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Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations

A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy

This publication contains comprehensive updates to the Risk Management Framework. These updates include an alignment with the constructs in the NIST Cybersecurity Framework; the integration of privacy risk management processes; an alignment with system life cycle security engineering processes; and the incorporation of supply chain risk management processes. Organizations can use the frameworks and processes in a complementary manner within the RMF to effectively manage security and privacy risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. This update includes organization-wide RMF tasks that are designed to prepare information system owners to conduct system-level risk management activities. The intent is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the RMF by establishing a closer connection to the organization's missions and business functions and improving the communications among senior leaders, managers, and operational personnel.

JOINT TASK FORCE

FINAL PUBLIC DRAFT



Draft NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 2

Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations

A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy

October 2018



U.S. Department of Commerce Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

42 The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information Technology Laboratory 43 (ITL) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the 44 Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference 45 data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development 46 and productive use of information technology (IT). ITL's responsibilities include the development 47 of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-48 effective security of other than national security-related information in federal information 49 systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach 50 efforts in information systems security and privacy and its collaborative activities with industry, 51 government, and academic organizations.

52

Abstract

53 This publication provides guidelines for applying the Risk Management Framework (RMF) to 54 information systems and organizations. The RMF provides a disciplined, structured, and flexible 55 process for managing security and privacy risk that includes information system categorization; 56 control selection, implementation, and assessment; system and common control authorizations; 57 and continuous monitoring. The RMF includes activities to prepare organizations to execute the 58 framework at appropriate risk management levels. The RMF also promotes near real-time risk 59 management and ongoing information system and common control authorization through the 60 implementation of continuous monitoring processes; provides senior leaders and executives 61 with the necessary information to make efficient, cost-effective, risk management decisions 62 about the systems supporting their missions and business functions; and incorporates security 63 and privacy into the system development life cycle. Executing the RMF tasks links essential risk 64 management processes at the system level to risk management processes at the organization 65 level. In addition, it establishes responsibility and accountability for the controls implemented 66 within an organization's information systems and inherited by those systems.

67

Keywords

68 assess; authorization to operate; authorization to use; authorizing official; categorize; common 69 control; common control authorization; common control provider; continuous monitoring; 70 control assessor; control baseline; hybrid control; information owner or steward; monitor; 71 ongoing authorization; plan of action and milestones; privacy; privacy assessment report; 72 privacy control; privacy plan; privacy risk; profile; risk assessment; risk executive function; risk 73 management; risk management framework; security; security assessment report; security 74 control; security plan; security risk; senior agency information security officer; senior agency 75 official for privacy; supply chain risk management; system development life cycle; system 76 owner; system privacy officer; system security officer; system-specific control.

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Notes to Reviewers

- 143 This is the final draft of NIST Special Publication 800-37, Revision 2. We have incorporated
- 144 changes to the publication in response to the comments received during the initial public
- 145 comment period. In addition to seeking your comments on those changes, we are also seeking
- 146 feedback on a new RMF <u>Task P-13</u>, *Information Life Cycle*. The life cycle describes the stages
- 147 through which information passes, typically characterized as creation or collection, processing,
- 148 dissemination, use, storage, and disposition, to include destruction and deletion. Identifying and
- 149 understanding all stages of the information life cycle have significant implications for security
- 150 and privacy. We are seeking comments on how organizations would execute this task and how
- 151 we might provide the most helpful discussion to assist organizations in the execution.
- 152 Your feedback on this draft publication is important to us. We appreciate each contribution
- 153 from our reviewers. The very insightful comments from both the public and private sectors,
- 154 nationally and internationally, continue to help shape the final publication to ensure that it
- 155 meets the needs and expectations of our customers. NIST anticipates publishing the final
- 156 version of this publication by **December 2018**.

157 - **RON ROSS**

158 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Executive Summary

As we push computers to "the edge" building an increasingly complex world of interconnected information systems and devices, security, privacy, and supply chain issues continue to be a large part of the national conversation. The Defense Science Board Report, *Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat* [DSB 2013], provides a sobering assessment of the vulnerabilities in the United States Government, the U.S. critical infrastructure, and the systems that support the mission-essential operations and assets in the public and private sectors.

166 *"…The Task Force notes that the cyber threat to U.S. critical infrastructure is outpacing*

167 efforts to reduce pervasive vulnerabilities, so that for the next decade at least the United States

168 must lean significantly on deterrence to address the cyber threat posed by the most capable

- 169 U.S. adversaries. It is clear that a more proactive and systematic approach to U.S. cyber
- 170 *deterrence is urgently needed..."*

171 There is an urgent need to further strengthen the underlying information systems, component 172 products, and services that we depend on in every sector of the critical infrastructure—ensuring 173 that those systems, products, and services are sufficiently trustworthy throughout the system 174 development life cycle (SDLC) and can provide the necessary resilience to support the economic 175 and national security interests of the United States. System modernization, the aggressive use of 176 automation, and the consolidation, standardization, and optimization of federal systems and 177 networks to strengthen the protection for high-value assets, are key objectives for the federal 178 government.

Executive Order (E.O.) 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical
 Infrastructure [EO 13800] recognizes the increasing interconnectedness of Federal information
 systems and requires agency heads to ensure appropriate risk management not only for the
 Federal agency's enterprise, but also for the Executive Branch as a whole. The E.O. states:

183 "...The executive branch operates its information technology (IT) on behalf of the American people.
184 Its IT and data should be secured responsibly using all United States Government capabilities..."

185 "...Cybersecurity risk management comprises the full range of activities undertaken to protect IT
 186 and data from unauthorized access and other cyber threats, to maintain awareness of cyber
 187 threats, to detect anomalies and incidents adversely affecting IT and data, and to mitigate the
 188 impact of, respond to, and recover from incidents..."

OMB Memorandum M-17-25, *Reporting Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure* [OMB M-17-25] provides
 implementation guidance to Federal agencies for E.O. 13800. The memorandum states:

"... An effective enterprise risk management program promotes a common understanding for
 recognizing and describing potential risks that can impact an agency's mission and the delivery of
 services to the public. Such risks include, but are not limited to, strategic, market, cyber, legal,
 reputational, political, and a broad range of operational risks such as information security, human
 capital, business continuity, and related risks..."

197"... Effective management of cybersecurity risk requires that agencies align information security198management processes with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes..."

OMB Circular A-130, *Managing Information as a Strategic Resource* [OMB A-130], addresses
 responsibilities for protecting federal information resources and for managing personally

- 201 identifiable information (PII). Circular A-130 requires agencies to implement the RMF that is
- 202 described in this guideline and requires agencies to integrate privacy into the RMF process. In
- 203 establishing requirements for information security programs and privacy programs, the OMB
- 204 circular emphasizes the need for both programs to collaborate on shared objectives:
- 205 "While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, they are closely related, and it is
 206 essential for agencies to take a coordinated approach to identifying and managing security and privacy
 207 risks and complying with applicable requirements...."
- 208 This update to NIST Special Publication 800-37 (Revision 2) responds to the call by the Defense
- 209 Science Board, the Executive Order, and the OMB policy memorandum to develop the next-
- 210 generation Risk Management Framework (RMF) for information systems, organizations, and 211 individuals.
- 212 There are seven major objectives for this update:
- To provide closer linkage and communication between the risk management processes and activities at the C-suite or governance level of the organization and the individuals, processes, and activities at the system and operational level of the organization;
- To institutionalize critical risk management preparatory activities at all risk management 217 levels to facilitate a more effective, efficient, and cost-effective execution of the RMF;
- To demonstrate how the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [<u>NIST CSF</u>]can be aligned with the
 RMF and implemented using established NIST risk management processes;
- To integrate privacy risk management processes into the RMF to better support the privacy protection needs for which privacy programs are responsible;
- To promote the development of trustworthy secure software and systems by aligning life
 cycle-based systems engineering processes in NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 1
 [NIST 800-160-1], with the relevant tasks in the RMF;
- To integrate security-related, supply chain risk management (SCRM) concepts into the RMF
 to address untrustworthy suppliers, insertion of counterfeits, tampering, unauthorized
 production, theft, insertion of malicious code, and poor manufacturing and development
 practices throughout the SDLC; and
- To allow for an organization-generated control selection approach to complement the
 traditional baseline control selection approach and support the use of the consolidated
 control catalog in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5.
- The addition of the *Prepare* step is one of the key changes to the RMF—incorporated to achieve
 more effective, efficient, and cost-effective security and privacy risk management processes.
 The primary objectives for institutionalizing organization-level and system-level preparation are:
- To facilitate effective communication between senior leaders and executives at the
 organization and mission/business process levels and system owners at the operational
 level.
- To facilitate organization-wide identification of common controls and the development of
 organization-wide tailored control baselines, reducing the workload on individual system
 owners and the cost of system development and asset protection.

241	 To reduce the complexity of the information technology (IT) and operations technology (OT)
242	infrastructure using Enterprise Architecture concepts and models to consolidate, optimize,
243	and standardize organizational systems, applications, and services.
244	 To identify, prioritize, and focus resources on the organization's high-value assets (HVA) that
245	require increased levels of protection—taking measures commensurate with the risk to such
246	assets.
247 248 249	By achieving the above objectives, organizations can simplify RMF execution, employ innovative approaches for managing risk, and increase the level of automation when carrying out specific tasks. Organizations implementing "RMF 2.0" will be able to:
250 251	 Use the tasks and outputs of the Organization-Level and System-Level Prepare step to promote a consistent starting point within organizations to execute the RMF;
252	 Maximize the use of common controls at the organization level to promote standardized,
253	consistent, and cost-effective security and privacy capability inheritance;
254 255	- Maximize the use of shared or cloud-based systems, services, and applications to reduce the number of authorizations needed across the organization;
256	 Employ organization-wide tailored control baselines to increase the speed of security and
257	privacy plan development and the consistency of security and privacy plan content;
258	 Employ organization-defined controls based on security and privacy requirements
259	generated from a systems security engineering process;
260	 Maximize the use of automated tools to manage security categorization; control selection,
261	assessment, and monitoring; and the authorization process;
262	 Decrease the level of effort and resource expenditures for low-impact systems if those
263	systems cannot adversely affect higher-impact systems through system connections;
264	 Maximize the reuse of RMF artifacts (e.g., security and privacy assessment results) for
265	standardized hardware/software deployments, including configuration settings;
266	 Reduce the complexity of the IT/OT infrastructure by eliminating unnecessary systems,
267	system components, and services — employing the least functionality principle;
268	 Make the transition to ongoing authorization a priority and use continuous monitoring
269	approaches to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of security and privacy programs.
270 271 272 273 274	Recognizing that the preparation for RMF execution may vary from organization to organization, achieving the above objectives can reduce the overall IT/OT footprint and attack surface of organizations, promote IT modernization objectives, conserve resources, prioritize security activities to focus protection strategies on the most critical assets and systems, and promote privacy protections for individuals.

COMMON SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK FOUNDATIONS

In developing standards and guidelines, NIST consults with federal agencies, state, local, and tribal governments, and private sector organizations; avoids unnecessary and costly duplication of effort; and ensures that its publications are complementary with the standards and guidelines used for the protection of national security systems. In addition to implementing a transparent public review process for its publications, NIST collaborates with the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the Committee on National Security Systems, and has established a unified risk management framework for the federal government. This common foundation provides the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities of the federal government and their contractors, cost-effective, flexible, and consistent methods and techniques to manage security and privacy risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The unified framework also provides a strong basis for reciprocal acceptance of assessment results and authorization decisions and facilitates information sharing and collaboration. NIST continues to work with public and private sector entities to establish mappings and relationships between its security and privacy standards and guidelines and those developed by external organizations.

ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

The Risk Management Framework addresses security and privacy risk from two perspectives an information system perspective and a common controls perspective. For an information system, authorizing officials issue an *authorization to operate* or *authorization to use* for the system, accepting the security and privacy risks to the organization's operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. For common controls, authorizing officials issue a *common control authorization* for a specific set of controls that can be inherited by designated organizational systems, accepting the security and privacy risks to the organization's operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Authorizing officials also consider the risk of inheriting common controls as part of their system authorizations. The different types of authorizations are described in <u>Appendix F</u>.

THE RMF IS TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL

The RMF is purposefully designed to be technology neutral so that the methodology can be applied to any type of information system^{*} without modification. While the specific controls selected, control implementation details, and control assessment methods and objects may vary with different types of IT resources, there is no need to adjust the RMF process to accommodate specific technologies.

All information systems process, store, or transmit some type of information. For example, information about the temperature in a remote facility collected and transmitted by a sensor to a monitoring station, location coordinates transmitted by radio to a controller on a weapons system, photographic images transmitted by a remote camera (land/satellite-based) to a server, or health IT devices transmitting patient information via a hospital network, require protection. This information can be protected by: categorizing the information to determine the impact of loss; assessing whether the processing of the information could impact individuals' privacy; and selecting and implementing controls that are applicable to the IT resources in use. Therefore, cloud-based systems, industrial/process control systems, weapons systems, cyber physical systems, applications, IoT devices, or mobile devices/systems, do not require a separate risk management process but rather a tailored control set and specific implementation details determined by applying the existing RMF process.

The RMF is applied iteratively, as applicable, during the system development life cycle for any type of system development approach (including *Agile* and *DevOps* approaches). The security and privacy requirements and controls are implemented, verified, and validated as development progresses throughout the life cycle. This flexibility allows the RMF to support rapid technology cycles, innovation, and the use of current best practices in system and system component development.

* Note: The publication pertains to information systems, which are discrete sets of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information, whether such information is in digital or non-digital form. Information resources include information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology. Therefore, information systems may or may not include hardware, firmware, and software.

USE OF AUTOMATION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE RMF

Organizations should maximize the use of *automation*, wherever possible, to increase the speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of executing the steps in the Risk Management Framework (RMF). Automation is particularly useful in the assessment and continuous monitoring of controls, the preparation of authorization packages for timely decision-making, and the implementation of ongoing authorization approaches—together facilitating a real-time or near real-time risk-based decision-making process for senior leaders. Organizations have significant flexibility in deciding when, where, and how to use automation or automated support tools for their security and privacy programs. In some situations, automated assessments and monitoring of controls may not be possible or feasible.

SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY

This publication is intended to help organizations manage security and privacy risk, and to satisfy the requirements in the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), the Privacy Act of 1974, OMB policies, and Federal Information Processing Standards, among other laws, regulations, and policies. The scope of this publication pertains to federal information systems, which are discrete sets of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information, whether such information is in digital or non-digital form. Information resources include information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology.

MANAGING RISK

Using the Cybersecurity Framework

Executive Order (E.O.) 13800 requires federal agencies to modernize their IT infrastructure and systems and recognizes the increasing interconnectedness of federal information systems and networks. The E.O. also requires agency heads to manage risk at the agency level and across the Executive Branch using the *Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity* (also known as the Cybersecurity Framework). And finally, the E.O. reinforces the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 by holding agency heads accountable for managing the cybersecurity risk to their organizations.

The Cybersecurity Framework is adaptive to provide a flexible and risk-based implementation that can be used with a broad array of cybersecurity risk management processes. Therefore, consistent with OMB Memorandum M-17-25, the federal implementation of the Cybersecurity Framework fully supports the use of and is consistent with the risk management processes and approaches defined in [SP 800-39] and NIST Special Publication 800-37. This allows agencies to meet their concurrent obligations to comply with the requirements of FISMA and E.O. 13800.

Each task in the RMF includes references to specific sections in the Cybersecurity Framework. For example, <u>Task P-2</u>, *Risk Management Strategy*, aligns with the Cybersecurity Framework Core [Identify Function]; <u>Task P-4</u>, *Organization-Wide Tailored Control Baselines and Profiles*, aligns with Cybersecurity Framework Profile construct; and <u>Task R-5</u>, *Authorization Reporting*, and <u>Task M-5</u>, *Posture Reporting*, support OMB reporting and risk management requirements organization-wide by using the Cybersecurity Framework constructs of Functions, Categories, and Subcategories. The subcategory mappings to the [SP 800-53] controls are available at: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/federal-resources.

SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE RMF

Organizations are encouraged to collaborate on the plans, assessments, and POAMs for security and privacy issues to maximize efficiency and reduce duplication of effort. The objective is to ensure that security and privacy requirements derived from laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or missions and business functions are adequately addressed, and the appropriate controls are selected, implemented, assessed, and monitored on an ongoing basis. The authorization decision, a key step in the RMF, depends on the development of credible and actionable security and privacy evidence generated for the authorization package. Creating such evidence in a cost-effective and efficient manner is important.

The unified and collaborative approach to bring security and privacy evidence together in a single authorization package will support authorizing officials with critical information from security and privacy professionals to help inform the authorization decision. In the end, it is not about generating additional paperwork, artifacts, or documentation. Rather, it is about ensuring greater visibility into the implementation of security and privacy controls which will promote more informed, risk-based authorization decisions.

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314 CHAPTER ONE

315 **INTRODUCTION**

316 THE NEED TO MANAGE SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

rganizations depend on information systems¹ to carry out their missions and business functions and those systems are constantly subject to serious threats. The threats to information systems include environmental disruptions, human or machine errors, and 320 purposeful attacks that are often disciplined, well-organized, and well-funded. These attacks in 321 many cases are very sophisticated.² When successful, attacks on information systems can result 322 in serious or catastrophic damage to organizational operations³ and assets, individuals, other 323 organizations, and the Nation.⁴ Given the significant and ever-increasing danger of those 324 threats, it is imperative that organizations remain vigilant and that executives, leaders, and 325 managers at all organizational levels understand their responsibilities and are accountable for 326 protecting organizational assets and for managing security and privacy risks.⁵

327 In addition to the responsibility to protect organizational assets from the threats that exist in 328 today's environment, organizations have a responsibility to consider and manage the risks to 329 individuals when information systems process personally identifiable information (PII).⁶⁷ The 330 information security and privacy programs implemented by organizations have complementary 331 objectives with respect to managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII. While 332 many privacy risks arise from unauthorized activities that lead to the loss of confidentiality, 333 integrity, or availability of PII, other privacy risks result from authorized activities involving the 334 creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, or 335 disposal of PII that enables an organization to meet its mission or business objectives. For 336 example, organizations could fail to provide appropriate notice of PII processing depriving an 337 individual of knowledge of such processing or an individual could be embarrassed or stigmatized 338 by the authorized disclosure of PII. While managing privacy risk requires close coordination

¹ An *information system* is a discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information [See 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3502]. The term information system includes, for example, general-purpose computing systems; industrial/process control systems; cyber-physical systems; weapons systems; super computers; command, control, and communications systems; devices such as smart phones and tablets; environmental control systems; embedded devices/sensors; and paper-based systems.

² Defense Science Board Task Force Report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat [DSB 2013].

³ Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation.

⁴ Adverse impacts include, for example, compromises to systems that support critical infrastructure applications or are paramount to government continuity of operations as defined by the Department of Homeland Security.

⁵ Risk is a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event. Risk is also a function of the adverse impacts that arise if the circumstance or event occurs, and the likelihood of occurrence. Types of risk include program risk; compliance/regulatory risk; financial risk; legal risk; mission/business risk; political risk; security risk; privacy risk; project risk; reputational risk; safety risk; strategic planning risk; and supply chain risk.

⁶ [<u>OMB A-130</u>] defines PII as "information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual."

⁷ Organizations may also choose to consider risks to individuals that may arise from interactions with information systems, where the processing of PII may be less impactful than the effect the system has on individuals' behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individual autonomy and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security and privacy risks.

- between information security and privacy programs due to the complementary nature of the
- 340 programs' objectives around the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, privacy risks
- 341 also raise distinct concerns that require specialized expertise and approaches. Therefore, it is
- 342 critical that organizations also establish and maintain robust privacy programs to ensure
- 343 compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage the risk to individuals
- 344 associated with the processing of PII.
- In addition to information security and privacy risks, supply chain risk⁸ is also of growing concern
- to organizations. Because of the increased reliance on third-party or external providers and
- 347 commercial-off-the-shelf products, systems, and services, attacks or disruptions in the supply
- 348 chain which impact an organization's systems are increasing. Such attacks can be difficult to 349 trace or manage and can result in serious, severe, or catastrophic, long-standing consequences
- 349 trace or manage and can result in serious, severe, or catastrophic, long-standing consequences 350 for an organization's systems. Supply chain risk management (SCRM) overlaps and works in
- harmony with security and privacy risk management. For this publication, it is integrated in to
- 351 namony with security and privacy risk management. For this publication, it is integrated in to 352 security, but also specially called out in several areas to add emphasis and clarification, and to
- 353 help promote a comprehensive security and privacy risk management approach.

1.1 BACKGROUND

355 NIST in its partnership with the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National

- 356 Intelligence, and the Committee on National Security Systems, developed a *Risk Management*
- Framework (RMF) to improve information security, strengthen risk management processes, and
 encourage reciprocity⁹ among organizations. In July 2016, the Office of Management and
 Budget (OMB) revised Circular A-130 to include responsibilities for privacy programs under the
- 360 RMF.

The RMF emphasizes risk management by promoting the development of security and privacy capabilities into information systems throughout the system development life cycle (SDLC);¹⁰ by maintaining situational awareness of the security and privacy posture of those systems on an ongoing basis through continuous monitoring processes; and by providing information to senior leaders and executives to facilitate decisions regarding the acceptance of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation arising from the use and operation of their systems. The RMF:

- Provides a repeatable process designed to promote the protection of information and
 information systems commensurate with risk;
- Emphasizes organization-wide preparation necessary to manage security and privacy risks;
- Facilitates the categorization of information and systems, the selection, implementation,
 assessment, and monitoring of controls, and the authorization of information systems and
 common controls;
- Promotes the use of automation for near real-time risk management and ongoing system
 and control authorization through the implementation of continuous monitoring processes;

⁸ SCRM requirements are promulgated in [OMB A-130], [DODI 5200.44], and for National Security Systems in [CNSSD 505]. SCRM requirements have also been addressed by the Federal SCRM Policy Coordinating Committee.

 ⁹ Reciprocity is a mutual agreement among participating organizations to accept each other's security assessment results to reuse system resources and/or to accept each other's assessed security posture to share information.
 ¹⁰ [SP 800-64] provides guidance on security considerations in the SDLC.

- Encourages the use of correct and timely metrics to provide senior leaders and managers
 with the necessary information to make cost-effective, risk-based decisions for information
 systems supporting their missions and business functions;
- Facilitates the integration of security and privacy requirements and controls into enterprise
 architecture,¹¹ SDLC, acquisition processes, and systems engineering processes;
- Connects risk management processes at the organization and mission/business process
 levels to risk management processes at the information system level through a senior
 accountable official for risk management and risk executive (function);¹² and
- Establishes responsibility and accountability for controls implemented within information
 systems and inherited by those systems.
- 386 The RMF provides a dynamic and flexible approach to effectively manage security and privacy 387 risks in diverse environments with complex and sophisticated threats, evolving missions and 388 business functions, and changing system and organizational vulnerabilities. The framework is 389 policy and technology neutral which facilitates ongoing upgrades to IT resources¹³ and IT 390 modernization efforts to support and help ensure critical missions and essential services during 391 such transition periods.

392 **1.2 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY**

- This publication provides guidelines for applying the RMF to information systems andorganizations. The guidelines have been developed:
- To ensure that managing system-related security and privacy risk is consistent with the
 mission and business objectives of the organization and risk management strategy
 established by the senior leadership through the risk executive (function);
- To achieve privacy protections for individuals and security protections for information and
 information systems through the implementation of appropriate risk response strategies;
- To facilitate the implementation of the *Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity* [NIST CSF] within federal organizations.¹⁴
- 402 To facilitate the integration of security and privacy requirements and controls into
 403 enterprise architecture, SDLC processes, acquisition processes, and systems engineering
 404 processes;¹⁵ and
- To support consistent, informed, and ongoing authorization decisions (through continuous monitoring),¹⁶ reciprocity, and the transparency and traceability of security and privacy information.

¹¹ [OMB FEA] provides guidance on the Federal Enterprise Architecture.

¹² [OMB M-17-25] provides guidance on risk management roles and responsibilities.

¹³ IT resources refer to the information technology component of *information resources* defined in [OMB A-130].

¹⁴ [EO 13800] directs federal agencies to use the [NIST CSF] to manage cybersecurity risk.

¹⁵ [SP 800-160-1] provides guidance on systems security engineering and building trustworthy, secure systems.

¹⁶ [SP 800-137] provides guidance on information security continuous monitoring. Future updates to this publication will also address privacy continuous monitoring.

408 This publication is intended to help organizations manage security and privacy risk and to satisfy

- 409 the security and privacy requirements in the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of
- 410 2014 [FISMA14], the Privacy Act of 1974 [PRIV74], OMB policies (e.g., [OMB A-130]), and
- 411 designated Federal Information Processing Standards, among other laws, regulations, and
- 412 policies.
- 413 The scope of this publication pertains to federal information systems, which are discrete sets of
- 414 information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing,
- 415 dissemination, or disposition of information, whether such information is in digital or non-digital
- 416 form. Information resources include information and related resources, such as personnel,
- 417 equipment, funds, and information technology. The guidelines have been developed from a
- 418 technical perspective to complement guidelines for national security systems and may be used
- 419 for such systems with the approval of appropriate federal officials with policy authority over
- 420 such systems. State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations are
- 421 encouraged to use these guidelines, as appropriate.

422 **1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE**

- This publication serves individuals associated with the design, development, implementation,assessment, operation, maintenance, and disposition of information systems including:
- Individuals with mission or business ownership responsibilities or fiduciary responsibilities
 including, for example, and heads of federal agencies;
- Individuals with information system development and acquisition responsibilities, including,
 for example, program managers, procurement officials, component product and system
 developers, systems integrators, and enterprise architects;
- Individuals with logistical or disposition-related responsibilities, including, for example,
 program managers, procurement officials, system integrators, and property managers;
- Individuals with information system, information security, or privacy management,
 oversight, or governance responsibilities including, for example, senior leaders, risk
 executives, authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior agency information
 security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy;
- Individuals responsible for conducting security or privacy assessments and for monitoring
 information systems, for example, control assessors, auditors, and system owners; and
- Individuals with security or privacy implementation and operational responsibilities, for
 example, system owners, common control providers, information owners/stewards, mission
 or business owners, security or privacy architects, and systems security or privacy engineers.

441 **1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS PUBLICATION**

- 442 The remainder of this special publication is organized as follows:
- 443 <u>Chapter Two</u> describes the concepts associated with managing information system-related
- security and privacy risk. This includes an organization-wide view of risk management; the
- 445 RMF steps and structure; the relationship between security and privacy and how both are
- 446 used in the RMF; system and system elements; authorization boundaries; the allocation of

- 447 controls to systems and organizations; security and privacy posture; and considerations448 related to supply chain risk management.
- Chapter Three describes the tasks required to implement the steps in the RMF including:
 organization-level and information system-level preparation; categorization of information
 and information systems; control selection, tailoring, and implementation; assessment of
 control effectiveness; information system and common control authorization; the ongoing
 monitoring of controls; and maintaining awareness of the security and privacy posture of
 information systems and the organization.
- 455 Supporting Appendices provide additional information and guidance for the application of
 456 the RMF including: references; glossary of terms; acronyms; roles and responsibilities;
 457 summary of tasks; information system and common control authorizations; authorization
 458 boundary considerations; and SDLC considerations.

459 CHAPTER TWO


460 **THE FUNDAMENTALS**

461 HOW TO MANAGE SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

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468 2.1 ORGANIZATION-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT

469 Managing information system-related security and privacy risk is a complex undertaking that 470 requires the involvement of the entire organization—from senior leaders providing the strategic 471 vision and top-level goals and objectives for the organization, to mid-level leaders planning, 472 executing, and managing projects, to individuals developing, implementing, operating, and 473 maintaining the systems supporting the organization's missions and business functions. Risk 474 management is a holistic activity that affects every aspect of the organization including the 475 mission and business planning activities, the enterprise architecture, the SDLC processes, and 476 the systems engineering activities that are integral to those system life cycle processes. Figure 1 477 illustrates a multi-level approach to risk management described in [SP 800-39] that addresses 478 security and privacy risk at the organization level, the mission/business process level, and the 479 information system level. Communication and reporting are bi-directional information flows 480 across the three levels to ensure that risk is addressed throughout the organization.



- 497 The activities conducted at Levels 1 and 2 are critical to preparing the organization to execute
- 498 the RMF. Such preparation involves a wide range of activities that go beyond simply managing
- the security and privacy risk associated with operating or using specific systems and includes
- 500 activities that are essential to managing security and privacy risk appropriately throughout the
- 501 organization. Decisions about how to manage such risk at the system level cannot be made in 502 isolation. Such decisions are closely linked to the:
- JO2 Isolation. Such decisions are closely linked to the.
- Mission or business objectives of organizations;
- Modernization initiatives for systems, components, and services;
- Enterprise architecture and the need to manage and reduce the complexity¹⁷ of systems
 through consolidation, optimization, and standardization;¹⁸ and
- Allocation of resources to ensure the organization can conduct its missions and business
 operations effectively, efficiently, and in a cost-effective manner.
- 509 Preparing the organization to execute the RMF can include:
- Assigning roles and responsibilities for organizational risk management processes;
- Establishing a risk management strategy and organizational risk tolerance;
- Identifying the missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the
 information system is intended to support;
- Identifying key stakeholders (internal and external to the organization) that have an interest 515 in the information system;
- Identifying and prioritizing assets (including information assets);
- Understanding threats to information systems and organizations;
- Understanding the potential adverse effects on individuals;
- Conducting organization- and system-level risk assessments;
- Identifying and prioritizing security and privacy requirements;¹⁹
- Determining authorization boundaries for information systems and common controls;²⁰
- Defining information systems in terms of the enterprise architecture;
- Developing the security and privacy architectures that include controls suitable for 524 inheritance by information systems;

¹⁷ Managing complexity of systems through consolidation, optimization, and standardization reduces the attack surface and technology footprint exploitable by adversaries.

¹⁸ Enterprise architecture defines the mission, information, and the technologies necessary to perform the mission, and transitional processes for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs. It also includes a baseline architecture, a target architecture, and a sequencing plan. [OMB FEA] provides guidance for implementing enterprise architectures.

¹⁹ Security and privacy requirements can be obtained from a variety of sources including, for example, laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and mission/business/operational requirements.

²⁰ Authorization boundaries determine the scope of authorizations for information systems and common controls (i.e., the system elements that define the system or the set of common controls available for inheritance).

- Identifying, aligning, and deconflicting security and privacy requirements; and
- Allocating security and privacy requirements to information systems, system elements, and organizations.

528 In contrast to the Level 1 and 2 activities that prepare the organization for the execution of the 529 RMF, Level 3 addresses risk from an *information system* perspective and is guided and informed 530 by the risk decisions at the organization and mission/business process levels. The risk decisions 531 at Levels 1 and 2 can impact the selection and implementation of controls at the system level. 532 Security and privacy requirements are satisfied by the selection and implementation of controls 533 from [SP 800-53]. These controls are allocated to the system as system-specific, hybrid, or 534 common (inherited) controls in accordance with the enterprise architecture, security or privacy 535 architecture, and any tailored control baselines or overlays that have been developed by the organization.²¹ 536

537 Organizations establish *traceability* of the controls to the security and privacy requirements that 538 the controls are intended to satisfy. Establishing such traceability ensures that all requirements 539 are addressed during system design, development, implementation, operations, maintenance,

540 and disposition.²² Each level of the risk management hierarchy is a beneficiary of a successful

541 RMF execution—reinforcing the iterative nature of the risk management process where security

- 542 and privacy risks are framed, assessed, responded to, and monitored at various levels of an
- 543 organization.

544 Without adequate risk management preparation at the organizational level, security and privacy 545 activities can become too costly, demand too many skilled security and privacy professionals,

546 and produce ineffective solutions. For example, organizations that fail to define and implement

547 an effective enterprise architecture approach will have difficulty in consolidating, optimizing,

548 and standardizing their information technology infrastructures. Additionally, the effect of

549 architectural and design decisions can adversely affect the ability of organizations to implement

550 effective security and privacy solutions. A lack of adequate preparation by organizations could

result in unnecessary redundancy as well as inefficient, costly and vulnerable systems, services, and applications.

553 2.2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK STEPS AND STRUCTURE

554 There are seven steps in the RMF; a preparatory step to ensure that organizations are ready to 555 execute the process and six main steps. All seven steps are essential for the successful execution 556 of the RMF. The steps are:


- Prepare to execute the RMF from an organization- and a system-level perspective by
 establishing a context and priorities for managing security and privacy risk.
- 559 <u>Categorize</u> the system and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by the
 560 system based on a security impact analysis.


²¹ Controls can be allocated at all three levels in the risk management hierarchy. For example, common controls may be allocated at the organization, mission/business process, or information system level.

²² [SP 800-160-1] provides guidance on requirements engineering and traceability.

- <u>Select</u> an initial set of controls for the system and tailor the controls as needed to mitigate
 risk based on an organizational assessment of risk and local conditions.
- 563 <u>Implement</u> the controls and describe how the controls are employed within the system and
 564 its environment of operation.
- Assess the controls to determine if the controls are implemented correctly, operating as
 intended, and producing the desired outcomes with respect to satisfying the security and
 privacy requirements.
- <u>Authorize</u> the system or common controls based on a determination that the risk to
 organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation is
 acceptable.
- Monitor the system and the associated controls on an ongoing basis to include assessing control effectiveness, documenting changes to the system and environment of operation, conducting risk assessments and impact analyses, and reporting the security and privacy posture of the system.

575 Figure 2 illustrates the steps in the RMF. The RMF operates at all levels in the risk management 576 hierarchy illustrated in <u>Figure 1</u>. <u>Chapter Three</u> provides a detailed description of each of the 577 tasks necessary to carry out the steps in the RMF.





597 following the *Prepare* step can be carried out in a nonsequential order. After completing the

598 tasks in the *Prepare* step, organizations executing the RMF for the first time for a particular

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599 system or set of common controls typically carry out the remaining steps in sequential order. 600 However, there could be many points in the risk management process where there is a need to 601 diverge from the sequential order due to the type of system, risk decisions made by senior 602 leadership, or to allow for iterative cycles between tasks or revisiting of tasks (e.g., during agile 603 development). Once the system is in the operations and maintenance phase of the SDLC in the 604 Continuous Monitoring step, events may dictate nonsequential execution of steps. For example, 605 changes in risk or in system functionality may necessitate revisiting one or more of the steps in 606 the RMF to address the change.

FLEXIBILITY IN RMF IMPLEMENTATION Organizations have significant flexibility in executing the steps and tasks of the RMF—including the *selection* of controls and *tailoring* the controls to meet organizational security and privacy needs. The implementation of common controls and control tailoring helps ensure that security and privacy solutions are customized for the missions, business functions, and operating environments of the organization. Although the risk management approach in Figure 1 is conveyed as hierarchical, project and organization dynamics are typically more complex. The risk management approach selected by an organization may vary on a continuum from top-down command to decentralized consensus among peers. However, in all cases, organizations use a consistent approach that is applied to risk management processes across the enterprise from the organization level to the information system level. Organizational officials identify and secure the needed resources to complete the risk management tasks described in this publication and ensure that those resources are made available to the appropriate personnel. Resource allocation includes funding to conduct risk management tasks and assigning qualified personnel that will be needed to accomplish the tasks. Each step in the RMF has a purpose statement, a defined set of outcomes, and a set of tasks that

are carried out to achieve those outcomes.²³ Each task contains a set of potential inputs needed to execute the task and a set of potential outputs generated from task execution.²⁴ In addition, each task describes the risk management roles and responsibilities associated with the task and the phase of the SDLC where task execution occurs.²⁵ A discussion section provides information related to the task to facilitate understanding and to promote effective task execution. Finally, completing the RMF task description, there is a list of references to provide organizations with supplemental information for each task. Where applicable, the references also identify systems

631 security engineering tasks that correlate with the RMF task.²⁶

²³ The outcomes described in this publication can be achieved by different organizational levels—that is, some of the outcomes are universal to the entire organization, while others are system-focused or mission/business unit-focused.
²⁴ The *potential inputs* for a task may not always be derived from the *potential outputs* from the previous task. This can occur because the RMF steps are not always executed in sequential order, breaking the sequential dependencies.
²⁵ Appendix D provides a description of each of the roles and responsibilities identified in the tasks.

²⁶ [SP 800-160-1] describes life cycle-based systems security engineering processes.

632 The following example illustrates the structure of a typical RMF task:

633 PLAN REVIEW AND APPROVAL

Task

Task 6

TASK S-6 Review and approve the security and privacy plans for the system and the environment of Abbreviation operation. Select Step Potential Inputs: Completed security and privacy plans; organization- and system-level risk assessment results. Potential Outputs: Security and privacy plans approved by the authorizing official.

636 Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.

637 Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief 638 Information Officer; Chief Acquisition Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency 639 Official for Privacy.

640 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition. 641 Existing – Operations/Maintenance. **Explanatory information to** facilitate understanding

642 Discussion: The security and privacy plan review by the authorizing official or designated representative 643 with support from the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), chief 644 information officer, senior agency information security officer, and senior agency official for privacy, 645 determines if the plans are complete, consistent, and satisfy the stated security and privacy requirements 646 for the system. Based on the results from this review, the authorizing official or designated representative 647 may recommend changes to the security and privacy plans. If the plans are unacceptable, the system

648 owner or common control provider make appropriate changes to the plans. If the plans are acceptable, 649 the authorizing official or designated representative approves the plans.

650 The acceptance of the security and privacy plans represents an important milestone in the SDLC and risk 651 management process. The authorizing official or designated representative, by approving the plans, 652 agrees to the set of controls (i.e., system-specific, hybrid, or common controls) and the description of the 653 proposed implementation of the controls to meet the security and privacy requirements for the system 654 and the environment in which the system operates. The approval of the plans allows the risk management 655 process to proceed to the RMF *Implement* step. The approval of the plans also establishes the level of 656

effort required to successfully complete the remainder of the RMF steps and provides the basis of the 657 security and privacy specifications for the acquisition of the system or individual system components.

- 658 References: [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-160-1] (System Requirements Definition, Architecture
- 659 Definition, and Design Definition Processes).

2.3 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE RMF

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OMB CIRCULAR A-130: INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY

In 2016, OMB revised Circular A-130, the circular establishing general policy for the planning, budgeting, governance, acquisition, and management of federal information, personnel, equipment, funds, information technology resources, and supporting infrastructure and services. The circular addresses responsibilities for protecting federal information resources and managing personally identifiable information (PII). In establishing requirements for information security programs and privacy programs, the circular emphasizes the need for both programs to collaborate on shared objectives:

While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, they are closely related, and it is essential for agencies to take a coordinated approach to identifying and managing security and privacy risks and complying with applicable requirements.

[OMB A-130] requires organizations to implement the RMF that is described in this guideline. With the 2016 revision to the circular, OMB also requires organizations to integrate privacy into the RMF process:

The RMF provides a disciplined and structured process that integrates information security, privacy, and risk management activities into the SDLC. This Circular requires organizations to use the RMF to manage privacy risks beyond those that are typically included under the "confidentiality" objective of the term "information security." While many privacy risks relate to the unauthorized access or disclosure of PII, privacy risks may also result from other activities, including the creation, collection, use, and retention of PII; the inadequate quality or integrity of PII; and the lack of appropriate notice, transparency, or participation.

This section of the guideline describes the *relationship* between information security programs and privacy programs under the RMF. However, subject to OMB policy, organizations retain the flexibility to undertake the integration of privacy into the RMF in the most effective manner, considering the organization's mission and circumstances.

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690 Executing the RMF requires close collaboration between information security programs and 691 privacy programs. While information security programs and privacy programs have different 692 objectives, those objectives are overlapping and complementary. Information security programs 693 are responsible for protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, 694 use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction (i.e., unauthorized system activity or 695 behavior) in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Privacy programs are 696 responsible for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements and for managing the 697 risks to individuals associated with the creation, collection, use, processing, dissemination, 698 storage, maintenance, disclosure, or disposal (collectively referred to as "processing") of PII.²⁷ 699 When preparing to execute the steps of the RMF, organizations consider how to best promote 700 and institutionalize collaboration between the two programs to ensure that the objectives of 701 both disciplines are met at every step of the process.

²⁷ Privacy programs may also choose to consider the risks to individuals that may arise from their interactions with information systems, where the processing of PII may be less impactful than the effect the system has on individuals' behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individual autonomy and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security and privacy risks.

When an information system processes PII, the organizations' information security program and privacy program have a shared responsibility for managing the risks to individuals that may arise from unauthorized system activity or behavior. This requires the two programs to collaborate when selecting, implementing, assessing, and monitoring security controls.²⁸ However, while information security programs and privacy programs have complementary objectives with respect to managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, protecting individuals'

708 privacy cannot be achieved solely by securing PII.

