The attached DRAFT document (provided here for historical purposes) has been superseded by the following publication:

Publication Number: NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-76-2

Title: Biometric Specifications for Personal Identity Verification

Publication Date: 07/12/2013

• Final Publication: <a href="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-76-2">https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-76-2</a> (which links to <a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-76-2.pdf">http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-76-2.pdf</a>).

• Information on other NIST Computer Security Division publications and programs can be found at: <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/">http://csrc.nist.gov/</a>

The following information was posted with the attached DRAFT document:

Apr. 18, 2011

# SP 800-76-2

# DRAFT Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification

NIST is pleased to announce the availability of the public comment draft of NIST Special Publication 800-76-2, *Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification*. The draft amends the 2007 specification SP 800-76-1 to include iris recognition and on-card fingerprint comparison, and to extend and refine the biometric sensor and performance specifications. Note that FIPS 201-2, the binding parent PIV specification, is simultaneously open for public comment (see http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsDrafts.html#FIPS-201--2).

Written comments on SP 800-76-2 may be sent to: Patrick Grother, Information Access Division, Information Technology Laboratory, ATTN: Comments on Revision Draft SP 800-76-2, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, Mail Stop 7740, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-7740.

Electronic comments on SP 800-76-2 should be drafted using this <u>template</u> and sent to: piv\_comments\_@ nist.gov. Comments must be received by *June 6, 2011*.

**DRAFT NIST Special Publication 800-76-2** 

Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification



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# INFORMATION SECURITY

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# DRAFT DRAFT

April 17, 2011



U. S. Department of Commerce *Gary Locke* 

National Institute of Standards and Technology Dr. Patrick D. Gallagher, Director

<u>'</u>		EDITORIAL NOTES
2		EDITORIAL NOTES
5 4 5 6	_	This document is a draft of NIST Special Publication 800-76-2. It is open for public comment until Noon on May 22 2011. Comments should be directed to <a href="mailto:patrick.grother@nist.gov">patrick.grother@nist.gov</a>
7 8 9	_	This document supports the draft version of FIPS 201-2, released March 8, 2011 <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html">http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html</a>
10 11 12	_	This document revises NIST Special Publication 800-76-1 published January 24, 2007, <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76-1/SP800-76-1_012407.pdf">http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76-1/SP800-76-1_012407.pdf</a>
13 14 15	_	New content and modifications are shown in red. Editor's Notes appear in blue. The coloration, and these notes, will be removed from the final publication.
16	_	The main modifications are as follows.
17 18 19		<ul> <li>The inclusion of specifications for an optional iris biometric record, intended to afford an alternative to fingerprint based authentication and chain-of-trust maintenance. This includes</li> <li>Standardized iris image specification for the PIV Card</li> </ul>
20		<ul> <li>Standardized iris image specification for off-card use of iris images</li> </ul>
21		<ul> <li>Specifications for the iris camera</li> </ul>
22		<ul> <li>Specifications for the semantic properties of iris images.</li> </ul>
23		<ul> <li>An iris image capture interface</li> </ul>
24		<ul> <li>An iris recognition interface</li> </ul>
25 26		<ul> <li>A specification for on-card biometric comparison of fingerprint minutiae to support card activation (instead of PIN) and authentication. This includes</li> </ul>
27		<ul> <li>Standardized fingerprint and auxilliary data specifications</li> </ul>
28		<ul> <li>Profile of 7816-4 for Standardized interface.</li> </ul>
29		<ul> <li>A provisional specification for use of swipe fingerprint sensors with on-card comparison</li> </ul>
30		<ul><li>See NOTE in clause 5.5 and 6.3</li></ul>
31		<ul> <li>Specification of minimum biometric accuracy in terms of false match rates</li> </ul>
32		<ul> <li>For off-card authentication with fingerprint minutiae</li> </ul>
33		<ul> <li>For on-card authentication with fingerprint minutiae</li> </ul>
34		<ul> <li>For off-card authentications with iris images</li> </ul>
35		<ul> <li>Requirements for inclusion of fingerprint minutia templates when fingerprints cannot be authenticated</li> </ul>
36		<ul> <li>A modified procedure for quality assessment during fingerprint capture.</li> </ul>
37		

