

**From:** [800-171comments@list.nist.gov](mailto:800-171comments@list.nist.gov) on behalf of [REDACTED]  
**To:** [800-171comments@list.nist.gov](mailto:800-171comments@list.nist.gov)  
**Subject:** [800-171 Comments] Comments on NIST 800-171  
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**Attachments:** [Feedback on 171R3.xlsx](#)

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Below comments submitted for your consideration.

I wanted to thank the NIST team for the great, professional job you have done with this. In several instances, I still have serious concerns. You have done a great job of reformatting and adding clarity though. Thank you for your entire team's efforts in this.

W/r  
Vince



**Vince Scott**  
CEO and Founder  
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Submitted By	Type	Source	Starting Page #	Line	Page #	Comment	Suggested Change
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		25-26	1.1	<p>not collecting information on behalf of a Federal agency. Under standing n s that under the current regulation we collect CUI information on behalf of a contract, on our contract network, and on devices with 32CFR2002. The purpose of this regulation is to ensure that the information is collected on behalf of a Federal agency.</p> <p>The whole language s</p> <p>The purpose of this publication is to provide federal agencies with recommended security requirements for protecting the confidentiality of CUI.</p> <p>When the CUI is resident in a nonfederal system and a contractor.</p> <p>When the nonfederal system is not collecting information on behalf of a Federal agency or using an open system on behalf of an agency.</p> <p>So concern with the first bullet</p> <p>Using an open system on behalf of an agency. Concern with the second half of the second bullet. This is the GDOO scenario. But when the nonfederal system is not collecting information on behalf of a Federal agency, it is not that part of the sentence. Recommendation is to change the second bullet into two which believe then represents the intent aligned with 32CFR2002.</p> <p>When the nonfederal system is collecting information on behalf of a Federal agency.</p> <p>When the nonfederal system is not using an open system on behalf of an agency.</p> <p>This may be an editing error where the concatenation of the two phrases was changed the meaning slightly.</p>	<p>Recommend editing the second bullet into two which believe then represents the intent aligned with 32CFR2002.</p> <p>When the nonfederal system is collecting information on behalf of a Federal agency.</p> <p>When the nonfederal system is not using an open system on behalf of an agency.</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		31	1.1	<p>Existing scoping language is interpreted to be overly broad, resulting in all requirements applying to any component providing security functionality (such as NTP servers, log servers, and configuration management databases) without regard to whether the component could affect the confidentiality of CUI. Suggested change: "The security requirements in this publication are only applicable to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such components." To "The security requirements in this publication are applicable to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI. Security requirements may be performed by other components in order to protect CUI components."</p> <p>The intent of the NIST current language, and renewed emphasis on "or" in revision 3, is to enhance the security of CUI. However, by expanding the scope of applicability by NIST is exceeding the authority under the regulations. NIST has been charged with defining the security requirements for CUI assets and systems only. As currently worded it opens the door to massive scope expansion for the requirements that is unexecutable. Recommend modification to the language above.</p>	<p>Change "The security requirements in this publication are only applicable to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI or that provide protection for such components." to "The security requirements in this publication are applicable to components of nonfederal systems that process, store, or transmit CUI. Security requirements may be performed by other components in order to protect CUI components."</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		137	3.1.1	<p>Need to know is not the standard of access per 32CFR2002. It is lawful government purpose. Refer to 32 CFR 2002.16(a)(1)(i). Recommend changing the language to lawful government purpose.</p>	<p>Change language to lawful government purpose</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		148	3.1.1	<p>Recommend using the word may before include.</p>	<p>Recommend using the word may before include.</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		166	3.1.2	<p>Consider whether the access control policies should be (Assignment of organizationally defined access control policies)</p>	<p>Change to ODP</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		181	3.1.3	<p>Consider if approved authorization should be (Assignment of organizationally defined approved authorization)</p>	<p>Change to ODP</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		180-209	3.1.3	<p>The discussion on section 3.1.3 does not mention CUI and focuses strictly on the technical aspects of flow control. It is important for organizations to actually control the flow of CUI in order to protect confidentiality, and this control should include a combination of policy, procedure, and technical flow controls that support these policies and procedures. Recommend NIST add at least some language in the discussion on access to aspects of flow control.</p>	<p>Add language on CUI</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		186	3.1.3	<p>Recommend changing export control information to CUI. Recommend using may in front of include.</p>	<p>Change export control to CUI. Insert may in front of include.</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		357-385	3.1.12	<p>The e-commerce multiplatform definition in the NIST glossary of remote access. In paragraph 3.1.12, Access by users (of information systems) communication external to an information system system type multiplatform definition in the NIST glossary of remote access. In paragraph 3.1.12, Access by users (of information systems) communication external to an information system system type multiplatform definition in the NIST glossary of remote access. In paragraph 3.1.12, Access by users (of information systems) communication external to an information system system type multiplatform definition in the NIST glossary of remote access.