709 Not all privacy risks arise from unauthorized system activity or behavior, such as unauthorized 710 access or disclosure of PII. Some privacy risks may result from authorized activity that is beyond 711 the scope of information security. For example, privacy programs are responsible for managing 712 the risks to individuals that may result from the creation, collection, use, and retention of PII; 713 the inadequate quality or integrity of PII; and the lack of appropriate notice, transparency, or 714 participation. Therefore, to help ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to 715 manage privacy risks from authorized and unauthorized processing of PII, organizations' privacy 716 programs also select, implement, assess, and monitor privacy controls.²⁹

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718 [OMB A-130] defines a privacy control as an administrative, technical, or physical safeguard 719 employed within an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to 720 manage privacy risks. A privacy control is different from a security control, which the Circular 721 defines as a safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system or an 722 organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its 723 information. Due to the shared responsibility that organizations' information security programs 724 and privacy programs have to manage the risks to individuals arising from unauthorized system 725 activity or behavior, controls that achieve both security and privacy objectives are both privacy 726 and security controls. This guideline refers to such controls that achieve both sets of objectives 727 simply as "controls." When this guideline uses the descriptors "privacy" and "security" with the 728 term control, it is referring to those controls in circumstances where the controls are selected, 729 implemented, and assessed for particular objectives.

730 The risk management processes described in this publication are equally applicable to security

and privacy programs. However, the risks that security and privacy programs are required to

- manage are overlapping in some areas, but not in others. Consequently, it is important that
- 733 organizations understand the interplay between privacy and security in order to promote
- rivacy and security officials at every level of the organization.

²⁸ For example, in <u>Task C-1</u> of the *Categorize* step, privacy and security programs work together to consider potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of PII in order to determine the impact level for the information system. The resulting impact level drives the selection of a security control baseline in <u>Task S-2</u> of the *Select* step.

²⁹ Different controls may need to be selected to mitigate the privacy risks associated with authorized processing of PII. For example, there may be a risk that individuals would be embarrassed or stigmatized if certain information is disclosed about them. While encryption could prevent unauthorized disclosure of PII, it would not address any privacy risks related to disclosures to parties that are authorized to decrypt and access the PII. In order to mitigate this privacy risk, organizations would need to assess the risk of allowing authorized parties to decrypt the information and potentially select controls that would mitigate that risk. In such an example, an organization might select controls to enable individuals to understand the organization's disclosure practices and exercise choices about this access, or use differential privacy or privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques to disassociate the information from an individual.

735 **2.4 SYSTEM AND SYSTEM ELEMENTS**

736 This publication uses the statutory definition of information system for RMF execution. 737 However, it is important to describe information systems in the context of the SDLC and how 738 security and privacy capabilities are implemented within the components of those systems. 739 Therefore, organizations executing the RMF take a broad view of the life cycle of information 740 system development to provide a contextual relationship and linkage to architectural and 741 engineering concepts that allow security, privacy, and supply chain issues to be addressed 742 throughout the life cycle and at the appropriate level of detail to help ensure that such 743 capabilities are achieved. [ISO 15288] provides an architectural and engineering view of an 744 information system and the entities with which the system interacts in its environment of 745 operation.³⁰

746 Similar to how federal law defines information system as a discrete set of information resources 747 organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition 748 of information. [ISO 15288] defines a system as a set of interacting elements that are organized 749 to achieve one or more stated purposes. Just as the information resources that comprise an information system include information and other resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, funds, 750 751 and information technology), system elements include technology or machine elements, human 752 elements, and physical or environmental elements. Each of the system elements³¹ within the 753 system fulfills specified requirements and may be implemented via hardware, software, or 754 firmware;³² physical structures or devices; or people, processes, policies, and procedures. 755 Individual system elements or a combination of system elements may satisfy stated system 756 requirements. Interconnections between system elements allow those elements to interact as 757 necessary to produce a capability as specified by the system requirements. Finally, every system 758 operates within an environment that influences the system and its operation.


759 The authorization boundary defines the system³³ for the purpose of RMF execution. The system 760 may be supported by one or more *enabling systems* that provide support during the system life 761 cycle. Enabling systems are not contained within the authorization boundary of the system and 762 do not necessarily exist in the system's environment of operation. An enabling system may 763 provide common (i.e., inherited) controls for the system or may include any type of service or 764 functionality used by the system such as identification and authentication services, network 765 services, or monitoring functionality. Finally, there are other systems the system interacts with 766 in the operational environment. These systems are outside of the authorization boundary and 767 may be the beneficiaries of services provided by the system or may simply have some general 768 interaction.

 ³⁰ [ISO 15288] is not publicly available. [SP 800-160-1] addresses system security engineering as part of the SDLC.
 ³¹ The terms system element and information resource are used interchangeably in this publication. Information resources as defined in 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3502 include information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology. By law, a system is composed of a discrete set of information resources.

³² The term *system component* refers to a *system element* that is implemented via hardware, software, or firmware. ³³ Historically, NIST has used the terms *authorization boundary* and *system boundary* interchangeably. In the interest of clarity, accuracy, and use of standardized terminology, the term authorization boundary is now used exclusively to refer to the set of system elements comprising the system to be authorized for operation or authorized for use by an authorizing official (i.e., the scope of the authorization). Authorization boundary can also refer to the set of common controls to be authorized for inheritance purposes.

769 Figure 3 illustrates the conceptual view of the system and the relationships among the system,

570 system elements, enabling systems, other systems, and the environment of operation.³⁴



As shown in Figure 3, certain parts of the environment of operation for the system are included in the authorization boundary (i.e., determined to be "in scope" for the authorization) while other parts are excluded. For example, the facility that provides protection for a system is part of the environment in which the system operates. As such, the physical and environmental protection controls (e.g., physical access controls at entry points, exterior perimeter protection devices) are included in the security plan for the system and therefore, are included in the authorization boundary.

Conversely, the system may communicate or have other interactions with enabling systems and
 other systems that are part of the extended environment of operation but are outside of the
 scope of authorization for the system. Organizations determine which parts of the environment
 of operation are within the authorization boundary. These determinations are typically specific
 to the system and are context-driven.

804 **2.5 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES**

The authorization boundary establishes the scope of protection for an information system (i.e., what the organization agrees to protect under its direct management or within the scope of its

³⁴ The terms *system, system element, enabling system, other systems,* and the *environment of operation* are agnostic with respect to information technology (IT) and operations technology (OT).

807 responsibilities).³⁵ The authorization boundary includes the people, processes, and information 808 technologies (i.e., system elements) that are part of each system supporting the organization's 809 missions and business functions. Authorization boundaries that are too expansive (i.e., include 810 too many system elements or components) make the risk management process unnecessarily 811 complex. Conversely, authorization boundaries that are too limited (i.e., include too few system 812 elements or components) increase the number of systems that must be separately managed 813 and therefore, may unnecessarily inflate the information security and privacy costs for the 814 organization.

815 The authorization boundary for a system is established during the RMF *Prepare Task – System*

level, <u>Task P-11</u>. Organizations have flexibility in determining what constitutes the authorization
 boundary for a system. The set of system elements included within an authorization boundary
 defines the system (i.e., the scope of the authorization). When a set of system elements is
 identified as an authorization boundary for a system, the elements are generally under the same
 direct management.³⁶ Other considerations for determining the authorization boundary include

- 821 identifying system elements that:
- Support the same mission or business functions;
- Have similar operating characteristics and security and privacy requirements;
- Process, store, and transmit similar types of information (e.g., categorized at the same impact level);³⁷ or
- Reside in the same environment of operation (or in the case of a distributed system, reside
 in various locations with similar operating environments).

The scope of the authorization boundary is revisited periodically as part of the continuous monitoring process carried out by the organization. While the above considerations may be useful to organizations in determining authorization boundaries for purposes of managing risk, the considerations are not intended to limit the organization's flexibility in establishing authorization boundaries that promote effective security and privacy with the available resources of the organization.

- The process of establishing authorization boundaries carries significant risk management
 implications and is therefore an organization-wide activity that requires coordination among key
- 836 participants. The process considers mission and business requirements, security and privacy
- 837 requirements, and the costs to the organization. <u>Appendix G</u> provides additional information
- 838 and considerations for determining authorization boundaries, including boundaries for complex
- 839 systems and software applications.

³⁵ Information systems are discrete sets of information resources organized for the collection, processing, use, sharing, maintenance, dissemination, or disposition of information, whether such information is in digital or nondigital form. Information resources include information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology. Therefore, information systems may or may not include hardware, firmware, and software.

³⁶ For information systems, direct management control involves budgetary, programmatic, or operational authority and associated *responsibility* and *accountability*. Direct management control does not necessarily imply that there is no intervening management.

³⁷ If a system contains information at multiple impact levels, the system is categorized at the highest impact level. See [FIPS 199] and [FIPS 200].

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EFFECTIVE AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES

Establishing effective authorization boundaries for *systems* and *common controls* is one of the most important risk management activities carried out by the organization. The authorization boundary defines the scope of an authorizing official's responsibility for protecting information resources and individuals' privacy.

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850 2.6 CONTROL ALLOCATION

851 There are three types of controls that can be selected and implemented by organizations: 852 system-specific controls (i.e., controls that provide a security or privacy capability for an 853 information system); common controls (i.e., controls that provide a security or privacy capability 854 for multiple systems); or hybrid controls (i.e., controls that have system-specific and common 855 characteristics). Controls are allocated to a system or an organization consistent with the 856 organization's enterprise architecture and security or privacy architecture.³⁸ This activity is 857 carried out as an organization-wide activity that involves authorizing officials, system owners, 858 common control providers, the chief information officer, the senior accountable official for risk 859 management or risk executive (function); the senior agency information security officer, the 860 senior agency official for privacy, system security or privacy officers, the enterprise architect, 861 and security and privacy architects.³⁹

862 Organizations are encouraged to identify and implement common controls that can support 863 multiple information systems efficiently and effectively as a common protection capability. 864 When these common controls are used to support a specific system, they are referenced by that 865 system as *inherited controls*. Common controls promote cost-effective, efficient, and consistent 866 security and privacy safeguards across the organization and can also simplify risk management 867 processes and activities. By allocating controls to a system as system-specific controls, hybrid 868 controls, or common controls, organizations assign responsibility and accountability to specific 869 organizational entities for the development, implementation, assessment, authorization, and 870 monitoring of those controls. Organizations have significant flexibility in deciding which controls 871 from [SP 800-53] are appropriate for specific types of allocations.

Controls may also be allocated to specific elements within a system. While the control selection
process is conducted primarily at the system level, it may not always be necessary to allocate
every control in the tailored baseline to each system element. Organizations can save resources
by allocating controls to only those system elements that require such protection or that

876 provide such protection for the system.


³⁸ Allocation is the process an organization employs to determine whether controls are system-specific, shared, or common and to assign the controls to the specific system elements (i.e., machine, physical, or human components) responsible for providing a security or privacy capability.

³⁹ Security control allocation also occurs during the SDLC process as part of *requirements engineering*. [SP 800-160-1] describes the systems security engineering activities associated with system life cycle processes that are needed to achieve trustworthy, secure components, systems, and services.

877 Figure 4 illustrates control allocation using the RMF to produce risk-related information for the

878 senior leaders and executives (including authorizing officials) in the organization on the security 879 and privacy posture of organizational systems and the mission/business processes supported by

and privacy posture of organizational systems and the mission/business processes supported by
 those systems.⁴⁰



⁴⁰ When authorizing officials issue a *common control authorization* (see <u>Appendix F</u>), they are addressing the security and privacy risks to systems that can potentially inherit those controls. Authorizing officials that issue an *authorization to operate* or *authorization to use* also consider the security and privacy risks associated with the inheritance of the common controls identified by the organization for the system they are authorizing. Common control authorization addresses the risk in providing (i.e., provisioning) common controls to system owners. System authorization addresses the risk in receiving or using the inherited controls.

906 **2.7 SECURITY AND PRIVACY POSTURE**

907 The purpose of the RMF is to help ensure that, throughout the SDLC, information systems, 908 organizations, and individuals are adequately protected, and that authorizing officials have the 909 information needed to make credible, risk-based decisions regarding the operation or use of 910 systems or the provision of common controls. A key aspect of risk-based decision making for 911 authorizing officials is understanding the security and privacy posture of information systems 912 and the common controls that are available for inheritance by those systems. The security and 913 privacy posture represents the status of information systems and information resources (e.g., 914 personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology) within an organization based on 915 information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies, procedures) and 916 the capabilities in place to manage the defense of the organization in its operation or use of 917 systems; comply with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks; and react as 918 the situation changes.

- 919 The security and privacy posture of information systems and organizations is determined on an 920 ongoing basis by assessing and continuously monitoring system-specific, hybrid, and common 921 controls.⁴¹ The control assessments and monitoring activities provide evidence that the controls 922 selected by the organization are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and satisfying 923 the security and privacy requirements in response to laws, executive orders, regulations, 924 directives, policies, standards, or mission and business requirements. Authorizing officials use 925 the security and privacy posture to determine if the risk to organizational operations and assets, 926 individuals, other organizations, or the Nation are acceptable based on the organization's risk
- 927 management strategy and organizational risk tolerance.⁴²

928 **2.8 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT**

Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on products, systems, and services provided by
 external providers to carry out missions and business functions. Organizations are responsible
 and accountable for the risk incurred when using such component products, systems, and
 services.⁴³ Relationships with external providers can be established in a variety of ways, for
 example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, various types of formal agreements
 (e.g., contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements),
 or outsourcing arrangements.

936 The growing dependence on products, systems, and services from external providers, along with 937 the nature of the relationships with those providers, present an increasing amount of risk to an 938 organization. Some of these risks include the insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, 939 tampering, theft, insertion of malicious software and hardware, as well as poor manufacturing 940 and development practices in the supply chain. Supply chain risks can be endemic or systemic 941 within a system element or component, system, organization, sector, or nation. While the 942 singular use of a component or service operated in a system may present an acceptable risk to 943 an organization, its common use throughout a system, organization, sector or nation can raise 944 the risk to an unacceptable level. These risks are associated with the global and distributed

⁴¹ Monitoring of controls is part of an organization-wide risk management approach defined in [SP 800-39].

⁴² See RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, <u>Task P-2</u>.

⁴³ [OMB A-130] defines supply chain risk and requires federal agencies to consider supply chain security issues for all resource planning and management activities throughout the SDLC so that risks are appropriately managed.

945 nature of product and service supply chains and an organization's decreased visibility into, and
946 understanding of, how the technology that they acquire is developed, integrated, and deployed.
947 This includes the processes, procedures, and practices used to assure the integrity, security,

948 resilience, and quality of the acquired products, systems, and services.

949 To address supply chain risks, organizations develop an SCRM policy, which is an important 950 vehicle for directing SCRM activities.⁴⁴ Guided and informed by applicable laws, executive 951 orders, directives, policies, and regulations, the SCRM policy supports applicable organizational 952 policies including, for example, acquisition and procurement, information security and privacy, 953 quality, supply chain, and logistics. The policy addresses the goals and objectives established in 954 the organization's strategic plan, specific missions and business functions, and the internal and 955 external customer requirements. It also defines the integration points for SCRM with the risk 956 management and the SDLC processes for the organization. The SCRM policy defines SCRM-957 related roles and responsibilities within the organization, any dependencies among those roles, 958 and the interaction among the roles. SCRM roles specify the responsibilities for procurement,

959 collecting supply chain threat intelligence, conducting risk assessments, identifying and

960 implementing risk-based mitigations, and performing monitoring functions.

961 [FISMA14] and [OMB A-130] require external providers handling federal information or 962 operating systems on behalf of the federal government to meet the same security and privacy 963 requirements as federal agencies. Security and privacy requirements for external providers 964 including the controls for systems processing, storing, or transmitting federal information are 965 expressed in contracts or other formal agreements. The RMF can be effectively used to manage 966 supply chain security risk. The conceptual view of the system in Figure 3 can guide and inform 967 security, privacy, and risk management activities for all elements of the supply chain. Every step 968 in the RMF can be executed by nonfederal external providers except for the <u>Authorize</u> step— 969 that is, the acceptance of risk is an inherent federal responsibility for which senior executives 970 are held responsible and accountable. The authorization decision is directly linked to the 971 management of risk related to the acquisition and use of component products, systems, and 972 services from external providers.⁴⁵ [OMB A-130] also requires organizations to develop and

973 implement SCRM plans.⁴⁶

Managing supply chain risk is a complex, multifaceted undertaking requiring a coordinated
 effort across an organization—building trust relationships and communicating with both internal
 and external stakeholders. SCRM activities involve identifying and assessing applicable risks.

- and external stakeholders. SCRM activities involve identifying and assessing applicable risks,
 determining appropriate mitigating actions, developing appropriate SCRM plans to document
- determining appropriate mitigating actions, developing appropriate SCRM plans to document
 selected mitigating actions, and monitoring performance against SCRM plans. Because supply
- 978 Selected filling actions, and monitoring performance against Schwippians. Because supply
- 979 chains differ across and within organizations, SCRM plans are tailored to the individual program,

⁴⁴ [SP 800-161] provides guidance on SCRM practices. SCRM and security risk management share many common objectives with regard to protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and information systems. However, there are also areas where SCRM diverges from traditional security risk management. SCRM policies are coordinated with information security policies at the organizational level to ensure that the policies are mutually supportive and reinforcing. The RMF tasks address those areas where SCRM and security risk management share common objectives.

⁴⁵ While *authorization* (i.e., the acceptance of risk) of federal information systems is an inherent federal responsibility, it is a foundational concept that can be used by senior executives in nonfederal organizations at all levels in the supply chain to manage security and privacy risk.

⁴⁶ [SP 800-161] provides guidance on SCRM plans.

- 980 organizational, and operational contexts. Tailored plans provide the basis for determining
 981 whether a system is "fit for purpose" and as such, the controls need to be tailored accordingly.
- 982Tailored SCRM plans help organizations to focus their resources on the most critical missions
- 983 and business functions based on mission and business requirements and their risk environment.

984 The determination that the risk from acquiring products, systems, or services from external 985 providers is acceptable depends on the level of assurance⁴⁷ that the organization can gain from 986 the providers. The level of assurance is based on the degree of control the organization can 987 exert on the external provider regarding the controls needed for the protection of the product, 988 system, or service and the evidence brought forth by the provider as to the effectiveness of 989 those controls.

- 990 The degree of control is established by the specific terms and conditions of the contract or 991 service-level agreement. Some organizations have extensive control through contract vehicles or 992 other agreements that specify the security and privacy requirements for the external provider. 993 Other organizations, in contrast, have limited control because they are purchasing commodity 994 services or commercial off-the-shelf products. The level of assurance can also be based on many 995 other factors that convince the organization that the requisite controls have been implemented 996 and that a credible determination of control effectiveness exists. For example, an authorized 997 external cloud service provided to an organization through a well-established line-of-business 998 relationship may provide a level of trust in the service that is within the risk tolerance of the 999 organization. Ultimately, the responsibility for responding to risks from the use of component 1000 products, systems, and services from external providers remains with the organization and the 1001 authorizing official. Organizations require that an appropriate chain of trust be established with 1002 external providers when dealing with the many issues associated with system security or privacy 1003 risks.
- 1004

SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT PLANS

Organizations have flexibility on how the details of SCRM plans are documented. SCRM plan details for Levels 1 and 2 (organization and mission/business process levels), can be documented in the information security program plan for the organization or in separate organization-level and/or mission/business process-level SCRM plans. SCRM plan details for Level 3 (information system level) can be documented in the system security plan or in a separate system-level SCRM plan. A SCRM plan template is provided in [SP 800-161].

⁴⁷ The level of assurance provided by an external provider can vary, ranging from those who provide high assurance (e.g., business partners in a joint venture that share a common business model and goals) to those who provide less assurance and represent greater sources of risk (e.g., business partners in one endeavor who are also competitors in another market sector).

1005 CHAPTER THREE

1006 THE PROCESS

1007 EXECUTING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK TASKS

1008 his chapter describes the steps and associated tasks that comprise the RMF and the 1009 selected individuals or groups (defined organizational roles) that carry out such tasks.⁴⁸ 1010 Many risk management roles defined in this publication have counterpart roles defined in 1011 the SDLC process. Organizations align their risk management roles with similar or 1012 complementary roles defined for the SDLC whenever possible, and consistent with missions and 1013 business functions. RMF tasks are executed concurrently with, or as part of, the SDLC processes 1014 in the organization. This helps to ensure that organizations are effectively integrating the 1015 process of managing information security, privacy, and supply chain risks with life cycle 1016 processes. 1017 The process of implementing RMF tasks may vary from organization to organization. The tasks 1018 are applied at appropriate phases in the SDLC. While the tasks appear in sequential order, there 1019 can be many points in the risk management process that require divergence from the sequential 1020 order including the need for iterative cycles between initial task execution and revisiting tasks. 1021 For example, control assessment results can trigger a set of remediation actions by system

1022 owners and common control providers, which can in turn require the reassessment of selected

1023 controls. Monitoring controls can generate a cycle of tracking changes to the system and its1024 environment of operation; assessing the information security and privacy impact; reassessing

1025 controls, taking remediation actions, and reporting the security and privacy impact, reassessing the

1026 system and the organization.

1027 There may be other opportunities to diverge from the sequential nature of the tasks when it is 1028 more effective, efficient, or cost-effective to do so. For example, while the control assessment 1029 tasks are listed after the control implementation tasks, organizations may begin the assessment 1030 of controls as soon as they are implemented but prior to the complete implementation of all 1031 controls described in the security plans and privacy plans. This may result in some organizations 1032 assessing the physical and environmental protection controls within a facility prior to assessing 1033 the controls implemented in the hardware, firmware, or software components of the system 1034 (which may be implemented later). Regardless of the task ordering, the final action before a 1035 system is placed into operation is the explicit acceptance of risk by the authorizing official.

1036 The RMF steps and associated tasks can be applied to new development systems and existing 1037 systems. For new and existing systems, organizations ensure that the designated tasks have 1038 been completed to prepare for the execution of the RMF. For existing systems, organizations 1039 confirm that the security categorization and (for information systems processing PII) a privacy 1040 risk assessment have been completed and are appropriate; and that the needed controls have 1041 been selected, tailored, and implemented.

⁴⁸ <u>Appendix D</u> describes the roles and responsibilities of key participants involved in organizational risk management and the execution of the RMF.

1042 Applying the RMF steps and associated tasks to existing systems can serve as a gap analysis to 1043 determine if the organization's security and privacy risks have been effectively managed. 1044 Deficiencies in controls can be addressed in the RMF steps for implementation, assessment, 1045 authorization, and monitoring in the same manner as in new development systems. If no 1046 deficiencies are discovered during the gap analysis and there is a current authorization in effect, 1047 the organization can move directly to the continuous monitoring step in the RMF. If a current 1048 authorization is not in effect, the organization continues in the usual sequence with the 1049 assessment, authorization, and monitoring steps. 1050

TIPS FOR STREAMLINING RMF IMPLEMENTATION

- Use the tasks and outputs of the Organization-Level and System-Level *Prepare* Step to promote a consistent starting point within organizations to execute the RMF.
- Maximize the use of *common controls* at the organization level to promote standardized, consistent, and cost-effective security and privacy capability inheritance.
- Maximize the use of *shared* or *cloud-based* systems, services, and applications to reduce the number of authorizations, enterprise-wide.
- Employ organization-wide *tailored* control baselines (including organization-wide control parameters) to increase the speed of security and privacy plan development and the consistency of security and privacy plan content.
- Employ organization-defined controls based on security and privacy requirements generated from a systems security engineering process;
- Maximize the use of *automated tools* to manage security categorization; control selection, assessment, and monitoring; and the authorization process.
- Decrease the level of effort and resource expenditures for *low-impact* systems if those systems cannot adversely affect higher-impact systems through system connections.
- Maximize the *reuse* of RMF artifacts (e.g., security and privacy assessment results) for standardized hardware/software deployments, including configuration settings.
- Reduce the *complexity* of the IT/OT infrastructure by eliminating unnecessary systems, system components, and services employ *least functionality* principle.
- Make the transition to ongoing authorization a priority and use continuous monitoring approaches to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of security and privacy programs.

DEVELOPING WELL-DEFINED SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS

The RMF is an SDLC-based process that can be effectively used to help ensure that security and privacy requirements are satisfied for information systems or organizations. Defining clear, consistent, and unambiguous security and privacy requirements is an important element in the successful execution of the RMF. The requirements are defined early in the SDLC in collaboration with the senior leaders and are integrated into the acquisition and procurement processes. For example, organizations can use the [SP 800-160-1] life cycle-based systems engineering process to define an initial set of security and privacy requirements, which in turn, can be used to select a set of controls* to satisfy the requirements. The requirements or the controls can be stated in the Request for Proposal or other contractual agreement when organizations acquire systems, system components, or services. Requirements can also be added throughout the life cycle, such as with the agile development methodology where new features are continuously deployed.

The NIST *Cybersecurity Framework* [NIST CSF] (i.e., Core, Profiles) can also be used to identify, align, and deconflict security requirements and to subsequently inform the selection of security controls for an organization. Cybersecurity Framework Profiles can provide a link between cybersecurity activities and organizational mission/business objectives, which supports risk-based decision-making throughout the RMF. While Profiles may be used as a starting point to inform control selection and tailoring activities, further evaluation is needed to ensure the appropriate controls are selected. Some organizations may choose to use the Cybersecurity Framework in concert with the NIST *Systems Security Engineering* publications—identifying, aligning, and deconflicting requirements across a sector, an industry, or an organization—and subsequently employing a systems engineering approach to further refine the requirements and obtain trustworthy secure solutions to help protect the organization's operations, assets, individuals.

* See Section 2.3 for specific guidance on privacy control selection and managing privacy risk.

ORGANIZATION AND SYSTEM PREPARATION

Preparation can achieve effective, efficient, and cost-effective execution of risk management processes. The primary objectives of the <u>Prepare</u> step include:

- Facilitate better communication between senior leaders and executives in the C-suite and system owners and operators—
 - aligning organizational priorities with resource allocation and prioritization at the system level; and
 - conveying acceptable limits regarding the selection and implementation of controls within the established organizational risk tolerance.
- Promote organization-wide identification of common controls and the development of organization-wide tailored control baselines, to reduce the workload on individual system owners and the cost of system development and protection.
- Reduce the complexity of the IT infrastructure by consolidating, standardizing, and optimizing systems, applications, and services through the application of enterprise architecture concepts and models.
- Identify, prioritize, and focus resources on high-value assets that require increased levels of protection.
- Facilitate system readiness for system-specific tasks.

These objectives, if achieved, significantly reduce the information technology footprint and the attack surface of organizations, promote IT modernization objectives, and prioritize security and privacy activities to focus protection strategies on the most critical assets and systems.

Finally, certain tasks in the *Prepare* step at the organization level are designated as *optional*. These tasks are included to provide organizations additional options to help make their RMF implementations more effective, efficient, and cost-effective.

1053 **3.1 PREPARE**⁴⁹

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Purpose

The purpose of the **Prepare** step is to carry out essential activities at the organization, mission and business process, and information system levels of the enterprise to help prepare the organization to manage its security and privacy risks using the *Risk Management Framework*.

1063 **PREPARE TASKS—ORGANIZATION LEVEL**⁵⁰

1064 Table 1 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF *Prepare* step at the 1065 *organization* level. Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

1066

TABLE 1: PREPARE TASKS AND OUTCOMES—ORGANIZATION LEVEL

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK P-1	 Individuals are identified and assigned key roles for executing the
RISK MANAGEMENT ROLES	Risk Management Framework. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM-6; ID.GV-2]
TASK P-2 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY	 A risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination and expression of organizational risk tolerance is established. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RM; ID.SC]
TASK P-3	 An organization-wide risk assessment is completed or an existing
RISK ASSESSMENT—ORGANIZATION	risk assessment is updated. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RA; ID.SC-2]
TASK P-4 ORGANIZATION-WIDE TAILORED CONTROL BASELINES AND PROFILES (OPTIONAL)	 Tailored control baselines for organization-wide use are established and made available. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]
TASK P-5	 Common controls that are available for inheritance by
COMMON CONTROL IDENTIFICATION	organizational systems are identified, documented, and published.
TASK P-6	 A prioritization of organizational systems with the same impact
IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION (OPTIONAL)	level is conducted. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM-5]
TASK P-7	An organization-wide strategy for monitoring control
CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY—	effectiveness is developed and implemented.
ORGANIZATION	[Cybersecurity Framework: DE.CM; ID.SC-4]

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Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

⁴⁹ The *Prepare* step is intended to leverage activities already being conducted within security, privacy, and supply chain programs to emphasize the importance of having enterprise-wide governance and the appropriate resources in place to enable the execution of cost-effective and consistent risk management processes across the organization. ⁵⁰ For ease of use, the preparatory activities are grouped into organization-level preparation and information system-level preparation.

1069 **RISK MANAGEMENT ROLES**

- 1070TASK P-1Identify and assign individuals to specific roles associated with security and privacy risk1071management.
- **Potential Inputs:** Organizational security and privacy policies and procedures; organizational charts.
- 1073 **Potential Outputs:** Documented Risk Management Framework role assignments.
- 1074 Primary Responsibility: <u>Head of Agency</u>; <u>Chief Information Officer</u>; <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>.
- Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>Senior</u>
 <u>Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function</u>); <u>Senior Agency Information</u>
 Security Officer.
- 1078 Discussion: The roles and responsibilities of key participants in risk management processes are described 1079 in Appendix D. The roles and responsibilities may include personnel that are internal or external to the 1080 organization, as appropriate. Since organizations have different missions, functions, and organizational 1081 structures, there may be differences in naming conventions for risk management roles and how specific 1082 responsibilities are allocated among organizational personnel including, for example, multiple individuals 1083 filling a single role or one individual filling multiple roles. In either situation, the basic risk management 1084 functions remain the same. Organizations ensure that there are no conflicts of interest when assigning the 1085 same individual to multiple risk management roles. For example, authorizing officials cannot occupy the 1086 role of system owner or common control provider for systems or common controls they are authorizing. 1087 In addition, combining multiple roles for security and privacy requires care because the two disciplines 1088 may require different expertise, and in some circumstances, the priorities may be competing. Some roles 1089 may be allocated to a group or an office rather than to an individual, for example, control assessor, risk 1090 executive (function), or system administrator.
- 1091 **References:** [SP 800-160-1] (Human Resource Management Process); [SP 800-181]; [NIST CSF] (Core 1092 [Identify Function]).

1093 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

- 1094TASK P-2Establish a risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination of risk
tolerance.
- Potential Inputs: Organizational mission statement; organizational policies; organizational risk
 assumptions, constraints, priorities and trade-offs.
- Potential Outputs: Risk management strategy and statement of risk tolerance inclusive of information
 security and privacy risk.
- 1100 Primary Responsibility: <u>Head of Agency</u>.

1101Supporting Roles:Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief1102Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

- 1103 **Discussion:** Risk tolerance is the degree of risk or uncertainty that is acceptable to an organization. Risk
- 1104 tolerance affects all components of the risk management process, having a direct impact on the risk
- 1105 management decisions made by senior leaders or executives throughout the organization and providing
- 1106 important constraints on those decisions. The risk management strategy guides and informs risk-based
- 1107 decisions including how security and privacy risk is framed, assessed, responded to, and monitored. The
- 1108 risk management strategy may be composed of a single document, or separate security and privacy risk
- 1109 management documents.⁵¹ The risk management strategy makes explicit the threats, assumptions,
- 1110 constraints, priorities, trade-offs, and risk tolerance used for making investment and operational

⁵¹ A separate supply chain risk management strategy document is called a *supply chain risk management plan*.

- 1111 decisions. This strategy includes the strategic-level decisions and considerations for how senior leaders
- and executives are to manage security and privacy risks to organizational operations, organizational
- assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The risk management strategy includes an
- expression of organizational risk tolerance; acceptable risk assessment methodologies and risk response
- strategies; a process for consistently evaluating security and privacy risks across the organization; and approaches for monitoring risk over time. As organizations define and implement risk management
- 1116 approaches for monitoring risk over time. As organizations define and implement risk management 1117 strategies, policies, procedures, and processes, it is important that they include SCRM considerations. Th
- 1117 strategies, policies, procedures, and processes, it is important that they include SCRM considerations. The 1118 risk management strategy for security and privacy connects security and privacy programs with the
- 1119 management control systems established in the organization's Enterprise Risk Management strategy.⁵²
- 1120 **References:** [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-160-1] (Risk Management, Decision
- 1121 Management, Quality Assurance, Quality Management, Project Assessment and Control Processes); [SP
- 1122 <u>800-161</u>]; [IR 8062]; [IR 8179] (Criticality Analysis Process B); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

1123 RISK ASSESSMENT—ORGANIZATION

1124 **TASK P-3** Assess organization-wide security and privacy risk and update the results on an ongoing basis.

Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; mission or business objectives; current threat information; system-level security and privacy risk assessment results; previous organization-level security and privacy risk assessment results; information sharing agreements or memoranda of understanding; security- and privacy-related information from continuous monitoring.

- 1129 **Potential Outputs:** Organization-level risk assessment results.
- Primary Responsibility: <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>;
 Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
- Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Mission or Business Owner; Authorizing Official or
 Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
- 1134 Discussion: Risk assessment at the organizational level leverages aggregated information from system-1135 level risk assessment results, continuous monitoring, and any strategic risk considerations relevant to the 1136 organization. The organization considers the totality of risk from the operation and use of its information 1137 systems, from information exchange and connections with other internally and externally owned systems, 1138 and from the use of external providers. For example, the organization may review the risk related to its 1139 enterprise architecture and information systems of varying impact levels residing on the same network 1140 and whether higher impact systems are segregated from lower impact systems or systems operated and 1141 maintained by external providers. Risk assessments of the organization's supply chain may be conducted 1142 as well. Risk assessment results may be used to help organizations establish a Cybersecurity Framework 1143 target profile.
- 1144
 References: [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization Level, Mission/Business Process Level); [SP 800-161];

 1145
 [IR 8062].

1146 TAILORED CONTROL BASELINES AND PROFILES 53

1147 **TASK P-4** Establish, document, and publish organization-wide tailored control baselines and/or profiles.

⁵² See [<u>OMB A-123</u>].

⁵³ Optional task.

1148 **Potential Inputs:** Documented security and privacy requirements; requiring the use of specific tailored

- 1149 control baselines; mission or business objectives; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; 1150 NIST Special Publication 800-53B control baselines.⁵⁴
- 1151 Potential Outputs: List of organization-approved or mandated tailored baselines; [NIST CSF] profiles.
- 1152 Primary Responsibility: Mission or Business Owner; Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or 1153 Risk Executive (Function).
- 1154 Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated 1155 Representative; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
- 1156 **Discussion:** To address the organizational need for specialized sets of controls, tailored control baselines 1157 may be developed for organization-wide use.⁵⁵ An organization-wide tailored baseline provides a fully 1158 specified set of controls, control enhancements, and supplemental guidance derived from established 1159 control baselines described in [SP 800-53B]. The tailoring process can also be guided and informed by the 1160 requirements engineering process described in [SP 800-160-1]. Organizations can use the tailored control 1161 baseline concept when there is divergence from the specific assumptions used to create the initial control 1162 baselines in [SP 800-53B]. This would include, for example, situations when the organization has specific 1163 security or privacy risks, has specific mission or business needs, or plans to operate in environments that 1164 are not addressed in the initial baselines.
- 1165 Tailored baselines and overlays complement the initial NIST control baselines by providing an opportunity
- 1166 to add or eliminate controls to accommodate organizational requirements while continuing to protect
- 1167 information commensurate with risk. Organizations can use tailored baselines to customize control 1168 baselines by describing control applicability and by providing interpretations for specific technologies; 1169 types of missions or business functions, operations, systems, operating modes, or environments of
- 1170 operation; and statutory or regulatory requirements. Multiple customized baselines may be useful for 1171 organizations with heterogeneous systems (e.g., organizations that maintain systems with different
- 1172 operating or processing characteristics, or mission or business characteristics).
- 1173 Organization-wide tailored baselines can establish organization-defined control parameter values for 1174 assignment or selection statements in controls and control enhancements that are agreeable to specific 1175 communities of interest and can also extend the supplemental guidance where necessary. Organization-1176 wide tailored baselines may be more stringent or less stringent than the baselines identified in [SP 800-1177 53B] and are applied to multiple systems. Tailored baselines may also be mandated for use by certain 1178 laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or standards. In some situations, tailoring actions 1179 may be restricted or limited by the developer of the tailored baseline or by the issuing authority for the 1180 tailored baseline. Tailored baselines (or overlays) have been developed by communities of interest for 1181 cloud and shared systems, services, and applications; industrial control systems; national security 1182 systems; weapons and space-based systems; high-value assets; mobile device management; federal 1183 public key infrastructure; and privacy risks.
- 1184 Organizations may also benefit from the creation of one or more Cybersecurity Framework profiles. A 1185 profile is a prioritization of the Framework Core Categories or Subcategory outcomes based on mission or 1186 business functions, security requirements, and risk determinations. The prioritized list of cybersecurity 1187 outcomes developed at the organization and mission/business process levels can be helpful in facilitating
- 1188
- consistent, risk-based decisions at the system level. Profiles, the precursor to subcategory selection in the

⁵⁴ NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Revision 5), separates the control catalog from the control baselines that have been included historically in that publication. A new companion publication, NIST Special Publication 800-53B, Control Baselines and Tailoring Guidance for Federal Information Systems and Organizations is forthcoming. This publication is referenced throughout the RMF in the relevant tasks.

⁵⁵ Tailored control baselines may also be referred to as *overlays*. An organization-wide tailored control baseline is analogous to an organization-wide overlay since an overlay is a tailored baseline that services a community of interest, in this case, the organization.

- 1189 Cybersecurity Framework, can also be used to guide and inform the development of the tailored control baselines described above.
- 1191 **References:** [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53B]; [SP 800-160-1] (Business or Mission Analysis and Stakeholder 1192 Needs and Requirements Definition Processes); [NIST CSF] (Core, Profiles).

1193 COMMON CONTROL IDENTIFICATION

1194TASK P-5Identify, document, and publish organization-wide common controls that are available for1195inheritance by organizational systems.

Potential Inputs: Documented security and privacy requirements; existing common control providers and associated security and privacy plans; information security and privacy program plans; organization- and system-level security and privacy risk assessment results.

- Potential Outputs: List of common control providers and common controls available for inheritance;
 security and privacy plans (or equivalent documents) providing a description of the common control
 implementation (including inputs, expected behavior, and expected outputs).
- 1202 Primary Responsibility: <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u>; <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>.

Supporting Roles: <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>; <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk</u>
 <u>Executive (Function)</u>; <u>Chief Information Officer</u>; <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated</u>
 <u>Representative</u>; <u>Common Control Provider</u>; <u>System Owner</u>.

1206 Discussion: Common controls are controls that can be inherited by one or more information systems. 1207 Common controls can include controls from any [SP 800-53] control family, for example, physical and 1208 environmental protection controls, system boundary and monitoring controls, personnel security 1209 controls, policies and procedures, acquisition controls, account and identity management controls, audit 1210 log and accountability controls, or complaint management controls for receiving privacy-related inquiries 1211 from the public. Organizations identify and select the set of common controls and allocate those controls 1212 to the organizational entities designated as common control providers. Common controls may differ 1213 based upon a variety of factors, such as hosting location, system architecture, and the structure of the 1214 organization. The organization-wide list of common controls takes these factors into account. Common 1215 controls can also be identified at different levels of the organization, including, for example, corporate, 1216 department, or agency level; bureau or subcomponent level; or individual program level. Organizations 1217 may establish one or more lists of common controls that can be inherited by information systems. A 1218 particular requirement may not be fully met by a common control. In such cases, the control is considered 1219 a hybrid control and is noted as such by the organization, including specifying which parts of the control 1220 requirement are provided for inheritance by the common control and which parts are to be provided at 1221 the system level.

1222 When there are multiple sources of common controls, organizations specify the common control provider 1223 (i.e., who is providing the controls and through what venue, for example, shared services, specific 1224 systems, or within a specific type of architecture) and which systems or types of systems can inherit the 1225 controls. Common control listings are communicated to system owners so they are aware of the security 1226 and privacy capabilities that are available from the organization through inheritance. System owners are 1227 not required to assess common controls that are inherited by their systems or document common control 1228 implementation details; that is the responsibility of the common control providers. Likewise, common 1229 control providers are not required to have visibility into the system-level details of those systems that are 1230 inheriting the common controls they are providing.

1231Risk assessment results can be used when identifying common controls to determine if the controls1232available for inheritance satisfy the security and privacy requirements for organizational systems and the1233environments in which those systems operate (including the identification of potential single points of1234failure). When the common controls provided by the organization are determined to be insufficient for

1235 the information systems inheriting those controls, system owners can supplement the common controls

1236 with system-specific or hybrid controls to achieve the required protection for their systems or accept 1237 greater risk with the acknowledgement and approval of the organization.