REPORTS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY

The Information Technology Laboratory (ITL) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the Nation's measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development and productive use of information technology. ITL's responsibilities include the development of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of non-national security-related information in Federal information systems. This special publication 800-series reports on ITL's research, guidelines, and outreach efforts in information system security, and its collaborative activities with industry, government, and academic organizations. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-76-2, 61 pages (April 2011)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD-12 called for new standards to be adopted governing the interoperable use of identity credentials to allow physical and logical access to Federal government locations and systems. The Personal Identity Verification (PIV) standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS 201), was developed to establish standards for identity credentials. This document, Special Publication 800-76 (SP 800-76), is a companion document to FIPS 201. It describes technical acquisition and formatting specifications for the biometric credentials of the PIV system, including the PIV Card¹ itself. It enumerates procedures and formats for fingerprints, iris and facial images by restricting values and practices included generically in published biometric standards. The primary design objective behind these particular specifications is high performance and universal interoperability. The addition of iris specifications in the 2011 edition adds an alternative modality for biometric authentication and extends coverage to persons for whom fingerprinting is problematic. The addition of on-card comparison offers an alternative to PIN-mediated card activation. For the preparation of biometric data suitable for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) background check, SP 800-76 references FBI documentation, including the ANSI/NIST Fingerprint Standard and the Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification. This document does not preclude use of other biometric modalities in conjunction with the PIV card.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors, Patrick Grother and Wayne Salamon of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and James Matey of the United States Naval Academy, wish to thank their colleagues who reviewed drafts of this document and contributed to its development. Particular thanks go to Charles Wilson who led the development of the original SP 800-76 and its early update, SP 800-76-1. Thanks also go to R. Michael McCabe for his extensive knowledge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's procedures. The authors also gratefully acknowledge and appreciate the many contributions from the public and private sectors for the continued interest and involvement in the development of this publication.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A physical artifact (e.g., identity card, "smart" card) issued to an individual that contains stored identity credentials (e.g., photograph, cryptographic keys, biometric data) so that the claimed identity of the cardholder can be verified against the stored credentials by another person (human readable and verifiable) or an automated process (computer readable and verifiable).

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# 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 Authority

- 254 This document has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in furtherance of its
- 255 statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-
- 256 347.

252

253

- NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for providing adequate
- information security for all agency operations and assets, but such standards and guidelines **shall** not apply to
- national security systems. This recommendation is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management
- and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), Securing Agency Information Systems, as analyzed in A-130,
- 261 Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. Supplemental information is provided in A-130, Appendix III.
- 262 This recommendation has been prepared for use by federal agencies. It may be used by non-governmental
- organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright. Nothing in this document should be taken to
- contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce
- under statutory authority. Nor should this recommendation be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing
- authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, or any other Federal
- 267 official.

268

# 1.2 Purpose and scope

- 269 FIPS 201 [FIPS], Personal Identity Verification (PIV) for Federal Employees and Contractors, defines procedures for the
- 270 PIV lifecycle activities including identity proofing, registration, PIV Card issuance and re-issuance, chain-of-trust
- operations, and PIV Card usage. FIPS also defines the structure of an identity credential which includes biometric
- data. Requirements on interfaces are described in [800-73]. Those on cryptographic protection of the biometric data
- are described in [FIPS] and in [800-78].
- 274 This document contains technical specifications for biometric data mandated or allowed in [FIPS]. These
- specifications reflect the design goals of interoperability, performance and security of the PIV Card and PIV processes.
- 276 This specification addresses image acquisition to support the background check, fingerprint template creation,
- retention, and authentication. The goals are addressed by normatively citing biometric standards and by enumerating
- 278 requirements where the standards include options and branches. In such cases, a biometric profile can be used to
- declare what content is required and what is optional. This document goes further by constraining implementers'
- 280 interpretation of the standards. Such restrictions are designed to ease implementation, assure conformity, facilitate
- interoperability, and ensure performance, in a manner tailored for PIV applications.
- 282 The biometric data specification in this document is the mandatory format for biometric data carried in the PIV Data
- 283 Model (Appendix A of SP 800-73-1). Biometric data used only outside the PIV Data Model is not within the scope of
- 284 this standard.
- 285 This document does however specify that any biometric data in the PIV Data Model shall be embedded in the
- 286 Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) structure of clause 9. This document provides an
- overview of the strategy that can be used for testing conformance to the standard. It is not meant to be a
- comprehensive set of test requirements that can be used for certification or demonstration of compliance to the
- specifications in this document. NIST Special Publication 800-85 implements those objectives.