</p> <p>In the mode in context of commercial networks generally have components that communicate using external networks. Indeed, we would imagine that the Federal Government networks do well in many ways that are not obvious to the system engineer and generally not considered. Any organization with more than one location likely uses some form of external network for communication even if that is a dedicated leased line. From an OIG perspective, Federal agencies should not be considered. Request NIST for the purposes of NIST 800-171 Rev 3 adopt the definition of information outside the security perimeter. This is a change from Rev 2, however, the R2 definition involves remote access controls on systems and operations that are effectively in the world of information but not remote. This change would allow these controls to (operate) and to the benefit of better security focus on fully remote connections from outside the system, rather than internal connections that happen to travel over a network not owned by the organization.</p>	<p>Change definition to 800-82 definition</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		630-631	3.3.2	<p>3.3.2 add content. Specifying physical location for where an event occurred will be extremely challenging if not impossible. This information can be developed and correlated but having to contain each audit event is not executable. Recommend using where from the list of elements. Likewise the density of an individual impacted by an event can equate to relevant analysis and is not contained in individual event data. Recommend defining language that identifies that event to you to capture all of these data elements so that thorough analysis when needed you can assemble the story. It is not needed for each individual logged event to contain all of these data elements.</p>	<p>Use where from the list of elements</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		645-646	3.3.3	<p>The combination of 3.3.3b heuristics leads to a conclusion on whether a logged event must contain all of the data elements listed. It is necessary to capture logs that do NOT contain all of these elements because they are not available at the application log level. If the assessment purposes we must show that each event record contains what type of event occurred, time when the event occurred, identity of an associated individual, subject, object, event, location, and density of the event. Logically, it is the most problematic. Again, this information can be developed from the total of the audit event logs; however, defining language is needed to ensure that is not repeated by organizations and associated assessors that this means all elements are included in each event.</p>	<p>Use qualifying language may include</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		705-718	3.3.6	<p>Audit event reduction. Does not explicitly impact the confidentiality of CUI but a cultural by the event reduction aspect. Recommend the event. This is a good thing to have and provide after the fact analysis capabilities to better examine and manage logs, however, the fact capabilities does not explicitly impact the confidentiality of CUI.</p>	<p>Recommend removal</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		741-753	3.3.8	<p>Does not explicitly impact the confidentiality of CUI. Recommend removal.</p>	<p>Recommend removal</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		754-764	3.3.9	<p>Does not explicitly impact the confidentiality of CUI. Recommend removal.</p>	<p>Recommend removal</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		871-872	3.4.6	<p>As written seems to say that a defined protocol, protocols, and functions must be disabled. In reality we want to disable/remove functions on behalf of the event. Rather than say "disabled" in 3.4.6b, recommend "on behalf of the event" or "disabled" to be added to clause. The information regarding the assessment objectives for this following the event pattern, PoB to a Restated, Functions are established etc tied to an assessment event to identify all functions and established on some functions on a defined set of all services (as defined in the functional purpose and protocols), and a block of some of those, etc. Go through that and identify to block them if they are not needed, say, using blocked ports to a defined function on a protocol. You will see that is not only challenging, but an exercise of time and effort that does not add to security. Recommend the formulation of the AOs leaving things rolled up rather than breaking down by each conjunction as the break down assessment purposes leads to a lot of effort that does not promote information security or the confidentiality of CUI.</p>	<p>Change to phobbed or established 3.4.6b.</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		895-922	3.4.8	<p>Allow software by exception only. Recommend removal. Although CM(7)S is now included in the Moderate baseline this is not a moderate control in commercial enterprise. Removal of the blacklist option for the control of software will represent an incredibly massive level of expenditure for implementation across commercial IT that is not set up to operate in this fashion. It will be equally challenging across large and small organizations although for a few reasons. This should be reserved for 172 implementation and not implemented in 171.</p>	<p>Move to 172</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		940-957	3.4.10	<p>System Component Inventory. The discussion on section 3.4.10 adds enormous elements that add nothing to the confidentiality of CUI. Realize that if you say the inventory includes system components, and then system components has a domain, software, firmware, system name, software owner, software version, software, hardware inventory specification (how this is defined) on hardware, software license information, machine names (how this is defined) in the system name, network address (how can I include IP address in the inventory when they are dynamic allocated?) date of acquisition, model, manufacturer, supplier information, component type, and physical location (so every time an employee leaves work to go home, I have to update the location of the laptop inventory by). In line 950 line 1 may between components and includes, as in effect we accountability of system components may include... Also, inventory specifications may include... Other way you are entering a component for a company to invest in mass inventory management capabilities to cover each new specification data type in a way that does nothing to enhance the confidentiality of Federal CUI.