1238 Common control providers execute the RMF steps to implement, assess, and monitor the controls 1239 designated as common controls. Common control providers may also be system owners when the 1240 common controls are resident within an information system. Organizations select senior officials or 1241 executives to serve as authorizing officials for common controls. The senior agency official for privacy is 1242 responsible for designating common privacy controls and for documenting them in the organization's 1243 privacy program plan. Authorizing officials are responsible for accepting security and privacy risk resulting

- 1244 from the use of common controls inherited by organizational systems.
- 1245 Common control providers are responsible for documenting common controls in security and privacy 1246 plans (or equivalent documents prescribed by the organization); ensuring that the common controls are
- 1247 implemented and assessed for effectiveness by gualified assessors and that assessment findings are
- 1248 documented in assessment reports; producing a plan of action and milestones for common controls
- 1249 determined to have unacceptable deficiencies and targeted for remediation; receiving authorization for
- 1250 the common controls from the designated authorizing official; and monitoring control effectiveness on an
- 1251 ongoing basis. Plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common controls (or a
- summary of such information) are made available to system owners and can be used by authorizing
- 1253 officials to guide and inform authorization decisions for systems inheriting common controls. For
- 1254 information about the authorization of common controls, see <u>Task R4</u> and <u>Appendix F</u>.
- 1255 **References:** [SP 800-53].

1256 IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION ⁵⁶

1257 **TASK P-6** Prioritize organizational systems with the same impact level.

Potential Inputs: System categorization information for organizational systems; system descriptions;
 organization- and system-level risk assessment results; mission or business objectives; Cybersecurity
 Framework profiles.

- 1261 **Potential Outputs:** Organizational systems prioritized into low-, moderate-, and high-impact sub-1262 categories.
- 1263 Primary Responsibility: <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>.

Supporting Roles: Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Mission
 or Business Owner; System Owner; Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official
 Designated Representative.

1267 Discussion: This task is carried out only after organizational systems have been categorized (see Task C1). 1268 This task requires organizations to first apply the "high water mark" concept to each of their information 1269 systems categorized in accordance with [FIPS 199]. The application of the high-water mark concept results 1270 in systems designated as low impact, moderate impact, or high impact. Organizations desiring additional 1271 granularity in their impact designations for risk-based decision making can use this task to prioritize their 1272 systems within each impact level. For example, an organization may decide to prioritize its moderate-1273 impact systems by assigning each moderate system to one of three new subcategories: low-moderate 1274 systems, moderate-moderate systems, and high-moderate systems. The prioritization of its moderate 1275 systems gives organizations an opportunity to make more informed decisions regarding control selection 1276 and the tailoring of control baselines when responding to identified risks.⁵⁷ Impact-level prioritization can

⁵⁶ Optional task.

⁵⁷ Organizations can use this task in conjunction with the optional RMF *Prepare*-Organization Level step, <u>Task P4</u>, to develop organization-wide tailored baselines for the more granular impact designations, for example, organization-wide tailored baselines for low-moderate systems and high-moderate systems.

- 1277 also be used to determine those systems that are critical or essential to organizational missions and
- 1278 business operations and therefore, organizations can focus on the factors of complexity, aggregation, and
- 1279 system interconnections. Such systems can be identified, for example, by prioritizing high-impact systems
- 1280 into *low-high* systems, *moderate-high* systems, and *high-high* systems. Impact-level prioritizations can be
- 1281 conducted at any level of the organization and are based on system categorization data reported by 1282 individual system owners. Impact-level prioritization may necessitate the development of organization-
- wide tailored baselines to designate the appropriate set of controls for the additional, more granularimpact levels.
- 1285
 References:
 [FIPS 199];
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-39]
 (Organization and System Levels);
 [SP 800-59];
 [SP 800-10]

 1286
 60-1];
 [SP 800-60-2];
 [SP 800-160-1]
 (System Requirements Definition Process);
 [IR 8179]
 (Criticality

 1287
 Analysis Process B);
 [CNSSI 1253];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Identify Function]).

1288 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY—ORGANIZATION

- 1289TASK P-7Develop and implement an organization-wide strategy for continuously monitoring control
effectiveness.
- Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;
 organizational security and privacy policies.
- 1293 **Potential Outputs:** An implemented organizational continuous monitoring strategy.
- 1294 Primary Responsibility: <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>.
- Supporting Roles: <u>Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency</u>
 Official for Privacy; <u>Mission or Business Owner; System Owner; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official</u>
 Designated Representative.

1298 **Discussion:** An important aspect of risk management is the ability to monitor the security and privacy 1299 posture across the organization and the effectiveness of controls implemented within or inherited by 1300 organizational systems on an ongoing basis.⁵⁸ An effective organization-wide continuous monitoring 1301 strategy is essential to efficiently and cost-effectively carry out such monitoring. Continuous monitoring 1302 strategies can also include supply chain risk considerations, for example, regularly reviewing supplier 1303 foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI), monitoring inventory forecasts, or requiring on-going 1304 audits of suppliers. The implementation of a robust and comprehensive continuous monitoring program 1305 helps an organization understand the security and privacy posture of its information systems. It also 1306 facilitates ongoing authorization after the initial system or common control authorizations. This includes 1307 the potential for changing missions or business functions, stakeholders, technologies, vulnerabilities, 1308 threats, risks, and suppliers of systems, components, or services.

- 1309The organizational continuous monitoring strategy addresses monitoring requirements at the1310organization, mission/business process, and information system levels. The continuous monitoring1311strategy identifies the minimum monitoring frequency for implemented controls across the organization;1312defines the ongoing control assessment approach; and describes how ongoing assessments are to be1313conducted (e.g., addressing the use and management of automated tools, and instructions for ongoing1314assessment of controls for which monitoring cannot be automated). The continuous monitoring strategy
- 1315 may also define security and privacy reporting requirements including recipients of the reports.
- 1316 The criteria for determining the minimum frequency for control monitoring post implementation, is
- 1317 established in collaboration with selected organizational officials including, for example, the senior
- 1318 accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function); senior agency information security

⁵⁸ Monitoring for control effectiveness is a form of control assessment. [SP 800-53A], [SP 800-137], and [IR 8011-1] provide additional information on monitoring, conducting control effectiveness assessments, and automating control effectiveness assessments respectively.

officer; senior agency official for privacy; chief information officer; system owners; common control
 providers; and authorizing officials or their designated representatives. An organizational risk assessment
 can be used to guide and inform the frequency of monitoring.

1322The use of automation facilitates a greater frequency and volume of control assessments as part of the1323monitoring process. The ongoing monitoring of controls using automated tools and supporting databases1324facilitates near real-time risk management for information systems and supports ongoing authorization1325and efficient use of resources. The senior accountable official for risk management or the risk executive1326(function) approves the continuous monitoring strategy including the minimum frequency with which

1327 controls are to be monitored.

 1328
 References:
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-39]
 (Organization, Mission or Business Process, System Levels);
 [SP 800-53];
 [SP 800-53A];
 [SP 800-137];
 [SP 800-161];
 [IR 8062];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Detect Function]);
 [CNSSI 1253].
 [SP 800-137];
 [SP 800-161];
 [IR 8062];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Detect Function]);
 [CNSSI 1253].
 [SP 800-161];
 [SP 800-161];

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MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS (LEVEL 2) CONSIDERATIONS

1331Mission/business processconsiderations are addressed in the RMF Prepare-Organization Level
step and the RMF Prepare-System Level step by specifying mission/business process concerns;
by identifying the mission or business owners in primary or supporting roles; and by identifying
the mission or business objectives. Task P-8 and Task P-9 from the RMF Prepare-System Level
step are mission/business process level tasks conducted with a system-level specific focus.

1334

1335 **PREPARE TASKS—SYSTEM LEVEL**

1336 Table 2 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF *Prepare* step at the 1337 *system* level. Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

1338

TABLE 2: PREPARE TASKS AND OUTCOMES—SYSTEM LEVEL

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK P-8 MISSION OR BUSINESS FOCUS	 Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes that the system is intended to support are identified. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile; Implementation Tiers; ID.BE]
TASK P-9 SYSTEM STAKEHOLDERS	• The stakeholders having an interest in the system are identified. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM; ID.BE]
TASK P-10 ASSET IDENTIFICATION	 Stakeholder assets are identified and prioritized. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM]
TASK P-11 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY	• The authorization boundary (i.e., system) is determined.
TASK P-12 INFORMATION TYPES	 The types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by the system are identified. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.AM-5]
TASK P-13 INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE	Identify and understand all stages of the information life cycle.
TASK P-14 RISK ASSESSMENT—SYSTEM	 A system-level risk assessment is completed or an existing risk assessment is updated. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RA; ID.SC-2]
TASK P-15 SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS	• Security and privacy requirements are defined and prioritized. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.GV; PR.IP]

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK P-16 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE	• The placement of the system within the enterprise architecture is determined.
TASK P-17 SYSTEM REGISTRATION	 The system is registered for purposes of management, accountability, coordination, and oversight. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.GV]

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Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

1341 MISSION OR BUSINESS FOCUS

- 1342TASK P-8Identify the missions, business functions, and mission/business processes that the system is1343intended to support.
- 1344Potential Inputs: Organizational mission statement; organizational policies; mission/business process1345information; system stakeholder information; Cybersecurity Framework profiles.
- Potential Outputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes that the system willsupport.
- 1348 **Primary Responsibility:** <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>.
- Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>System Owner</u>;
 Information Owner or Steward; <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u>; <u>Senior Agency Official for</u>
 Privacy.
- 1352System Life Development Cycle Phase: New Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1353Existing Operations/Maintenance.

Discussion: Organizational missions and business functions influence the design and development of the mission or business processes that are created to carry out those missions and business functions. The prioritization of missions and business functions drives investment strategies and funding decisions, and therefore, affects the development of the enterprise architecture and the associated security and privacy architectures. Information is elicited from stakeholders to acquire a more thorough understanding of the missions, business functions, and mission/business processes of the organization from a system security and privacy perspective.

1361References: [SP 800-39] (Organization and Mission/Business Process Levels); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1]1362(Business or Mission Analysis, Portfolio Management, and Project Planning Processes); [NIST CSF] (Core1363[Identify Function]); [IR 8179] (Criticality Analysis Process B).

1364 SYSTEM STAKEHOLDERS

- 1365TASK P-9Identify stakeholders who have an interest in the design, development, implementation,1366assessment, operation, maintenance, or disposal of the system.
- Potential Inputs: Organizational mission statement; mission or business objectives; missions, business
 functions, and mission/business processes that the system will support; other mission/business process
 information; organizational security and privacy policies and procedures; organizational charts;
- 1370 information about individuals or groups (internal and external) that have an interest in and decision-
- 1371 making responsibility for the system.
- 1372 **Potential Outputs:** List of system stakeholders.
- 1373 Primary Responsibility: <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>; <u>System Owner</u>.

1374	Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
1375	Representative; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior
1376	Agency Official for Privacy; Chief Acquisition Officer.

1377System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1378Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1379 Discussion: Stakeholders include individuals, organizations, or representatives that have an interest in 1380 the system throughout the system life cycle—for design, development, implementation, delivery, 1381 operation, and sustainment of the system. It also includes all aspects of the supply chain. Stakeholders 1382 may reside in the same organization or they may reside in different organizations in situations when there 1383 is a common interest by those organizations in the information system. For example, this may occur 1384 during the development, operation, and maintenance of cloud-based systems, shared service systems, or 1385 any system where organizations may be adversely impacted by a breach or a compromise to the system 1386 or for a variety of considerations related to the supply chain. Communication among stakeholders is 1387 important during every step in the RMF and throughout the SDLC to ensure that security and privacy 1388 requirements are satisfied, concerns and issues are addressed expeditiously, and risk management 1389 processes are carried out effectively.

1390References: [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1] (Stakeholder Needs and1391Requirements Definition and Portfolio Management Processes); [SP 800-161]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify1392Function]).

1393 ASSET IDENTIFICATION

1394 **TASK P-10** Identify assets that require protection.

Potential Inputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the information system
 will support; business impact analyses; internal stakeholders; system stakeholder information; system
 information; information about other systems that interact with the system.

- 1398 **Potential Outputs:** Set of assets to be protected.
- 1399 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>.

1400Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Mission or
Business Owner; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior1401Business Owner; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior

- 1402 Agency Official for Privacy.
- 1403System Development Life Cycle Phase:New Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1404Existing Operations/Maintenance.

1405 **Discussion:** Assets are tangible and intangible items that are of value to achievement of mission or 1406 business objectives. Tangible assets are physical in nature and include physical/environmental elements 1407 (e.g., non-digital information, structures, facilities), human elements, and technology/machine elements 1408 (e.g., hardware elements of components, mechanisms, and networks). In contrast, intangible assets are 1409 not physical in nature and include mission and business processes, functions, digital information and data, 1410 firmware, software, and services. Information assets include the information needed to carry out missions 1411 or business functions, to deliver services, and for system management/operation; controlled unclassified 1412 information and classified information; and all forms of documentation associated with the information 1413 system. Intangible assets can also include the image or reputation of an organization, and the privacy 1414 interests of the individuals whose information will be processed by the system. The organization defines 1415 the scope of stakeholder assets to be considered for protection. The assets that require protection are 1416 identified based on stakeholder concerns and the contexts in which the assets are used. This includes the 1417 missions or business functions of the organization; the other systems that interact with the system; and 1418 stakeholders whose assets are utilized by the mission or business functions or by the system.

- 1419 **References:** [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1] (Stakeholder Needs and
- 1420Requirements Definition Process); [IR 8179] (Criticality Analysis Process C); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify1421Function]); [NARA CUI].

1422 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY

- 1423 **TASK P-11** Determine the authorization boundary of the system.
- 1424 **Potential Inputs:** System design documentation; system stakeholder information; asset information; 1425 organizational structure information/charts.
- 1426 **Potential Outputs:** Documented authorization boundary.
- 1427 Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official</u>.

1428Supporting Roles:Chief Information Officer; System Owner; Mission or Business Owner; Senior Agency1429Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Enterprise Architect.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
 Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1432 **Discussion:** Authorization boundaries establish the scope of protection for information systems (i.e., 1433 what the organization agrees to protect under its management control or within the scope of its 1434 responsibilities). Authorization boundaries are determined by authorizing officials with input from the 1435 system owner based on mission, management, or budgetary responsibility. A clear delineation of 1436 authorization boundaries is important for accountability and for security categorization, especially in 1437 situations where lower-impact systems are connected to higher-impact systems, or when external 1438 providers are responsible for the operation or maintenance of a system. Each system includes a set of 1439 elements (i.e., information resources)⁵⁹ organized to achieve one or more purposes and to support the 1440 organization's missions and business processes. Each system element is implemented in a way that allows 1441 the organization to satisfy specified security and privacy requirements. System elements include human 1442 elements, technology/machine elements, and physical/environmental elements.

1443 The term system is used to define the set of system elements, system element interconnections, and the 1444 environment that is the focus of the RMF implementation (see FIGURE 3). The system is included in a 1445 single authorization boundary to ensure accountability. For systems processing PII, the privacy and 1446 security programs collaborate to develop a common understanding of authorization boundaries. To 1447 conduct effective risk assessments and select appropriate controls, privacy and security programs provide 1448 a clear and consistent understanding of what constitutes the authorization boundary. Understanding the 1449 authorization boundary and what will occur beyond it may influence controls selected and how they are 1450 implemented. For example, if a function of the system includes sharing PII externally, robust encryption 1451 controls may be selected for PII transmitted from the system.

1452Similarly, for systems either partially or wholly managed, maintained, or operated by external providers,1453an agreement clearly describing authorization boundaries ensures accountability. Privacy and security1454programs collaborate with providers to develop a common understanding of authorization boundaries.

1455 Formal agreements with external providers (e.g. contracts) may be used to delineate what constitutes

- 1456 authorization boundaries. Understanding such boundaries facilitates the selection of appropriate controls
- 1457 to manage supply chain risk.
- 1458References: [SP 800-18]; [SP 800-39] (System Level); [SP 800-47]; [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1] (System1459Requirements Definition Process); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

⁵⁹ *System elements* are implemented via hardware, software, or firmware; physical structures or devices; or people, processes, and procedures. The term *system component* is used to indicate system elements that are implemented specifically via hardware, software, and firmware.

1460 INFORMATION TYPES

- 1461 **TASK P-12** Identify the types of information to be processed, stored, and transmitted by the system.
- 1462 Potential Inputs: Assets to be protected; mission/business process information.
- 1463 **Potential Outputs:** A list of information types for the system.
- 1464 Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Information Owner or Steward.
- 1465 Supporting Role: Mission or Business Owner; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
- 1466 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition). 1467 Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
- 1468 Discussion: Identifying the types of information needed to support organizational missions, business 1469 functions, and mission/business processes is an important step in developing security and privacy plans 1470 for the system and a precondition for determining the security categorization. [NARA CUI] defines the 1471 information types that require protection as part of its Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) program, 1472 in accordance with laws, regulations, or governmentwide policies. Organizations may define additional 1473 information types needed to support organizational missions, business functions, and mission/business
- 1474 processes that are not defined in the CUI Registry or in [SP 800-60-2].

1475 References: [SP 800-39] (System Level); [SP 800-60-1]; [SP 800-60-2]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify 1476 Function]); [NARA CUI].

1477 INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE

1478 **TASK P-13** Identify and understand all stages of the information life cycle.

1479 Potential Inputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the system will support; 1480 system stakeholder information; information about other systems that interact with the system; system 1481 design documentation; list of information types.

1482 Potential Outputs: Documentation of the stages though which information passes in the system, such as 1483 a data map or model illustrating how information is structured or is processed by the system throughout 1484 its life cycle. Such documentation includes, for example, data flow diagrams, entity relationship diagrams, 1485 database schemas, and data dictionaries.

- 1486 Primary Responsibility: Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Owner; Information Owner or Steward.
- 1487 Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Mission or Business Owner.
- 1488 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition). 1489

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1490 Discussion: The information life cycle describes the stages through which information passes, typically 1491 characterized as creation or collection, processing, dissemination, use, storage, and disposition, to include 1492 destruction and deletion [OMB A-130]. Identifying and understanding all stages of the life cycle helps 1493 inform the organization's security and privacy risk assessments and the selection and implementation of 1494 controls.

- 1495 Identifying the life cycle of information by using tools such as a data map enables organizations to
- 1496 understand how the information is being processed so that organizations can better assess where security
- 1497 and privacy risks could arise and where controls could be applied most effectively. It is important for
- 1498 organizations to consider the appropriate delineation of the authorization boundary and the information
- 1499 system's interaction with other systems because the way information enters and leaves the system can
- 1500 significantly affect the security and privacy risk assessments. The components of the system are identified
- 1501 with sufficient granularity to support such risk assessments.

- 1502 Identifying and understanding the information life cycle is particularly relevant for the assessment of
- security and privacy risks since information may be processed by a system in any of the SDLC phases. For
- example, in the testing and integration phase of the SDLC, processing actual (i.e., live) data would likely raise security and privacy risks, but using substitute (i.e., synthetic) data may allow an equivalent benefit
- 1506 in terms of system testing while reducing risk.
- 1507 **References:** [OMB A-130]; [OMB M-13-13]; [IR 8062].

1508 **RISK ASSESSMENT—SYSTEM**

1509 **TASK P-14** Conduct a system-level risk assessment and update the risk assessment on an ongoing basis.

Potential Inputs: Assets to be protected; missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the system will support; business impact analyses or criticality analyses; system stakeholder information; information about other systems that interact with the system; provider information; threat information; data map; system design documentation; Cybersecurity Framework profiles; risk management strategy;

- 1514 organization-level risk assessment results.
- 1515 **Potential Outputs:** Security and privacy risk assessment reports.
- 1516 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>; <u>System Privacy Officer</u>.⁶⁰
- 1517 Supporting Roles: <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>;
- 1518 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Mission or Business Owner;</u>
- 1519 Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; Control Assessor.
- 1520System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1521Existing Operations/Maintenance.

1522 Discussion: This task may require that organizations conduct security and privacy risk assessments to 1523 ensure that each type of risk is fully assessed. Assessment of security risk includes identification of threat 1524 sources⁶¹ and threat events affecting assets, whether and how the assets are vulnerable to the threats, 1525 the likelihood that an asset vulnerability will be exploited by a threat, and the impact (or consequence) of 1526 loss of the assets. As a key part of the risk assessment, assets are prioritized based on the adverse impact 1527 or consequence of asset loss. The meaning of loss is defined for each asset type to enable a determination 1528 of the loss consequence (i.e., the adverse impact of the loss). Loss consequences may be tangible (e.g., 1529 monetary) or intangible (e.g., reputation) and constitute a continuum that spans from partial loss to total 1530 loss relative to the asset. Interpretations of information loss may include loss of possession, destruction, 1531 or loss of precision or accuracy. The loss of a function or service may be interpreted as a loss of control, 1532 loss of accessibility, loss of the ability to deliver normal function, performance, or behavior, or a limited 1533 loss of capability resulting in a level of degradation of function, performance, or behavior. Prioritization of 1534 assets is based on asset value, criticality, cost of replacement, impact on image or reputation, or trust by 1535 users, by mission or business partners, or by collaborating organizations. The asset priority translates to 1536 precedence in allocating resources, determining strength of mechanisms, and defining levels of assurance. 1537 Asset valuation is a precondition for defining security requirements.

- 1538 Privacy risk assessments are conducted to determine the likelihood that a given operation the system is
- 1539 taking when processing PII could create an adverse effect on individuals—and the potential impact on
- 1540 individuals.⁶² These adverse effects can arise from unauthorized activities that lead to the loss of
- 1541 confidentiality, integrity, or availability in information systems processing PII, or may arise as a byproduct

⁶⁰ System Privacy Officer is only a primary role when the information system processes PII.

⁶¹ In addition, the use of threat intelligence, threat analysis, and threat modelling can help agencies develop the security capabilities necessary to reduce agency susceptibility to a variety of threats including hostile cyber-attacks, equipment failures, natural disasters, and errors of omission and commission.

⁶² [IR 8062] introduces privacy risk management and a privacy risk model for conducting privacy risk assessments.

1542 of authorized activities. Privacy risk assessments are influenced by contextual factors. Contextual factors 1543 can include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity level of the PII, including specific elements or in 1544 aggregate; the types of organizations using or interacting with the system and individuals' perceptions 1545 about the organizations with respect to privacy; individuals' understanding about the nature and purpose 1546 of the processing; and the privacy interests of individuals, technological expertise or demographic 1547 characteristics that influence their understanding or behavior. The privacy risks to individuals may affect 1548 individuals' decisions to engage with the system thereby impacting mission or business objectives, or 1549 create legal liability, reputational risks, or other types of risks for the organization. Impacts to the 1550 organization are not privacy risks. However, these impacts can guide and inform organizational decision-1551 making and influence prioritization and resource allocation for risk response.

- 1552 Risk assessments are also conducted to determine the potential that the use of an external provider for 1553 the development, implementation, maintenance, management, operation, or disposition of a system, 1554 system component, or service could create a loss, and the potential impact of that loss. The impact may 1555 be immediate (e.g., physical theft) or on-going (e.g., the ability of adversaries to replicate sensitive 1556 equipment because of theft). The impact may be endemic (e.g., limited to a single system) or systemic 1557 (e.g., including any system that uses a specific type of system component). Supply chain risk assessments 1558 consider vulnerabilities which may arise related to the disposition of a system or system element and 1559 from the use of external providers. Vulnerabilities in the supply chain may include a lack of traceability or 1560 accountability leading to the potential use of counterfeits, insertion of malware, or poor-quality systems. 1561 The use of external providers may result in a loss of visibility and control over how systems, system 1562 components, and services are developed, deployed, and maintained. A clear understanding of the threats, 1563 vulnerabilities, and potential impacts of an adverse supply chain-related event can help organizations 1564 appropriately balance supply chain risk with risk tolerance. Supply chain risk assessments can include 1565 information from supplier audits, reviews, and supply chain intelligence. Organizations develop a strategy 1566 for collecting information, including a strategy for collaborating with providers on supply chain risk 1567 assessments. Such collaboration helps organizations leverage information from providers, reduce 1568 redundancy, identify potential courses of action for risk responses, and reduce the burden on providers.
- 1569Risk assessments are conducted throughout the SDLC and support various RMF steps and tasks. Risk1570assessment results are used to inform potential courses of action for risk responses. Organizations1571determine the form of risk assessment conducted (including the scope, rigor, and formality of such1572assessments) and method of reporting results.
- 1573
 References:
 [FIPS 199];
 [FIPS 200];
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-39]
 (Organization Level);
 [SP 800-59];
 [SP 800-60-1];

 1574
 1];
 [SP 800-60-2];
 [SP 800-64];
 [SP 800-160-1]
 (Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition and Risk

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 Management Processes);
 [SP 800-161]
 (Assess);
 [IR 8062];
 [IR 8179];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Identify Function]);

 1576
 [CNSSI 1253].
 [CNSSI 1253].
 [CNSSI 1253].
 [CNSSI 1253].

1577 **REQUIREMENTS**

- 1578TASK P-15Define the security and privacy requirements for the system and the environment of
operation.
- **Potential Inputs:** System design documentation; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;
- 1581 known set of stakeholder assets to be protected; missions, business functions, and mission/business
- processes the system will support; business impact analyses or criticality analyses; system stakeholder information; data map of the information life cycle for PII; Cybersecurity Framework profiles; information
- 1583 information; data map of the information life cycle for PII; Cybersecurity Framework profiles; information 1584 about other systems that interact with the system; supply chain information; threat information; laws,
- 1585 executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies that apply to the system; risk management strategy.
- **Potential Outputs:** Documented stakeholder protection needs; security and privacy requirements.

Primary Responsibility: <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>; <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Information Owner or Steward</u>;
 <u>System Privacy Officer</u>.⁶³

Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>System Security</u>
 Officer; <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u>; <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>; <u>Chief Acquisition</u>
 Officer.

1592System Development Life Cycle Phase:New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1593Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1594 Discussion: Prior to defining security and privacy requirements, stakeholder protection needs are 1595 established. The protection needs are an expression of the protection capability required for the system. 1596 Protection needs include the security characteristics⁶⁴ of the system and the security behavior of the 1597 system in its intended operational environment and across all system life cycle phases. The protection 1598 needs reflect the relative priorities of stakeholders, results of negotiations among stakeholders in 1599 response to conflicts, opposing priorities, contradictions, and stated objectives, and thus, are inherently 1600 subjective. The protection needs are documented to help ensure that the reasoning, assumptions, and 1601 constraints associated with those needs are available for future reference and to provide traceability to 1602 the security and privacy requirements. Security and privacy requirements⁶⁵ constitute a formal, more 1603 granular expression of protection needs across all SDLC phases, the associated life cycle processes, and 1604 protections for the assets associated with the system. Security and privacy requirements are obtained 1605 from many sources including, for example, laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, 1606 standards, mission and business needs, or risk assessments. These requirements are an important part of 1607 the formal expression of the required characteristics of the system, encompassing security and privacy.⁶⁶ 1608 The security and privacy requirements guide and inform the selection of controls for a system and the 1609 tailoring activities associated with those controls.

1610 Organizations can use the Cybersecurity Framework to manage security and privacy requirements and 1611 express those requirements in Framework Profiles defined for the organization. For instance, multiple

requirements can be aligned and even deconflicted using the *Function-Category-Subcategory* structure of

1613 the Framework Core. The Framework *profiles* can then be used to inform the development of tailored

1614 control baselines described in the RMF *Prepare-Organization Level* step, <u>Task P-4</u>.

1615 References: [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1](Stakeholder Needs and

1616 Requirements Definition Process); [SP 800-161] (Multi-Tiered Risk Management); [IR 8179]; [NIST CSF] 1617 (Core [Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover Functions]; Profiles).

1618 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE

1619 **TASK P-16** Determine the placement of the system within the enterprise architecture.

1620 **Potential Inputs:** Security and privacy requirements; organization- and system-level risk assessment

results; enterprise architecture information; security architecture information; privacy architectureinformation; asset information.

⁶³ The system privacy officer is only a primary role when the information system processes PII.

⁶⁴ For example, a fundamental security characteristic is that the system exhibits only specified behaviors, interactions, and outcomes.

⁶⁵ The term *requirements* can have discrete meanings. For example, legal and policy requirements impose obligations to which organizations must adhere. Security and privacy requirements, however, are derived from the protection needs for the system and those protection needs can derive from legal or policy requirements, mission or business needs, risk assessments, or other sources.

⁶⁶ Security and privacy requirements can also include *assurance* requirements. Assurance is having confidence about the ability of the system to remain trustworthy with respect to security and privacy across all forms of adversity resulting from malicious or non-malicious intent.

1623 **Potential Outputs:** Updated enterprise architecture; updated security architecture; updated privacy architecture; plans to use cloud-based systems and shared systems, services, or applications.

Primary Responsibility: <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>; <u>Enterprise Architect</u>; <u>Security Architect</u>; <u>Privacy</u>
 <u>Architect</u>.

Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
 Representative; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System
 Owner; Information Owner or Steward.

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- 1631 1632

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition). Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1633 Discussion: System complexity can impact risk and the ability of organizations to successfully carry out 1634 their missions and business functions. An enterprise architecture can help provide greater understanding 1635 of information and operational technologies included in the initial design and development of information 1636 systems and is a prerequisite for achieving resilience and survivability of those systems in an environment 1637 of increasingly sophisticated threats. Enterprise architecture is a management practice used to maximize 1638 the effectiveness of mission/business processes and information resources and to achieve mission and 1639 business success. Enterprise architecture provides a singular opportunity for organizations to consolidate, 1640 standardize, and optimize information and technology assets. An effectively implemented architecture 1641 produces systems that are more transparent and therefore, easier to understand and protect. Enterprise 1642 architecture also establishes an unambiguous connection from investments to measurable performance 1643 improvements. The placement of a system within the enterprise architecture is important as it provides 1644 greater visibility and understanding about the other systems (internal and external) that are connected to 1645 the system and can also be used to establish security domains for increased levels of protection for the 1646 system.

1647The security architecture and the privacy architecture are integral parts of the enterprise architecture.1648These architectures represent the parts of the enterprise architecture related to the implementation of1649security and privacy requirements. The primary purpose of the security and privacy architectures is to1650ensure that security and privacy requirements are consistently and cost-effectively met in organizational1651systems and are aligned with the risk management strategy. The security and privacy architectures1652provide a roadmap that facilitates traceability from the strategic goals and objectives of organizations,1653through protection needs and security and privacy requirements, to specific security and privacy solutions

- 1654 provided by people, processes, and technologies.
- 1655References: [SP 800-39] (Mission/Business Process Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1] (System1656Requirements Definition Process); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]; Profiles); [OMB FEA].

1657 SYSTEM REGISTRATION

- 1658 **TASK P-17** Register the system with organizational program or management offices.
- 1659 **Potential Inputs:** Organizational policy on system registration; system information.
- 1660 **Potential Outputs:** Registered system in accordance with organizational policy.
- 1661 **Primary Responsibility:** <u>System Owner</u>.
- Supporting Role: <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>; <u>Chief Information Officer</u>; <u>System Security Officer</u>; <u>System</u>
 <u>Privacy Officer</u>.
- 1664System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1665Existing Operations/Maintenance.
- 1666 **Discussion:** System registration, in accordance with organizational policy, serves to inform the governing organization of plans to develop the system or the existence of the system; the key characteristics of the

- system; and the expected security and privacy implications for the organization due to the operation and use of the system. System registration provides organizations with a management and tracking tool to
- 1669 use of the system. System registration provides organizations with a management and tracking tool to 1670 facilitate bringing the system into the enterprise architecture, implementation of protections that are
- 1671 commensurate with risk, and security and privacy posture reporting in accordance with applicable laws,
- 1672 executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or standards. As part of the system registration process,
- 1673 organizations add the system to the organization-wide system inventory. System registration information
- 1674 is updated with system categorization and system characterization information upon completion of the
- 1675 *Categorize* step.
- 1676 **References:** None.

3.2 CATEGORIZE 67 1677

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Purpose

The purpose of the *Categorize* step is to inform organizational risk management processes and tasks by determining the adverse impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation with respect to the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational systems and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems.

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1688 CATEGORIZE TASKS

- 1689 Table 3 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Categorize step.
- 1690 Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.
- 1691

TABLE 3: CATEGORIZE TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK C-1 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION	 A security categorization of the system, including the information processed by the system represented by the organization-identified information types, is completed. [<i>Cybersecurity Framework</i>: ID.AM-5] Security categorization results are documented in the security and privacy plans. [<i>Cybersecurity Framework</i>: Profile]
	 Security categorization results are consistent with the enterprise architecture and commitment to protecting organizational missions, business functions, and mission/business processes.
	 Security categorization results reflect the organization's risk management strategy.
TASK C-2 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION REVIEW AND APPROVAL	 The security categorization results are reviewed and the categorization decision is approved by senior leaders in the organization.
TASK C-3 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION	• The characteristics of the system are described and documented. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]

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Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

1694 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION

1695 **TASK C-1** Categorize the system and document the security categorization results.

- 1696 Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; organizational risk tolerance; authorization boundary (i.e., 1697
 - system) information; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; information types processed,

⁶⁷ The RMF Categorize step is a precondition for the selection of security controls. However, for privacy, there are other factors considered by organizations that guide and inform the selection of privacy controls. These factors are described in the RMF Prepare-System Level step, Task P-15.

stored, or transmitted by the system; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system,
 system elements, and environment of operation; business impact analyses or criticality analyses.

Potential Outputs: Impact levels determined for each information type and for each security objective
 (confidentiality, integrity, availability); system categorization based on high water mark of information
 type impact levels.

1703 **Primary Responsibility:** <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Information Owner or Steward</u>.

Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
 Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy;
 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Security Officer; System
 Privacy Officer.

System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
 Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1710 Discussion: Security categorization determinations consider potential adverse impacts to organizational 1711 operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the loss 1712 of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information. The categorization process is carried out by the 1713 system owner and the information owner or steward in cooperation and collaboration with senior leaders 1714 and executives with mission, business function, or risk management responsibilities. This ensures that 1715 individual systems are categorized based on the mission and business objectives of the organization. The 1716 system owner and information owner or steward consider the results from the security risk assessment 1717 (and the privacy risk assessment when the system processes PII) as a part of the security categorization 1718 decision. The decision is consistent with the risk management strategy. The results of the categorization 1719 process influence the selection of security controls for the system. Security categorization information is 1720 documented in the security plan or included as an attachment to the plan and can be cross-referenced in 1721 a privacy plan when the system processes PII.

1722The security categorization results for the system can be further refined by the organization to facilitate1723an impact-level prioritization of systems with the same impact level (see Task P-6). Results from the1724impact-level prioritization conducted by the organization can be used to help system owners in control1725selection and tailoring decisions.

 1726
 References:
 [FIPS 199];
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-39]
 (System Level);
 [SP 800-59];
 [SP 800-60-1];
 [SP 800-60-2];

 1727
 [SP 800-160-1]
 (Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition and System Requirements Definition

 1728
 Processes);
 [IR 8179];
 [CNSSI 1253];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Identify Function]).

- 1729 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION REVIEW AND APPROVAL
- 1730 **TASK C-2** Review and approve the security categorization results and decision.
- Potential Inputs: Impact levels determined for each information type and for each security objective
 (confidentiality, integrity, availability); system categorization based on high water mark of information
 type impact levels; list of high-value assets for the organization.
- 1734 **Potential Outputs:** Approval of security categorization for the system.
- Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>Senior</u>
 Agency Official for Privacy.⁶⁸
- Supporting Roles: <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>; <u>Chief</u>
 Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer.

⁶⁸ The senior agency official for privacy participates in determining whether the information processed by the information system is considered PII, and is involved in reviewing and approving the categorization for such systems.

1739System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).1740Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1741 Discussion: For information systems that process PII, the senior agency official for privacy reviews and 1742 approves the security categorization results and decision prior to the authorizing official's review.⁶⁹ 1743 Security categorization results and decisions are reviewed by the authorizing official or a designated 1744 representative to ensure that the security category selected for the information system is consistent with 1745 the mission and business functions of the organization and the need to adequately protect those missions 1746 and functions. The authorizing official or designated representatives reviews the categorization results 1747 and decision from an organization-wide perspective, including how the decision aligns with categorization 1748 decisions for all other organizational systems. The authorizing official collaborates with the senior agency 1749 official for risk management or the risk executive (function) to ensure that the categorization decision for 1750 the system is consistent with the organizational risk management strategy and satisfies requirements for 1751 high-value assets. As part of the approval process, the authorizing official can provide specific guidance to 1752 the system owner with respect to any limitations on baseline tailoring activities for the system that occur 1753 at the RMF Select step, Task S-3. If the security categorization decision is not approved, the system owner 1754 initiates steps to repeat the categorization process and resubmits the adjusted results to the authorizing 1755 official or designated representative. System registration information is subsequently updated with the 1756 approved security categorization information (see Task P-17).

1757References: [FIPS 199]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-160-1] (Stakeholder Needs1758and Requirements Definition Process); [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

1759 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

1760 **TASK C-3** Document the characteristics of the system.

Potential Inputs: System design and requirements documentation; authorization boundary information;
 list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements, and the environment
 of operation; system element information; system component inventory; system element supply chain
 information, including inventory and supplier information; system categorization; data map of the
 information life cycle for PII; information on system use, users, and roles.

- 1766 **Potential Outputs:** Documented system description.
- 1767 **Primary Responsibility:** <u>System Owner</u>.
- Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>Information</u>
 <u>Owner or Steward</u>; <u>System Security Officer</u>; <u>System Privacy Officer</u>.
- 1770 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
 1771 Existing Operations/Maintenance.

1772 Discussion: A description of the system characteristics is documented in the security and privacy plans,
 1773 included in attachments to the plans, or referenced in other standard sources for the information
 1774 generated as part of the SDLC. Duplication of information is avoided, whenever possible. The level of
 1775 detail in the security and privacy plans is determined by the organization and is commensurate with the
 1776 security categorization and the security and privacy risk assessments of the system. Information may be
 1778 added to the system description as it becomes available during the system life cycle and execution of the
 1778 RMF steps.

Examples of different types of descriptive information that organizations can include in security and
 privacy plans include: descriptive name of the system and system identifier; system version or release
 number; manufacturer and supplier information; individual responsible for the system; system contact
 information; organization that manages, owns, or controls the system; system location; purpose of the

⁶⁹ The responsibilities of the senior agency official for privacy are detailed in [OMB A-130].

1783 system and missions/business processes supported; how the system is integrated into the enterprise 1784 architecture; SDLC phase; results of the categorization process and privacy risk assessment; authorization 1785 boundary; laws, directives, policies, regulations, or standards affecting individuals' privacy and the 1786 security of the system; architectural description of the system including network topology; information 1787 types; hardware, firmware, and software components that are part of the system; hardware, software, 1788 and system interfaces (internal and external); information flows within the system; network connection 1789 rules for communicating with external systems; interconnected systems and identifiers for those systems; 1790 system users (including affiliations, access rights, privileges, citizenship); system provenance in the supply 1791 chain; maintenance or other relevant agreements; potential suppliers for replacement components for 1792 the system; alternative compatible system components; number and location in inventory of replacement 1793 system components; ownership or operation of the system (government-owned, government-operated; 1794 government-owned, contractor-operated; contractor-owned, contractor-operated; nonfederal [state and 1795 local governments, grantees]); incident response points of contact; authorization date and authorization 1796 termination date; and ongoing authorization status. System registration information is updated with the 1797 system characterization information (see Task P-17).

1798 **References:** [SP 800-18]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

1799 **3.3 SELECT**

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Purpose

The purpose of the *Select* step is to select, tailor, and document the controls necessary to protect the information system and organization commensurate with risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

1808 1809 SELECT TASKS

- Table 4 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF *Select* step. Applicable
 Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.
- 1812

TABLE 4: SELECT TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK S-1 REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION	 Security and privacy requirements are allocated to the system and to the environment in which the system operates. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.GV]
TASK S-2 CONTROL SELECTION	 Control baselines necessary to protect the system commensurate with risk are selected. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]
	 Controls are assigned as system-specific, hybrid, or common controls. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile; PR.IP]
TASK S-3 CONTROL TAILORING	Controls are tailored producing tailored control baselines. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]
TASK S-4 PLAN DEVELOPMENT	 Controls and associated tailoring actions are documented in security and privacy plans or equivalent documents. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]
TASK S-5 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY— SYSTEM	 A continuous monitoring strategy for the system that reflects the organizational risk management strategy is developed. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.GV; DE.CM]
TASK S-6 PLAN REVIEW AND APPROVAL	 Security and privacy plans reflecting the selection of controls necessary to protect the system and the environment of operation commensurate with risk are reviewed and approved by the authorizing official.

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Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

1815 **REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION**

1816TASK S-1Allocate security and privacy requirements to the information system and to the environment1817of operation.

1818 **Potential Inputs:** System categorization; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;

- 1819 organizational policy on system registration; documented stakeholder protection needs; security and
- 1820 privacy requirements; list of common control providers and common controls available for inheritance;

1821 system description; system element information; system component inventory; relevant laws, executive1822 orders, directives, regulations, and policies.

1823 Potential Outputs: List of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements,1824 and the environment of operation.

1825 Primary Responsibility: <u>Security Architect</u>; <u>Privacy Architect</u>; <u>System Security Officer</u>; <u>System Privacy</u>
 1826 <u>Officer</u>.

1827 Supporting Roles: <u>Chief Information Officer</u>; <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated</u>
 1828 <u>Representative</u>; <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>; <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u>; <u>Senior Agency</u>
 1829 <u>Official for Privacy</u>; <u>System Owner</u>.

