 PBKDF Known Answer Test

In all cases for any failure of a power-on (startup) self-test, the Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library module will not load and status will be returned. The only way to recover from the failure of a
10.2 Conditional Self-Tests

Kernel Mode Cryptographic Primitives Library performs pair-wise consistency checks upon each invocation of RSA, ECDH, and ECDSA key-pair generation and import as defined in FIPS 140-2. A Continuous Random Number Generator Test (CRNGT) is used for the random number generators and the Deterministic Random Bit Generator (DRBG) of this cryptographic module, which includes the SP 800-90A AES-256 CTR DRBG. All approved and non-approved DRBGs have a CRNGT. If the conditional self-test fails, the module will not load and status will be returned. If the status is not STATUS_SUCCESS, then that is the indicator a conditional self-test failed.

- CRNGTs for SP 800-90A AES-CTR DRBG and non-Approved NDRNG (entropy pool)
- Pairwise consistency test for RSA
- Pairwise consistency test for ECDSA key generation
- Pairwise consistency tests for Diffie-Hellman and EC Diffie-Hellman prime value generation
- Assurances for SP 800-56A (According to sections 5.5.2, 5.6.2, and 5.6.3 of the standard)
- DRBG health test for SP 800-90A AES-CTR

11 Design Assurance

The secure installation, generation, and startup procedures of this cryptographic module are part of the overall operating system secure installation, configuration, and startup procedures for the Windows 10 OEs. The various methods of delivery and installation for each product are listed in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Delivery and Installation Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Download that updates to Windows 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Enterprise IT deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface Book, Surface Pro 4, Surface Pro 3, Surface 3, Lumia 950, Windows Storage Server 2016</td>
<td>• Pre-installed by the OEM (Microsoft)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After the operating system has been installed, it must be configured by enabling the "System cryptography: Use FIPS compliant algorithms for encryption, hashing, and signing" policy setting followed by restarting the system. This procedure is all the crypto officer and user behavior necessary for the secure operation of this cryptographic module.
An inspection of authenticity of the physical medium can be made by following the guidance at this Microsoft web site: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/howtotell/default.aspx

The installed version of Windows 10 OEs must be verified to match the version that was validated. See Appendix A for details on how to do this.

For Windows Updates, the client only accepts binaries signed by Microsoft certificates. The Windows Update client only accepts content whose SHA-2 hash matches the SHA-2 hash specified in the metadata. All metadata communication is done over a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) port. Using SSL ensures that the client is communicating with the real server and so prevents a spoof server from sending the client harmful requests. The version and digital signature of new cryptographic module releases must be verified to match the version that was validated. See Appendix A for details on how to do this.

12 Mitigation of Other Attacks

The following table lists the mitigations of other attacks for this cryptographic module:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Protected Against</th>
<th>Mitigation</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHA1</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant Time Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory Access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA2</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant Time Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory Access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triple-DES</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant Time Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES</td>
<td>Timing Analysis Attack</td>
<td>Constant Time Implementation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cache Attack</td>
<td>Memory Access pattern is independent of any confidential data</td>
<td>Protected Against Cache attacks only when used with AES NI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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13 Security Levels
The security level for each FIPS 140-2 security requirement is given in the following table.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Requirement</th>
<th>Security Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Specification</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roles, Services, and Authentication</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finite State Model</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Security</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cryptographic Key Management</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI/EMC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Tests</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Assurance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitigation of Other Attacks</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Additional Details
For the latest information on Microsoft Windows, check out the Microsoft web site at:

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windows

For more information about FIPS 140 validations of Microsoft products, please see:

15 Appendix A – How to Verify Windows Versions and Digital Signatures

15.1 How to Verify Windows Versions

The installed version of Windows 10 OEs must be verified to match the version that was validated using the following method:

1. In the Search box type "cmd" and open the Command Prompt desktop app.
2. The command window will open.
3. At the prompt, enter “ver”.
4. The version information will be displayed in a format like this:
   Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.xxxxx]

If the version number reported by the utility matches the expected output, then the installed version has been validated to be correct.

15.2 How to Verify Windows Digital Signatures

After performing a Windows Update that includes changes to a cryptographic module, the digital signature and file version of the binary executable file must be verified. This is done like so:

1. Open a new window in Windows Explorer.
2. Type “C:\Windows\” in the file path field at the top of the window.
3. Type the cryptographic module binary executable file name (for example, “CNG.SYS”) in the search field at the top right of the window, then press the Enter key.
4. The file will appear in the window.
5. Right click on the file’s icon.
6. Select Properties from the menu and the Properties window opens.
7. Select the Details tab.
8. Note the File version Property and its value, which has a number in this format: xx.x.xxxxx.xxxx.
9. If the file version number matches one of the version numbers that appear at the start of this security policy document, then the version number has been verified.
10. Select the Digital Signatures tab.
11. In the Signature list, select the Microsoft Windows signer.
12. Click the Details button.
13. Under the Digital Signature Information, you should see: “This digital signature is OK.” If that condition is true, then the digital signature has been verified.