</p>	<p>Use may include</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1016	3.5.2	<p>Insert the word can into Systems use shared as in Systems can use shared... do not seem to be mandated a particular technology to meet the status of the control. For example a small business might meet the control with physical security controls. Only Bob has the key to the room with the small server the business uses and stores the CUI. Bob usually respects Paul's computer to ensure it is on his authorized inventory list before allowing Paul into the CUI room that has the server. One possible scenario... I can also envision other token based, user, sensitive, technologies for event device control on...</p>	<p>Insert the word can</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1060	3.5.5	<p>Insert the word may as follows: Cha act sct that identify... You do not want to mandate the discussion on equipment to say identify for general purpose equipment in the DIB. For multi-national companies where the engineer? Every US person working for BAE needs to have FN in the email address? John-smith@bae.com? Every non-US person working for a US based DIB contractor must have FN in the email address? The intent of the control is to slow flow. This is an ODP. The discussion on written seems to walk that back and specify a data type that must be included.</p>	<p>Insert the word may</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1072-1073	3.5.7	<p>You should not mandate the allowance of spaces and all printable characters in passwords. Many legacy systems do not allow this and I will cause a great amount of problems when not meaningfully help security. The exception on access controls, unlike the government accommodation legacy system elements we've yet to define to obtain. Effectively impossible for most. It would be better to specify security and implementable to mandate a minimum password length, rather than specifying characters that must be allowable in a password. An eight character password, uniformly to all the standards for many, with a space, is a long character password. Recommend using including, where implementable, spaces and all printable... Also, recommend considering adding a minimum password length. 12-14 character at a minimum. That is one that would add a lot of value to security, is implementable, and we need NIST's authority to state a longer password. Cryptographically, a minimum of 8 characters is woefully insufficient. This recommendation is a departure from our normal recommendations of not specifying how to implement, however in this case we feel warranted based on the significant impact to security, and relatively low cost to implement. This change (specifying a length not a complex type of element) is consistent with NIST's emphasis on how to better educate against brute force password attacks.</p>	<p>Remove implementable including a space password. Specify minimum password length.</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1090	3.5.7	<p>Insert 'may' as password may include... do not mandate that all elements must be present in all lists</p>	<p>Insert may</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1123	3.5.12	<p>On change default authentication to a protocol to use. This may often not be possible. Passwords are a new one. It has a default password, Admin. I must log in (I use) with the default password of no de to change to something else. From an assessment perspective, how do I prove no default of a default? Even when it is possible? If an authenticator is something like a GAC or a how can I change to a protocol to use? I cannot change my thumbprint or a protocol to use. The goal is not to deploy the suite with the default password of no de. As we did though and when authenticator has been defined to mean many different things, this needs to be removed, moved, or added. One possible approach is the addition of when possible. at the end of the sentence. Another would be to specify change a default authentication to set on a system or device before use in a protected system.</p>	<p>Insert when possible otherwise adjust language to allow authenticator on methods that cannot be changed to a protocol to use.</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1234	3.7.4	<p>Recommend remove the word maintenance. Check the line and prevent the removal of equipment containing CUI. So we do not want to be just maintenance equipment that is prevented from being removed without being CUI checked but all equipment.</p>	<p>Remove maintenance</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1301	3.7.5	<p>Insert into multiplatform definition may include... other way we see the discussion could be interpreted to mandate a set of controls, controls, and check in and out of a digital and non-digital media. So every time a piece of CUI page would have to be numbered, entered into the CUI inventory, logged, added, etc. Note this is a huge equipment that applies to most class of information and class of digital media. Yes, it needs to be locked, it needs to be labeled and controlled, but defining controls as being and locking every item is above and beyond moderate. To unclassified information on controlling that the USG does not impose that element on much more sensitive class of information.</p>	<p>Insert may</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1312-1315	3.8.2	<p>Agenda the discussion on expands the equipment to an equipment that a CUI media must be added and accounted for individually. Agenda this is above and beyond the equipment elements generally applied to class I media and a not moderate. Recommend adding. May include conducting inventory, etc.</p>	<p>Insert may</p>
Vicent Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication		1320	3.8.3	<p>Recommend adding off-site before a reference. Technically as written says, San'te system media containing CUI to a reference. So the organization authorized CUI (if personnel access the system media) is a reference, agenda the status of being authorized to use CUI to a reference. So if my laptop has the issue, and I go to a remote access to fix that issue, the laptop must be sanitized. I realize that is not the intent. That is what the control says however. Recommend adjusting the wording to make it clear that this is before a session by someone who is not authorized. CUI, it must be sanitized.</p>	<p>Insert offsite</p>

Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1337	3.8.4	As written this goes counter to the NARA guidance for marking systems with a content need in the NARA CUI marking guide, version 1.1 December 2016. It says specifically on page 23 "Media such as USB sticks, hard drives, and CD ROMs must be marked to hold a copy of the content of the device. Due to space limitations it may not be possible to include CUI Category, Subcategory, or Limited Dissemintation Control Markings. Recommended markings to mark a system with NARA or other agency specific marking guidance. You might even enter a marking that is an ODP while NARA and DoD already have a marking that is specifically defined. NIST should not equate markings with NARA."	Recommend changing this to: Mark system with a content need in accordance with NARA or other agency specific marking guidance.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1354	3.8.5	This removes the capability to protect digital media during transport through physical protection mechanisms, for example a locked container. As written this moves the 800-53 requirement from a marking requirement to a control requirement. Recommend continuing to a low security transport without encryption as an option. Open only to the extent that the security equipment is used when moving information across a content need system, to a government organization where the government's control is on the information.	Restore option for a native physical control.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1400	3.8.9	The discussion on maintenance of alternative physical controls however the base security equipment only lists cryptographic mechanisms. Recommend the addition of alternative physical controls to the base equipment.	Restore option for a native physical control.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1474-1491	3.10.1	<b>What happens when there is no facility? In the modern cloud world, no company is starting with on-prem systems. They are all cloud, and many in the current remote work environment have no corporate facilities at all, and are completely a cloud based system. How then can they issue authorization credentials for facility access? What if that facility only has a key, and not a badge reader? How are credentials created and issued when they simply lock the front door? As written this looks at the problem completely through the big governments lens and not through the lens by which business often operates. Authorization credentials include ID badges, identification on cards, and smart cards. This essentially mandates that every company in the DIB have a badge system of some kind. That does not match the effect we secure operation of small and medium sized businesses in many cases. Recommend moving this to an NFO.</b>	Move to NFO
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1601	3.11.2	Insecure policy introduced when new vulnerability is potentially affecting the system is identified. If already known the vulnerability impacts the system, I don't need to scan for it.	Insecure policy
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1620	3.11.2	Insecure should not organizations should consider	Insecure should
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1632	3.11.2	Based on the 3.12.2.1e 1685 comment, recommend removing the discussion on an additional on page 1632. Vulnerability identified at should be acknowledged to identify all open vulnerabilities, the status, and those under ongoing remediation on mitigation on the timeline for conducting that remediation on mitigation. This is similar language as a substitute for mandating that vulnerability identified at be acknowledged on the equalization mandated POAM as outlined in 3.11.4.	Recommend removing the discussion on an additional on page 1632. Vulnerability identified at should be acknowledged to identify all open vulnerabilities, the status, and those under ongoing remediation on mitigation on the timeline for conducting that remediation on mitigation.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1638-1652	3.11.4	Remove the language around POAM removal. This is being to do what how an organization conducts the risk management process and then solely about risks as IT risks, and I suspect it comes from a vision that conflates risks and vulnerabilities (they are different things) that seems to eschew the control framework. From an equality perspective also clutter the use of the POAM as a mandated mechanism for controlling and risk control of risks. All risks are NOT control of risks is not a binary thing that can always be fixed or implemented. Often the mitigation on ongoing for ever. The risks exist. Supply chain risk is ongoing for ever. I know of a number of organizations that do not have a good job of identifying and mitigating risks, and the processes do not include putting things into a POAM, yet they continue to track and mitigate those risks. Curiously the number of ways to address this. Mandating inclusion in the POAM will cause issues with governance processes broadly in a way that does nothing to decrease the risk to the confidentiality of CUI.	Remove language around POAM removal.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1665-1666	3.12.1	and ensure compliance to vulnerability mitigation on occurrence. Recommend removal of this phrase. Vulnerability mitigation on occurrence is a subset of the 110 security requirements/control. The ease and ease of vulnerability management process across many of them (I would prefer to see them tightly bundled but a large concern is that they likely elude the vulnerability management, and cover them in one place. This phrase is just muddy water that is already muddy enough around this topic.	Remove phrase
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1675-1677	3.12.1	Organizations can choose to use other types of assessment and verification, such as vulnerability scanning and system monitoring, to maintain the security posture of the system during the lifecycle. Recommend removing this sentence. It implies that vulnerability scanning is a substitute for security assessment and that is NOT the case. No is the armor phorus system to require a substitute for the security assessment process.	Remove sentence