1830 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
 1831 Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1832 Discussion: Organizations allocate security and privacy requirements to facilitate the control selection 1833 and implementation processes at the organization, information system, and system element (i.e., 1834 component) levels. The allocation of security and privacy requirements to the system and to the 1835 environment⁷⁰ in which the system operates, determines which controls are designated as system-1836 specific, common, and hybrid during the control selection process. Requirements allocation also identifies 1837 the system elements (i.e., components) to which controls are assigned. The allocation of requirements 1838 conserves resources and facilitates streamlining of the risk management process by ensuring that 1839 requirements are not implemented on multiple systems or multiple components within a system when 1840 implementation of a common control or a system-level control on a specific component provides the 1841 needed protection capability. Common controls satisfy security and privacy requirements allocated to the 1842 organization and provide a protection capability that is inherited by one or more systems (see RMF 1843 Prepare-Organization Level step, Task P-5). Hybrid controls satisfy security and privacy requirements 1844 allocated to the system and to the organization and provide a protection capability that is partially 1845 inherited by one or more systems. And finally, system-specific controls satisfy security and privacy 1846 requirements allocated to the system and provide a protection capability for that system. Requirements 1847 can also be allocated to specific system components rather than to every component within a system. For 1848 example, system-specific controls associated with management of audit logs may be allocated to a log 1849 management server and thus need not be implemented on every system component.

1850References: [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800-64]; [SP1851800-160-1] (System Requirements Definition Process); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]; Profiles);1852[OMB FEA].

1853 CONTROL SELECTION

1854 **TASK S-2** Select the controls for the system and the environment of operation.

1855Potential Inputs: System categorization information; organization- and system-level risk assessment1856results; system element information; system component inventory; list of security and privacy

- 1857 requirements allocated to the system, system elements, and environment of operation; list of contractual
- 1858 requirements allocated to external providers of the system or system component; business impact or
- 1859 criticality analysis; risk management strategy; organizational security and privacy policy; federal or
- 1860 organization-approved or mandated baselines or overlays; Cybersecurity Framework profiles.
- 1861 **Potential Outputs:** Controls selected for the system and the environment of operation.

⁷⁰ The environment of operation for an information system refers to the physical surroundings in which the system processes, stores, and transmits information. For example, *security requirements* are allocated to the facilities where the system is located and operates. Those security requirements can be satisfied by the physical security controls in [SP 800-53]

1862 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Common Control Provider</u>.

1863 Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information</u>
 1864 <u>Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy</u>
 1865 Officer.

1866 **System Development Life Cycle Phase:** New – Development/Acquisition.

1867

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1868 Discussion: There are two approaches that can be used for the initial selection of controls: a baseline 1869 control selection approach, or an organization-generated control selection approach. The baseline control 1870 selection approach uses control baselines, which are pre-defined sets of controls specifically assembled to 1871 address the protection needs of a group, organization, or community of interest. Control baselines serve 1872 as a starting point for the protection of individuals' privacy, information, and information systems. Federal 1873 control baselines are provided in [SP 800-53B]. The system security categorization (see Task C-1) and the 1874 security requirements derived from stakeholder protection needs, laws, executive orders, regulations, 1875 policies, directives, instructions, and standards (see Task P-15) can help inform the selection of security 1876 control baselines. A privacy risk assessment (see Task P-14) and privacy requirements derived from 1877 stakeholder protection needs, laws, executive orders, regulations, policies, directives, instructions, and 1878 standards (see Task P-15) can help inform the selection of privacy control baselines. Privacy programs use 1879 security and privacy control baselines to manage the privacy risks arising from both unauthorized system 1880 activity or behavior, as well as from authorized activities. After the pre-defined control baseline is 1881 selected, organizations tailor the baseline in accordance with the guidance provided (see Task S-3). The 1882 baseline control selection approach can provide consistency across a broad community of interest.

1883 The organization-generated control selection approach differs from the baseline selection approach 1884 because the organization does not start with a pre-defined set of controls. Rather, the organization uses 1885 its own selection process to select controls. This may be necessary when the system is highly specialized 1886 (e.g., a weapons system or a medical device) or has limited purpose or scope (e.g., a smart meter). In 1887 these situations, it may be more efficient and cost-effective for an organization to select a specific set of 1888 controls for the system (i.e., a bottom-up approach) instead of starting with a pre-defined set of controls 1889 from a broad-based control baseline and subsequently eliminating controls through the tailoring process 1890 (i.e., top-down approach).

1891 In both the baseline control selection approach and organization-generated control selection approach, 1892 organizations develop a well-defined set of security and privacy requirements using a life cycle-based 1893 systems engineering process (e.g., [ISO 15288] and [SP 800-160-1] as described in the RMF Prepare-1894 System Level step, Task P-15. This process generates a set of requirements that can be used to guide and 1895 inform the selection of a set of controls to satisfy the requirements (whether the organization starts with 1896 a control baseline or generates the set of controls from its own selection process). Similarly, organizations 1897 can use the [NIST CSF] to develop profiles representing a set of organization-specific security and privacy 1898 requirements—and thus, guiding and informing control selection from [SP 800-53]. Tailoring may also be 1899 required in the organization-generated control selection approach (see Task S-3). Organizations do not 1900 need to choose one approach for the selection of controls for each of their systems, but instead, may use 1901 different approaches as circumstances dictate.

- 1902References: [FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53B]; [SP 800-160-1] (System1903Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes); [SP 800-161] (Respond1904and Chapter 3); [IR 8062]; [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond,
- 1905 Recover Functions]; Profiles).

1906 CONTROL TAILORING

1907 **TASK S-3** Tailor the controls selected for the system and the environment of operation.

1908Potential Inputs: Initial control baselines; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; system1909element information; system component inventory; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to1010element information; system component inventory; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to

- 1910 the system, system elements, and environment of operation; business impact analysis or criticality
- 1911 analysis; risk management strategy; organizational security and privacy policies; federal or organization-1912 approved or mandated overlays.
- 1913**Potential Outputs:** List of tailored controls for the system and environment of operation (i.e., tailored1914control baselines).
- 1915 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Common Control Provider</u>.

Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>Information</u>
 Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy

- 1918 Officer.
- 1919System Development Life Cycle Phase:New Development/Acquisition.1920Existing Operations/Maintenance.

1921 **Discussion:** After selecting the applicable control baselines, organizations tailor the controls based on 1922 various factors including, for example, missions or business functions, threats, privacy risks, supply chain 1923 risks, type of system, or risk tolerance. Controls related to SCRM provide the basis for determining 1924 whether an information system is fit-for-purpose⁷¹ and need to be tailored accordingly. The tailoring 1925 process includes identifying and designating common controls in the control baselines (see Task P-5); 1926 applying scoping considerations to the remaining baseline controls; selecting compensating controls, if 1927 needed; assigning specific values to organization-defined control parameters using either assignment or 1928 selection statements; supplementing baselines with additional controls; and providing specification 1929 information for control implementation.⁷² Organizations determine the amount of detail to include in 1930 justifications or supporting rationale required for tailoring decisions. For example, the justification or 1931 supporting rationale for scoping decisions related to a high-impact system (or high value asset) may 1932 necessitate greater specificity than similar decisions for a low-impact system. Such determinations are 1933 consistent with the organization's missions and business functions; stakeholder needs; and any relevant 1934 laws, executive orders, regulations, directives, or policies.

1935 Organizations use risk assessments to inform and guide the tailoring process. Threat information from 1936 security risk assessments provides information on adversary capabilities, intent, and targeting that may 1937 affect organizational decisions regarding the selection of security controls, including the associated costs 1938 and benefits. Privacy risk assessments, including the contextual factors therein, will also influence 1939 tailoring when an information system processes PII.⁷³ Risk assessment results are also leveraged when 1940 identifying common controls to determine if the controls available for inheritance meet the security and 1941 privacy requirements for the system and its environment of operation. When common controls provided 1942 by the organization are not sufficient for the systems inheriting the controls, system owners can either 1943 supplement the common controls with system-specific or hybrid controls to achieve the required level of 1944 protection for the system or accept greater risk with the acknowledgement and approval of the 1945 organization. Organizations may also consider federally or organizationally mandated or approved 1946 overlays, tailored baselines, or Cybersecurity Framework Profiles when conducting tailoring (see Task P-4).

- 1947 **References:** [FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53B]; [SP 800-160-1] (System
- 1948 Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes); [SP 800-161] (Respond
- and Chapter 3); [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
 Functions]; Profiles).
 - ⁷¹ [ISO 15288] describes *fit-for-purpose* as an outcome from the validation process in the SDLC that demonstrates, through assessment of the services presented to the stakeholders, that the "right" system has been created and satisfies the customer need.

⁷² The tailoring process is fully described in [SP 800-53B].

⁷³ [IR 8062] provides a discussion of context and its function in a privacy risk model.

1951 PLAN DEVELOPMENT

1952 TASK S-4 Document the controls for the system and environment of operation in security and privacy 1953 plans.

1954 Potential Inputs: System categorization information; organization- and system-level risk assessment 1955 results; system element information; system component inventory; business impact or criticality analysis; 1956 list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements, and environment of 1957 operation; risk management strategy; list of selected controls for the system and environment of 1958 operation; organizational security and privacy policies.

- 1959 **Potential Outputs:** Security and privacy plans for the system.
- 1960 Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.

1961 Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information 1962 Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy 1963 Officer.

1964 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition. 1965

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

1966 **Discussion:** Security and privacy plans contain an overview of the security and privacy requirements for 1967 the system and the controls selected to satisfy the requirements. The plans describe the intended 1968 application of each selected control in the context of the system with a sufficient level of detail to 1969 correctly implement the control and to subsequently assess the effectiveness of the control. The control 1970 documentation describes how system-specific and hybrid controls are implemented and the plans and 1971 expectations regarding the functionality of the system. The description includes planned inputs, expected 1972 behavior, and expected outputs where appropriate, typically for those controls implemented in the 1973 hardware, software, or firmware components of the system. Common controls are also identified in the 1974 plans. There is no requirement to provide implementation details for inherited common controls. Rather, 1975 those details are provided in the plans for common control providers and are made available to system 1976 owners. For hybrid controls, the organization specifies in the system-level plans the parts of the control 1977 that are provided by the common control provider and the parts of the control that are implemented at 1978 the system level.

1979 Organizations may develop a consolidated plan that incorporates security and privacy plans, or maintain 1980 separate plans. Privacy programs collaborate on the development of the security component of an 1981 integrated plan in the following areas. When controls provide protections with respect to managing 1982 confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, privacy programs collaborate with security programs to 1983 ensure that the plan reflects the selection of these controls and delineates roles and responsibilities for 1984 control implementation, assessment, and monitoring. For separate security plans and privacy plans, 1985 organizations cross-reference the controls in all plans to help to maintain awareness and accountability. 1986 The senior agency official for privacy reviews and approves the privacy plan (or integrated plan) before 1987 the plan is provided to the authorizing official or designated representative for review (see Task S-6). 1988 Organizations may document control selection and tailoring information in documents equivalent to 1989 security and privacy plans, for example, in systems engineering or system life cycle artifacts or documents.

1990 Documentation of planned control implementations allows for traceability of decisions prior to and after 1991 the deployment of the system. To the extent possible, organizations reference existing documentation 1992 (either by vendors or other organizations that have employed the same or similar systems or system 1993 elements), use automated support tools, and coordinate across the organization to reduce redundancy 1994 and increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of control documentation. The documentation also 1995 addresses platform dependencies and includes any additional information necessary to describe how the 1996 capability required is to be achieved at the level of detail sufficient to support control implementation and 1997 assessment. Documentation for control implementations follows best practices for hardware and 1998 software development and for systems security and privacy engineering disciplines and is also consistent

- 1999 with established policies and procedures for documenting activities in the SDLC. In certain situations, 2000 security controls can be implemented in ways that create privacy risks. The privacy program supports 2001 documentation of privacy risk considerations and the implementations intended to mitigate them.
- 2002 For controls that are mechanism-based, organizations take advantage of the functional specifications 2003 provided by or obtainable from manufacturers, vendors, and systems integrators. This includes any 2004 documentation that may assist the organization during the development, implementation, assessment, 2005 and monitoring of controls. For certain controls, organizations obtain control implementation information 2006 from the appropriate organizational entities including, for example, physical security offices, facilities 2007 offices, records management offices, and human resource offices. Since the enterprise architecture and 2008 the security and privacy architectures established by the organization guide and inform the organizational 2009 approach used to plan for and implement controls, documenting the process helps to ensure traceability 2010 in meeting the security and privacy requirements.
- 2011 **References:** [FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-18]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160-1]
- 2012 (System Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes); [SP 800-161] 2013 (Respond and Chapter 3); [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond,
- 2014 Recover Functions]; Profiles).

2015 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY—SYSTEM

- 2016TASK S-5Develop and implement a system-level strategy for monitoring control effectiveness to
supplement the organizational continuous monitoring strategy.
- Potential Inputs: Organizational risk management strategy; organizational continuous monitoring
 strategy; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; security and privacy plans; organizational
 security and privacy policies.
- 2021 **Potential Outputs:** Continuous monitoring strategy for the system including time-based trigger for ongoing authorization.
- 2023 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Common Control Provider</u>.

Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
 Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy;
 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information Owner or Steward;
 Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer;
 System Privacy Officer.

2029 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition.

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2031 Discussion: An important aspect of risk management is the ongoing monitoring of controls implemented 2032 within or inherited by an information system. An effective continuous monitoring strategy at the system 2033 level is developed and implemented in coordination with the organizational continuous monitoring 2034 strategy early in the SDLC (i.e., during initial system design or procurement decision). The system-level 2035 continuous monitoring strategy supplements the continuous monitoring strategy for the organization. The 2036 system-level strategy addresses monitoring those controls for which monitoring is not provided as part of 2037 the continuous monitoring strategy and implementation for the organization. The system-level strategy 2038 identifies the frequency of monitoring for controls not addressed by the organization-level strategy and 2039 defines the approach to be used for assessing those controls. The system-level continuous monitoring 2040 strategy, consistent with the organizational strategy, may define how changes to the system are to be 2041 monitored; how risk assessments are to be conducted; and the security and privacy posture reporting

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requirements including recipients of the reports. The system-level continuous monitoring strategy can be
 included in security and privacy plans.⁷⁴

2044 For controls that are not addressed by the organizational continuous monitoring strategy, the criteria for 2045 determining the frequency with which controls are monitored post-implementation and a plan for the 2046 ongoing assessment of those controls, are established by the system owner or common control provider 2047 in collaboration with other organizational officials including, for example, the authorizing official or 2048 designated representative; senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function); 2049 senior agency information security officer; senior agency official for privacy; and chief information officer. 2050 The frequency criteria at the system level reflect organizational priorities and the importance of the 2051 system to the organization's operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 2052 Controls that are volatile (i.e., where the control or the control implementation is most likely to change 2053 over time),⁷⁵ critical to certain aspects of the protection needs for the organization, or identified in plans 2054 of action and milestones, may require more frequent assessment. The approach to control assessments 2055 during continuous monitoring may include, for example, reuse of assessment procedures and assessment 2056 results that supported the initial authorization decision; detection of the status of system components; 2057 and analysis of historical and operational data.

2058The authorizing official or designated representative approves the continuous monitoring strategy and2059the minimum frequency with which each control is to be monitored. The approval of the strategy can be2060obtained in conjunction with the security and privacy plan approval. The monitoring of controls begins at2061the start of the operational phase of the SDLC and continues through the disposal phase.

 2062
 References:
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-39]
 (Organization, Mission or Business Process, System Levels);
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-33];
 [SP 800-137];
 [SP 800-161];
 [IR 8011-1];
 [CNSSI 1253];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Detect Punction]).

2065 PLAN REVIEW AND APPROVAL

- 2066TASK S-6Review and approve the security and privacy plans for the system and the environment of
operation.
- Potential Inputs: Completed security and privacy plans; organization- and system-level risk assessment
 results.
- 2070 **Potential Outputs:** Security and privacy plans approved by the authorizing official.
- 2071 Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>.
- 2072 Supporting Roles: <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>; <u>Chief</u>
- 2073 <u>Information Officer; Chief Acquisition Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency</u>
 2074 Official for Privacy.

⁷⁴ The Privacy Continuous Monitoring (PCM) strategy includes all of the available privacy controls implemented throughout the organization at all risk management levels (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and system). The strategy ensures that the controls are monitored on an ongoing basis by assigning an organization-defined assessment frequency to each control that is sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks. If, during the development of a new system, there is a need to create or use a privacy control not included in the PCM strategy, the SAOP is consulted to determine whether it is appropriate for the proposed use case. If there is a decision to implement a new privacy control, the organization's PCM strategy is updated to include the new control with an organization-defined monitoring frequency.

⁷⁵ Volatility is most prevalent in those controls implemented in the hardware, software and firmware components of the system. For example, replacing or upgrading an operating system, a database system, application, or a network router may change the security controls provided by the vendor or original equipment manufacturer. Moreover, configuration settings may also require adjustments as organizational missions, business functions, threats, risks, and risk tolerance change.

2075System Development Life Cycle Phase:New – Development/Acquisition.2076Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2077 Discussion: The security and privacy plan review by the authorizing official or designated representative 2078 with support from the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), chief 2079 information officer, senior agency information security officer, and senior agency official for privacy, 2080 determines if the plans are complete, consistent, and satisfy the stated security and privacy requirements 2081 for the system. Based on the results from this review, the authorizing official or designated representative 2082 may recommend changes to the security and privacy plans. If the plans are unacceptable, the system 2083 owner or common control provider make appropriate changes to the plans. If the plans are acceptable, 2084 the authorizing official or designated representative approves the plans.

- 2085The acceptance of the security and privacy plans represents an important milestone in the SDLC and risk2086management process. The authorizing official or designated representative, by approving the plans,2087agrees to the set of controls (i.e., system-specific, hybrid, or common controls) and the description of the2088proposed implementation of the controls to meet the security and privacy requirements for the system2089and the environment in which the system operates. The approval of the plans allows the risk management2090process to proceed to the RMF Implement step. The approval of the plans also establishes the level of
- 2091 effort required to successfully complete the remainder of the RMF steps and provides the basis of the
- 2092 security and privacy specifications for the acquisition of the system or individual system components.
- 2093 **References:** [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-160-1] (System Requirements Definition, Architecture 2094 Definition, and Design Definition Processes).

2095 **3.4 IMPLEMENT**

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Purpose

The purpose of the *Implement* step is to implement the controls in the security and privacy plans for the system and for the organization and to document in a baseline configuration, the specific details of the control implementation.

2105 IMPLEMENT TASKS

2106 Table 5 provides a summary	of tasks and	expected	outcomes for th	ne RMF <i>Implen</i>	<i>nent</i> step.
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- 2107 Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.
- 2108

TABLE 5: IMPLEMENT TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK I-1 CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION	 Controls specified in the security and privacy plans are implemented. [Cybersecurity Framework: PR.IP-1] Systems security and privacy engineering methodologies are used to implement the controls in the system security and privacy plans. [Cybersecurity Framework: PR.IP-2]
TASK I-2 BASELINE CONFIGURATION	 The configuration baseline is established. [Cybersecurity Framework: PR.IP-1] The security and privacy plans are updated based on information obtained during the implementation of the controls. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]

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Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

2111 CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION

2112 **TASK I-1** Implement the controls in the security and privacy plans.

2113 **Potential Inputs:** Approved security and privacy plans; system design documents; organizational security

and privacy policies and procedures; business impact or criticality analyses; enterprise architecture

2115 information; security architecture information; privacy architecture information; list of security and

2116 privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements; and environment of operation; system 2117 element information; system component inventory; organization- and system-level risk assessment

- 2118 results.
- 2119 **Potential Outputs:** Implemented controls.
- 2120 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Common Control Provider</u>.

2121 Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Systems Security

2122 Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Enterprise Architect; System

- 2123 <u>Administrator</u>.
- 2124

 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment. Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
 Discussion: Organizations implement the controls listed in the security and privacy plans. The control implementation is consistent with the organization's enterprise architecture and associated security and

privacy architectures. The security and privacy architectures serve as a resource to guide and inform the allocation of controls to a system or system component. Not all controls need to be allocated to every system component. Controls providing a specific security or privacy capability are only allocated to system components that require that capability. The security categorization, privacy risk assessment, security and privacy architectures, and the allocation of controls work together to help achieve a suitable balance between security and privacy protections and the mission-based function of the system.

- 2135 Organizations use best practices when implementing controls, including systems security and privacy 2136 engineering methodologies, concepts, and principles. Risk assessments guide and inform decisions 2137 regarding the cost, benefit, and risk trade-offs in using different technologies or policies for control 2138 implementation. Organizations also ensure that mandatory configuration settings are established and 2139 implemented on system components in accordance with federal and organizational policies. When 2140 organizations have no direct control over what controls are implemented in a system component, for 2141 example, in commercial off-the-shelf products, organizations consider the use of system components that 2142 have been tested, evaluated, or validated by approved, independent, third-party assessment facilities 2143 (e.g., NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program Testing Laboratories, National Information 2144 Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Testing Laboratories). In addition, organizations address, where 2145 applicable, assurance requirements when implementing controls. Assurance requirements are directed at 2146 the activities that control developers and implementers carry out to increase the level of confidence that 2147 the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with 2148 respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the system. The assurance requirements 2149 address quality of the design, development, and implementation of the controls.⁷⁶
- 2150 For the common controls inherited by the system, systems security and privacy engineers with support 2151 from system security and privacy officers, coordinate with the common control provider to determine the 2152 most appropriate way to implement common controls. System owners can refer to the authorization 2153 packages prepared by common control providers when making determinations regarding the adequacy of 2154 common controls inherited by their systems. During implementation, it may be determined that common 2155 controls previously selected to be inherited by the system do not meet the specified security or privacy 2156 requirements for the system. For common controls that do not meet the requirements for the system 2157 inheriting the controls or when common controls have unacceptable deficiencies, the system owners 2158 identify compensating or supplementary controls to be implemented. System owners can supplement the 2159 common controls with system-specific or hybrid controls to achieve the required protection for their 2160 systems or they can accept greater risk with the acknowledgement and approval of the organization. Risk 2161 assessments may determine how gaps in security or privacy requirements between systems and common 2162 controls affect the risk associated with the system, and how to prioritize the need for compensating or 2163 supplementary controls to mitigate specific risks.

2164 Consistent with the flexibility allowed in applying the tasks in the RMF, organizations conduct initial 2165 control assessments during system development and implementation. Conducting such assessments in 2166 parallel with the development and implementation phases of the SDLC facilitates early identification of 2167 deficiencies and provides a cost-effective method for initiating corrective actions. Issues discovered 2168 during these assessments can be referred to authorizing officials for resolution. The results of the initial 2169 control assessments can also be used during the authorize step to avoid delays or costly repetition of 2170 assessments. Assessment results that are subsequently reused in other phases of the SDLC meet the 2171 reuse requirements established by the organization.77

⁷⁶ [SP 800-53] provides a list of assurance-related security and privacy controls.

⁷⁷ See the RMF <u>Assess</u> step and [SP 800-53A] for information on assessments and reuse of assessment results.

2172 **References:** [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160-1] (Implementation, 2173 Integration, Verification, and Transition Processes); [SP 800-161]; [IR 8062]; [IR 8179].

2174 **BASELINE CONFIGURATION**

- 2175TASK I-2Establish the initial configuration baseline for the system by documenting changes to planned2176control implementation.
- 2177 **Potential Inputs:** Security and privacy plans; information from control implementation efforts.
- 2178 **Potential Outputs:** Security and privacy plans updated with implementation detail sufficient for use by assessors; system configuration baseline.
- 2180 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner; Common Control Provider</u>.

Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Systems Security
 Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Enterprise Architect; System
 Administrator.

2184
2185System Development Life Cycle Phase:
New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2186 **Discussion:** Despite the specific control implementation details in the security and privacy plans and the 2187 system design documents, it is not always feasible to implement controls as planned. Therefore, as 2188 control implementations are carried out, the security and privacy plans are updated with as-implemented 2189 control implementation details. The updates include revised descriptions of implemented controls 2190 including changes to planned inputs, expected behavior, and expected outputs with sufficient detail to 2191 support control assessments. Configuration baselines are established for all aspects of the information 2192 system including any information technology component (i.e., hardware, software, and firmware) 2193 configurations and include system configuration settings and other technical implementation details. The 2194 configuration baselines are essential to providing the capability to determine when there are changes to 2195 the system, whether those changes are authorized, and the impact of the changes on the security and 2196 privacy posture of the system and the organization.

References: [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-128]; [SP 800-160-1] (Implementation, Integration, Verification, and
 Transition, Configuration Management Processes).

2199 **3.5 ASSESS**

Purpose

The purpose of the **Assess** step is to determine if the controls selected for implementation are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the system and the organization.

2209 ASSESS TASKS

2210	Table 6 provides a s	ummary of tasks and	expected outcom	es for the	RMF Assess step.
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- 2211 Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.
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TABLE 6: ASSESS TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK A-1 ASSESSOR SELECTION	 An assessor or assessment team is selected to conduct the control assessments. The appropriate level of independence is achieved for the assessor or assessment team selected.
TASK A-2 ASSESSMENT PLAN	 Documentation needed to conduct the assessments is provided to the assessor or assessment team. Security and privacy assessment plans are developed and documented. Security and privacy assessment plans are reviewed and approved to establish the expectations for the control assessments and the level of effort required.
TASK A-3 CONTROL ASSESSMENTS	 Control assessments are conducted in accordance with the security and privacy assessment plans. Opportunities to reuse assessment results from previous assessments to make the risk management process timely and cost-effective are considered. Use of automation to conduct control assessments is maximized to increase speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of assessments.
TASK A-4 ASSESSMENT REPORTS	Security and privacy assessment reports that provide findings and recommendations are completed.
TASK A-5 REMEDIATION ACTIONS	 Remediation actions to address deficiencies in the controls implemented in the system and environment of operation are taken. Security and privacy plans are updated to reflect control implementation changes made based on the assessments and subsequent remediation actions. [Cybersecurity Framework: Profile]
TASK A-6 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES	• A plan of action and milestones detailing remediation plans for unacceptable risks identified in security and privacy assessment reports is developed. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RA-6]

2213

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

2214 ASSESSOR SELECTION

applicable to the system.

2215 **TASK A-1** Select the appropriate assessor or assessment team for the type of control assessment to be 2216 conducted.

2217 **Potential Inputs:** Security and privacy plans; program management control information; common control 2218 documentation; organizational security and privacy program plans; system design documentation; 2219 enterprise, security, and privacy architecture information; security and privacy policies and procedures 2220

- 2221 Potential Outputs: Selection of assessor or assessment team responsible for conducting the control 2222 assessment.
- 2223 Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
- 2224 Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency 2225 Official for Privacy.
- 2226 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment. 2227 Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2228 Discussion: Organizations consider both the technical expertise and level of independence required in 2229 selecting control assessors.⁷⁸ Organizations ensure that control assessors possess the required skills and 2230 technical expertise to develop effective assessment plans and to conduct assessments of program 2231 management, system-specific, hybrid, and common controls, as appropriate. This includes general 2232 knowledge of risk management concepts as well as comprehensive knowledge of and experience with the 2233 specific hardware, software, and firmware components implemented. As controls may be implemented to 2234 achieve security and privacy objectives, organizations consider the degree of collaboration between 2235 security control and privacy control assessors that is necessary.

- 2236 Organizations can conduct self-assessments of controls or obtain the services of an independent control 2237 assessor. An independent assessor is an individual or group that is capable of conducting an impartial 2238 assessment. Impartiality means that assessors are free from perceived or actual conflicts of interest with 2239 respect to the determination of control effectiveness or the development, operation, or management of 2240 the system, common controls, or program management controls. The authorizing official determines the 2241 level of assessor independence based on applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, 2242 policies, or standards. The authorizing official consults with the Office of the Inspector General, chief 2243 information officer, senior agency official for privacy, and senior agency information security officer to 2244 help guide and inform decisions regarding assessor independence.
- 2245 The system privacy officer is responsible for identifying assessment methodologies and metrics to 2246 determine if privacy controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure 2247 compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. The senior agency official for 2248 privacy is also responsible for conducting assessments of privacy controls and documenting the results of 2249 the assessments. At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls may be assessed by an 2250 independent assessor. However, in all cases, the senior agency official for privacy is responsible and 2251 accountable for the organization's privacy program, including any privacy functions performed by 2252 independent assessors. The senior agency official for privacy is also responsible for providing privacy-2253 related information to the authorizing official.
- 2254 References: [FIPS 199]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-55].

⁷⁸ In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization's discretion.

ASSESSMENT PLAN

2256 **TASK A-2** Develop, review, and approve plans to assess implemented controls.

Potential Inputs: Security and privacy plans; program management control information; common control
 documentation; organizational security and privacy program plans; system design documentation;
 enterprise, security, and privacy architecture information; policies and procedures applicable to the
 system.

- 2261 **Potential Outputs:** Security and privacy assessment plans approved by the authorizing official.
- Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>Control</u>
 <u>Assessor</u>.
- Supporting Roles: Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System
 Owner; Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System
 Privacy Officer.
- 2267System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.2268Existing Operations/Maintenance.

2269 Discussion: Security and privacy assessment plans are developed by control assessors based on the 2270 implementation information contained in security and privacy plans, program management control 2271 documentation, and common control documentation. Organizations may choose to develop a single, 2272 integrated security and privacy assessment plan for the system or the organization. An integrated 2273 assessment plan delineates roles and responsibilities for control assessment. Assessment plans also 2274 provide the objectives for control assessments and specific assessment procedures for each control. 2275 Assessment plans reflect the type of assessment the organization is conducting, including for example: 2276 developmental testing and evaluation; independent verification and validation; audits, including supply 2277 chain; assessments supporting system and common control authorization or reauthorization; program 2278 management control assessments; continuous monitoring; and assessments conducted after remediation 2279 actions.

2280 Assessment plans are reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or the designated representative 2281 of the authorizing official to help ensure that the plans are consistent with the security and privacy 2282 objectives of the organization; employ procedures, methods, techniques, tools, and automation to 2283 support continuous monitoring and near real-time risk management; and are cost-effective. Approved 2284 assessment plans establish expectations for the control assessments and the level of effort for the 2285 assessment. Approved assessment plans help to ensure that appropriate resources are applied toward 2286 determining control effectiveness while providing the necessary level of assurance in making such 2287 determinations. When controls are provided by an external provider through contracts, interagency 2288 agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or supply chain arrangements, the 2289 organization can request security and privacy assessment plans and assessments results or evidence from 2290 the provider.

 2291
 References: [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160-1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [SP 800-161]; [IR 8011

 2292
 1].

2293 CONTROL ASSESSMENTS

- 2294TASK A-3Assess the controls in accordance with the assessment procedures described in assessment2295plans.
- Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment plans; security and privacy plans; external assessment
 or audit results (if applicable).
- 2298 **Potential Outputs:** Completed control assessments and associated assessment evidence.
- 2299 Primary Responsibility: <u>Control Assessor</u>.

Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Owner;</u>
 Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer;
 Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.

2303 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
 2304 Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2305 **Discussion:** Control assessments determine the extent to which the selected controls are implemented 2306 correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security and 2307 privacy requirements for the system and the organization. The system owner, common control provider, 2308 and/or organization rely on the technical skills and expertise of assessors to assess implemented controls 2309 using the assessment procedures specified in assessment plans and provide recommendations on how to 2310 respond to control deficiencies to reduce or eliminate identified vulnerabilities or unacceptable risks. The 2311 senior agency official for privacy serves as the control assessor for the privacy controls and is responsible 2312 for conducting an initial assessment of the privacy controls prior to system operation, and for assessing 2313 the controls periodically thereafter at a frequency sufficient to ensure compliance with privacy 2314 requirements and to manage privacy risks.⁷⁹ Controls implemented to achieve both security and privacy 2315 objectives may require a degree of collaboration between security and privacy control assessors. The 2316 assessor findings are a factual reporting of whether the controls are operating as intended and whether 2317 any deficiencies⁸⁰ in the controls are discovered during the assessment.

2318 Control assessments occur as early as practicable in the SDLC, preferably during the development phase. 2319 These types of assessments are referred to as developmental testing and evaluation and validate that the 2320 controls are implemented correctly and are consistent with the established information security and 2321 privacy architectures. Developmental testing and evaluation activities include, for example, design and 2322 code reviews, regression testing, and application scanning. Deficiencies identified early in the SDLC can be 2323 resolved in a more cost-effective manner. Assessments may be needed prior to source selection during 2324 the procurement process to assess potential suppliers or providers before the organization enters into 2325 agreements or contracts to begin the development phase. The results of control assessments conducted 2326 during the SDLC can also be used (consistent with reuse criteria established by the organization) during 2327 the authorization process to avoid unnecessary delays or costly repetition of assessments. Organizations 2328 can maximize the use of automation to conduct control assessments to increase the speed, effectiveness, 2329 and efficiency of the assessments, and to support continuous monitoring of the security and privacy 2330 posture of organizational systems.

2331 Applying and assessing controls throughout the development process may be appropriate for iterative 2332 development processes. When iterative development processes (e.g., agile development) are employed, 2333 an iterative assessment may be conducted as each cycle is completed. A similar process is employed for 2334 assessing controls in commercial IT products that are used in the system. Organizations may choose to 2335 begin assessing controls prior to the complete implementation of all controls in the security and privacy 2336 plans. This type of incremental assessment is appropriate if it is more efficient or cost-effective to do so. 2337 Common controls (i.e., controls that are inherited by the system) are assessed separately (by assessors 2338 chosen by common control providers or the organization) and need not be assessed as part of a system-2339 level assessment.

Organizations ensure that assessors have access to the information system and environment of operation
 where the controls are implemented and to the documentation, records, artifacts, test results, and other
 materials needed to assess the controls. This includes the controls implemented by external providers
 through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or
 supply chain arrangements. Assessors have the required degree of independence as determined by the

 ⁷⁹ The senior agency official for privacy can delegate the assessment functions, consistent with applicable policies.
 ⁸⁰ Only deficiencies in controls that can be exploited by threat agents are considered vulnerabilities.

authorizing official.⁸¹ Assessor independence during the continuous monitoring process facilitates reuse
 of assessment results to support ongoing authorization and reauthorization.

2347 To make the risk management process more efficient and cost-effective, organizations may choose to 2348 establish reasonable and appropriate criteria for reusing assessment results as part of organization-wide 2349 assessment policy or in the security and privacy program plans. For example, a recent audit of a system 2350 may have produced information about the effectiveness of selected controls. Another opportunity to 2351 reuse previous assessment results may come from external programs that test and evaluate security and 2352 privacy features of commercial information technology products (e.g., Common Criteria Evaluation and 2353 Validation Program and NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program,). If prior assessment results from 2354 the system developer or vendor are available, the control assessor, under appropriate circumstances, may 2355 incorporate those results into the assessment. In addition, if a control implementation was assessed 2356 during other forms of assessment at previous stages of the SDLC (e.g., unit testing, functional testing, 2357 acceptance testing), organizations may consider potential reuse of those results to reduce duplication of 2358 efforts. And finally, assessment results can be reused to support reciprocity, for example, assessment 2359 results supporting an authorization to use (see Appendix F). Additional information on assessment result 2360 reuse is available in [SP 800-53A].

2361 **References:** [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160-1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [IR 8011-1].

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

- 2363TASK A-4Prepare the assessment reports documenting the findings and recommendations from the
control assessments.
- 2365 **Potential Inputs:** Completed control assessments⁸² and associated assessment evidence.
- Potential Outputs: Completed security and privacy assessment reports detailing the assessor findings andrecommendations.
- 2368 Primary Responsibility: <u>Control Assessor</u>.
- Supporting Roles: System Owner; Common Control Provider; System Security Officer; System Privacy
 Officer.
- 2371 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
 2372 Existing Operations/Maintenance.

2373 **Discussion:** The results of the security and privacy control assessments, including recommendations for 2374 correcting deficiencies in the implemented controls, are documented in the assessment reports⁸³ by 2375 control assessors. Organizations may develop a single, integrated security and privacy assessment report. 2376 Assessment reports are key documents in the system or common control authorization package that is 2377 developed for authorizing officials. The assessment reports include information based on assessor 2378 findings, necessary to determine the effectiveness of the controls implemented within or inherited by the 2379 information system. Assessment reports are an important factor in a determining risk to organizational 2380 operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation by the authorizing official. The 2381 format and the level of detail provided in assessment reports are appropriate for the type of control 2382 assessment conducted, for example, developmental testing and evaluation; independent verification and

⁸¹ In accordance with [<u>OMB A-130</u>], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization's discretion. ⁸² A *privacy control assessment* is defined in [<u>OMB A-130</u>] as both an assessment and a formal document detailing the process and the outcome of the assessment. In this guideline, a privacy assessment report is identified as a separate output, but it should be considered as part of the privacy control assessment.

⁸³ If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an assessment report, then the comparable report would itself constitute the assessment report.

validation; independent assessments supporting information system or common control authorizations or
 reauthorizations; self-assessments; assessments after remediation actions; independent evaluations or
 audits; and assessments during continuous monitoring. The reporting format may also be prescribed by
 the organization.

2387 Control assessment results obtained during the system development lifecycle are documented in an 2388 interim report and included in the final security and privacy assessment reports. Development of interim 2389 reports that document assessment results from relevant phases of the SDLC reinforces the concept that 2390 assessment reports are evolving documents. Interim reports are used, as appropriate, to inform the final 2391 assessment report. Organizations may choose to develop an executive summary from the control 2392 assessment findings. The executive summary provides authorizing officials and other interested 2393 individuals in the organization with an abbreviated version of the assessment reports that includes a 2394 synopsis of the assessment, findings, and the recommendations for addressing deficiencies in the 2395 controls.

2396 **References:** [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160-1] (Verification and Validation Processes).

2397 **REMEDIATION ACTIONS**

- 2398 **TASK A-5** Conduct initial remediation actions on the controls and reassess remediated controls.
- Potential Inputs: Completed security and privacy assessment reports with findings and
 recommendations; security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment plans; organization- and
- 2401 system-level risk assessment results.
- Potential Outputs: Completed initial remediation actions based on the security and privacy assessment
 reports; changes to implementations reassessed by the assessment team; updated security and privacy
 assessment reports; updated security and privacy plans including changes to the control implementations.
- 2405 Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider; Control Assessor.
- Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Senior Agency</u>
 Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Senior Accountable Official for Risk
 Management or <u>Risk Executive (Function); System Owner; Information Owner or Steward; Systems</u>
 Security Engineer; <u>Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer</u>.
- 2410System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.2411Existing Operations/Maintenance.

2412 Discussion: The security and privacy assessment reports describe deficiencies in the controls 2413 implemented within the system or the common controls available for inheritance that could not be 2414 resolved during the development of the system or that are discovered post-development. Such control 2415 deficiencies may result in security, privacy, and supply chain risks. The findings generated during control 2416 assessments provide information that facilitates a disciplined and structured approach to responding to 2417 those risks in accordance with the organizational risk tolerance and priorities. Findings from a system-2418 level control assessment may necessitate an update to the system risk assessment and the organizational 2419 risk assessment.⁸⁴ The updated risk assessment and any inputs from the senior accountable official for risk 2420 management or risk executive (function) determines the initial remediation actions and the prioritization 2421 of those actions. System owners and common control providers may decide, based on a risk assessment, 2422 that certain findings are inconsequential and present no significant security or privacy risk. Such findings 2423 are retained in the security and privacy assessment reports and monitored during the monitoring step. 2424 The authorizing official is responsible for reviewing and understanding the assessor findings and for

⁸⁴ Risk assessments are conducted as needed at the organizational level, mission/business level, and at the system level throughout the SDLC. Risk assessment is specified as part of the RMF *Prepare-Organization Level* step, <u>Task P-3</u> and RMF *Prepare-System Level* step, <u>Task P-14</u>.

accepting the security, privacy, and supply chain risks from operating an information system or the use of
 common controls. The authorizing official, in consultation with system owners and other organizational
 officials, may decide that certain findings do, in fact, represent significant, unacceptable risk and require
 immediate remediation actions.

2429 In all cases, organizations review assessor findings to determine the significance of the findings (i.e., the 2430 potential adverse impact on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the 2431 Nation) and whether the findings warrant any further investigation or remediation. Senior leadership 2432 involvement in the mitigation process is necessary to help ensure that the organization's resources are 2433 effectively allocated in accordance with organizational priorities, providing resources to the systems that 2434 are supporting the most critical missions and business functions or correcting the deficiencies that pose 2435 the greatest risk. If deficiencies in controls are corrected, the assessors reassess the remediated controls. 2436 Control reassessments determine the extent to which remediated controls are implemented correctly, 2437 operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security and 2438 privacy requirements for the system and the organization. The assessors update the assessment reports 2439 with the findings from the reassessment, but do not change the original assessment results. The security 2440 and privacy plans are updated based on the findings of the control assessments and any remediation 2441 actions taken. The updated plans reflect the state of the controls after the initial assessment and any 2442 modifications by the system owner or common control provider in addressing recommendations for 2443 corrective actions. At the completion of the control assessments, security and privacy plans contain an 2444 accurate description of implemented controls, including compensating controls.