# 1.3 Audience and assumptions

- 291 This document is targeted at Federal agencies and implementers of PIV systems. In addition, it should be of interest
- to the biometric access control industry. Readers are assumed to have a working knowledge of biometric standards
- 293 and applications.

294

#### 1.4 Overview

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#### 1.4.1 Document structure

- 297 This document defines:
- 298 In clause 2, acronyms and terms;
- in clause 3, the fingerprint acquisition process, requirements for transmission of data to FBI, and a format for
   agency-optional image retention;
- in clause 4, the format of the PIV Card minutiae templates; and specifications for algorithms used in the
   generation and matching of such;
- in clause 5, the formats, data structures and interfaces for minutiae used in on-card comparison operations, and
   specifications for algorithms used in the generation of matching of such;
- 305 in clause 6, specifications for two kinds of fingerprint sensors;
- on algorithms, and specifications for algorithms used in generation and matching of such;
- 308 in clause 8, facial image specifications;
- 309 in clause 9, the CBEFF header and footer supporting digital signatures on all PIV biometric data;
- 310 in clause 10, additional conformance information, beyond the specifications embedded in clauses 4 through 7;
- 311 in clause 11, references.
- gives an approximate procedure for biometric data acquisition and disposition.




Figure 1 – PIV biometric data flow

# 1.5 Inclusion of iris recognition

- 315 Iris specifications are included, in clause 7, to allow biometric authentication of individuals who do not have
- fingerprints. [FIPS] requires use of iris in this case. The requirement on an agency to install and operate iris
- equipment in its PIV issuance processes allows agencies to then additionally populate PIV Cards with iris as an
- 318 alternative authentication factor.

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#### 1.6 Inclusion of fingerprint on-card comparison

- 320 FIPS 201-2 requires fingerprint templates of clause 4 as the mandatory biometric element for PIV. These templates are
- intended to be compared on a reader device with templates collected in an authentication attempt. FIPS 201-2
- requires the cardholder to enter a PIN number to release the templates. This constitutes multi-factor authentication.
- Agencies may additionally choose to populate the card with an on-card comparison algorithm, and on-card
- comparison templates. The specifications for these appear in clause 5. FIPS 201-2 does not require PIN entry ahead of
- a fingerprint minutiae on-card comparison transaction. Indeed, FIPS 201-2 extends on-card comparison as an
- alternative to PIN entry in altering the state of the PIV card.
- Table 1 describes the differences between the off-card and on-card specifications.

#### Table 1 – Summary of properties and roles of on- and off-card comparison

Aspect	Off-card comparison	On-card comparison
FIPS 201-2 requirement on	Mandatory	Optional
presence of biometric data		
Domain of use	All card issuance, re-issuance, replacement	Card activation as PIN replacement,
	applications, and cardholder authentication.	cardholder authentication.
Pre-requisites for access to the	Successful PIN authentication	None, for card activation.
data	On-card comparison has not been used.	
Number of fingers	2	1 or 2
Location of data format	SP 800-76-2, this document, clause 4	SP 800-76-2, this document, clause 5
specifications		
Location of card Interface	SP 800-73-3	SP 800-76-2, with transfer to SP 800-
specifications		73 at its next revision
Underlying data format standard	INCITS 378:2004	ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011
How to identify specific fingers	INCITS 378:2004	ISO/IEC 7816-11:2007
Fingerprint capture device for	Plain impression as specified in clause 6.2.	Plain impression and swipe as
enrollment		specified in clauses 6.2 and 6.3.
Fingerprint capture device for	Plain impression as specified in clause 6.2.	Plain impression or swipe as specified
authentication		in clauses 6.2 and 6.3.
Accuracy testing	MINEX III (formerly Ongoing MINEX)	MINEX II

# 329 2. Terms, acronyms, and notation

# 330 **2.1 Terms**

Term	Definition
Segmentation	For fingerprints, segmentation is the separation of an N finger image into N single finger images.