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1684	3.12.2	Two of the actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies in controls. Control of failures can be identified at times other than control assessments, like incident response. If you find a control of failure to correct on should go on the POAM. Agree with the other you found it.	Two of the actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies in controls.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1685	3.12.2	We note that this is in the CA-S control, however the removal of bullet 2. We cannot mandate the inclusion of a vulnerability identified in the system in the POAM. This is like the DoD mandate that assessments cannot be until all POAM items are closed as well, even for a moderate sized organization at any given time this is likely thousands of entries. For large organizations potentially in the tens of thousands. The vulnerability management process should not be forced to be conflated with the control management process. This is deep in the weeds of how to and recommend that NIST should stick to what needs to be done to the maximum extent possible rather than being that a vulnerability identified in the system is a compliance mandated document with compliance mandated forms. Under vulnerability management, in the discussion on mandate that vulnerability identified in the system must be tracked. We have added a recommendation on the application area line.	Remove bullet 2
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1710	3.12.3	Add the sentence. Identified control of failures should be added to the POAM as indicated in 3.12.2.	Add the sentence. Identified control of failures should be added to the POAM as indicated in 3.12.2.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1733	3.12.6	Insecure CUI exchange information of agreements. So not all agreements but specifically CUI exchange agreements.	Insecure CUI exchange information of agreements.
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1782	3.13.1	Insecure may possibly includes for systems may include... to prevent an interpretation of mandating universal implementation of the three listed activities.	Insecure may possibly includes for systems may include...
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1788	3.13.1	Insecure should not organizations should consider	Insecure should not organizations should consider
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	1867-1888	3.13.8	<b>The theme seems to be to require encryption at rest for all CUI. Based on the "not in process or transit" standard outlined at line 1879 some level of super encryption will be needed for a CUI wherever present in the contractors system. This seems to be a significant uplift from the 800-53 moderate requirement which mitigates this with an ODP. So a scenario. We receive a properly encrypted email document from our government sponsor. We open and decrypt the email using our medium assurance tokens. After reviewing the file we save it to our hard drive. On a laptop with a blocker encryption enabled that would only encrypt when the device was shut down. Based on the not in process standard, it would seem to drive a need for an additional FIPS validated encryption method that would protect the CUI when not in process. Extend this scenario to servers and databases. This will add massive complexity to the CUI handling process across the DIB and exceed the implemented standard in government networks for CUI documents. We recommend that this requirement be reserved for certain types of CUI specified where needed and not be applied to a CUI basis.</b>	Restore a allowance for alternative physical controls
Vincenzo Scott, Defense Cyber security Group	General	Publication	2001	3.14.1	Flaw Remed at on "b. Test software and firmware updates related to flaw remediation on effectiveness and potential side effects before installation"  This does not directly impact the confidentiality of CUI. Side effects are not the problem of CUI confidentiality but of availability of the system. Effectiveness testing beyond the capability of most commercial businesses so the testing that would be done could not be easily determined that for example a zero day has been effectively patched than the testing conducted by the vendor producing the patch. In addition the delays for testing can easily, and do when they are performed, increase the risk of confidentiality because it delays the rollout of needed patches.  This equipment will ensure a net-negative security by businesses. Many businesses typically configure the systems to accept and install vendor security updates automatically. Automatic patching results in much quicker remediation on, which is very important.  The vast majority of business IT departments are less qualified than the tested vendors to test and fix the patches. For example, many companies use Microsoft as one of the primary vendors. Microsoft spends billions of dollars on cybersecurity and the internal testing and development process for patching. This control means we cannot accept such updates from Microsoft, but instead must configure our systems to REJECT patches until the internal IT department manually packages them and pushes them to a test group, then to production.  For a business, this is likely early on exceeds latency before patching from 12 hours to 15-30 days. 2) equipment is added to a network to manage the process, such as a non-FedRAMP patch management solution, which increases the attack surface of the information on system. 3) increases IT burden by about many hours per week conducting testing activities that are less capable than those of the vendor in most cases.  For a typical business implementation this equipment, the proposed benefit testing patches to determine if they are effective is negligible. Unless an explicit control is added to the effect, most business IT departments will not perform network analysis or behavior analysis during testing to identify malicious behavior. They will simply slow down the patching process automatically. This change will result in a net negative for security. For most businesses, the risk of a tested vendor being compromised and pushing a bad patch is less than the unintended consequence of increasing latency in remediation on and increasing attack surface.	Remove equipment