2445 Organizations can prepare an addendum to the security and privacy assessment reports that provides an 2446 opportunity for system owners and common control providers to respond to initial assessment findings. 2447 The addendum may include, for example, information regarding initial remediation actions taken by 2448 system owners or common control providers in response to assessor findings. The addendum can also 2449 provide the system owner or common control provider perspective on the findings. This may include 2450 providing additional explanatory material, rebutting certain findings, and correcting the record. The 2451 addendum does not change or influence the initial assessor findings provided in the reports. Information 2452 provided in the addendum is considered by authorizing officials when making risk-based authorization 2453 decisions. Organizations implement a process to determine the actions to take regarding the control 2454 deficiencies identified during the assessment. This process can address vulnerabilities and risks, false 2455 positives, and other factors that provide useful information to authorizing officials regarding the security 2456 and privacy posture of the system and organization including the ongoing effectiveness of system-specific, 2457 hybrid, and common controls. The issue resolution process can also ensure that only substantive items 2458 are identified and transferred to the plan of actions and milestones.

2459 **References:** [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160-1] (Verification and Validation Processes).

2460 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES

- 2461TASK A-6Prepare the plan of action and milestones based on the findings and recommendations of the
assessment reports.
- Potential Inputs: Updated security and privacy assessment reports; updated security and privacy plans;
 organization- and system-level risk assessment results; organizational risk management strategy and risk
 tolerance.
- Potential Outputs: A plan of action and milestones detailing the findings from the security and privacy
 assessment reports that are to be remediated.
- 2468 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner</u>; <u>Common Control Provider</u>.
- 2469 Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior
- 2470 <u>Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Chief Acquisition Officer</u>.
- 2471

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2473System Development Life Cycle Phase:
New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2474 Discussion: The plan of action and milestones, prepared for the authorizing official by the system owner 2475 or the common control provider, is included as part of the authorization package. It describes the actions 2476 that are planned to correct deficiencies in the controls identified during the assessment of the controls 2477 and during continuous monitoring. The plan of action and milestones includes tasks to be accomplished 2478 with a recommendation for completion before or after system authorization; resources required to 2479 accomplish the tasks; milestones established to meet the tasks; and the scheduled completion dates for 2480 the milestones and tasks. The plan of action and milestones is reviewed by the authorizing official to 2481 ensure there is agreement with the remediation actions planned to correct the identified deficiencies. It is 2482 subsequently used to monitor progress in completing the actions. Deficiencies are accepted by the 2483 authorizing official as residual risk or are remediated during the assessment or prior to submission of the 2484 authorization package to the authorizing official. Plan of action and milestones entries are not necessary 2485 when deficiencies are accepted by the authorizing official as residual risk. However, deficiencies identified 2486 during assessment and monitoring are documented in the assessment reports, which can be retained 2487 within an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to maintain an effective audit trail. 2488 Organizations develop plans of action and milestones based on assessment results obtained from control 2489 assessments, audits, and continuous monitoring and in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, 2490 directives, policies, regulations, standards, or guidance.

2491 Organizations implement a consistent process for developing plans of action and milestones that uses a 2492 prioritized approach to risk mitigation that is uniform across the organization. A risk assessment guides 2493 the prioritization process for items included in the plan of action and milestones. The process ensures that 2494 plans of action and milestones are informed by the security categorization of the system and security, 2495 privacy, and supply chain risk assessments; the specific deficiencies in the controls; the criticality of the 2496 identified control deficiencies (i.e., the direct or indirect effect that the deficiencies may have on the 2497 security and privacy posture of the system, and therefore, on the risk exposure of the organization; or the 2498 ability of the organization to perform its mission or business functions); and the proposed risk mitigation 2499 approach to address the identified deficiencies in the controls, including, for example, prioritization of risk 2500 mitigation actions and allocation of risk mitigation resources. Risk mitigation resources include, for 2501 example, personnel, new hardware or software, and tools.

2502 **References:** [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160-1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [IR 8062].

3.6 AUTHORIZE

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Purpose

The purpose of the Authorize step is to provide organizational accountability by requiring a senior management official to determine if the security, privacy, and supply chain risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation based on the operation of a system or the use of common controls, is acceptable.

AUTHORIZE TASKS

- 2515 Table 7 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF *Authorize* step.
- 2516 Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

2517

TABLE 7: AUTHORIZE TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK R-1 AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE	 An authorization package is developed for submission to the authorizing official.
TASK R-2 RISK ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION	• A risk determination by the authorizing official that reflects the risk management strategy including risk tolerance, is rendered.
TASK R-3 RISK RESPONSE	 Risk responses for determined risks are provided. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.RA-6]
TASK R-4 AUTHORIZATION DECISION	• The authorization for the system or the common controls is approved or denied.
TASK R-5 AUTHORIZATION REPORTING	 Authorization decisions, significant vulnerabilities, and risks are reported to organizational officials.

- 2518 2519
- Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE

- 2521TASK R-1Assemble the authorization package and submit the package to the authorizing official for an
authorization decision.
- 2523 **Potential Inputs:** Security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment reports; plan of action and milestones; supporting assessment evidence or other documentation, as required.

Potential Outputs: Authorization package (with an executive summary), which may be generated from a security or privacy management tool⁸⁵ for submission to the authorizing official.

2527 Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Organizations are encouraged to maximize the use of automated tools in the preparation, assembly, and transmission of authorization packages and security- and privacy-related information supporting the authorization process. Many commercially available governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) tools can be employed to reduce or eliminate hard copy documentation.

⁸⁶ The senior agency official for privacy is active for information systems processing PII.

Supporting Roles: System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Control Assessor.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment. Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Authorization packages ⁸⁷ include security and privacy plans, security and privacy assessment reports, plans of action and milestones, and an executive summary. Additional information can be included in the authorization package at the request of the authorizing official. Organizations maintain version and change control as the information in the authorization package is updated. Providing timely updates to the plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones on an ongoing basis supports the concept of near real-time risk management and ongoing authorization, and can be used for reauthorization actions, if required.
The senior agency official for privacy reviews the authorization package for systems that process PII to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks, prior to authorizing officials making risk determination and acceptance decisions.
The information in the authorization package is used by authorizing officials to make informed, risk-based decisions. When controls are implemented by an external provider through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or supply chain arrangements, the organization ensures that the information needed to make risk-based decisions is made available by the provider.
The authorization package may be provided to the authorizing official in hard copy or electronically or may be generated using an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. Organizations can use automated support tools in preparing and managing the content of the authorization package. Such tools provide an effective vehicle for maintaining and updating information for authorizing officials regarding the ongoing security and privacy posture of information systems within the organization.
When an information system is under ongoing authorization, the authorization package is presented to the authorizing official via automated reports to provide information in the most efficient and timely manner possible. ⁸⁸ Information to be presented to the authorizing official in assessment reports is generated in the format and with the frequency determined by the organization using information from the information security and privacy continuous monitoring programs.
The assessment reports presented to the authorizing official include information about implemented system-specific, hybrid, and common controls. The authorizing official uses automated security/privacy management and reporting tools or other automated methods, whenever practicable, to access the security and privacy plans and the plans of action and milestones. The authorization documents are updated at an organization-defined frequency using automated or manual processes in accordance with

2562 the risk management objectives of the organization.⁸⁹

2563 **References:** [SP 800-18]; [SP 800-160-1] (Risk Management Process); [SP 800-161] (SCRM Plans).

⁸⁷ If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an authorization package, then the comparable report would itself constitute the authorization package.

⁸⁸ While the objective is to fully automate all components of the authorization package, organizations may be in various states of transition to a fully automated state—that is, with certain sections of the authorization package available via automated means and other sections available only through manual means.

⁸⁹ Organizations decide on the level of detail and the presentation format of security and privacy information that is made available to authorizing officials through automation. These decisions are based on organizational needs with the automated presentation of security- and privacy-related information tailored to the decision-making needs of the authorizing officials. For example, detailed security- and privacy-related information may be generated and collected at the operational level of the organization with information subsequently analyzed, distilled, and presented to authorizing officials in a summarized or highlighted format using automation.

2564 **RISK ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION**

2565TASK R-2Analyze and determine the risk from the operation or use of the system or the provision of
common controls.

Potential Inputs: Authorization package; supporting assessment evidence or other documentation as
 required; information provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive
 (function); organizational risk management strategy and risk tolerance; organization- and system-level risk
 assessment results.

- 2571 **Potential Outputs:** Risk determination.
- 2572 Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>.

2573 **Supporting Roles:** <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive (Function)</u>; <u>Senior</u> 2574 <u>Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>.

2575System Development Life Cycle Phase:New – Implementation/Assessment.2576Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

Discussion: The authorizing official or designated representative, in collaboration with the senior agency
 information security officer and the senior agency official for privacy (for information systems processing
 PII), analyzes the information in the authorization package provided by the control assessor, system
 owner, or common control provider, and finalizes the determination of risk. Further discussion with the
 control assessor, system owner, or common control provider may be necessary to help ensure a thorough
 understanding of risk by the authorizing official.

2583 Risk assessments are employed, if needed, to provide information⁹⁰ that may influence the risk analysis 2584 and determination. The senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) may 2585 provide information to the authorizing official that is considered in the final determination of risk to 2586 organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from 2587 either the operation or use of the system or the provision of common controls. Such information may 2588 include, for example, organizational risk tolerance, dependencies among systems and controls, mission 2589 and business requirements, the criticality of the missions or business functions supported by the system, 2590 or the risk management strategy.

2591The authorizing official analyzes the information provided by the senior accountable official for risk2592management or risk executive (function) and information provided by the system owner or common2593control provider in the authorization package when making a risk determination. The information2594provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) is2595documented and included, to the extent it is relevant, as part of the authorization decision (see Task R-4).2596The authorizing official may also use an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to2597annotate senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) input.

When the system is operating under an ongoing authorization, the risk determination task is effectively
 unchanged. The authorizing official analyzes the relevant security and privacy information provided by the
 automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to determine the current security and privacy
 posture of the system.

 2602
 References: [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 2603
 800-137]; [SP 800-160-1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8062].

⁹⁰ [SP 800-30] provides guidance on conducting security risk assessments. [IR 8062] provides information about privacy risk assessments and associated risk factors.

2604 **RISK RESPONSE**

- 2605 TASK R-3 Identify and implement a preferred course of action in response to the risk determined.
- 2606 Potential Inputs: Authorization package; risk determination; organization- and system-level risk 2607 assessment results.
- 2608 Potential Outputs: Risk responses for determined risks.
- 2609 Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
- 2610 Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior

2611 Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Owner or Common Control 2612 Provider; Information Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security

- 2613 Officer; System Privacy Officer.
- 2614 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment. 2615

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2616 **Discussion:** After risk is analyzed and determined, organizations can respond to risk in a variety of ways, 2617 including acceptance of risk and mitigation of risk. Existing risk assessment results and risk assessment 2618 techniques may be used to help determine the preferred course of action for the risk response.⁹¹ When 2619 the response to risk is mitigation, the planned mitigation actions are included in and tracked using the 2620 plan of action and milestones. When the response to risk is acceptance, the deficiency found during the 2621 assessment process remains documented in the security and privacy assessment reports and is monitored 2622 for changes to the risk factors.⁹² Because the authorizing official is the only person who can accept risk, 2623 the authorizing official is responsible for reviewing the assessment reports and plans of action and 2624 milestones and determining whether the identified risks need to be mitigated prior to authorization. 2625 Decisions on the most appropriate course of action for responding to risk may include some form of 2626 prioritization. Some risks may be of greater concern to organizations than other risks. In that case, more 2627 resources may need to be directed at addressing higher-priority risks versus lower-priority risks. This does 2628 not necessarily mean that the lower-priority risks are ignored. Rather, it could mean that fewer resources 2629 are directed at addressing the lower-priority risks, or that the lower-priority risks are addressed later. A 2630 key part of the risk-based decision process is the recognition that regardless of the risk response, there 2631 remains a degree of residual risk. Organizations determine acceptable degrees of residual risk based on 2632 organizational risk tolerance.

2633 References: [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 2634 800-160-1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8062]; [IR 8179]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

2635 AUTHORIZATION DECISION

- 2636 **TASK R-4** Determine if the risk from the operation or use of the information system or the provision or 2637 use of common controls is acceptable.
- 2638 Potential Inputs: Risk responses for determined risks.
- 2639 Potential Outputs: Authorization to operate, authorization to use, common control authorization; denial 2640 of authorization to operate, denial of authorization to use, denial of common control authorization.
- 2641 Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official.

⁹¹ [SP 800-39] provides additional information on risk response.

⁹² The four security risk factors are threat, vulnerability, likelihood, and impact. [SP 800-30] and [SP 800-39] provide information about security risk assessments and associated risk factors. [IR 8062] and Section 2.3 provide additional information on privacy risk factors and conducting privacy risk assessments.

Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior
 Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated
 Representative.

2645System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.2646Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2647 **Discussion:** The explicit acceptance of risk is the responsibility of the authorizing official and cannot be 2648 delegated to other officials within the organization. The authorizing official considers many factors when 2649 deciding if the risk to the organization's operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation) 2650 and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation, is acceptable. Balancing security and privacy 2651 considerations with mission and business needs is paramount to achieving an acceptable risk-based 2652 authorization decision.⁹³ The authorizing official issues an authorization decision for the system or for 2653 organization-designated common controls after reviewing the information in the authorization package, 2654 input from other organizational officials (see Task R-2), and other relevant information that may affect the 2655 authorization decision. The authorization package provides the most current information on the security 2656 and privacy posture of the system or the common controls.

The authorization decision is conveyed by the authorizing official to the system owner or common control provider, and other organizational officials, as appropriate.⁹⁴ The authorization decision also conveys the terms and conditions for the authorization to operate; the authorization termination date or time-driven authorization frequency; input from the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), if provided; and for common control authorizations, the system impact level supported by the common controls.

For systems, the authorization decision indicates to the system owner whether the system is authorized to operate or authorized to use, or not authorized to operate or not authorized to use. For common controls, the authorization decision indicates to the common control provider and to the system owners of inheriting systems, whether the common controls are authorized to be provided or not authorized to be provided. The terms and conditions for the common control authorization provide a description of any specific limitations or restrictions placed on the operation of the system or the controls that must be followed by the system owner or common control provider.

2670The authorization termination date is established by the authorizing official and indicates when the2671authorization expires. Organizations may eliminate the authorization termination date if the system is2672operating under an ongoing authorization—that is, the continuous monitoring program is sufficiently2673robust and mature to provide the authorizing official with the needed information to conduct ongoing risk2674determination and risk acceptance activities regarding the security and privacy posture of the system and2675the ongoing effectiveness of the controls employed within and inherited by the system.

2676The authorization decision is included with the authorization package and is transmitted to the system2677owner or common control provider. Upon receipt of the authorization decision and the authorization2678package, the system owner or common control provider acknowledges and implements the terms and2679conditions of the authorization. The organization ensures that the authorization package, including the2680authorization for systems and common controls, is made available to organizational officials

⁹³ While balancing security and privacy considerations with mission and business needs is paramount to achieving an acceptable risk-based authorization decision, there may be instances when the authorizing official and senior agency official for privacy cannot reach a final resolution regarding the appropriate protection for PII and the information systems that process PII. [OMB A-130] provides guidance on how to resolve such instances.

⁹⁴ Organizations are encouraged to employ automated security/privacy management and reporting tools whenever feasible, to develop the authorization packages for systems and common controls and to maintain those packages during ongoing authorization. Automated tools can significantly reduce documentation costs, provide increased speed and efficiency in generating important information for decision makers, and provide more effective means for updating critical risk management information. It is recognized that certain controls are not conducive to the use of automated tools and therefore, manual methods are acceptable in those situations.

including, for example, system owners inheriting common controls; chief information officers; senior
 accountable officials for risk management or risk executive (function); senior agency information security
 officers; senior agency officials for privacy; and system security and privacy officers. The authorizing
 official verifies on an ongoing basis as part of continuous monitoring (see <u>Task M-2</u>) that the established
 terms and conditions for authorization are being followed by the system owner or common control
 provider.

2687 When the system is operating under ongoing authorization, the authorizing official continues to be 2688 responsible and accountable for explicitly understanding and accepting the risk of continuing to operate 2689 or use the system or continuing to provide common controls for inheritance. For ongoing authorization, 2690 the authorization frequency is specified in lieu of an authorization termination date. The authorizing 2691 official reviews the information with the specific time-driven authorization frequency defined by the 2692 organization as part of the continuous monitoring strategy and determines if the risk of continued system 2693 operation or the provision of common controls remains acceptable. If the risk remains acceptable, the 2694 authorizing official acknowledges the acceptance in accordance with organizational processes. If not, the 2695 authorizing official indicates that the risk is no longer acceptable and requires further risk response or a 2696 full denial of the authorization.

2697The organization determines the level of formality for the process of communicating and acknowledging2698continued risk acceptance by the authorizing official. The authorizing official may continue to establish2699and convey the specific terms and conditions to be followed by the system owner or common control2700provider for continued authorization to operate, continued common control authorization, or continued2701authorization to use. The terms and conditions of the authorization may be conveyed through an2702automated management and reporting tool as part of an automated authorization decision.

If control assessments are conducted by qualified assessors with the level of independence⁹⁵ required,
 the assessment results support ongoing authorization and may be applied to a reauthorization.
 Organizational policies regarding ongoing authorization and reauthorization are consistent with laws,
 executive orders, directives, regulations, and policies.

The authorizing official consults with the Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or the Risk
 Executive (Function) prior to making the final authorization decision for the information system or the
 common controls. Because there are potentially significant dependencies among organizational systems
 and with external systems, the authorization decisions for individual systems consider the current residual
 risk, organizational plans of action and milestones, and the risk tolerance of the organization.

- 2712 <u>Appendix F</u> provides additional guidance on authorization decisions, the types of authorizations, and the 2713 preparation of the authorization packages.
- References: [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800-160-1]
 (Risk Management Process).

2716 AUTHORIZATION REPORTING

- 2717TASK R-5Report the authorization decision and any deficiencies in controls that represent significant2718security or privacy risk.
- 2719 **Potential Inputs:** Authorization decision.
- Potential Outputs: A report indicating the authorization decision for a system or set of common controls;
 annotation of authorization status in the organizational system registry.
- 2722 Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>.

⁹⁵ In accordance with [<u>OMB A-130</u>], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization's discretion.

2723	Supporting Roles: <u>System Owner</u> or <u>Common Control Provider</u> ; <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> ; <u>System</u>
2724	<u>Security Officer</u> ; <u>System Privacy Officer</u> ; <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u> ; <u>Senior Agency Official</u>
2725	<u>for Privacy</u> .
2726	System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
2727	Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
2728 2729 2730 2731 2732 2733 2734 2735 2736 2737 2738	Discussion: Authorizing officials report authorization decisions for systems and common controls to designated organizational officials so the individual risk decisions can be viewed in the context of organization-wide security and privacy risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Reporting occurs only in situations where organizations have delegated the authorization functions to levels of the organization below the head of agency. Authorizing officials also report exploitable deficiencies (i.e., vulnerabilities) in the system or controls noted during the assessment and continuous monitoring that represent significant security or privacy risk. Organizations determine, and the organizational policy reflects, what constitutes a significant security or privacy risk for reporting. Deficiencies that represent significant vulnerabilities and risk can be reported using the subcategories, categories, and functions in the [NIST CSF]. Authorization decisions may be tracked and reflected as part of the organization-wide system registration process at the organization's discretion (see <u>Task P-17</u>).
2739 2740	References: [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800-160-1] (Decision Management and Project Assessment and Control Processes); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify,

2741 Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover Functions]).

2742 **3.7 MONITOR**

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Purpose

The purpose of the **Monitor** step is to maintain an ongoing situational awareness about the security and privacy posture of the information system and the organization in support of risk management decisions.

2752 MONITOR TASKS

2753	Table 8 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF <i>Monitor</i> step.
2754	Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

2755

TABLE 8: MONITOR TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks	Outcomes
TASK M-1 SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES	 The information system and environment of operation are monitored in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy. [Cybersecurity Framework: DE.CM; ID.GV]
TASK M-2 ONGOING ASSESSMENTS	 Ongoing assessments of control effectiveness are conducted in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy. [Cybersecurity Framework: ID.SC-4]
TASK M-3 ONGOING RISK RESPONSE	 The output of continuous monitoring activities is analyzed and responded to appropriately. [Cybersecurity Framework: RS.AN]
TASK M-4 AUTHORIZATION UPDATES	 Risk management documents are updated based on continuous monitoring activities. [Cybersecurity Framework: RS.IM]
TASK M-5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY REPORTING	• A process is in place to report the security and privacy posture to the authorizing official and other senior leaders and executives.
TASK M-6 ONGOING AUTHORIZATION	 Authorizing officials conduct ongoing authorizations using the results of continuous monitoring activities and communicate changes in risk determination and acceptance decisions.
TASK M-7 SYSTEM DISPOSAL	 A system disposal strategy is developed and implemented, as needed.

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2757

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

2758 SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES

- 2759TASK M-1Monitor the information system and its environment of operation for changes that impact the
security and privacy posture of the system.
- 2761 **Potential Inputs:** Organizational continuous monitoring strategy; organizational configuration
- 2762 management policy and procedures; organizational policy and procedures for handling unauthorized
- 2763 system changes; security and privacy plans; configuration change requests/approvals; system design

- documentation; security and privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; informationfrom automated and manual monitoring tools.
- Potential Outputs: Updated security and privacy plans; updated plans of action and milestones; updated
 security and privacy assessment reports.
- Primary Responsibility: System Owner or Common Control Provider; Senior Agency Information Security
 Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
- Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function);
 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information Owner or Steward;
 System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
- 2773System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Operations/Maintenance.2774Existing Operations/Maintenance.

2775 **Discussion:** Systems and environments of operation are in a constant state of change with changes 2776 occurring in the technology or machine elements, human elements, and physical or environmental 2777 elements. Changes to the technology or machine elements include for example, upgrades to hardware, 2778 software, or firmware; changes to the human elements include for example, staff turnover or a reduction 2779 in force; and modifications to the surrounding physical and environmental elements include for example, 2780 changes in the location of the facility or the physical access controls protecting the facility. When changes 2781 are made by external providers, those changes can be difficult to detect. A disciplined and structured 2782 approach to managing, controlling, and documenting changes to systems and environments of operation, 2783 and adherence with terms and conditions of the authorization, is an essential element of security and 2784 privacy programs. Organizations establish configuration management and control processes to support 2785 configuration and change management.⁹⁶

- 2786 Common activities within organizations can cause changes to systems or the environments of operation 2787 and can have a significant impact on the security and privacy posture of systems. Examples include 2788 installing or disposing of hardware, making changes to configurations, and installing patches outside of 2789 the established configuration change control process. Unauthorized changes may occur because of 2790 purposeful attacks by adversaries or inadvertent errors by authorized personnel. In addition to adhering 2791 to the established configuration management process, organizations monitor for unauthorized changes to 2792 systems and analyze information about unauthorized changes that have occurred to determine the root 2793 cause of the unauthorized change. In addition to monitoring for unauthorized changes, organizations 2794 continuously monitor systems and environments of operation for any authorized changes that impact the 2795 privacy posture of systems.⁹⁷
- 2796 Once the root cause of an unauthorized change (or an authorized change that impacts the privacy posture 2797 of the system) has been determined, organizations respond accordingly (see Task M-3). For example, if 2798 the root cause of an unauthorized change is determined to be an adversarial attack, multiple actions 2799 could be taken such as invoking incident response processes, adjusting intrusion detection and prevention 2800 tools and firewall configurations, or implementing additional or stronger controls to reduce the risk of 2801 future attacks. If the root cause of an unauthorized change is determined to be a failure of staff to adhere 2802 to established configuration management processes, remedial training for certain individuals may be 2803 warranted.
- 2804 **References:** [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-128]; [SP 800-137]; [IR 8062].

⁹⁶ [SP 800-128] provides guidance on security-focused configuration management (SecCM). Note that the SecCM process described in [SP 800-128] includes a related monitoring step.

⁹⁷ For information about the distinction between authorized and unauthorized system behavior, see the discussion of security and privacy in <u>Section 2.3</u>.

2805 ONGOING ASSESSMENTS

2806 Task M-2 Assess the controls implemented within and inherited by the system in accordance with the 2807 continuous monitoring strategy.

2808 **Potential Inputs:** Organizational continuous monitoring strategy and system level continuous monitoring 2809 strategy (if applicable); security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment plans; security and 2810 privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; organization- and system-level risk 2811 assessment results; external assessment or audit results (if applicable); information from automated and 2812 manual monitoring tools.

- 2813 Potential Outputs: Updated security and privacy assessment reports.
- 2814 Primary Responsibility: Control Assessor.

2815 Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Owner 2816 or Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy 2817 Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.

2818 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance. 2819

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2820 **Discussion:** After an initial system or common control authorization, the organization assesses all controls 2821 implemented within and inherited by the system on an ongoing basis. This ongoing assessment of the 2822 effectiveness of controls is part of an organization's continuous monitoring activities. The monitoring 2823 frequency for each control is based on the organizational continuous monitoring strategy (see Task P-7) 2824 and can be supplemented by the system-level continuous monitoring strategy (see Task S-5). Adherence 2825 to the terms and conditions specified by the authorizing official as part of the authorization decision are 2826 also monitored (see Task M-1). Ongoing control assessment continues as the information generated as 2827 part of continuous monitoring is correlated, analyzed, and reported to senior leaders.

2828 For ongoing control assessments, assessors have the required degree of independence as determined by 2829 the authorizing official.⁹⁸ Assessor independence during continuous monitoring introduces efficiencies 2830 into the process and may allow for reuse of assessment results in support of ongoing authorization and 2831 when reauthorization is required.

2832 To satisfy the annual FISMA security assessment requirement, organizations can use assessment results 2833 from control assessments that occurred during authorization, ongoing authorization, or reauthorization; 2834 during continuous monitoring; or the during testing and evaluation of systems as part of the SDLC or an 2835 audit (provided the assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of control effectiveness, 2836 and obtained by assessors with the required degree of independence). Existing assessment results are 2837 reused consistent with the reuse policy established by the organization and are supplemented with 2838 additional assessments as needed. The reuse of assessment results is helpful in achieving a cost-effective, 2839 security program capable of producing the evidence necessary to determine the security posture of 2840 information systems and the organization. Finally, the use of automation to support control assessments 2841 facilitates a greater frequency, volume, and coverage of assessments.

2842 References: [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-160-1] (Verification, Validation, Operation, and 2843 Maintenance Processes); [IR 8011-1].

2844 **ONGOING RISK RESPONSE**

2845 Task M-3 Respond to risk based on the results of ongoing monitoring activities, risk assessments, and 2846 outstanding items in plans of action and milestones.

⁹⁸ In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy programs and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization's discretion.

Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment reports; organization- and system-level risk assessment
 results; security and privacy plans; plans of action and milestones.

- Potential Outputs: Mitigation actions or risk acceptance decisions; updated security and privacy
 assessment reports.
- 2851 Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official; System Owner; Common Control Provider.

Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior
 Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information Owner or
 Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer;
 Security Architect; Privacy Architect.

2856 **System Development Life Cycle Phase:** New – Operations/Maintenance.

2857

Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2858 **Discussion:** Assessment information produced by an assessor during continuous monitoring is provided 2859 to the system owner and the common control provider in updated assessment reports or via reports from 2860 automated security/privacy management and reporting tools. The authorizing official determines the 2861 appropriate risk response to the assessment findings or approves responses proposed by the system 2862 owner and common control provider. The system owner and common control provider subsequently 2863 implement the appropriate risk response. When the risk response is acceptance, the findings remain 2864 documented in the security and privacy assessment reports and are monitored for changes to risk factors. 2865 When the risk response is mitigation, the planned mitigation actions are included in and tracked using the 2866 plans of action and milestones. If requested by the authorizing official, control assessors may provide 2867 recommendations for remediation actions. Recommendations for remediation actions may also be 2868 provided by an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. An organizational 2869 assessment of risk (Task P-3) and system-level risk assessment results (Task P-14) guide and inform the 2870 decisions regarding ongoing risk response. Controls that are modified, enhanced, or added as part of 2871 ongoing risk response are reassessed by assessors to ensure that the new, modified, or enhanced controls 2872 have been implemented correctly, are operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with 2873 respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements of the system.

 2874
 References:
 [SP 800-30];
 [SP 800-53];
 [SP 800-137];
 [SP 800-160-1]
 (Risk Management

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 Process);
 [IR 8011-1];
 [IR 8062];
 [NIST CSF]
 (Core [Respond Functions]).

AUTHORIZATION UPDATES

- <u>Task M-4</u> Update plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones based on the results of the continuous monitoring process.
- 2879 **Potential Inputs:** Security and privacy assessment reports; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; security and privacy plans; plans of action and milestones.
- 2881 **Potential Outputs:** Updated security and privacy assessment reports;⁹⁹ updated plans of action and milestones; updated risk assessment results; updated security and privacy plans.
- 2883 Primary Responsibility: <u>System Owner; Common Control Provider</u>.
- Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior
 Agency Official for Privacy; Senior Agency Information Security Officer.
- 2886 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Operations/Maintenance.
 2887 Existing Operations/Maintenance.

⁹⁹ If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an assessment report (e.g., a report generated from a security or privacy management and reporting tool), then the comparable report would constitute the assessment report.

2888 **Discussion:** To achieve near real-time risk management, the organization updates security and privacy 2889 plans, security and privacy assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones on an ongoing basis. 2890 Updates to the plans reflect modifications to controls based on risk mitigation activities carried out by 2891 system owners or common control providers. Updates to control assessment reports reflect additional 2892 assessment activities carried out to determine control effectiveness based on implementation details in 2893 the plans. Plans of action and milestones are updated based on progress made on the current outstanding 2894 items; address security and privacy risks discovered as part of control effectiveness monitoring; and 2895 describe how the system owner or common control provider intends to address those risks. The updated 2896 information raises awareness of the security and privacy posture of the system and the common controls 2897 inherited by the system, thereby, supporting near real-time risk management and the ongoing 2898 authorization process.

2899 The frequency of updates to risk management-related information is at the discretion of the system 2900 owner, common control provider, and authorizing officials in accordance with federal and organizational 2901 policies and is consistent with the organizational and system-level continuous monitoring strategies. The 2902 updates to information regarding the security and privacy posture of the system and the common 2903 controls inherited by the system are accurate and timely since the information provided influences 2904 ongoing actions and decisions by authorizing officials and other senior leaders within the organization. 2905 The use of automated support tools and organization-wide security and privacy program management 2906 practices ensure that authorizing officials can readily access the current security and privacy posture of 2907 the system. This provides essential information for continuous monitoring and ongoing authorization and 2908 promotes the near real-time management of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, 2909 other organizations, and the Nation.

- 2910 Organizations ensure that information needed for oversight, management, and auditing purposes is not 2911 modified or destroyed when updating security and privacy plans, assessment reports, and plans of action
- and milestones. Providing an effective method to track changes to systems through configuration
- 2913 management procedures is necessary to achieve transparency and traceability in the security and privacy
- activities of the organization; to obtain individual accountability for any security or privacy actions; and to
- 2915 understand emerging trends in the security and privacy programs of the organization.
- 2916 **References:** [SP_800-53A].

2917 **POSTURE REPORTING**

- 2918
2919Task M-5
organizational officials on an ongoing basis in accordance with the organizational continuous
monitoring strategy.
- Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; organization and system-level risk assessment results; organization- and system-level continuous monitoring strategy;
 security and privacy plans; Cybersecurity Framework profile.
- 2924 **Potential Outputs:** Security and privacy posture reports.¹⁰⁰
- Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider; Senior Agency Information Security
 Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
- 2927 Supporting Roles: <u>System Security Officer</u>; <u>System Privacy Officer</u>.
- 2928 **System Development Life Cycle Phase:** New Operations/Maintenance.
 - Existing Operations/Maintenance.

2929

¹⁰⁰ If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in a security or privacy posture report (e.g., a report generated from a security or privacy management and reporting tool), then the comparable report would constitute the posture report.

2930 **Discussion:** The results of monitoring activities are documented and reported to the authorizing official 2931 and other selected organizational officials on an ongoing basis in accordance with the organizational 2932 continuous monitoring strategy. Other organizational officials who may receive security and privacy 2933 posture reports include, for example, chief information officer, senior agency information security officer, 2934 senior agency official for privacy, senior agency official for risk management or risk executive (function), 2935 information owner or steward, incident response roles, and contingency planning roles. Security and 2936 privacy posture reporting can be event-driven, time-driven, or event- and time-driven.¹⁰¹ The reports 2937 provide the authorizing official and other organizational officials with information regarding the security 2938 and privacy posture of the systems including the effectiveness of implemented controls. Security and 2939 privacy posture reports describe the ongoing monitoring activities employed by system owners or 2940 common control providers. The reports also include information about security and privacy risks in the 2941 systems and environments of operation discovered during control assessments, auditing, and continuous 2942 monitoring and how system owners or common control providers plan to address those risks.

2943 Organizations have flexibility in the breadth, depth, formality, form, and format of security and privacy 2944 posture reports. The goal is efficient ongoing communication with the authorizing official and other 2945 organizational officials as necessary, conveying the current security and privacy posture of systems and 2946 environments of operation and how the current posture affects individuals, organizational missions, and 2947 business functions. At a minimum, security and privacy posture reports summarize changes to the security 2948 and privacy plans, security and privacy assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones that have 2949 occurred since the last report. The use of automated security and privacy management and reporting 2950 tools (e.g., a dashboard) by the organization facilitates the effectiveness and timeliness of security and 2951 privacy posture reporting.

The frequency of security and privacy posture reports is at the discretion of the organization and in compliance with federal and organizational policies. Reports occur at appropriate intervals to transmit security- and privacy-related information about systems or common controls but not so frequently as to generate unnecessary work or expense. Authorizing officials use the security and privacy posture reports and consult with the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), senior agency information security officer, and senior agency official for privacy to determine if a reauthorization action is necessary.

Security and privacy posture reports are marked, protected, and handled in accordance with federal and
 organizational policies. Security and privacy posture reports can be used to satisfy FISMA reporting
 requirements for documenting remediation actions for security- and privacy-related weaknesses or
 deficiencies. Such reporting is intended to be ongoing and should not be interpreted as requiring the time,
 expense, and formality associated with the information provided for the initial authorization. Rather,
 reporting is conducted in a cost-effective manner consistent with achieving the reporting objectives.

2965References: [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover2966Functions]).

ONGOING AUTHORIZATION

- 2968Task M-6Review the security and privacy posture of the system on an ongoing basis to determine2969whether the risk remains acceptable.
- 2970 **Potential Inputs:** Risk tolerance; security and privacy posture reports; plans of action and milestones; 2971 organization- and system-level risk assessment results; security and privacy plans.

Potential Outputs: A determination of risk; ongoing authorization to operate, ongoing authorization to use, ongoing common control authorization; denial of ongoing authorization to operate, denial of ongoing outborization to use denial of ongoing authorization to operate, denial of ongoing authorization to operate, denial of ongoing on the structure denial of ongoing operation.

authorization to use, denial of ongoing common control authorization.

¹⁰¹ See <u>Appendix F</u> for more information about time- and event-driven authorizations and reporting.

2975 Primary Responsibility: <u>Authorizing Official</u>.

Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior
 Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated
 Representative.

2979System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.2980Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

2981 Discussion: To employ an ongoing authorization approach, organizations have in place an organization-2982 level and system-level continuous monitoring process to assess implemented controls on an ongoing 2983 basis. The findings or results from the continuous monitoring process provides useful information to 2984 authorization officials to support near-real time risk-based decision making. In accordance with the 2985 guidance in Task R-4, the authorizing official or designated representative reviews the security and privacy 2986 posture of the system (including the effectiveness of the implemented controls) on an ongoing basis to 2987 determine the current risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and 2988 the Nation. The authorizing official determines whether the current risk is acceptable and provides 2989 appropriate direction to the system owner or common control provider.

The risks may change based on the information provided in the security and privacy posture reports
 because the reports may indicate changes to the security or privacy risk factors. Determining how
 changing conditions affect organizational and individual risk is essential for managing privacy risk and
 maintaining adequate security. By carrying out ongoing risk determination and risk acceptance,

authorizing officials can maintain system and common control authorizations over time and transition to
 ongoing authorization. Reauthorization actions occur only in accordance with federal or organizational
 policies. The authorizing official conveys updated risk determination and acceptance results to the senior
 accountable official for risk management or the risk executive (function).

The use of automated support tools to capture, organize, quantify, visually display, and maintain security and privacy posture information promotes near real-time risk management regarding the risk posture of the organization. The use of metrics and dashboards increases an organization's capability to make riskbased decisions by consolidating data in an automated fashion and providing the data to decision makers at different levels within the organization in an easy-to-understand format.

 3003
 References: [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800-155]; [SP 800-160-1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8011-1]; [IR 8062].

3005 SYSTEM DISPOSAL

- 3006
3007Task M-7
Implement a system disposal strategy and execute required actions when a system is removed
from operation.
- 3008 **Potential Inputs:** Security and privacy plans; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; 3009 system component inventory.
- 3010 **Potential Outputs:** Disposal strategy; updated system component inventory; updated security and privacy plans.
- 3012 **Primary Responsibility:** <u>System Owner</u>.
- 3013 Supporting Roles: <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u>; <u>Information</u>
- 3014 Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior Accountable Official for Risk
- 3015 Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
- 3016 <u>Official for Privacy</u>.
- 3017 System Development Life Cycle Phase: New Not Applicable.
- 3018 Existing Disposal.

- 3019 Discussion: When a system is removed from operation, several risk management-related actions are 3020 required. Organizations ensure that all controls addressing system disposal are implemented. Examples 3021 include media sanitization; configuration management and control; and record retention. Organizational 3022 tracking and management systems (including inventory systems) are updated to indicate the system that 3023 is being removed from service. Security and privacy posture reports reflect the security and privacy status 3024 of the system. Users and application owners hosted on the disposed system are notified as appropriate, 3025 and any control inheritance relationships are reviewed and assessed for impact. This task also applies to 3026 system components that are removed from operation. Organizations removing a system from operation 3027 update the inventory of information systems to reflect the removal.
- 3028 **References:** [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-88]; [IR 8062].

3029 APPENDIX A

3030 **REFERENCES**

3031 LAWS, POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES ¹⁰²

	LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS
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[FOIA96]	Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996. <u>https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-104publ231/html/PLAW-104publ231.htm</u>
[FISMA14]	Federal Information Security Modernization Act (P.L. 113-283), December 2014. https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ283/PLAW-113publ283.pdf
[EO 13800]	Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, May 2017. <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-strengthening-cybersecurity-federal-networks-critical-infrastructure</u>
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[OMB A-130]	Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, <i>Managing Information as a Strategic Resource</i> , July 2016. <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A130/a13</u> <u>Orevised.pdf</u>
[OMB M-13-13]	Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-13-13, <i>Open Data Policy-Managing Information as an Asset</i> , May 2013. <u>https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-13.pdf</u>
[OMB M-17-25]	Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-17-25, <i>Reporting Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure</i> , May 2017. <u>https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-25.pdf</u>

¹⁰² The references cited in this appendix are those external publications that directly support the FISMA and Privacy Projects or for which mappings are provided in <u>Appendix E</u>. Additional referential NIST standards, guidelines, and interagency reports are cited throughout this publication, including in the references section of the applicable controls in <u>Chapter Three</u>. Direct links to the NIST website are provided to obtain access to those publications.

[CNSSI 1253]	Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 1253, Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems, March 2014. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm
[CNSSI 4009]	Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 4009, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary, April 2015. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm
[CNSSD 505]	Committee on National Security Systems Directive 505, <i>Supply Chain Risk Management</i> , August 2017. <u>https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Directives.cfm</u>
[DODI 5200.44]	Department of Defense Instruction 5200.44, <i>Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks</i> (TSN), July 2017. http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/520044p.pdf
	STANDARDS, GUIDELINES, AND REPORTS
[ISO 15026-1]	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15026-1:2013, Systems and software engineering—Systems and software assurance—Part 1: Concepts and vocabulary, May 2015. https://www.iso.org/standard/62526.html
[ISO 15288]	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15288:2015, Systems and software engineering— Systems life cycle processes, May 2015.
[ISO 15408-1]	https://www.iso.org/standard/63711.html International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 15408-1:2009, Information technology— Security techniques— Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 1: Introduction and general model. https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf
[ISO 15408-2]	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 15408-2:2008, Information technology— Security techniques— Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 2: Security functional requirements. https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf
[ISO 15408-3]	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 15408-3:2008, <i>Information technology—</i> Security techniques— Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 3: Security assurance requirements. https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf

[ISO 29148]	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 29148:2011, Systems and software engineering— Life cycle processes—Requirements engineering, December 2011. https://www.iso.org/standard/45171.html
[ISO 27001]	International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission 27001:2013, Information Technology— Security techniques— Information security management systems— Requirements. https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html
[FIPS 199]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199, <i>Standards for Security Categorization</i> <i>of Federal Information and Information Systems</i> , February 2004. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199</u>
[FIPS 200]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 200, <i>Minimum Security Requirements for</i> <i>Federal Information and Information Systems</i> , March 2006. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.200</u>
[SP 800-18]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-18, Revision 1, <i>Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information</i> <i>Systems</i> , February 2006. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-18r1</u>
[SP 800-30]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1, <i>Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments</i> , September 2012. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-30r1</u>
[SP 800-39]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View, March 2011. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-39
[SP 800-47]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-47, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, August 2002. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-47
[SP 800-53]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, April 2013. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4
[SP 800-53A]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 4, Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans, July 2008. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar4

[SP 800-55]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-55, Revision 1, <i>Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security</i> , December 2014. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-55r1</u>
[SP 800-59]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-59, <i>Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security</i> <i>System</i> , August 2003. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-59</u>
[SP 800-60-1]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Volume 1, Revision 1, <i>Guide for Mapping Types of Information and</i> <i>Information Systems to Security Categories</i> , August 2008. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-60v1r1</u>
[SP 800-60-2]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Volume 2, Revision 1, <i>Guide for Mapping Types of Information and</i> <i>Information Systems to Security Categories: Appendices</i> , August 2008. <u>https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-60v2r1</u>
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[SP 800-88]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization, December 2014. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-88r1
[SP 800-128]	National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-128, Guide for Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems, August 2011. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-128
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[NARA CUI]	National Archives and Records Administration, <i>Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Registry</i> . https://www.archives.gov/cui
[NIST CSF]	National Institute of Standards and Technology <i>Framework for Improving</i> <i>Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity</i> (Cybersecurity Framework), Version 1.1, April 2018. <u>https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework</u>
[OMB FEA]	Office of Management and Budget, <i>Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA)</i> . https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/e-gov/fea

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3033 APPENDIX B

3034 GLOSSARY

3035 COMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

3036 ppendix B provides definitions for terminology used within Special Publication 800-37. 3037 Sources for terms used in this publication are cited as applicable. Where no citation is 3038 noted, the source of the definition is Special Publication 800-37.

adequate security [OMB A-130]	Security protections commensurate with the risk resulting from the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information. This includes ensuring that information hosted on behalf of an agency and information systems and applications used by the agency operate effectively and provide appropriate confidentiality, integrity, and availability protections through the application of cost-effective security controls.
agency [OMB A-130]	Any executive agency or department, military department, Federal Government corporation, Federal Government- controlled corporation, or other establishment in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, or any independent regulatory agency.
allocation	The process an organization employs to determine whether controls are defined as system-specific, hybrid, or common. The process an organization employs to assign controls to specific information system components responsible for providing a security or privacy capability (e.g., router, server, remote sensor).
application	A software program hosted by an information system.
assessment	See control assessment.
assessment plan	The objectives for the control assessments and a detailed roadmap of how to conduct such assessments.
assessor	The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting a security or privacy assessment.
assignment statement	A control parameter that allows an organization to assign a specific, organization-defined value to the control or control enhancement (e.g., assigning a list of roles to be notified or a value for the frequency of testing).
	See organization-defined control parameters and selection statement.

assurance [ISO 15026, Adapted]	Grounds for justified confidence that a [security or privacy] claim has been or will be achieved. <i>Note 1:</i> Assurance is typically obtained relative to a set of specific claims. The scope and focus of such claims may vary (e.g., security claims, safety claims) and the claims themselves may be interrelated. <i>Note 2:</i> Assurance is obtained through techniques and methods that generate credible evidence to substantiate claims.
audit log [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	A chronological record of system activities, including records of system accesses and operations performed in a given period.
audit trail	A chronological record that reconstructs and examines the sequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specific operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction from inception to result.
authentication [FIPS 200]	Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system.
authenticity	The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message, or message originator. See <i>authentication</i> .
authorization boundary [OMB A-130]	All components of an information system to be authorized for operation by an authorizing official. This excludes separately authorized systems to which the information system is connected.
authorization package [OMB A-130]	The essential information that an authorizing official uses to determine whether to authorize the operation of an information system or the provision of a designated set of common controls. At a minimum, the authorization package includes an executive summary, system security plan, privacy plan, security control assessment, privacy control assessment, and any relevant plans of action and milestones.
authorization to operate [OMB A-130]	The official management decision given by a senior Federal official or officials to authorize operation of an information system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security and privacy controls. Authorization also applies to common controls inherited by agency information systems.

authorization to use	The official management decision given by an authorizing official to authorize the use of an information system, service, or application based on the information in an existing authorization package generated by another organization, and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of controls in the system, service, or application. <i>Note:</i> An authorization to use typically applies to cloud and shared systems, services, and applications and is employed when an organization (referred to as the customer organization) chooses to accept the information in an existing authorization package generated by another organization (referred to as the provider organization).
authorizing official [OMB A-130]	A senior Federal official or executive with the authority to authorize (i.e., assume responsibility for) the operation of an information system or the use a designated set of common controls at an acceptable level of risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
authorizing official designated representative	An organizational official acting on behalf of an authorizing official in carrying out and coordinating the required activities associated with the authorization process.
availability [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3542]	Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.
baseline	See control baseline.
baseline configuration [SP 800-128, Adapted]	A documented set of specifications for a system, or a configuration item within a system, that has been formally reviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can be changed only through change control procedures.
capability	A combination of mutually reinforcing controls implemented by technical means, physical means, and procedural means. Such controls are typically selected to achieve a common information security- or privacy-related purpose.
chain of trust (supply chain)	A certain level of trust in supply chain interactions such that each participant in the consumer-provider relationship provides

chief information officer [OMB A-130]	The senior official that provides advice and other assistance to the head of the agency and other senior management personnel of the agency to ensure that IT is acquired and information resources are managed for the agency in a manner that achieves the agency's strategic goals and information resources management goals; and is responsible for ensuring agency compliance with, and prompt, efficient, and effective implementation of, the information policies and information resources management responsibilities, including the reduction of information collection burdens on the public.
chief information security officer	See Senior Agency Information Security Officer.
classified information	See classified national security information.
classified national security information [CNSSI 4009]	Information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13526 or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to indicate its classified status when in documentary form.
commodity service	A system service provided by a commercial service provider to a large and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring or receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into the management structure and operations of the provider, and while the organization may be able to negotiate service-level agreements, the organization is typically not able to require that the provider implement specific controls.
common control [OMB A-130]	A security or privacy control that is inherited by multiple information systems or programs.
common control provider	An organizational official responsible for the development, implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls (i.e., controls inheritable by organizational systems).
common criteria [<u>CNSSI 4009</u>]	Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous method for specifying security function and assurance requirements for products and systems.
compensating controls	The security and privacy controls implemented in lieu of the controls in the baselines described in NIST Special Publication 800-53 that provide equivalent or comparable protection for a system or organization.
component	See system component.
confidentiality [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3542]	Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information.

configuration control [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, software, and documentation to protect the information system against improper modifications before, during, and after system implementation.
configuration item [SP 800-128]	An aggregation of system components that is designated for configuration management and treated as a single entity in the configuration management process.
configuration management [SP 800-128]	A collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining the integrity of information technology products and systems, through control of processes for initializing, changing, and monitoring the configurations of those products and systems throughout the system development life cycle.
configuration settings [SP 800-128]	The set of parameters that can be changed in hardware, software, or firmware that affect the security posture and/or functionality of the system.
continuous monitoring	Maintaining ongoing awareness to support organizational risk decisions.
continuous monitoring program	A program established to collect information in accordance with preestablished metrics, utilizing information readily available in part through implemented security controls.
	<i>Note:</i> Privacy and security continuous monitoring strategies and programs can be the same or different strategies and programs.
control assessment	The testing or evaluation of the controls in an information system or an organization to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security or privacy requirements for the system or the organization.
control assessor	The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting a control assessment. See <i>assessor</i> .
control baseline	A collection of controls specifically assembled or brought together to address the protection needs of a group, organization, or community of interest.
control effectiveness	A measure of whether a given control is contributing to the reduction of information security or privacy risk.
control enhancement	Augmentation of a control to build in additional, but related, functionality to the control; increase the strength of the control; or add assurance to the control.

control inheritance [<u>CNSSI 4009</u>]	A situation in which a system or application receives protection from controls (or portions of controls) that are developed, implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by entities other than those responsible for the system or application; entities either internal or external to the organization where the system or application resides. See <i>common control</i> .
control parameter	See organization-defined control parameter.
controlled unclassified information [32 CFR part 2002]	Information that the Government creates or possesses, or that an entity creates or possesses for or on behalf of the Government, that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy requires or permits an agency to handle using safeguarding or dissemination controls. However, CUI does not include classified information or information a non-executive branch entity possesses and maintains in its own systems that did not come from, or was not created or possessed by or for, an executive branch agency or an entity acting for an agency.
countermeasures [FIPS 200]	Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of a system. Synonymous with <i>security controls</i> and <i>safeguards</i> .
cybersecurity [OMB A-130]	Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of computers, electronic communications systems, electronic communications services, wire communication, and electronic communication, including information contained therein, to ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation.
developer	A general term that includes developers or manufacturers of systems, system components, or system services; systems integrators; vendors; and product resellers. Development of systems, components, or services can occur internally within organizations or through external entities.
enterprise [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	An organization with a defined mission/goal and a defined boundary, using systems to execute that mission, and with responsibility for managing its own risks and performance. An enterprise may consist of all or some of the following business aspects: acquisition, program management, human resources, financial management, security, and systems, information and mission management. See <i>organization</i> .
enterprise architecture [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3601]	A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission; the information necessary to perform the mission; the technologies necessary to perform the mission; and the transitional processes for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs; and includes a baseline architecture; a target architecture; and a sequencing plan.

environment of operation [OMB A-130]	The physical surroundings in which an information system processes, stores, and transmits information.
event [NIST SP 800-61, Adapted]	Any observable occurrence in a system.
executive agency [OMB A-130]	An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 101; a military department specified in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 102; an independent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 104(1); and a wholly owned Government corporation fully subject to the provisions of 31 U.S.C. Chapter 91.
external system (or component)	A system or component of a system that is outside of the authorization boundary established by the organization and for which the organization typically has no direct control over the application of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness.
external system service	A system service that is implemented outside of the authorization boundary of the organizational system (i.e., a service that is used by, but not a part of, the organizational system) and for which the organization typically has no direct control over the application of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness.
external system service provider	A provider of external system services to an organization through a variety of consumer-producer relationships including but not limited to: joint ventures; business partnerships; outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements); licensing agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges.
external network	A network not controlled by the organization.
federal agency	See executive agency.
federal enterprise architecture [OMB FEA]	A business-based framework for governmentwide improvement developed by the Office of Management and Budget that is intended to facilitate efforts to transform the federal government to one that is citizen-centered, results-oriented, and market-based.
federal information system [40 U.S.C. Sec. 11331]	An information system used or operated by an executive agency, by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another organization on behalf of an executive agency.
firmware [<u>CNSSI 4009</u>]	Computer programs and data stored in hardware - typically in read-only memory (ROM) or programmable read-only memory (PROM) - such that the programs and data cannot be dynamically written or modified during execution of the programs. See <i>hardware</i> and <i>software</i> .
hardware [<u>CNSSI 4009</u>]	The material physical components of a system. See <i>software</i> and <i>firmware</i> .

high-impact system [FIPS 200]	A system in which at least one security objective (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential impact value of high.
hybrid control [<u>OMB A-130</u>]	A security or privacy control that is implemented for an information system in part as a common control and in part as a system-specific control. See <i>common control</i> and <i>system-specific control</i> .
impact	With respect to security, the effect on organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation (including the national security interests of the United States) of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or a system. With respect to privacy, the adverse effects that individuals could experience when an information system processes their PII.
impact value [FIPS 199]	The assessed worst-case potential impact that could result from a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information expressed as a value of low, moderate or high.
incident [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3552]	An occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without lawful authority, the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or an information system; or constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies.
independent verification and validation [CNSSI 4009]	A comprehensive review, analysis, and testing, (software and/or hardware) performed by an objective third party to confirm (i.e., verify) that the requirements are correctly defined, and to confirm (i.e., validate) that the system correctly implements the required functionality and security requirements.
industrial control system [SP 800-82]	General term that encompasses several types of control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as programmable logic controllers (PLC) often found in the industrial sectors and critical infrastructures. An ICS consists of combinations of control components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic) that act together to achieve an industrial objective (e.g., manufacturing, transportation of matter or energy).
information [<u>OMB A-130</u>]	Any communication or representation of knowledge such as facts, data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual, numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, electronic, or audiovisual forms.
information life cycle [OMB A-130]	The stages through which information passes, typically characterized as creation or collection, processing, dissemination, use, storage, and disposition, to include destruction and deletion.

information owner	Official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.
information resources [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3502]	Information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology.
information security [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3542]	The protection of information and systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
information security architecture [OMB A-130]	An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and behavior of the enterprise security processes, security systems, personnel and organizational subunits, showing their alignment with the enterprise's mission and strategic plans. See <i>security architecture</i> .
information security program plan [<u>OMB A-130</u>]	Formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an organization-wide information security program and describes the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.
information security risk [SP 800-30]	The risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential for unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information and/or systems.
information steward	An agency official with statutory or operational authority for specified information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.
information system [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3502]	A discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information.
information system boundary	See authorization boundary.
information system security officer [CNSSI 4009]	Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the appropriate operational security posture for an information system or program.
Information system security plan [OMB A-130]	A formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. See <i>system security plan</i> .

information technology [OMB A-130]	Any services, equipment, or interconnected system(s) or subsystem(s) of equipment, that are used in the automatic acquisition, storage, analysis, evaluation, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by the agency. For purposes of this definition, such services or equipment if used by the agency directly or is used by a contractor under a contract with the agency that requires its use; or to a significant extent, its use in the performance of a service or the furnishing of a product. Information technology includes computers, ancillary equipment (including imaging peripherals, input, output, and storage devices necessary for security and surveillance), peripheral equipment designed to be controlled by the central processing unit of a computer, software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including cloud computing and help-desk services or other professional services which support any point of the life cycle of the equipment or service), and related resources. Information technology does not include any equipment that is acquired by a contractor incidental to a contract which does not require its use.
information technology product	See system component.
information type [FIPS 199]	A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical, proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor-sensitive, security management) defined by an organization or in some instances, by a specific law, executive order, directive, policy, or regulation.
interface [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	Common boundary between independent systems or modules where interactions take place.
integrity [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3542]	Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity.
joint authorization	Authorization involving multiple authorizing officials.
low-impact system [FIPS 200]	A system in which all three security objectives (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential impact value of low.
media [<u>FIPS 200]</u>	Physical devices or writing surfaces including, but not limited to, magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale Integration memory chips, and printouts (but excluding display media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or printed within a system.

moderate-impact system [FIPS 200]	A system in which at least one security objective (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS Publication 199 potential impact value of moderate and no security objective is assigned a potential impact value of high.
national security system [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3542]	Any system (including any telecommunications system) used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency—(i) the function, operation, or use of which involves intelligence activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national security; involves command and control of military forces; involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions (excluding a system that is to be used for routine administrative and business applications, for example, payroll, finance, logistics, and personnel management applications); or (ii) is protected at all times by procedures established for information that have been specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
network	A system implemented with a collection of interconnected components. Such components may include routers, hubs, cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution centers, and technical control devices.
network access	Access to a system by a user (or a process acting on behalf of a user) communicating through a network including, for example, a local area network, a wide area network, and Internet.
operational technology	Programmable systems or devices that interact with the physical environment (or manage devices that interact with the physical environment). These systems/devices detect or cause a direct change through the monitoring and/or control of devices, processes, and events. Examples include industrial control systems, building management systems, fire control systems, and physical access control mechanisms.
operations technology	See operational technology.
organization [FIPS 200, Adapted]	An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure including, for example, federal agencies, private enterprises, academic institutions, state, local, or tribal governments, or as appropriate, any of their operational elements.
organization-defined control parameter	The variable part of a control or control enhancement that can be instantiated by an organization during the tailoring process by either assigning an organization-defined value or selecting a value from a pre-defined list provided as part of the control or control enhancement.

overlay [OMB A-130]	A specification of security or privacy controls, control enhancements, supplemental guidance, and other supporting information employed during the tailoring process, that is intended to complement (and further refine) security control baselines. The overlay specification may be more stringent or less stringent than the original security control baseline specification and can be applied to multiple information systems. See <i>tailoring</i> and <i>tailored control baseline</i> .
personally identifiable information [<u>OMB A-130]</u>	Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.
plan of action and milestones	A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It details resources required to accomplish the elements of the plan, any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled completion dates for the milestones.
potential impact [FIPS 199]	The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be expected to have a limited adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 low); a serious adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 moderate); or a severe or catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 high) on organizational operations, organizational assets, or individuals.
privacy architect	Individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring that the system privacy requirements necessary to protect individuals' privacy are adequately addressed in all aspects of enterprise architecture including reference models, segment and solution architectures, and information systems processing PII.
privacy architecture	An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise's privacy protection processes, technical measures, personnel and organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the enterprise's mission and strategic plans.
privacy control [OMB A-130]	The administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employed within an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. <i>Note:</i> Controls can be selected to achieve multiple objectives; those controls that are selected to achieve both security and privacy objectives require a degree of collaboration between the organization's information security program and privacy program.
privacy control assessment [OMB A-130]	The assessment of privacy controls to determine whether the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. A privacy control assessment is both an assessment and a formal document detailing the process and the outcome of the assessment.

privacy control baseline	A collection of controls specifically assembled or brought together by a group, organization, or community of interest to address the privacy protection needs of individuals.
privacy impact assessment [OMB A-130]	An analysis of how information is handled to ensure handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; to determine the risks and effects of creating, collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining, disseminating, disclosing, and disposing of information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; and to examine and evaluate protections and alternate processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy concerns. A privacy impact assessment is both an analysis and a formal document detailing the process and the outcome of the analysis.
privacy plan [OMB A-130]	A formal document that details the privacy controls selected for an information system or environment of operation that are in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks, details how the controls have been implemented, and describes the methodologies and metrics that will be used to assess the controls.
privacy posture	The privacy posture represents the status of the information systems and information resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology) within an organization based on information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies, procedures) and the capabilities in place to comply with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks and to react as the situation changes.
privacy program plan [OMB A-130]	A formal document that provides an overview of an agency's privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program, the resources dedicated to the privacy program, the role of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy and other privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy program, and the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks.
privacy requirement	A requirement that applies to an information system or an organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, procedures, and/or mission/business needs with respect to privacy. <i>Note:</i> The term <i>privacy requirement</i> can be used in a variety of contexts from high-level policy-related activities to low-level implementation-related
privacy-related information	activities in system development and engineering disciplines. Information that describes the privacy posture of an information system or organization.

provenance	The chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or associated data.
reciprocity	Agreement among participating organizations to accept each other's security assessments to reuse system resources and/or to accept each other's assessed security posture to share information.
records [44 U.S.C. § 3301]	All recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the United States Government or because of the informational value of data in them.
resilience [CNSSI 4009]	The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.
risk [OMB A-130]	A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.
risk assessment [<u>SP 800-30</u>]	The process of identifying risks to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from the operation of a system.
risk executive (function)	An individual or group within an organization that helps to ensure that security risk-related considerations for individual systems, to include the authorization decisions for those systems, are viewed from an organization-wide perspective with regard to the overall strategic goals and objectives of the organization in carrying out its missions and business functions; and managing risk from individual systems is consistent across the organization, reflects organizational risk tolerance, and is considered along with other organizational risks affecting mission/business success.

risk management [OMB A-130]	The program and supporting processes to manage risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation), agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, and includes: establishing the context for risk-related activities; assessing risk; responding to risk once determined; and monitoring risk over time.
risk mitigation [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk- reducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk management process.
risk response [OMB A-130]	Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk to agency operations, agency assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.
sanitization [<u>SP 800-88]</u>	A process to render access to target data on the media infeasible for a given level of effort. Clear, purge, and destroy are actions that can be taken to sanitize media.
scoping considerations	A part of tailoring guidance providing organizations with specific considerations on the applicability and implementation of controls in the control baselines. Considerations include policy/regulatory, technology, physical infrastructure, system component allocation, operational/environmental, public access, scalability, common control, and security objective.
security [CNSSI 4009]	A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that enable an organization to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its use of systems. Protective measures may involve a combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection, recovery, and correction that should form part of the organization's risk management approach.
security architect	Individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring that the information security requirements necessary to protect the organization's core missions and business processes are adequately addressed in all aspects of enterprise architecture including reference models, segment and solution architectures, and the resulting information systems supporting those missions and business processes.

security architecture [SP 800-39]	An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise's security processes, information security systems, personnel and organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the enterprise's mission and strategic plans. See <i>information security</i> <i>architecture</i> .
[<u>SP 800-160-1</u>]	A set of physical and logical security-relevant representations (i.e., views) of system architecture that conveys information about how the system is partitioned into security domains and makes use of security-relevant elements to enforce security policies within and between security domains based on how data and information must be protected. <i>Note:</i> The security architecture reflects security domains, the placement of security-relevant elements within the security domains, the interconnections and trust relationships between the security-relevant elements, and the behavior and interactions between the security-relevant elements. The security architecture, similar to the system architecture, may be expressed at different levels of abstraction and with different scopes.
security categorization	The process of determining the security category for information or a system. Security categorization methodologies are described in CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security systems and in FIPS Publication 199 for other than national security systems. See <i>security category</i> .
security category [OMB A-130]	The characterization of information or an information system based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or information system would have on agency operations, agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
security control [OMB A-130]	The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.
security control assessment [OMB A-130]	The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security requirements for an information system or organization.
security control baseline [OMB A-130]	The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact information system. See also <i>control baseline</i> .
security objective [FIPS 199]	Confidentiality, integrity, or availability.
security plan	See system security plan.

security posture [<u>CNSSI 4009</u>]	The security status of an enterprise's networks, information, and systems based on information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies) and capabilities in place to manage the defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation changes. Synonymous with <i>security status</i> .
security requirement [FIPS 200, Adapted]	A requirement levied on an information system or an organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, standards, instructions, regulations, procedures, and/or mission/business needs to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that is being processed, stored, or transmitted. <i>Note:</i> Security requirements can be used in a variety of contexts from high-
	level policy-related activities to low-level implementation-related activities in system development and engineering disciplines.
security-related information	Information within the system that can potentially impact the operation of security functions or the provision of security services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce the system security policy or maintain isolation of code and data.
selection statement	A control parameter that allows an organization to select a value from a list of pre-defined values provided as part of the control or control enhancement (e.g., selecting to either restrict an action or prohibit an action).
	See assignment statement and organization-defined control parameter.
senior agency information security officer [44 U.S.C. Sec. 3544]	Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information Officer responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief Information Officer's primary liaison to the agency's authorizing officials, information system owners, and information system security officers.
senior agency official for privacy [OMB A-130]	The senior official, designated by the head of each agency, who has agency-wide responsibility for privacy, including implementation of privacy protections; compliance with Federal laws, regulations, and policies relating to privacy; management of privacy risks at the agency; and a central policy-making role in the agency's development and evaluation of legislative, regulatory, and other policy proposals.
software [CNSSI 4009]	Computer programs and associated data that may be dynamically written or modified during execution.
subsystem	A major subdivision or component of an information system consisting of information, information technology, and personnel that performs one or more specific functions.

supply chain [OMB A-130]	Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers of developers that begins with the sourcing of products and services and extends through the design, development, manufacturing, processing, handling, and delivery of products and services to the acquirer.
supply chain risk [OMB A-130]	Risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
supply chain risk management [OMB A-130]	The process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks associated with the global and distributed nature of information and communications technology product and service supply chains.
system [<u>CNSSI 4009</u>]	Any organized assembly of resources and procedures united and regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set of specific functions. See <i>information system</i> . <i>Note:</i> Systems also include specialized systems such as industrial/process controls systems, telephone switching and private branch exchange (PBX)
[<u>ISO 15288]</u>	systems, and environmental control systems. Combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated purposes.
	<i>Note 1:</i> There are many types of systems. Examples include: general and special-purpose information systems; command, control, and communication systems; crypto modules; central processing unit and graphics processor boards; industrial/process control systems; flight control systems; weapons, targeting, and fire control systems; medical devices and treatment systems; financial, banking, and merchandising transaction systems; and social networking systems.
	<i>Note 2:</i> The interacting elements in the definition of system include hardware, software, data, humans, processes, facilities, materials, and naturally occurring physical entities. <i>Note 3:</i> System of systems is included in the definition of system.
system boundary	See authorization boundary.
system component [<u>SP 800-128]</u>	A discrete identifiable information technology asset that represents a building block of a system and may include hardware, software, and firmware.

system element	Member of a set of elements that constitute a system.
[<u>ISO 15288]</u>	<i>Note 1:</i> A system element can be a discrete component, product, service, subsystem, system, infrastructure, or enterprise.
	<i>Note 2:</i> Each element of the system is implemented to fulfill specified requirements.
	<i>Note 3:</i> The recursive nature of the term allows the term <i>system</i> to apply equally when referring to a discrete component or to a large, complex, geographically distributed system-of-systems.
	<i>Note 4:</i> System elements are implemented by: hardware, software, and firmware that perform operations on data/information; physical structures, devices, and components in the environment of operation; and the people, processes, and procedures for operating, sustaining, and supporting the system elements.
	<i>Note 5: System elements</i> and <i>information resources</i> (as defined at 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3502 and in this document) are interchangeable terms as used in this document.
system development life cycle	The scope of activities associated with a system, encompassing the system's initiation, development and acquisition, implementation, operation and maintenance, and ultimately its disposal that instigates another system initiation.
system privacy officer	Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the appropriate operational privacy posture for a system or program.
systems privacy engineer	Individual assigned responsibility for conducting systems privacy engineering activities.
systems privacy engineering	Process that captures and refines privacy requirements and ensures their integration into information technology component products and information systems through purposeful privacy design or configuration.
systems security engineer	Individual assigned responsibility for conducting systems security engineering activities.
systems security engineering	Process that captures and refines security requirements and ensures their integration into information technology component products and information systems through purposeful security design or configuration.
system security officer	Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the appropriate operational security posture for an information system or program.
system security plan	A formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for an information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. See <i>information system security plan</i> . <i>Note:</i> The security plan describes the authorization boundary; the environment in which the system operates; the relationships with or connections to other
	systems; and how the security requirements are implemented.

system-related privacy risk [OMB A-130]	Risk to an individual or individuals associated with the agency's creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of their PII. See <i>risk</i> .
system-related security risk [<u>SP 800-30</u>]	Risk that arises through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or systems and that considers impacts to the organization (including assets, mission, functions, image, or reputation), individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. See <i>risk</i> .
system-specific control [OMB A-130]	A security or privacy control for an information system that is implemented at the system level and is not inherited by any other information system.
tailored control baseline	A set of controls resulting from the application of tailoring guidance to a control baseline. See <i>tailoring</i> and <i>overlay</i> .
tailoring [OMB A-130]	The process by which security control baselines are modified by identifying and designating common controls; applying scoping considerations; selecting compensating controls; assigning specific values to agency-defined control parameters; supplementing baselines with additional controls or control enhancements; and providing additional specification information for control implementation. The tailoring process may also be applied to privacy controls. See <i>overlay</i> .
threat [CNSSI 4009, Adapted]	Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service.
threat source [FIPS 200]	The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation of a vulnerability or a situation and method that may accidentally trigger a vulnerability. See <i>threat agent</i> .
trustworthiness [CNSSI 4009]	The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence to others of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned responsibilities.
trustworthiness (system)	The degree to which an information system (including the information technology components that are used to build the system) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being processed, stored, or transmitted by the system across the full range of threats and individuals' privacy.
trustworthy information system [OMB A-130]	An information system that is believed to be capable of operating within defined levels of risk despite the environmental disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and purposeful attacks that are expected to occur in its environment of operation.

system user	Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, authorized to access a system.
vulnerability [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	Weakness in an information system, system security procedures, internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or triggered by a threat source.
	<i>Note:</i> The term <i>weakness</i> is synonymous for <i>deficiency</i> . Weakness may result in security and/or privacy risks.
vulnerability assessment [<u>CNSSI 4009]</u>	Systematic examination of an information system or product to determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy of such measures after implementation.

3040 APPENDIX C

3041 ACRONYMS

3042 COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

CIO	Chief Information Officer
CNSS	Committee on National Security Systems
CNSSI	Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
CNSSP	Committee on National Security Systems Policy
CUI	Controlled Unclassified Information
DoD	Department of Defense
EO	Executive Order
FedRAMP	Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act
FOCI	Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence
GRC	Governance Risk Compliance
GSA	General Services Administration
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISCM	Information Security Continuous Monitoring
п	Information Technology
IR	Internal Report or Interagency Report
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA	National Security Agency
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ОТ	Operations Technology
PCM	Privacy Continuous Monitoring
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PL	Public Law
RMF	Risk Management Framework

- SAOP Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- SCRM Supply Chain Risk Management
- SDLC System Development Life Cycle
- SecCM Security-focused Configuration Management
- SP Special Publication

3044 APPENDIX D

3045 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3046 KEY PARTICIPANTS IN THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

3047 he following sections describe the roles and responsibilities of key participants involved in 3048 an organization's risk management process.¹⁰³ Recognizing that organizations have varying 3049 missions, business functions, and organizational structures, there may be differences in 3050 naming conventions for risk management roles and how risk management responsibilities are 3051 allocated among organizational personnel. This includes, for example, multiple individuals filling a single role or one individual filling multiple roles.¹⁰⁴ However, the basic functions remain the 3052 3053 same. The application of the RMF described in this publication is flexible, allowing organizations 3054 to effectively accomplish the intent of the specific tasks within their respective organizational 3055 structures to best manage security and privacy risks. Many risk management roles defined in 3056 this publication have counterpart roles in the SDLC processes carried out by organizations. 3057 Organizations align their risk management roles with similar (or complementary) roles defined 3058 for the SDLC whenever possible.¹⁰⁵

3059 AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

3060 The authorizing official is a senior official or executive with the authority to formally assume 3061 responsibility and accountability for operating a system; providing common controls inherited 3062 by organizational systems; or using a system, service, or application from an external provider. 3063 The authorizing official is the only organizational official who can accept the security and privacy 3064 risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals.¹⁰⁶ Authorizing officials 3065 typically have budgetary oversight for the system or are responsible for the mission and/or 3066 business operations supported by the system. Accordingly, authorizing officials are in 3067 management positions with a level of authority commensurate with understanding and 3068 accepting such security and privacy risks. Authorizing officials approve plans, memorandums of 3069 agreement or understanding, plans of action and milestones, and determine whether significant 3070 changes in the information systems or environments of operation require reauthorization.

Authorizing officials coordinate their activities with common control providers, system owners,
 chief information officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for
 privacy, system security and privacy officers, control assessors, senior accountable officials for
 risk management/risk executive (function), and other interested parties during the authorization
 process. With the increasing complexity of the mission/business processes in an organization,

3076 partnership arrangements, and the use of shared services, it is possible that a system may

¹⁰³ Organizations may define other roles to support the risk management process.

¹⁰⁴ Organizations ensure that there are no conflicts of interest when assigning the same individual to multiple risk management roles. See RMF *Prepare-Organization Level* step, <u>Task P-1</u>.

¹⁰⁵ For example, the SDLC role of system developer or program manager can be aligned with the role of system owner; and the role of mission or business owner can be aligned with the role of authorizing official. [SP 800-64] provides guidance on information security in the SDLC.

¹⁰⁶ The responsibility and accountability of authorizing officials described in [FIPS 200] was extended in [SP 800-53] to include risks to other organizations and the Nation.

involve co-authorizing officials.¹⁰⁷ If so, agreements are established between the co-authorizing
 officials and documented in the security and privacy plans. Authorizing officials are responsible
 and accountable for ensuring that authorization activities and functions that are delegated to
 authorizing official designated representatives are carried out as specified. For federal agencies,
 the role of authorizing official is an inherent U.S. Government function and is assigned to
 government personnel only.

3083 AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE

The *authorizing official designated representative* is an organizational official designated by the authorizing official who is empowered to act on behalf of the authorizing official to coordinate and conduct the day-to-day activities associated with managing risk to information systems and organizations. This includes carrying out many of the activities related to the execution of the RMF. The only activity that cannot be delegated by the authorizing official to the designated representative is the authorization decision and signing of the associated authorization decision document (i.e., the acceptance of risk).

3091 CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER

3092 The chief acquisition officer is an organizational official designated by the head of an agency to 3093 advise and assist the agency head and other agency officials to ensure that the mission of the 3094 agency is achieved through the management of the agency's acquisition activities. The chief 3095 acquisition officer monitors the performance of acquisition activities and programs; establishes 3096 clear lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility for acquisition decision making within 3097 the agency; manages the direction and implementation of acquisition policy for the agency; and 3098 establishes policies, procedures, and practices that promote full and open competition from 3099 responsible sources to fulfil best value requirements considering the nature of the property or 3100 service procured. The Chief Acquisition Officer coordinates with mission or business owners, 3101 authorizing officials, system owners, common control providers, senior agency information 3102 security officer, senior agency official for privacy, risk executive (function), and senior agency 3103 official for risk management to ensure that security and privacy requirements are clearly defined 3104 in organizational procurements and acquisitions.

3105 CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

3106 The *chief information officer*¹⁰⁸ is an organizational official responsible for designating a senior 3107 agency information security officer; developing and maintaining security policies, procedures, 3108 and control techniques to address security requirements; overseeing personnel with significant 3109 responsibilities for security and ensuring that the personnel are adequately trained; assisting 3110 senior organizational officials concerning their security responsibilities; and reporting to the 3111 head of the agency on the effectiveness of the organization's security program, including 3112 progress of remedial actions. The chief information officer, with the support of the senior 3113 agency official for risk management, the risk executive (function), and the senior agency 3114 information security officer, works closely with authorizing officials and their designated 3115 representatives to help ensure that:

 ¹⁰⁷ [OMB A-130] provides additional information about authorizing officials and co-authorizing officials.
 ¹⁰⁸ When an organization has not designated a formal chief information officer position, [FISMA14] requires that the associated responsibilities be handled by a comparable organizational official.

- An organization-wide security program is effectively implemented resulting in adequate security for all organizational systems and environments of operation;
- Security and supply chain risk management considerations are integrated into
 programming/planning/budgeting cycles, enterprise architectures, the SDLC, and
 acquisitions;
- Organizational systems and common controls are covered by approved security plans and possess current authorizations;
- Security-related activities required across the organization are accomplished in an efficient,
 cost-effective, and timely manner; and
- There is centralized reporting of security-related activities.

3126 The chief information officer and authorizing officials determine the allocation of resources 3127 dedicated to the protection of systems supporting the organization's missions and business 3128 functions based on organizational priorities. For information systems that process personally 3129 identifiable information, the chief information officer and authorizing officials coordinate any 3130 determination about the allocation of resources dedicated to the protection of those systems 3131 with the senior agency official for privacy. For selected systems, the chief information officer 3132 may be designated as an authorizing official or a co-authorizing official with other senior 3133 organizational officials. The role of chief information officer is an inherent U.S. Government 3134 function and is assigned to government personnel only.

3135 COMMON CONTROL PROVIDER

3136 The common control provider is an individual, group, or organization that is responsible for the 3137 implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls (i.e., controls inherited by 3138 organizational systems).¹⁰⁹ Common control providers also are responsible for ensuring the 3139 documentation of organization-defined common controls in security and privacy plans (or 3140 equivalent documents prescribed by the organization); ensuring that required assessments of 3141 the common controls are conducted by qualified assessors with an appropriate level of 3142 independence; documenting assessment findings in control assessment reports; and producing 3143 plans of action and milestones for controls having deficiencies. Security and privacy plans, 3144 security and privacy assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common 3145 controls (or summary of such information) are made available to the system owners of systems 3146 inheriting common controls after the information is reviewed and approved by the authorizing 3147 officials accountable for those common controls.

- 3148 The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for designating which privacy controls may
- be treated as common controls. Privacy controls that are designated as common controls are
- 3150 documented in the organization's privacy program plan.¹¹⁰ The senior agency official for privacy

¹⁰⁹ Organizations can have multiple common control providers depending on how security and privacy responsibilities are allocated organization-wide. Common control providers may be *system owners* when the common controls are resident within an organizational system.

¹¹⁰ A privacy program plan is a formal document that provides an overview of an agency's privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program; the role of the senior agency official for privacy and other privacy officials and staff; the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy program; the resources dedicated to the privacy program; and the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks.

- 3151 has oversight responsibility for common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable
- 3152 privacy requirements and managing privacy risks and is responsible for assessing those controls.
- 3153 At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls that are designated as common controls
- may be assessed by an independent assessor. In all cases, however, the senior agency official for
- privacy retains responsibility and accountability for the organization's privacy program, including
- 3156 any privacy functions performed by independent assessors. Privacy plans and privacy control
- 3157 assessment reports are made available to systems owners whose systems inherit privacy
- 3158 controls that are designated as common controls.

3159 **CONTROL ASSESSOR**

3160 The control assessor is an individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting a 3161 comprehensive assessment of the controls and control enhancements implemented within or 3162 inherited by a system to determine the effectiveness of the controls (i.e., the extent to which 3163 the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired 3164 outcome with respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the system and the 3165 organization). The system owner and common control provider rely on the security and privacy 3166 expertise and judgment of the assessor to assess the controls implemented within and inherited 3167 by the information system using the assessment procedures specified in the security and privacy 3168 assessment plans. Multiple control assessors who are differentiated by their expertise in specific 3169 control requirements or technologies may be required to conduct the assessment effectively. 3170 Prior to initiating the control assessment, assessors review the security and privacy plans to 3171 facilitate development of the assessment plans. Control assessors provide an assessment of the 3172 severity of the deficiencies discovered in the system and its environment of operation and can 3173 recommend corrective actions to address the identified vulnerabilities. Finally, control assessors 3174 prepare security and privacy assessment reports containing the results and findings from the 3175 assessment.

The required level of assessor independence is determined by the authorizing official based on laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. When a control assessment is conducted in support of an authorization decision or ongoing authorization, the authorizing official makes an explicit determination of the degree of independence required. Assessor independence is a factor in preserving an impartial and unbiased assessment process; determining the credibility of the assessment results; and ensuring that the authorizing official receives objective information to make an informed, risk-based authorization decision.

The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for assessing privacy controls and for providing privacy-related information to the authorizing official. At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls may be assessed by an independent assessor. However, in all cases, the senior agency official for privacy retains responsibility and accountability for the privacy program of the organization, including any privacy functions performed by the independent assessors.

3189 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECT

The *enterprise architect* is an individual or group responsible for working with the leadership
 and subject matter experts in an organization to build a holistic view of the organization's
 missions and business functions, mission/business processes, information, and information
 technology assets. With respect to information security and privacy, enterprise architects:

- Implement an enterprise architecture strategy that facilitates effective security and privacy solutions;
- Coordinate with security and privacy architects to determine the optimal placement of
 systems/system elements within the enterprise architecture and to address security and
 privacy issues between systems and the enterprise architecture;
- Assist in reducing complexity within the IT infrastructure to facilitate security;
- Assist with determining appropriate control implementations and initial configuration 3201 baselines as they relate to the enterprise architecture;
- Collaborate with system owners and authorizing officials to facilitate authorization 3203 boundary determinations and allocation of controls to system elements;
- Serve as part of the Risk Executive (function); and
- Assist with integration of the organizational risk management strategy and system-level
 security and privacy requirements into program, planning, and budgeting activities, the
 SDLC, acquisition processes, and systems engineering processes.

3208 **HEAD OF AGENCY**

3209 The *head of agency* is responsible and accountable for providing information security 3210 protections commensurate with the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, 3211 other organizations, and the Nation—that is, risk resulting from unauthorized access, use, 3212 disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or 3213 on behalf of the agency; and the information systems used or operated by an agency or by a 3214 contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency. The head of agency is also 3215 the senior official in an organization with the responsibility for ensuring that privacy interests 3216 are protected and that PII is managed responsibly within the organization. The heads of 3217 agencies ensure that:

- Information security and privacy management processes are integrated with strategic and operational planning processes;
- Senior officials within the organization provide information security for the information and systems that support the operations and assets under their control;
- Senior agency officials for privacy are designated who are responsible and accountable for
 ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements, managing privacy risk, and the
 organization's privacy program; and
- The organization has adequately trained personnel to assist in complying with security and privacy requirements in legislation, executive orders, policies, directives, instructions, standards, and guidelines.
- The head of agency establishes the organizational commitment and the actions required to effectively manage security and privacy risk and protect the missions and business functions being carried out by the organization. The head of agency or establishes security and privacy accountability and provides active support and oversight of monitoring and improvement for the security and privacy programs. Senior leadership commitment to security and privacy

setablishes a level of due diligence within the organization that promotes a climate for missionand business success.

3235 INFORMATION OWNER OR STEWARD

3236 The *information owner or steward* is an organizational official with statutory, management, or 3237 operational authority for specified information and the responsibility for establishing the 3238 policies and procedures governing its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and 3239 disposal. In information-sharing environments, the information owner/steward is responsible 3240 for establishing the rules for appropriate use and protection of the information and retains that 3241 responsibility even when the information is shared with or provided to other organizations. The 3242 owner/steward of the information processed, stored, or transmitted by a system may or may 3243 not be the same individual as the system owner. An individual system may contain information 3244 from multiple information owners/stewards. Information owners/stewards provide input to 3245 system owners regarding the security and privacy requirements and controls for the systems 3246 where the information is processed, stored, or transmitted.

3247 MSSION OR BUSINESS OWNER

3248 The mission or business owner is the senior official or executive within an organization with 3249 specific mission or line of business responsibilities and that has a security or privacy interest in 3250 the organizational systems supporting those missions or lines of business. Mission or business 3251 owners are key stakeholders that have a significant role in establishing organizational mission 3252 and business processes and the protection needs and security and privacy requirements that 3253 ensure the successful conduct of the organization's missions and business operations. Mission 3254 and business owners provide essential inputs to the risk management strategy, play an active 3255 part in the SDLC, and may also serve in the role of authorizing official.

3256 **RISK EXECUTIVE (FUNCTION)**

3257 The risk executive (function) is an individual or group within an organization that provides a 3258 comprehensive, organization-wide approach to risk management. The risk executive (function) 3259 serves as the common risk management resource for senior leaders, executives, and managers, 3260 mission/business owners, chief information officers, senior agency information security officers, 3261 senior agency officials for privacy, system owners, common control providers, enterprise 3262 architects, security architects, systems security or privacy engineers, system security or privacy 3263 officers, and any other stakeholders having a vested interest in the mission/business success of 3264 organizations. The risk executive (function) is an inherent U.S. Government function and is 3265 assigned to government personnel only.

- 3266 The risk executive (function) ensures that risk-related considerations for systems (including 3267 authorization decisions for those systems and the common controls inherited by those systems), 3268 are viewed from an organization-wide perspective regarding the organization's strategic goals 3269 and objectives in carrying out its core missions and business functions. The risk executive 3270 (function) ensures that managing risk is consistent throughout the organization, reflects 3271 organizational risk tolerance, and is considered along with other types of risk to ensure 3272 mission/business success. The risk executive (function) coordinates with senior leaders and 3273 executives to:
- Establish risk management roles and responsibilities;

3275 Develop and implement an organization-wide risk management strategy that provides a 3276 strategic view of security-related risks for the organization¹¹¹ and that guides and informs 3277 organizational risk decisions (including how risk is framed, assessed, responded to, and 3278 monitored over time); 3279 Provide a comprehensive, organization-wide, holistic approach for addressing risk—an 3280 approach that provides a greater understanding of the integrated operations of the 3281 organization; 3282 Manage threat, vulnerability, and security, privacy, and supply chain risk information for 3283 organizational systems and the environments in which the systems operate; 3284 Establish organization-wide forums to consider all types and sources of risk (including 3285 aggregated risk); 3286 Identify the organizational risk posture based on the aggregated risk from the operation and 3287 use of systems and the respective environments of operation for which the organization is 3288 responsible; 3289 Provide oversight for the risk management activities carried out by organizations to help 3290 ensure consistent and effective risk-based decisions; 3291 Develop a broad-based understanding of risk regarding the strategic view of organizations 3292 and their integrated operations; 3293 Establish effective vehicles and serve as a focal point for communicating and sharing risk-3294 related information among key stakeholders (e.g., authorization officials and other senior 3295 leaders) internally and externally to organizations; 3296 Specify the degree of autonomy for subordinate organizations permitted by parent 3297 organizations regarding framing, assessing, responding to, and monitoring risk; 3298 Promote cooperation and collaboration among authorizing officials to include authorization • 3299 actions requiring shared responsibility (e.g., joint authorizations); 3300 Provide an organization-wide forum to consider all sources of risk (including aggregated risk) 3301 to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation; 3302 Ensure that authorization decisions consider all factors necessary for mission and business 3303 success; and 3304 Ensure shared responsibility for supporting organizational missions and business functions 3305 using external providers receives the needed visibility and is elevated to appropriate 3306 decision-making authorities. 3307 The risk executive (function) presumes neither a specific organizational structure nor formal 3308 responsibility assigned to any one individual or group within the organization. Heads of agencies 3309 or organizations may choose to retain the risk executive (function) or to delegate the function. 3310 The risk executive (function) requires a mix of skills, expertise, and perspectives to understand 3311 the strategic goals and objectives of organizations, organizational missions/business functions, 3312 technical possibilities and constraints, and key mandates and guidance that shape organizational

¹¹¹ Authorizing officials may have narrow or localized perspectives in rendering authorization decisions without fully understanding or explicitly accepting the organization-wide risks being incurred from such decisions.

operations. To provide this needed mixture, the risk executive (function) can be filled by a single
individual or office (supported by an expert staff) or by a designated group (e.g., a risk board,
executive steering committee, executive leadership council). The risk executive (function) fits
into the organizational governance structure in such a way as to facilitate efficiency and
effectiveness.

3318 SECURITY OR PRIVACY ARCHITECT

3319 The security or privacy architect is an individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring 3320 that stakeholder protection needs and the corresponding system requirements necessary to 3321 protect organizational missions and business functions and individuals' privacy are adequately 3322 addressed in the enterprise architecture including reference models, segment architectures, and 3323 solution architectures (systems supporting mission and business processes). The security or 3324 privacy architect serves as the primary liaison between the enterprise architect and the systems 3325 security or privacy engineer and coordinates with system owners, common control providers, 3326 and system security or privacy officers on the allocation of controls. Security or privacy 3327 architects, in coordination with system security or privacy officers, advise authorizing officials, 3328 chief information officers, senior accountable officials for risk management or risk executive 3329 (function), senior agency information security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy on 3330 a range of security and privacy issues. Examples include establishing authorization boundaries; 3331 establishing security or privacy alerts; assessing the severity of deficiencies in the system or 3332 controls; developing plans of action and milestones; creating risk mitigation approaches; and 3333 potential adverse effects of identified vulnerabilities or privacy risks.

When the security architect and privacy architect are separate roles, the security architect is generally responsible for aspects of the enterprise architecture that protect information and information systems from unauthorized system activity or behavior to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The privacy architect is responsible for aspects of the enterprise architecture that ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage the privacy risks to individuals associated with the processing of PII. Security and privacy architect responsibilities overlap regarding aspects of the enterprise architecture that protect the security of PII.

3341 SENIOR ACCOUNTABLE OFFICIAL FOR RISK MANAGEMENT

3342 The senior accountable official for risk management is the individual that leads and manages the 3343 risk executive (function) in an organization and is responsible for aligning information security 3344 and privacy risk management processes with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning 3345 processes. This official is the agency head or an individual designated by the agency head. The 3346 senior accountable official for risk management determines the organizational structure and 3347 responsibilities of the risk executive (function). The head of the agency, in coordination with the 3348 senior accountable official for risk management, may retain the risk executive (function) or 3349 delegate the function to another organizational official or group. The senior accountable official 3350 for risk management and the risk executive (function) are inherent U.S. Government functions 3351 and are assigned to government personnel only.

3352 SENIOR AGENCY INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER

3353 The *senior agency information security officer* is an organizational official responsible for 3354 carrying out the chief information officer security responsibilities under FISMA, and serving as

3355 the primary liaison for the chief information officer to the organization's authorizing officials, 3356 system owners, common control providers, and system security officers. The senior agency 3357 information security officer is also responsible for coordinating with the senior agency official 3358 for privacy to ensure coordination between privacy and information security programs. The 3359 senior agency information security officer possesses the professional qualifications, including 3360 training and experience, required to administer security program functions; maintains security 3361 duties as a primary responsibility; and heads an office with the specific mission and resources to 3362 assist the organization in achieving trustworthy, secure information and systems in accordance 3363 with the requirements in FISMA. The senior agency information security officer may serve as 3364 authorizing official designated representative or as a security control assessor. The role of senior 3365 agency information security officer is an inherent U.S. Government function and is therefore 3366 assigned to government personnel only. Organizations may also refer to the senior agency 3367 information security officer as the senior information security officer or chief information 3368 security officer.

3369 SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIAL FOR PRIVACY

The senior agency official for privacy is the senior official or executive with agency-wide
responsibility and accountability for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements
and managing privacy risk. Among other things, the senior agency official for privacy is
responsible for:

- Coordinating with the senior agency information security officer to ensure coordination of 3375 privacy and information security activities;
- Reviewing and approving the categorization of information systems that create, collect, use,
 process, store, maintain, disseminate, disclose, or dispose of personally identifiable
 information;
- Designating which privacy controls will be treated as program management, common,
 system-specific, and hybrid privacy controls;
- Identifying assessment methodologies and metrics to determine whether privacy controls
 are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure compliance with
 applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks;
- Reviewing and approving privacy plans for information systems prior to authorization, reauthorization, or ongoing authorization;
- Reviewing authorization packages for information systems that create, collect, use, process,
 store, maintain, disseminate, disclose, or dispose of personally identifiable information to
 ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage privacy risks;
- Conducting and documenting the results of privacy control assessments to verify the continued effectiveness of all privacy controls selected and implemented at the agency; and
- Establishing and maintaining a privacy continuous monitoring program to maintain ongoing
 awareness of privacy risks and assess privacy controls at a frequency sufficient to ensure
 compliance with privacy requirements and manage privacy risks.
- 3394 The role of senior agency official for privacy is an inherent U.S. Government function and is 3395 therefore assigned to government personnel only.

3396 SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR

3397 The system administrator is an individual, group, or organization responsible for setting up and 3398 maintaining a system or specific components of a system. System administrator responsibilities 3399 include, for example, installing, configuring, and updating hardware and software; establishing 3400 and managing user accounts; overseeing or conducting backup, recovery, and reconstitution 3401 activities; implementing controls; and adhering to and enforcing organizational security and 3402 privacy policies and procedures. The system administrator role includes other types of system 3403 administrators including, for example, database administrators, network administrators, 3404 application administrators, and web administrators.

3405 SYSTEM OWNER

The *system owner* is an organizational official responsible for the procurement, development,
 integration, modification, operation, maintenance, and disposal of a system.¹¹² The system
 owner is responsible for addressing the operational interests of the user community (i.e., users
 who require access to the system to satisfy mission, business, or operational requirements) and

3410 for ensuring compliance with security requirements. In coordination with the system security 3411 and privacy officers, the system owner is responsible for the development and maintenance of

and privacy officers, the system owner is responsible for the development and maintenance ofthe security and privacy plans and ensures that the system is operated in accordance with the

- 3413 selected and implemented controls.
- 3414 In coordination with the information owner/steward, the system owner decides who has access
- 3415 to the system (and with what types of privileges or access rights).¹¹³ The system owner ensures
- 3416 that system users and support personnel receive the requisite security and privacy training.
- 3417 Based on guidance from the authorizing official, the system owner informs organizational
- 3418 officials of the need to conduct the authorization, ensures that resources are available for the
- 3419 effort, and provides the required system access, information, and documentation to control
- 3420 assessors. The system owner receives the security and privacy assessment results from the
- 3421 control assessors. After taking appropriate steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities or
- security and privacy risks, the system owner assembles the authorization package and submitsthe package to the authorizing official or the authorizing official designated representative for
- 3424 adjudication.¹¹⁴

3425 SYSTEM SECURITY OR PRIVACY OFFICER

The *system security or privacy officer*¹¹⁵ is an individual responsible for ensuring that the security and privacy posture is maintained for an organizational system and works in close collaboration

¹¹² Organizations may refer to system owners as program managers or business/asset owners.

¹¹³ The responsibility for deciding who has access to specific information within an organizational system (and with what types of privileges or access rights) may reside with the information owner/steward.

¹¹⁴ The authorizing official may choose to designate an individual other than the system owner to compile and assemble the information for the authorization package. In this situation, the designated individual coordinates the compilation and assembly activities with the system owner.

¹¹⁵ Organizations may define a *system security manager* or *security manager* role with similar responsibilities as a system security officer or with oversight responsibilities for a security program. In these situations, system security officers may, at the discretion of the organization, report directly to system security managers or security managers. Organizations may assign equivalent responsibilities for privacy to separate individuals with appropriate subject matter expertise.

- 3428 with the system owner. The system security or privacy officer also serves as a principal advisor 3429 on all matters, technical and otherwise, involving the controls for the system. The system 3430 security or privacy officer has the knowledge and expertise to manage the security or privacy 3431 aspects of an organizational system and, in many organizations, is assigned responsibility for the 3432 day-to-day system security or privacy operations. This responsibility may also include, but is not 3433 limited to, physical and environmental protection; personnel security; incident handling; and 3434 security and privacy training and awareness. The system security or privacy officer may be called 3435 on to assist in the development of the system-level security and privacy policies and procedures 3436 and to ensure compliance with those policies and procedures. In close coordination with the 3437 system owner, the system security or privacy officer often plays an active role in the monitoring 3438 of a system and its environment of operation to include developing and updating security and 3439 privacy plans, managing and controlling changes to the system, and assessing the security or 3440 privacy impact of those changes.
- 3441 When the system security officer and system privacy officer are separate roles, the system
- 3442 security officer is generally responsible for aspects of the system that protect information and
- information systems from unauthorized system activity or behavior to provide confidentiality,
- integrity, and availability. The system privacy officer is responsible for aspects of the system that
- ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage the privacy risks to individuals
- 3446 associated with the processing of PII. The responsibilities of system security officers and system3447 privacy officers overlap regarding aspects of the system that protect the security of PII.

3448 SYSTEM USER

3449 The *system user* is an individual or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual, that is 3450 authorized to access information and information systems to perform assigned duties. System 3451 user responsibilities include, but are not limited to, adhering to organizational policies that 3452 govern acceptable use of organizational systems; using the organization-provided information 3453 technology resources for defined purposes only; and reporting anomalous or suspicious system 3454 behavior.

3455 SYSTEMS SECURITY OR PRIVACY ENGINEER

3456 The systems security or privacy engineer is an individual, group, or organization responsible for 3457 conducting systems security or privacy engineering activities as part of the SDLC. Systems 3458 security and privacy engineering is a process that captures and refines security and privacy 3459 requirements for systems and ensures that the requirements are effectively integrated into 3460 systems and system components through security or privacy architecting, design, development, 3461 and configuration. Systems security or privacy engineers are part of the development team— 3462 designing and developing organizational systems or upgrading existing systems along with 3463 ensuring continuous monitoring requirements are addressed at the system level. Systems 3464 security or privacy engineers employ best practices when implementing controls including 3465 software engineering methodologies; system and security or privacy engineering principles; 3466 secure or privacy-enhancing design, secure or privacy-enhancing architecture, and secure or 3467 privacy-enhancing coding techniques. Systems security or privacy engineers coordinate security 3468 and privacy activities with senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for 3469 privacy, security and privacy architects, system owners, common control providers, and system 3470 security or privacy officers.

- When the systems security engineer and privacy engineer are separate roles, the systems
 security engineer is generally responsible for those activities associated with protecting
 information and information systems from unauthorized system activity or behavior to provide
 confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The privacy engineer is responsible for those activities
 associated with ensuring compliance with privacy requirements and managing the privacy risks
 to individuals associated with the processing of PII. The responsibilities of systems security
 engineers and privacy engineers overlap regarding activities associated with protecting the
- 3478 security of PII.

3479 **APPENDIX E**

3480 SUMMARY OF RMF TASKS

3481 RMF TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

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TABLE E-1: PREPARE TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
	Organization Level	
TASK P-1 Risk Management Roles Identify and assign individuals to specific roles associated with security and privacy risk management.	 <u>Head of Agency</u> <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> 	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u>
TASK P-2 Risk Management Strategy Establish a risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination of risk tolerance.	• <u>Head of Agency</u>	 <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk</u> <u>Management or Risk Executive</u> (Function) <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>
TASK P-3 Risk Assessment—Organization Assess organization-wide security and privacy risk and update the results on an ongoing basis.	 <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk</u> <u>Management or Risk Executive</u> (Function) <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> 	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>
TASK P-4 Organization-Wide Tailored Control Baselines and Profiles (Optional) Establish, document, and publish organization-wide tailored control baselines and/or profiles.	Mission or Business Owner Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>
TASK P-5 Common Control Identification Identify, document, and publish organization-wide common controls that are available for inheritance by organizational systems.	 <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> 	 Mission or Business Owner Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Chief Information Officer Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Common Control Provider System Owner

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK P-6 Impact-Level Prioritization (Optional) Prioritize organizational systems with the same impact level.	• <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk</u> <u>Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive</u> (Function)	 Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Mission or Business Owner System Owner Chief Information Officer Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
TASK P-7 Continuous Monitoring Strategy—Organization Develop and implement an organization-wide strategy for continuously monitoring control effectiveness.	<u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk</u> <u>Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive</u> (Function)	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u>
	System Level	
TASK P-8Mission or Business FocusIdentify the missions, businessfunctions, and mission/businessprocesses that the system isintended to support.TASK P-9System StakeholdersIdentify stakeholders who havean interest in the design,development, implementation,assessment, operation,maintenance, or disposal of the	 <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>System Owner</u> 	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>Chief Acquisition Officer</u>
system. TASK P-10 Asset Identification Identify assets that require protection.	• <u>System Owner</u>	 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Mission or Business Owner Information Owner or Steward Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy
TASK P-11 Authorization Boundary Determine the authorization boundary of the system.	<u>Authorizing Official</u>	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>Enterprise Architect</u>

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK P-12 Information Types Identify the types of information to be processed, stored, and transmitted by the system.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> 	 <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>
TASK P-13 Information Life Cycle Identify and understand all stages of the information life cycle.	 <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> 	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u>
TASK P-14 Risk Assessment—System Conduct a system-level risk assessment and update the risk assessment on an ongoing basis.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> 	 <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk</u> <u>Management</u> or <u>Risk Executive</u> (<u>Function</u>) <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>System Security Officer</u>
TASK P-15RequirementsDefine the security and privacy requirements for the system and the environment of operation.	 <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> 	 <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>System Security Officer</u>
TASK P-16 Enterprise Architecture Determine the placement of the system within the enterprise architecture.	 <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>Enterprise Architect</u> <u>Security Architect</u> <u>Privacy Architect</u> 	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u>
TASK P-17 System Registration Register the system with organizational program or management offices.	• <u>System Owner</u>	 <u>Mission or Business Owner</u> <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>

TABLE E-2: CATEGORIZATION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK C-1Security CategorizationCategorize the system and document the security categorization results.	<u>System Owner</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u>	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Chief Information Officer Senior Agency Information Security Officer Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative System Security Officer System Privacy Officer
TASK C-2Security Categorization Review and ApprovalReview and approve the security categorization results and decision.	 <u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated</u> <u>Representative</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> (for systems processing PII) 	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Chief Information Officer Senior Agency Information Security Officer
TASK C-3 System Description Document the characteristics of the system.	• <u>System Owner</u>	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>

TABLE E-3: SELECTION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK S-1 Requirements Allocation Allocate security and privacy requirements to the information system and to the environment of operation.	 <u>Security Architect</u> <u>Privacy Architect</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> 	 Chief Information Officer Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Mission or Business Owner Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy System Owner
TASK S-2 Control Selection Select the controls for the system and the environment of operation.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>Systems Security Engineer</u> <u>Privacy Engineer</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>
TASK S-3 Control Tailoring Tailor the controls selected for the system and the environment of operation.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>Systems Security Engineer</u> <u>Privacy Engineer</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>
TASK S-4 Plan Development Document the controls for the system and environment of operation in security and privacy plans.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Information Owner or Steward Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer System Security Officer System Privacy Officer
TASK S-5 Continuous Monitoring Strategy— System Develop and implement a system- level strategy for monitoring control effectiveness to supplement the organizational continuous monitoring strategy.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Chief Information Officer Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Information Owner or Steward Security Architect Privacy Architect Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer System Security Officer System Privacy Officer

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK S-6 Plan Review and Approval Review and approve the security and privacy plans for the system and the environment of operation.	<u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing Official Designated</u> <u>Representative</u>	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Chief Information Officer Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Chief Acquisition Officer



TABLE E-4: IMPLEMENTATION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK I-1 Control Implementation Implement the controls specified in the security and privacy plans.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 Information Owner or Steward Security Architect Privacy Architect Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer System Security Officer System Privacy Officer Enterprise Architect System Administrator
TASK I-2 Baseline Configuration Establish the initial configuration baseline for the system by documenting changes to planned control implementation.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 Information Owner or Steward Security Architect Privacy Architect Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer System Security Officer System Privacy Officer Enterprise Architect System Administrator

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TABLE E-5: ASSESSMENT TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK A-1 Assessor Selection Select the appropriate assessor or assessment team for the type of control assessment to be conducted.	<u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u>	 <u>Chief Information Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>
TASK A-2 Assessment Plan Develop, review, and approve plans to assess implemented controls.	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Control Assessor</u> 	 <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>
TASK A-3 Control Assessments Assess the controls in accordance with the assessment procedures described in the assessment plans.	• <u>Control Assessor</u>	 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative System Owner Common Control Provider Information Owner or Steward Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy System Security Officer System Privacy Officer
TASK A-4 Assessment Reports Prepare the assessment reports documenting the findings and recommendations from the control assessments.	• <u>Control Assessor</u>	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>
TASK A-5 Remediation Actions Conduct initial remediation actions on the controls and reassess remediated controls.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> <u>Control Assessor</u> 	 Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) System Owner Common Control Provider Information Owner or Steward Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer System Security Officer System Privacy Officer

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK A-6 Plan of Action and Milestones Prepare the plan of action and milestones based on the findings and recommendations of the assessment reports.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 Information Owner or Steward System Security Officer System Privacy Officer Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Chief Acquisition Officer

TABLE E-6: AUTHORIZATION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK R-1 Authorization Package Assemble the authorization package and submit the package to the authorizing official for an authorization decision.	<u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u>	 <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Information</u> <u>Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> <u>Control Assessor</u>
TASK R-2 Risk Analysis and Determination Analyze and determine the risk from the operation or use of the system or the provision of common controls.	<u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u>	 <u>Senior Accountable Official for</u> <u>Risk Management or Risk</u> <u>Executive (Function)</u> <u>Senior Agency Information</u> <u>Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>
TASK R-3 Risk Response Identify and implement a preferred course of action in response to the risk determined.	<u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u>	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy System Owner or Common Control Provider Information Owner or Steward Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer System Security Officer System Privacy Officer
TASK R-4 Authorization Decision Determine if the risk from the operation or use of the information system or the provision or use of common controls is acceptable.	• <u>Authorizing Official</u>	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Authorizing Official Designated Representative
TASK R-5 Authorization Reporting Report the authorization decision and any deficiencies in controls that represent significant security or privacy risk.	<u>Authorizing Official</u> or <u>Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u>	 System Owner or Common Control Provider Information Owner or Steward System Security Officer System Privacy Officer Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy

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TABLE E-7: MONITORING TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK M-1 System and Environment Changes Monitor the information system and its environment of operation for changes that impact the security and privacy posture of the system.	 <u>System Owner or Common</u> <u>Control Provider</u> <u>Senior Agency Information</u> <u>Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> 	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative Information Owner or Steward System Security Officer System Privacy Officer
TASK M-2 Ongoing Assessments Assess the controls implemented within and inherited by the system in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy.	• <u>Control Assessor</u>	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>System Owner or Common Control</u> <u>Provider</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>
TASK M-3 Ongoing Risk Response Respond to risk based on the results of ongoing monitoring activities, risk assessments, and outstanding items in plans of action and milestones.	 <u>Authorizing Official</u> <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> 	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated Representative Information Owner or Steward System Security Officer System Privacy Officer Systems Security Engineer Privacy Engineer Security Architect Privacy Architect
TASK M-4 Authorization Updates Update plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones based on the results of the continuous monitoring process.	<u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u>	 Information Owner or Steward System Security Officer System Privacy Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Senior Agency Information Security Officer

RMF TASKS	PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY	SUPPORTING ROLES
TASK M-5 Posture Reporting Report the security and privacy posture of the system to the authorizing official and other organizational officials on an ongoing basis in accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy.	 <u>System Owner</u> <u>Common Control Provider</u> <u>Senior Agency Information</u> <u>Security Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u> 	 <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u>
TASK M-6 Ongoing Authorization Review the security and privacy posture of the system on an ongoing basis to determine whether the risk remains acceptable.	<u>Authorizing Official</u>	 Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) Senior Agency Information Security Officer Senior Agency Official for Privacy Authorizing Official Designated Representative
TASK M-7 System Disposal Implement a system disposal strategy and execute required actions when a system is removed from operation.	• <u>System Owner</u>	 <u>Authorizing Official or Authorizing</u> <u>Official Designated Representative</u> <u>Information Owner or Steward</u> <u>System Security Officer</u> <u>System Privacy Officer</u> <u>Senior Accountable Official for Risk</u> <u>Management or Risk Executive</u> (Function) <u>Senior Agency Information Security</u> <u>Officer</u> <u>Senior Agency Official for Privacy</u>

3496 APPENDIX F

3497 SYSTEM AND COMMON CONTROL AUTHORIZATIONS

3498 AUTHORIZATION DECISIONS AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

3499 his appendix provides information on the system and common control authorization 3500 processes to include: types of authorizations; content of authorization packages;

authorization decisions; authorization decision documents; ongoing authorization;

3502 reauthorization; event-driven triggers and significant changes; type and facility authorizations;

3503 and authorization approaches.

3504 **TYPES OF AUTHORIZATIONS**

3505 Authorization is the process by which a senior management official, the authorizing official, 3506 reviews security- and privacy-related information describing the current security and privacy 3507 posture of information systems or common controls that are inherited by systems. The 3508 authorizing official uses this information to determine if the mission/business risk of operating a 3509 system or providing common controls is acceptable—and if it is, explicitly accepts the risk. 3510 Security- and privacy-related information is presented to the authorizing official in an 3511 authorization package, which may consist of a report from an automated security/privacy 3512 management and reporting tool.¹¹⁶ System and common control authorization occurs as part of 3513 the RMF Authorize step. A system authorization or a common control authorization can be an 3514 initial authorization, an ongoing authorization, or a reauthorization as defined below:

- 3515 Initial authorization is defined as the initial (start-up) risk determination and risk acceptance • 3516 decision based on a complete, zero-based review of the system or of common controls. The 3517 zero-based review of the system includes an assessment of all implemented system-level 3518 controls (including the system-level portion of the hybrid controls) and a review of the 3519 security status of inherited common controls as specified in security and privacy plans.¹¹⁷ 3520 The zero-based review of common controls (other than common controls that are system-3521 based) includes an assessment of applicable controls (e.g., policies, operating procedures, 3522 implementation information) that contribute to the provision of a common control or set of 3523 common controls.
- Ongoing authorization is defined as the subsequent (follow-on) risk determinations and risk acceptance decisions taken at agreed-upon and documented frequencies in accordance with the organization's mission/business requirements and organizational risk tolerance. Ongoing authorization is a time-driven or event-driven authorization process. The authorizing official is provided with the necessary information regarding the near real-time security and privacy posture of the system to determine whether the mission/business risk of continued system

¹¹⁶ [SP 800-137] provides information on automated security management and reporting tools. Future updates to this publication will also address privacy management and reporting tools.

¹¹⁷ The zero-based review of a system does not require a zero-based review of the common controls that are available for inheritance by that system. The common controls are authorized under a separate authorization process with a separate authorization official accepting the risk associated with the provision of those controls. The review of the security and privacy plans containing common controls is necessary to understand the current state of the controls being inherited by organizational systems and factoring this information into risk-based decisions associated with the system.

- operation or the provision of common controls is acceptable. Ongoing authorization is
 fundamentally related to the ongoing understanding and ongoing acceptance of security
 and privacy risk and is dependent on a robust continuous monitoring program.
- 3533 Reauthorization is defined as the static, single point-in-time risk determination and risk • 3534 acceptance decision that occurs after initial authorization. In general, reauthorization 3535 actions may be time-driven or event-driven. However, under ongoing authorization, 3536 reauthorization is in most instances, an event-driven action initiated by the authorizing 3537 official or directed by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive 3538 (function) in response to an event that results in security and privacy risk above the level of 3539 risk previously accepted by the authorizing official. Reauthorization consists of a review of 3540 the system or the common controls similar to the review carried out during the initial 3541 authorization. The reauthorization differs from the initial authorization because the 3542 authorizing official can choose to initiate a complete zero-based review of the system or of 3543 the common controls or to initiate a targeted review based on the type of event that 3544 triggered the reauthorization. Reauthorization is a separate activity from the ongoing 3545 authorization process. However, security and privacy information generated from the 3546 continuous monitoring program may be leveraged to support reauthorization. The 3547 reauthorization actions may necessitate a review of and changes to the organization's 3548 information security and privacy continuous monitoring strategies which may in turn affect 3549 ongoing authorization.

3550 AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE

3551 The authorization package provides a record of the results of the control assessments and 3552 provides the authorizing official with the information needed to make a risk-based decision on 3553 whether to authorize the operation of a system or common controls.¹¹⁸ The system owner or 3554 common control provider is responsible for the development, compilation, and submission of 3555 the authorization package. This includes information available from reports generated by an 3556 automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. The system owner or common 3557 control provider receives inputs from many sources during the preparation of the authorization 3558 package including, for example: senior agency information security officer; senior agency official 3559 for privacy, senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function); control 3560 assessors; system security or privacy officer; and the continuous monitoring program. The 3561 authorization package¹¹⁹ includes the following:

- Executive summary;
- Security and privacy plans;¹²⁰
- Security and privacy assessment reports;¹²¹ and

¹¹⁸ Authorization packages for common controls that are not system-based may not include a security or privacy plan, but do include a record of common control implementation details.

¹¹⁹ The authorizing official determines what additional supporting information, artifacts, or references may be required in the authorization package. The additional documentation may include, for example, risk assessments, contingency plans, or SCRM plans.

¹²⁰ [SP 800-18] provides guidance on security plans. Guidance on privacy plans will be addressed in future updates to this publication.

¹²¹ [SP 800-53A] provides guidance on security assessment reports. Guidance on privacy assessment reports will be addressed in future updates to this publication.

• Plans of action and milestones.

3566 The executive summary provides a consolidated view of the security and privacy information in 3567 the authorization package. The executive summary identifies and highlights risk management 3568 issues associated with protecting organizational information systems and the environments in 3569 which the systems operate. The summary provides the essential information needed by the 3570 authorizing official to understand the security and privacy risks to the organization's operations 3571 and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. This information can be used by the 3572 authorizing official to make informed, risk-based decisions regarding the operation and use of 3573 the system or the provision of common controls that can be inherited by organizational systems.

3574 The security and privacy plans provide an overview of the security and privacy requirements and 3575 describe the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements. The plans provide 3576 sufficient information to understand the intended or actual implementation of the controls 3577 implemented within the system and indicate the controls that are implemented via inherited 3578 common controls. Additionally, privacy plans describe the methodologies and metrics that will 3579 be used to assess the controls. The security and privacy plans may also include as supporting 3580 appendices or as references, additional documents such as a privacy impact assessment, 3581 interconnection security agreements, security and privacy configurations, contingency plan, 3582 configuration management plan, incident response plan, and system-level continuous 3583 monitoring strategy. The security and privacy plans are updated whenever events dictate 3584 changes to the controls implemented within or inherited by the system.

The security and privacy assessment reports, prepared by the control assessor or generated by automated security/privacy management and reporting tools, provide the findings and results of assessing the implementation of the controls identified in the security and privacy plans to determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security and privacy requirements. The assessment reports may contain recommended corrective actions for deficiencies identified in the controls.¹²²

Supporting the near real-time risk management objectives of the authorization process, the assessment reports are updated on an ongoing basis whenever changes are made to the controls implemented within or inherited by the system.¹²³ Updates to the assessment reports help to ensure that system owners, common control providers, and authorizing officials maintain an awareness of control effectiveness. The effectiveness of the controls directly affects the security and privacy posture of the system and decisions regarding explicit acceptance of risk.

The plan of action and milestones, prepared by the system owner or common control provider,describes the specific measures planned to correct deficiencies identified in the controls during

¹²² An executive summary provides an authorizing official with an abbreviated version of the security and privacy assessment reports focusing on the highlights of the assessment, synopsis of findings, and recommendations for addressing deficiencies in the security and privacy controls.

¹²³ Because the desired outcome of ongoing tracking and response to assessment findings to facilitate risk management decisions is the focus (rather than the specific process used), organizations have the flexibility to manage and update security assessment report information using any format or method consistent with internal organizational processes.

3601 the assessment; and to address known vulnerabilities or security and privacy risks.¹²⁴ The 3602 content and structure of plans of action and milestones are informed by the risk management 3603 strategy developed as part of the risk executive (function) and are consistent with the plans of 3604 action and milestones process established by the organization which include any specific 3605 requirements defined in federal laws, executive orders, policies, directives, or standards. If the 3606 systems and the environments in which those systems operate have more vulnerabilities than 3607 available resources can realistically address, organizations develop and implement plans of 3608 action and milestones that facilitate a prioritized approach to risk mitigation and that is 3609 consistent across the organization. This ensures that plans of action and milestones are based 3610 on:

- The security categorization of the system and security, privacy, and supply chain risk
 assessments;
- The specific deficiencies in the controls;
- The criticality of the control deficiencies (i.e., the direct or indirect effect the deficiencies may have on the security and privacy posture of the system and the risk exposure of the organization);¹²⁵
- The risk mitigation approach of the organization to address the identified deficiencies in the controls; and
- The rationale for accepting certain deficiencies in the controls.

3620 Organizational strategies for plans of action and milestones are guided and informed by the 3621 security categorization of the systems affected by the risk mitigation activities. Organizations 3622 may decide, for example, to allocate their risk mitigation resources initially to the highest-impact 3623 systems or other high-value assets because a failure to correct the known deficiencies in those 3624 systems or assets could potentially have the most significant adverse effects on their missions or 3625 business functions. Organizations prioritize deficiencies using information from risk assessments 3626 and the risk management strategy developed as part of the risk executive (function). Therefore, 3627 a high-impact system would have a prioritized list of deficiencies for that system, and similarly 3628 for moderate-impact and low-impact systems.

3629 AUTHORIZATION DECISIONS

Authorization decisions are based on the content of the authorization package. There are fourtypes of authorization decisions that can be rendered by authorizing officials:

- Authorization to operate;
- Common control authorization;
- Authorization to use; and
- Denial of authorization.

¹²⁴ Implementation information about mitigation actions from plans of actions and milestones is documented in the security plan.

¹²⁵ In general, risk exposure is the degree to which an organization is threatened by the potential adverse effects on organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

3636 Authorization to Operate

3637 If the authorizing official, after reviewing the authorization package, determines that the risk to 3638 organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation 3639 is acceptable, an authorization to operate is issued for the information system. The system is 3640 authorized to operate for a specified period in accordance with the terms and conditions 3641 established by the authorizing official. An authorization termination date is established by the 3642 authorizing official as a condition of the authorization. The authorization termination date can 3643 be adjusted at any time by the authorizing official to reflect an increased level of concern 3644 regarding the security and privacy posture of the system. For example, the authorizing official 3645 may choose to authorize the system to operate only for a short time if it is necessary to test a 3646 system in the operational environment before all controls are fully in place, (i.e., the 3647 authorization to operate is strictly limited to the time needed to complete the testing 3648 objectives).¹²⁶ The authorizing official may choose to include operating restrictions such as 3649 limiting logical and physical access to a minimum number of users; restricting system use time 3650 periods; employing enhanced or increased audit logging, scanning, and monitoring; or restricting 3651 system functionality to include only the functions that require live testing. The authorizing 3652 official considers results from the assessment of controls that are fully or partially implemented 3653 since if the system is ready to be tested in a live environment, many of the controls should 3654 already be in place. If the system is under ongoing authorization, a time-driven authorization 3655 frequency is specified. Additionally, an adverse event could occur that triggers the need to 3656 review the authorization to operate.¹²⁷

3657 Common Control Authorization

3658 A common control authorization is similar to an authorization to operate for systems. If the 3659 authorizing official, after reviewing the authorization package submitted by the common control 3660 provider, determines that the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 3661 organizations, and the Nation is acceptable, a common control authorization is issued. It is the 3662 responsibility of common control providers to indicate that the common controls selected by 3663 the organization have been implemented, assessed, and authorized and are available for 3664 inheritance by organizational systems. Common control providers are also responsible for 3665 ensuring that the system owners inheriting the controls have access to appropriate 3666 documentation and tools.

3667 Common controls are authorized for a specific time period in accordance with the terms and 3668 conditions established by the authorizing official and the organization. An authorization 3669 termination date is established by the authorizing official as a condition of the initial common 3670 control authorization. The termination date can be adjusted at any time to reflect the level of 3671 concern by the authorizing official regarding the security and privacy posture of the common 3672 controls that are available for inheritance. If the controls are under ongoing authorization, a 3673 time-driven authorization frequency is specified. Within any authorization type, an adverse 3674 event could occur that triggers the need to review the common control authorization. Common 3675 controls that are implemented in a system do not require a separate common control

¹²⁶ Formerly referred to as an interim authority to test.

¹²⁷ Additional information on event-driven triggers is provided below.

3676 authorization because the controls receive an authorization to operate as part of the system 3677 authorization to operate.¹²⁸

3678 Authorization to Use

3679 An *authorization to use* is employed when an organization (hereafter referred to as the 3680 customer organization) chooses to accept the information in an existing authorization package 3681 produced by another organization (either federal or nonfederal) for an information system that 3682 is authorized to operate by a federal entity (referred to as the provider organization).¹²⁹ An 3683 authorization to use is issued by an authorizing official from the customer organization in lieu of 3684 an authorization to operate. The official issuing this type of authorization has the same level of 3685 risk management responsibility and authority as an authorizing official issuing an authorization 3686 to operate or a common control authorization.¹³⁰

3687 The acceptance of the information in the authorization package from the provider organization 3688 is based on a need to use shared systems, services, or applications. A customer organization can 3689 issue an authorization to use only after a valid authorization to operate has been issued by another federal entity (i.e., the provider organization).¹³¹ The authorization to operate by the 3690 3691 provider organization is a statement of acceptance of risk for the system, service, or application 3692 being provided. The authorization to use by the customer organization is a statement of the 3693 acceptance of risk in using the system, service, or application with respect to the customer's 3694 information. An authorization to use provides opportunities for significant cost savings and 3695 avoids a potentially costly and time-consuming authorization process by the customer 3696 organization.

3697 An authorization to use requires the customer organization to review the authorization package

3698 from the provider organization as the fundamental basis for determining risk.¹³² When

3699 reviewing the authorization package, the customer organization considers various risk factors

3700 such as the time elapsed since the authorization results were produced; the environment of

3701 operation (if different from the environment reflected in the authorization package); the impact level of the information to be processed, stored, or transmitted; and the overall risk tolerance of

3702

¹³⁰ Risk-based decisions related to control selection and baseline tailoring actions by organizations providing cloud or shared systems, services, or applications should consider the protection needs of the customer organizations that may be using those cloud or shared systems, services, or applications. Thus, organizations hosting cloud or shared systems, services, or applications should consider the shared risk of operating in those types of environments.

¹²⁸ In certain situations, system owners may choose to inherit controls from other organizational systems that may not be designated officially as common controls. System owners inheriting controls from other than approved common control providers ensure that the systems providing such controls have valid authorizations to operate. The authorizing official of the system inheriting the controls is also made aware of the inheritance.

¹²⁹ The term *provider organization* refers to the federal agency or subordinate organization that provides a shared system, service, or application and/or owns and maintains the authorization package (i.e., has granted an Authorization to Operate for the shared system, service, or application). The shared system, service, or application may not be owned by the organization that owns the authorization package, for example, in situations where the shared system, service, or application is provided by an external provider.

¹³¹ A provisional authorization (to operate) issued by the General Services Administration (GSA) as part of the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) is considered a valid authorization to operate for customer organizations desiring to issue an authorization to use for cloud-based systems, services, or applications.

¹³² The sharing of the authorization package (including security and privacy plans, security and privacy assessment reports, plans of action and milestones, and the authorization decision document) is accomplished under terms and conditions agreed upon by all parties (i.e., the customer organization and the service provider organization).

the customer organization. If the customer organization plans to integrate the shared system,
application, or service with one or more of its systems, the customer organization considers the
risk in doing so.

3706 If the customer organization determines that there is insufficient information in the provider 3707 authorization package or inadequate controls in place for establishing an acceptable level of 3708 risk, the organization may negotiate with the provider organization and request additional 3709 controls or security, privacy, or supply chain information. This may include for example, 3710 supplementing controls for risk reduction; implementing compensating controls; conducting 3711 additional or more rigorous assessments; or establishing constraints on the use of the system, 3712 application, or service provided. The request for additional information may include information 3713 the provider organization produced or discovered in the use of the system that is not reflected 3714 in the authorization package. When the provider organization does not provide the requested 3715 controls, the customer organization may choose to implement additional controls to reduce risk 3716 to an acceptable level. The additional controls, along with any other controls for which the 3717 customer organization is responsible, are documented, implemented, assessed, authorized, and 3718 monitored.


3719 Once the customer organization is satisfied with the security and privacy posture of the shared 3720 or cloud system, application, or service (as reflected in the current authorization package) and 3721 the risk of using the shared or cloud system, application, or service has been sufficiently 3722 mitigated, the customer organization issues an authorization to use in which the customer 3723 organization explicitly understands and accepts the security or privacy risk incurred by using the shared system, service, or application.¹³³ Ultimately, the customer organization is responsible 3724 3725 and accountable for the risks that may impact the customer organization's operations and 3726 assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

3727 The authorization to use does not require a termination date, but remains in effect while the 3728 customer organization continues to accept the security and privacy risk of using the shared or 3729 cloud system, application, or service; and the authorization to operate issued by the provider 3730 organization meets the requirements established by federal and organizational policies. It is 3731 incumbent on the customer organization to ensure that information from the monitoring 3732 activities conducted by the provider organization is shared on an ongoing basis and that the 3733 provider organization notifies the customer organization when there are significant changes to 3734 the system, application, or service that may affect the security and privacy posture of the 3735 provider. If desired, the authorization to use decision may specify time- or even-driven triggers 3736 for review of the security and privacy posture of the provider organization system, service, or 3737 application being used by the customer organization. The provider organization to notifies the 3738 customer organization if there is a significant event that compromises or adversely affects the 3739 customer organization's information.

¹³³ In accordance with [FISMA14], the head of each agency is responsible for providing information security protections commensurate with the risk resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or on behalf of the agency; and information systems used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency. [OMB A-130] describes organizational responsibilities for accepting security and privacy risk.

3740 Figure F-1 illustrates the types of authorization decisions that can be applied to organizational

3741 systems and common controls and the risk management roles in the authorization process.



3764 **Denial of Authorization**

3765 If the authorizing official, after reviewing the authorization package, including any inputs 3766 provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), 3767 determines that the risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other 3768 organizations, and the Nation is unacceptable and immediate steps cannot be taken to reduce 3769 the risk to an acceptable level, the authorization is not granted. A denial of authorization means 3770 that the information system is not authorized to operate and not placed into operation; 3771 common controls are not authorized to be provided to systems; or that the provider's system is 3772 not authorized for use by the customer organization. If the system is currently in operation, all 3773 activity is halted. Failure to receive an authorization means that there are significant deficiencies 3774 in the controls.

3775 The authorizing official or designated representative works with the system owner or the 3776 common control provider to revise the plan of action and milestones to help ensure that 3777 measures are taken to correct the deficiencies. A special case of authorization denial is an 3778 authorization rescission. Authorizing officials can rescind a previous authorization decision when 3779 there is a violation of federal or organizational policies, directives, regulations, standards, or 3780 guidance; or a violation of the terms and conditions of the authorization. For example, failure to 3781 maintain an effective continuous monitoring program may be grounds for rescinding an 3782 authorization decision.

3783 AUTHORIZATION DECISION INFORMATION

The authorization decision is transmitted from the authorizing official to system owners,
common control providers, and other key organizational officials. The authorization decision
includes the following information:

- Authorization decision;
- Terms and conditions for the authorization;
- Time-driven authorization frequency or authorization termination date;
- Events that may trigger a review of the authorization decision (if any); and
- For common controls, the [FIPS 199] impact level supported by those controls.

3792 The authorization decision indicates if the system is authorized to operate or authorized to be 3793 used; or if the common controls are authorized to be provided to system owners and inherited 3794 by organizational systems. The terms and conditions for the authorization provide any 3795 limitations or restrictions placed on the operation of the system that must be followed by the 3796 system owner or alternatively, limitations or restrictions placed on the implementation of 3797 common controls that must be followed by the common control provider. If the system or 3798 common controls are not under ongoing authorization, the termination date for the 3799 authorization established by the authorizing official indicates when the authorization expires 3800 and reauthorization is required. The authorization decision document is transmitted with the 3801 original authorization package to the system owner or common control provider.¹³⁴

3802 Upon receipt of the authorization decision and authorization package, the system owner and 3803 common control provider acknowledge, implement, and comply with the terms and conditions 3804 of the authorization. The system owner and common control provider retain the authorization 3805 decision and authorization package.¹³⁵ The organization ensures that authorization documents 3806 are available to organizational officials when requested. The contents of authorization packages, 3807 including sensitive information regarding system vulnerabilities, privacy risks, and control 3808 deficiencies, are marked and protected in accordance with federal and organizational policy. 3809 Authorization decision information is retained in accordance with the organization's record 3810 retention policy. The authorizing official verifies on an ongoing basis, that the terms and 3811 conditions established as part of the authorization are being followed by the system owner and

3812 common control provider.

3813 Authorization to Use Decision

- 3814 The authorization to use is a streamlined version of the authorization to operate and includes:
- A risk acceptance statement; and
- Time- or event-driven triggers for review of the security and privacy posture of the provider 3817 organization shared cloud or system, application, or service (if any).

¹³⁴ Authorization decision documents may be digitally signed to ensure authenticity.

¹³⁵ Organizations may choose to employ automated tools to support the development, distribution, and archiving of risk management information to include artifacts associated with the authorization process.

3818 An authorization to use is issued by an authorizing official from a customer organization in lieu

3819 of an authorization to operate. The authorizing official has the same level of risk management

3820 responsibility and authority as an authorizing official issuing an authorization to operate or a

- 3821 common control authorization. The risk acceptance statement indicates the explicit acceptance
- 3822 of the security and privacy risk incurred from the use of a shared system, service, or application
- 3823 with respect to the customer organization information processed, stored, or transmitted by or
- 3824 through the shared or cloud system, service, or application.

3825 ONGOING AUTHORIZATION

3826 Continuous monitoring strategies¹³⁶ promote effective and efficient risk management on an 3827 ongoing basis. Risk management can become *near real-time* by using automation and state-of-3828 the-practice tools, techniques, and procedures for the ongoing monitoring of controls and 3829 changes to systems and the environments in which those systems operate. Continuous 3830 monitoring based on the needs of the authorizing official, produces the necessary information 3831 to determine the current security and privacy posture of the system.¹³⁷ It also highlights the 3832 risks to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. 3833 Ultimately, continuous monitoring guides and informs the authorizing official's decision whether 3834 to authorize the continued operation of the system or the continued use of the common

- 3835 controls inherited by organizational systems.
- 3836 Continuous monitoring helps to achieve a state of ongoing authorization where the authorizing 3837 official maintains sufficient knowledge of the current security and privacy posture of the system 3838 to determine whether continued operation is acceptable based on ongoing risk 3839 determinations—and if not, which steps in the RMF need to be revisited to effectively respond 3840 to the additional risk. Reauthorizations are unnecessary in situations where the continuous 3841 monitoring program provides authorizing officials with the information necessary to manage the 3842 risk arising from changes to the system or the environment in which the system operates. If a 3843 reauthorization is required, organizations maximize the use of status reports and relevant 3844 information about the security and privacy posture of the system that is produced during the 3845 continuous monitoring process to improve efficiency.
- 3846 When a system or common controls are under ongoing authorization, the system or common 3847 controls may be authorized on a time-driven and/or event-driven basis, leveraging the security-3848 and privacy-related information generated by the continuous monitoring program. The system 3849 and common controls are authorized on a time-driven basis in accordance with the 3850 authorization frequency determined as part of the organization- and system-level continuous 3851 monitoring strategies. The system and common controls are authorized on an event-driven basis 3852 until organizational-defined trigger events occur. Whether the authorization is time-driven or 3853 event-driven, the authorizing official acknowledges the ongoing acceptance of identified risks. 3854 The organization determines the level of formality required for such acknowledgement by the 3855 authorizing official.

¹³⁶ [SP 800-137] provides additional guidance on information security continuous monitoring. Guidance on privacy continuous monitoring will be provided in future updates to this publication.

¹³⁷ For greater efficiency, the information security continuous monitoring (ISCM) and privacy continuous monitoring (PCM) strategies may be consolidated into a single unified continuous monitoring strategy. Similarly, the ISCM and PCM programs may also be consolidated into a single unified continuous monitoring program.

3856 **Conditions for Implementation of Ongoing Authorization**

When the RMF has been effectively applied across the organization and the organization has
implemented a robust continuous monitoring program, systems may transition from a static,
point-in-time authorization process to a dynamic, near real-time ongoing authorization process.
To do so, the following conditions must be satisfied:

The system or common control being considered for ongoing authorization has received an initial authorization based on a complete, zero-based review of the system or the common controls.¹³⁸

An organizational continuous monitoring program is in place that monitors implemented controls with the appropriate degree of rigor and at the required frequencies specified by the organization in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy and NIST standards and guidelines.¹³⁹

3868 The organization establishes and implements a process to designate that the two conditions are 3869 satisfied and the system or the common controls are transitioning to ongoing authorization. This 3870 includes the authorizing official acknowledging that the system or common control are now 3871 being managed by an ongoing authorization process and accepting the responsibility for 3872 performing all activities associated with that process. The transition to ongoing authorization is 3873 documented by the authorizing official by issuing a new authorization decision.¹⁴⁰ The security-3874 and privacy-related information generated through the continuous monitoring process is 3875 provided to the authorizing officials and other organizational officials in a timely manner 3876 through security and privacy management and reporting tools. Such tools facilitate risk-based 3877 decision making for the ongoing authorization for systems and common controls.

3878 Information Generation, Collection, and Independence Requirements

3879 To support ongoing authorization, security- and privacy-related information for controls is 3880 generated and collected at the frequency specified in the organization's continuous monitoring 3881 strategy. This information may be collected using automated tools or other methods of 3882 assessment depending on the type and purpose of the control and desired rigor of the 3883 assessment. Automated tools may not generate security- and privacy-related information that is 3884 sufficient to support the authorizing official in making risk determinations. This may occur for 3885 various reasons, including for example, the tools do not generate information for every control 3886 or every part of a control; additional assurance is needed; or the tools do not generate 3887 information on specific technologies or platforms. In such cases, manual control assessments 3888 are conducted at organizationally-determined frequencies to cover any gaps in automated 3889 security- and privacy-related information generation. The manually-generated assessment

¹³⁸ System owners and authorizing officials leverage security- and privacy-related information about inherited common controls from assessments conducted by common control providers.

¹³⁹ [<u>SP 800-53</u>] and [<u>SP 800-53A</u>] provide guidance regarding the appropriate degree of rigor for security assessments and monitoring. Future updates to Special Publication 800-53A will address privacy assessments.

¹⁴⁰ Prior to transitioning to ongoing authorization, organizations have authorization decision documents that include an authorization termination date. By requiring a new authorization decision document, it is made clear that the system or the common controls are no longer bound to the termination date specified in the initial authorization document because the system and the common controls are now under ongoing authorization.

results are provided to the authorizing official in the manner deemed appropriate by theorganization.

3892 To support ongoing authorizations for moderate-impact and high-impact systems, the security-3893 and privacy-related information provided to the authorizing official, whether generated 3894 manually or in an automated fashion, is produced and analyzed by an entity that meets the 3895 independence requirements established by the organization. The senior agency official for 3896 privacy is responsible for assessing privacy controls and for providing privacy-related 3897 information to the authorizing official. At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls 3898 may be assessed by an independent assessor. The independent assessor is impartial and free 3899 from any perceived or actual conflicts of interest regarding the development, implementation, 3900 assessment, operation, or management of the organizational systems and common controls 3901 being monitored.

3902 **Ongoing Authorization Frequency**

3903 [SP 800-53] security control CA-6, Part c. specifies that the authorization for a system and any 3904 common controls inherited by the system be updated at an organization-established frequency. 3905 This reinforces the concept of ongoing authorization. In accordance with CA-6 (along with the 3906 security and privacy assessment and monitoring frequency determinations established as part of 3907 the continuous monitoring strategy), organizations determine a frequency with which 3908 authorizing officials review security- and privacy-related information via the security or privacy 3909 management and reporting tool or manual process.¹⁴¹ This near real-time information is used to 3910 determine whether the mission or business risk of operating the system or providing the 3911 common controls continues to be acceptable. [SP 800-137] provides criteria for determining 3912 assessment and monitoring frequencies.

3913 Under ongoing authorization, time-driven authorization triggers refer to the frequency with 3914 which the organization determines that authorizing officials are to review security- and privacy-3915 related information and authorize the system (or common controls) for continued operation as 3916 described above. Time-driven authorization triggers can be based on a variety of organization-3917 defined factors including, for example, the impact level of the system. When a time-driven 3918 trigger occurs, authorizing officials review security- and privacy-related information on the 3919 systems for which they are responsible and accountable to determine the ongoing 3920 organizational mission or business risk, the acceptability of such risk in accordance with 3921 organizational risk tolerance, and whether the approval for continued operation is justified. The 3922 organizational continuous monitoring process, supported by the organization's security and 3923 privacy management and reporting tools, provides the appropriate functionality to notify the 3924 responsible and accountable authorizing official that it is time to review the security- and 3925 privacy-related information to support ongoing authorization.

¹⁴¹ Ongoing authorization and ongoing assessment are different concepts but closely related. To employ an ongoing authorization approach (which implies an ongoing understanding and acceptance of risk), organizations must have in place, an organization-level and system-level continuous monitoring process to assess implemented controls on an ongoing basis. The findings or results from the continuous monitoring process provides information to authorization officials to support near-real time risk-based decision making.

3926 In contrast to time-driven authorization triggers, event-driven triggers necessitate an immediate 3927 review of security- and privacy-related information by the authorizing official. Organizations 3928 may define event-driven triggers (i.e., indicators or prompts that cause an organization to react 3929 in a predefined manner) for ongoing authorization and reauthorization. When an event-driven 3930 trigger occurs under ongoing authorization, the authorizing official is either notified by 3931 organizational personnel (e.g., senior agency information security officer, senior agency official 3932 for privacy, system owner, common control provider, or system security or privacy officer) or via 3933 automated tools that defined trigger events have occurred requiring an immediate review of the 3934 system or the common controls. At any time, the authorizing official may also determine 3935 independently that an immediate review is required. This review is conducted in addition to the 3936 time-driven frequency review defined in the organizational continuous monitoring strategy and 3937 occurs during ongoing authorization when the residual risk remains within the acceptable limits 3938 of organizational risk tolerance.¹⁴²

3939 Transitioning from Static Authorization to Ongoing Authorization

3940 The intent of continuous monitoring is to monitor controls at a frequency that is sufficient to 3941 provide authorizing officials with the information necessary to make effective, risk-based 3942 decisions, whether by automated or manual means.¹⁴³ However, if a substantial portion of 3943 monitoring is not accomplished via automation, it will not be feasible or practical to move from 3944 the current static authorization approach to an effective and efficient ongoing authorization 3945 approach. A phased approach for the generation of security- and privacy-related information 3946 may be necessary during the transition as automated tools become available and a greater 3947 number of controls are monitored by automated techniques. Organizations may begin by 3948 generating security- and privacy-related information from automated tools and fill in gaps by 3949 generating additional information from manual assessments. As additional automated 3950 monitoring functionality is added, processes can be adjusted.

3951 Transitioning from a static authorization process to a dynamic, ongoing authorization process 3952 requires considerable thought and planning. One methodology that organizations may consider 3953 is to take a phased approach to the migration based on the security categorization of the 3954 system. Because risk tolerance levels for low-impact systems are likely to be greater than for 3955 moderate-impact or high-impact systems, implementing continuous monitoring and ongoing 3956 authorization for low-impact systems first may ease the transition. This allows organizations to 3957 incorporate lessons learned as continuous monitoring and ongoing authorization processes are 3958 implemented for moderate-impact and high-impact systems. This will facilitate the consistent 3959 progression of the continuous monitoring and ongoing authorization implementation from the 3960 lowest to the highest impact levels for the systems within the organization. Organizations may 3961 also consider employing the phased implementation approach by partitioning their systems into 3962 subsystems or system components and subsequently transitioning those subsystems or system 3963 components to ongoing authorization one segment at a time until the entire system is ready for

¹⁴² The immediate reviews initiated by specific trigger events may occur simultaneously (i.e., in conjunction) with time-driven monitoring activities based on the monitoring frequencies established by the organization and how the reviews are structured within the organization. The same reporting structure may be used for event- and time-driven reviews to achieve efficiencies.

¹⁴³ Privacy continuous monitoring means maintaining ongoing awareness of privacy risks and assessing privacy controls at a frequency sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks.

3964 the full transition (at which time the authorizing official acknowledges that the system is now 3965 being managed by an ongoing authorization process).

3966 **REAUTHORIZATION**

3967 Reauthorization actions occur at the discretion of the authorizing official in accordance with 3968 federal or organizational policy.¹⁴⁴ If a reauthorization action is required, organizations maximize 3969 the use of security and privacy risk-related information produced as part of the continuous 3970 monitoring processes currently in effect. Reauthorization actions, if initiated, can be either time-3971 driven or event-driven. Time-driven reauthorizations occur when the authorization termination 3972 date is reached (if one is specified). If the system is under ongoing authorization,¹⁴⁵ a time-3973 driven reauthorization may not be necessary. However, if the continuous monitoring program is 3974 not sufficiently comprehensive to fully support ongoing authorization, a maximum authorization 3975 period can be specified by the authorizing official. Authorization termination dates are guided 3976 and informed by federal and organizational policies and by the requirements of authorizing 3977 officials.

Under ongoing authorization, a reauthorization may be necessary if an event occurs that
 produces risk above the acceptable organizational risk tolerance. This situation may occur, for
 example, if there was a breach/incident or failure of or significant problems with the continuous
 monitoring program. Reauthorization actions may necessitate a review of and changes to the
 continuous monitoring strategy which may in turn, affect ongoing authorization.

3983 For security and privacy assessments associated with reauthorization, organizations leverage 3984 security- and privacy-related information generated by the continuous monitoring program and 3985 fill in gaps with manual assessments. Organizations may supplement automatically-generated 3986 assessment information with manually-generated information in situations where an increased 3987 level of assurance is needed. If the security control assessments are conducted by qualified 3988 assessors with the necessary independence, use appropriate security standards and guidelines, 3989 and are based on the needs of the authorizing official, the assessment results can be applied to 3990 the reauthorization.¹⁴⁶

3991 The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for assessing privacy controls and those 3992 assessment results can be cumulatively applied to the reauthorization. Independent assessors 3993 may assess privacy controls at the discretion of the organization. The senior agency official for 3994 privacy reviews and approves the authorization packages for information systems that process 3995 PII prior to the authorizing official making a reauthorization decision. The reauthorization action 3996 may be as simple as updating the security and privacy plans, security and privacy assessment 3997 reports, and plans of action and milestones—focused only on specific problems or ongoing 3998 issues, or as comprehensive as the initial authorization.

¹⁴⁴ Decisions to initiate a formal reauthorization include inputs from the senior agency information security officer, senior agency official for privacy, and senior accountable official for risk management/risk executive (function).
¹⁴⁵ An ongoing authorization approach requires that a continuous monitoring program is in place to monitor all implemented security controls with a frequency specified in the continuous monitoring strategy.

¹⁴⁶ [SP 800-53A] describes the specific conditions when security-related information can be reused to support authorization actions.

3999 The authorizing official signs an updated authorization decision document based on the current

- 4000 risk determination and acceptance of risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals,
- 4001 other organizations, and the Nation. In all situations where there is a decision to reauthorize a
- 4002 system or the common controls inherited by organizational systems, the maximum reuse of
- 4003 authorization information is encouraged to minimize the time and expense associated with the
- 4004 reauthorization effort (subject to organizational reuse policy).

4005 EVENT-DRIVEN TRIGGERS AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

- 4006 Organizations define event-driven *triggers* (i.e., indicators or prompts that cause a predefined
 4007 organizational reaction) for both ongoing authorization and reauthorization. Event-driven
 4008 triggers may include, but are not limited to:
- New threat, vulnerability, privacy risk, or impact information;
- An increased number of findings or deficiencies from the continuous monitoring program;
- New missions/business requirements;
- Change in the authorizing official;
- Significant change in risk assessment findings;
- Significant changes to the system, common controls, or the environments of operation; or
- 4015 Exceeding organizational thresholds.

4016 When there is a change in authorizing officials, the new authorizing official reviews the current 4017 authorization decision document, authorization package, any updated documents from ongoing 4018 monitoring activities, or a report from automated security/privacy management and reporting 4019 tools. If the new authorizing official finds the current risk to be acceptable, the official signs a 4020 new or updated authorization decision document, formally transferring responsibility and 4021 accountability for the system or the common controls. In doing so, the new authorizing official 4022 explicitly accepts the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 4023 organizations, and the Nation. If the new authorizing official finds the current risk to be 4024 unacceptable, an authorization action (i.e., ongoing authorization or reauthorization) can be 4025 initiated. Alternatively, the new authorizing official may instead establish new terms and 4026 conditions for continuing the original authorization, but not extend the original authorization 4027 termination date (if not under ongoing authorization).

4028 A significant change is defined as a change that is likely to substantively affect the security or
4029 privacy posture of a system. Significant changes to a system that may trigger an event-driven
4030 authorization action may include, but are not limited to:

- Installation of a new or upgraded operating system, middleware component, or application;
- Modifications to system ports, protocols, or services;
- Installation of a new or upgraded hardware platform;
- Modifications to how information, including PII, is processed;
- Modifications to cryptographic modules or services; or
- Modifications to security and privacy controls.

- 4037 Significant changes to the environment of operation that may trigger an event-driven 4038 authorization action may include, but are not limited to:
- 4039 Moving to a new facility;
- Adding new core missions or business functions;
- 4041
 Acquiring specific and credible threat information that the organization is being targeted by a threat source; or
- Establishing new/modified laws, directives, policies, or regulations.

The examples of changes listed above are only significant when they represent a change that is
likely to affect the security and privacy posture of the system. Organizations establish criteria for
what constitutes significant change based on a variety of factors including, for example, mission
and business needs; threat and vulnerability information; environments of operation for
systems; privacy risks; and security categorization.

Risk assessment results or the results from an impact analysis may be used to determine if
changes to systems or common controls are significant and trigger an authorization action. If an
authorization action is initiated, the organization targets only the specific controls affected by
the changes and reuses previous assessment results wherever possible. An effective monitoring
program can significantly reduce the overall cost and level of effort of authorization actions.
Most changes to a system or its environment of operation can be handled through the
continuous monitoring program and ongoing authorization.

4056 **TYPE AND FACILITY AUTHORIZATIONS**

4057 A type authorization¹⁴⁷ is an official authorization decision that allows for a single authorization 4058 package to be developed for an archetype (i.e., common) version of a system. This includes, for 4059 example hardware, software, or firmware components that are deployed to multiple locations for use in specified environments of operation (e.g., installation and configuration requirements 4060 4061 or operational security and privacy needs provided by the host organization at a specific 4062 location). A type authorization is appropriate when the system is deployed in a defined 4063 environment and is comprised of identical instances of system architecture, software, identical 4064 information types, functionally identical hardware, information that is processed in the same 4065 way, identical control implementations, or identical configurations. A type authorization is used 4066 in conjunction with authorized site-specific controls¹⁴⁸ or with a facility authorization as 4067 described below. A type authorization is issued by the authorizing official responsible for the 4068 development of the system¹⁴⁹ and represents an authorization to operate. At the site or facility 4069 where the system is deployed, the authorizing official who is responsible for the system at the

¹⁴⁷ Examples of type authorizations include: an authorization of the hardware and software applications for a standard financial system deployed in multiple locations; or an authorization of a common workstation or operating environment (i.e., hardware, operating system, and applications) deployed to all operating units within an organization.

¹⁴⁸ Site-specific controls are typically implemented by an organization as *common controls*. Examples include physical and environmental protection controls and personnel security controls.

¹⁴⁹ Typically, type authorizations are issued by organizations that are responsible for developing standardized hardware and software capabilities for customers and delivered to the recipient organizations as "turn key" solutions. The senior leaders issuing such authorizations may be referred to as developmental authorizing officials.

site or facility accepts the risk of deploying the system and issues an authorization to use. The

A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy

4071 authorization to use leverages the information in the authorization packages for the archetype 4072 system and the facility common controls.

4073 A facility authorization is an official authorization decision that is focused on specific controls 4074 implemented in a defined environment of operation to support one or more systems residing 4075 within that environment. This form of authorization addresses common controls within a facility 4076 and allows systems residing in the defined environment to inherit the common controls and the 4077 affected system security and privacy plans to reference the authorization package for the 4078 facility. The common controls are provided at a specified impact level to facilitate risk decisions 4079 on whether it is appropriate to locate a given system in the facility.¹⁵⁰ Physical and 4080 environmental controls are addressed in a facility authorization but other controls may also be 4081 included, for example, boundary protections; contingency plan and incident response plan for 4082 the facility; or training and awareness and personnel screening for facility staff. The facility 4083 authorizing official issues a common control authorization to describe the common controls 4084 available for inheritance by systems residing within the facility.

4085 TRADITIONAL AND JOINT AUTHORIZATIONS

4070

4086 Organizations can choose from two distinct approaches when planning for and conducting 4087 authorizations. These include an authorization with a *single* authorizing official or an 4088 authorization with *multiple* authorizing officials.¹⁵¹ The first approach is the traditional

- 4088 authorization with *multiple* authorizing officials.¹⁵¹ The first approach is the traditional 4089 authorization process defined in this appendix where a single organizational official in a senior
- 4090 leadership position is responsible and accountable for a system or for common controls. The
- 4091 organizational official accepts the security- and privacy-related risks that may adversely impact
- 4092 organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation.

4093 The second approach, joint authorization, is employed when multiple organizational officials 4094 either from the same organization or different organizations, have a shared interest in 4095 authorizing a system. The organizational officials collectively are responsible and accountable 4096 for the system and jointly accept the security- and privacy-related risks that may adversely 4097 impact organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. A 4098 similar authorization process is followed as in the single authorization official approach with the 4099 essential difference being the addition of multiple authorizing officials. Organizations choosing a 4100 joint authorization approach are expected to work together on the planning and the execution 4101 of RMF tasks and to document their agreement and progress in implementing the tasks.

- 4102 Collaboration on security categorization, control selection and tailoring, a plan for assessing
- 4103 controls to determine effectiveness, a plan of action and milestones, and a system-level
- 4104 continuous monitoring strategy is necessary for a successful joint authorization. The terms and
- 4105 conditions of the joint authorization are established by the participating parties in the joint
- 4106 authorization including, for example, the process for ongoing determination and acceptance of
- 4107 risk. The joint authorization remains in effect only while there is agreement among authorizing
- 4108 officials and the authorization meets the specific requirements established by federal and

¹⁵⁰ For example, if the facility is categorized as moderate impact, it may not be appropriate to locate high-impact systems or system components in that environment of operation.

¹⁵¹ Authorization approaches can be applied to systems and to common controls inherited by organizational systems.

- 4109 organizational policies. [SP 800-53] controls CA-6 (1), Joint Authorization Same Organization
- 4110 and CA-6 (2) Joint Authorization Different Organizations, describe the requirements for joint
- 4111 authorizations.


4112 APPENDIX G

4113 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY CONSIDERATIONS

- 4114 $\,$ complex systems, applications, and the effects of changing technologies
 - 4115 his appendix provides additional considerations for determining authorization boundaries
 - 4116 for complex systems and software applications. It also includes guidance on authorization
 - 4117 boundaries when organizations use external providers for their information resources. The
- 4118 foundational <u>RMF</u> steps and tasks described in <u>Chapter Three</u> can be applied in all three
- 4119 scenarios to help organizations manage security and privacy risks and comply with the laws,
- 4120 executive orders, and OMB policies discussed in Chapter One.

4121 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES FOR COMPLEX SYSTEMS

- 4122 The determination of authorization boundaries for complex systems can present significant
- 4123 challenges to organizations. A complex system can be viewed as set of individual subsystems. A
- 4124 subsystem is a major subdivision of a system consisting of system elements that perform one or
- 4125 more specific functions. Figure G-1 illustrates the concept of a complex system.



- 4151 Organizations can employ the concept of subsystems to divide complex systems into a set of
- 4152 manageable components or identify those components that support a similar in mission, but are
- 4153 sufficiently distinct to be identified separately. Each subsystem has its own boundary (distinct
- 4154 from an authorization boundary) and can be defined within a comprehensive authorization
- 4155 boundary that includes all subsystems.

4156 For example, an organization may find it useful to combine several systems that are under the 4157 same direct management control or that have similar missions or business functions into a 4158 single system to achieve the dual purposes of effective risk and resource management. An 4159 organization may also choose to develop a system composed of multiple independent systems (distributed across a widespread geographic area) supporting a set of common missions or 4160 4161 business functions. Similarly, a system can be divided into multiple subsystems to facilitate and 4162 support management of the system and risk-based decision making (e.g., categorization 4163 decisions, tailoring decisions, and control allocation decisions).

- 4105 decisions, tailorning decisions, and control anocation decisions).
- 4164 Dividing a system into subsystems (i.e., divide and conquer) facilitates a targeted application of
- 4165 controls to achieve adequate security, protection of individual privacy, and a cost-effective risk

4166 management process. Dividing complex systems into subsystems also supports the important

4167 security concepts of domain separation and network segmentation, which can be significant

4168 when dealing with high-value assets.

4169 Information security and privacy architectures play a key part in the process of dividing complex 4170 systems into subsystems. This includes monitoring and controlling communications at internal 4171 boundaries among subsystems and selecting, allocating, and implementing controls that meet 4172 or exceed the security and privacy requirements of the constituent subsystems. One approach 4173 to control selection and allocation is to categorize each identified subsystem separately (see 4174 Task C-1). However, separately categorizing each subsystem does not change the overall 4175 categorization of the system. Rather, it allows the subsystems to receive a separate and more 4176 targeted allocation of controls from [SP 800-53] instead of deploying higher-impact controls 4177 across the entire system (see Task S-1). Another approach is to bundle smaller subsystems into 4178 larger subsystems within the complex system, categorize each of the aggregated subsystems, 4179 and allocate controls to the subsystems, as needed. While subsystems within complex systems 4180 may exist as complete systems, the subsystems are, in most cases, not treated as independent

- 4181 entities because they are typically interdependent and interconnected.
- 4182 When the security categorizations for the identified subsystems are different (e.g., low-impact
- 4183 versus high-impact), the organization examines the subsystem interfaces, information flows,
- 4184 and security- and privacy-related dependencies among subsystems and selects the appropriate
- 4185 controls for the interconnection of the subsystems to eliminate/reduce potential vulnerabilities.
- 4186 This helps to ensure that the system is adequately protected.¹⁵² Controls for the interconnection
- 4187 of subsystems are also employed when the subsystems implement different security and privacy

¹⁵² The types of interfaces and couplings among subsystems may introduce inadvertent vulnerabilities in a complex system. For example, if a large organizational intranet is decomposed into smaller subsystems (e.g., severable systems such as local area network segments) and subsequently categorized individually, the specific protections at the system level may expose an attack vector against the intranet by erroneously selecting and implementing controls that are not sufficiently strong with respect to the rest of the system. To avoid this situation, organizations carefully examine the interfaces among subsystems and take appropriate actions to eliminate potential vulnerabilities in this area, thus helping to ensure that the information system is adequately protected.

- 4188 policies or are administered by different authorities. The extent to which the selected controls
- 4189 are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with
- 4190 respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the complex system, can be
- 4191 determined by combining control assessments at the system level and adding considerations
- 4192 addressing interface issues. This approach facilitates a more targeted and cost-effective risk
- 4193 management process by scaling the level of effort of the assessment in accordance with the 4194 system categorization and allowing for reuse of assessment results at the system level.

4195 **AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES FOR SOFTWARE APPLICATIONS**

4196 Authorization boundaries include all system components, including hardware, firmware, and 4197 software. Software components include applications (e.g., database applications, customized 4198 business applications, and web applications), middleware, and operating systems. The software 4199 components are included in authorization boundaries, either as part of the information system 4200 on which the software is hosted or as a part of an application-only system or subsystem that 4201 inherits controls from the hosting system. Software applications may depend on the resources 4202 provided by the hosting system and as such, can leverage the controls provided by the hosting 4203 system to help provide a foundational level of protection for the hosted applications. Additional 4204 application-level controls are provided by the respective software applications, as needed. 4205 Application owners coordinate with system owners to help ensure that security and privacy 4206 requirements are satisfied among applications and hosting systems. This coordination includes, 4207 for example, consideration for the selection, implementation, assessment, and monitoring of 4208 controls for the applications; the effects of changes to the applications on the security and 4209 privacy posture of the system and the organization; and the effects of changes to the system on 4210 the hosted applications.

4211

4212 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES AND EXTERNAL PROVIDERS

4213 While the concepts of external systems and external service providers are not new, the current 4214 pervasiveness and frequency of their invocation can present organizations with significant, new 4215 challenges. There are instances where system components, subsystems, or perhaps the entire 4216 system may be outside of the direct control of the organization that authorizes its operation. 4217 The nature of such external systems can vary from organizations employing external cloud 4218 computing services to process, store, and transmit federal information to organizations allowing 4219 platforms under their control to host applications or services developed by some external 4220 entity.153

4221 FISMA and OMB policy require external providers that process, store, or transmit federal 4222 information or operate information systems on behalf of the federal government to meet the 4223 same security and privacy requirements as federal agencies. Federal security and privacy 4224 requirements also apply to external systems storing, processing, or transmitting federal 4225 information and any services provided by or associated with the external system. Furthermore, 4226 the assurance or confidence that the risk from using external providers is at an acceptable level 4227 depends on the trust that the organization places in the provider. In some instances, the level of 4228 trust is based on the amount of direct control the organization can exert on the provider

¹⁵³ The <u>Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program</u> (FedRAMP) operated by the General Services Administration (GSA) provides guidance on determining cloud authorization boundaries.

regarding the employment of controls necessary to protect federal information and protect theprivacy of individuals.

The level of trust can also be based on the evidence brought forth by the external provider or by
an independent assessor as to the effectiveness of those controls. In other instances, trust can
be based on other factors, such as the previous experience the organization has had with the
external provider and the confidence the organization has in the provider taking the correct
actions. There are a variety of factors that can complicate the level of trust with external
providers:

- The delineation between what is owned by the external provider and the organization may
 be blurred (e.g., organization-owned platform executing external provider-developed
 application, software module, or firmware);
- The degree of control the organization has over the external provider may be very limited;
- The nature and content of the system, subsystem, service, or application may be subject to rapid change; and
- The system, subsystem, service, or application may be of such critical nature that it needs to be incorporated into organizational systems very rapidly.

4245 The consequence of the above factors is that some of the traditional means organizations use to 4246 verify and validate the correct functioning of a system, subsystem, application or service and the 4247 effectiveness of implemented controls (e.g., clearly defined requirements, design analysis, 4248 testing and evaluation before deployment, control assessments and continuous monitoring) 4249 may not be feasible. As a result, organizations may be left to depend upon the nature of the 4250 trust relationships with the external provider as the basis for determining whether to issue an 4251 authorization to use or authorization to operate for the system or subsystems processing, 4252 storing, or transmitting federal information (e.g., use of GSA list of approved providers). 4253 Alternatively, organizations may allow externally provided systems or services to be used only in 4254 those instances where the exchange of information risk determined by the organization is 4255 acceptable.

- 4256 Ultimately, when the level of trust in the external provider does not provide sufficient
- 4257 assurance, the organization employs compensating controls; accepts greater risk; contracts with
- 4258 a more trustworthy external provider; or does not obtain the service (i.e., conducts its missions
- 4259 and business operations with reduced levels of functionality or possibly no functionality at all).

LEVERAGING EXTERNAL PROVIDER CONTROLS AND ASSESSMENTS

Organizations should exercise caution when attempting to leverage external provider controls and assessment results. Controls implemented by external providers may be different than the controls in [SP 800-53] in the scope, coverage, and capability provided. NIST provides a mapping of the controls in its catalog to the [ISO 27001] security controls and to the [ISO 15408-2] and [ISO 15408-3] security requirements. However, such mappings are inherently subjective and should be reviewed carefully by organizations to determine if the controls and requirements addressed by external providers meet the protection needs of the organization.

Similar caution should be exercised when attempting to use or leverage security and privacy assessment results from external providers. The type, rigor, and scope of the assessments may vary widely from provider to provider. In addition, the assessment procedures employed by the provider and the independence of the assessors conducting the assessments are critical issues that should be reviewed and considered by organizations prior to leveraging assessment results.

Effective risk decisions by authorizing officials depend on the transparency of controls selected and implemented by external providers and the quality and efficacy of the assessment evidence produced by those providers. Transparency is essential to achieve the assurance necessary to ensure adequate protection for organizational assets.

4261 APPENDIX H

4262 SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE CONSIDERATIONS

4263 OTHER FACTORS EFFECTING THE EXECUTION OF THE RMF

4264 Il systems, including operational systems, systems under development, and systems that are undergoing modification or upgrade, are in some phase of the SDLC.¹⁵⁴ Defining 426 requirements is a critical part of an SDLC process and begins in the *initiation* phase.¹⁵⁵ 4266 4267 Security and privacy requirements are part of the functional and nonfunctional¹⁵⁶ requirements 4268 allocated to a system. The security and privacy requirements are incorporated into the SDLC 4269 simultaneously with the other requirements. Without the early integration of security and 4270 privacy requirements, significant expense may be incurred by the organization later in the life 4271 cycle to address security and privacy concerns that could have been included in the initial 4272 design. When security and privacy requirements are defined early in the SDLC and integrated 4273 with other system requirements, the resulting system has fewer deficiencies, and therefore,

- 4274 fewer privacy risks or security vulnerabilities that can be exploited in the future.
- 4275 Integrating security and privacy requirements into the SDLC is the most effective, efficient, and
- 4276 cost-effective method to ensure that the organization's protection strategy is implemented. It
- 4277 also ensures that security- and privacy-related processes are not isolated from the other
- 4278 processes used by the organization to develop, implement, operate, and maintain the systems
- 4279 supporting ongoing missions and business functions. In addition to incorporating security and
- 4280 privacy requirements into the SDLC, the requirements are integrated into the organization's
- 4281 program, planning, and budgeting activities to help ensure that resources are available when
- 4282 needed and program and project milestones are completed. The enterprise architecture
- 4283 provides a central record of this integration within an organization.
- 4284
- 4285

RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE

Risk management activities begin early in the SDLC and continue throughout the life cycle. These activities are important in helping to shape the security and privacy capabilities of the system; ensuring that the necessary controls are implemented and that the security and privacy risks are being adequately addressed on an ongoing basis; and ensuring that the authorizing officials understand the current security and privacy posture of the system in order to accept the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

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4291 Ensuring that security and privacy requirements are integrated into the SDLC helps facilitate the
4292 development and implementation of more resilient systems to reduce the security and privacy
4293 risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

¹⁵⁴ There are five phases in the SDLC including initiation; development and acquisition; implementation; operation and maintenance; and disposal. [SP 800-64] provides guidance on the SDLC.

¹⁵⁵ Organizations may employ a variety of development processes including, for example, waterfall, spiral, or agile. ¹⁵⁶ Nonfunctional requirements include, for example, quality and assurance requirements.

- This can be accomplished by using the concept of integrated project teams.¹⁵⁷ Organizational
 officials ensure that security and privacy professionals are part of the SDLC activities. Such
 consideration fosters an increased level of cooperation among personnel responsible for the
 development, implementation, assessment, operation, maintenance, and disposition of systems
 and the security and privacy professionals advising the senior leadership on the controls needed
 to adequately mitigate security and privacy risks and protect organizational missions and
 business functions.
- Finally, organizations maximize the use of security- and privacy-relevant information generated
 during the SDLC process to satisfy requirements for similar information needed for other
 security and privacy purposes. The reuse of such information is an effective method to reduce or
 eliminate duplication of effort, reduce documentation, promote reciprocity, and avoid
 unnecessary costs that may result when security and privacy activities are conducted
 independently of the SDLC processes. Reuse promotes consistency of information used in the
 development, implementation, assessment, operation, maintenance, and disposition of systems
- 4308 including security- and privacy-related considerations.

¹⁵⁷ Integrated project teams are multidisciplinary entities consisting of individuals with a range of skills and roles to help facilitate the development of systems that meet the requirements of the organization.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ARCHITECTURE AND ENGINEERING

Security architects, privacy architects, systems security engineers, and privacy engineers can play an essential role in the SDLC and in the successful execution of the RMF. These individuals provide *system owners* and *authorizing officials* with technical advice on the selection and implementation of controls in organizational information systems—guiding and informing risk-based decisions across the enterprise.

Security and Privacy Architects:

- Ensure that security and privacy requirements necessary to protect mission and business processes are adequately addressed in all aspects of enterprise architecture including reference models, segment and solution architectures, and the systems supporting those missions and business processes.
- Serve as the primary liaison between the enterprise architect and the systems security and privacy engineers.
- Coordinate with system owners, common control providers, and system security and privacy officers on the allocation of controls.
- Advise authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior accountable officials for risk management/risk executive (function), senior agency information security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy on a range of security and privacy issues.

Security and Privacy Engineers:

- Ensure that security and privacy requirements are integrated into systems and system components through purposeful security or privacy architecting, design, development, and configuration.
- Employ best practices when implementing controls within a system, including the use of software engineering methodologies; systems security or privacy engineering principles; secure or privacy-enhancing design, secure or privacy-enhancing architecture, and secure or privacy-enhancing coding techniques.
- Coordinate security- and privacy-related activities with senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for privacy, security and privacy architects, system owners, common control providers, and system security or privacy officers.