# 331 **2.2** Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
CBEFF	Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework
FAR	False Accept Rate
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FMR	False Match Rate
FNMR	False Non-Match Rate
FRR	False Reject Rate
FTE	Failure to Enroll Rate
EBTS / F	Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification (Appendix F)
INCITS	InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
ITL	Information Technology Laboratory (of NIST)
NFIQ	NIST Fingerprint Image Quality
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
PIV	Personal Identity Verification
WSQ	Wavelet Scalar Quantization

# 3. Fingerprint enrollment

# 333 **3.1 Scope**

332

- The specifications in this clause pertain to the production of the mandatory PIV biometric enrollment data. That is,
- this clause provides specifications for acquisition, formatting, and storage of fingerprint images and templates. The
- following is an overview of the material covered in this clause.
- Clause 3.2 gives specifications for the use of fingerprint scanners to capture fingerprint images for PIV
   Registration;
- 339 Clause 3.4 gives the format for fingerprint templates stored on the PIV Card;
- 340 Clause 3.6 gives specifications for fingerprint images retained by agencies;
- Clause 3.7 specifies the transformation of fingerprints into records suitable for transmission to the FBI for the
   background check.
- Note that although FBI requirements drive the sensor specifications, the permanent electronic storage formats, specified in Clauses 3.4 and 3.6, are INCITS (i.e. non-FBI) standard records and are therefore specified independently.

# 3.2 Fingerprint data retention

- This document neither requires nor precludes agencies from retaining fingerprint images. However, if an agency
- elects to retain images, then they **shall** be stored in the format specified in clause 3.6. The format specification
- includes the [CBEFF] header of clause 9, and this requires integrity protection and allows for encryption of the image
- 349 records.

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- 350 This document neither requires nor precludes agencies from retaining fingerprint templates. However, if an agency
- elects to retain templates, in either proprietary or standardized formats, then they **shall** be embedded in the [CBEFF]
- header of clause 9. This requires integrity protection and allows for encryption of the records.
- 353 Retention of data supports, for example, detection of duplicate identities.

# 3.3 Fingerprint image acquisition

This clause specifies the capture of a full set of fingerprint images for PIV registration. A subject's fingerprints **shall** be collected according to any of the three imaging modes enumerated in Table 2.

#### Table 2 – Fingerprint acquisition protocols

Option 1 – Required presentations for plain live scan					
Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the right hand (no thumb)					
Combined plain impression of the four fingers o	n the left hand (no thumb)				
Combined impression of the two thumbs					
Option 2 – Required presentations for rolled live	e scan				
10 separately rolled fingers					
Combined plain impression of the four fingers o	n the right hand (no thumb)				
Combined plain impression of the four fingers o	n the left hand (no thumb)				
Left thumb plain impression	These captures may be simultaneous (two thumbs next to				
Right thumb plain impression	each other) or sequential (one thumb at a time)				
Option 3 - Required presentations for rolled ink	on card				
10 separately rolled fingers					
Combined plain impression of the four fingers o	n the right hand (no thumb)				
Combined plain impression of the four fingers on the left hand (no thumb)					
Left thumb plain impression	These captures may be simultaneous (two thumbs next to				
Right thumb plain impression	each other) or sequential (one thumb at a time)				

#### **INFORMATIVE NOTES:**

- 1. There is no requirement that the order specified above is the order in which the images must be acquired.
- 2. The combined multi-finger plain-impression images are also referred to as slaps or flats. They are obtained by simultaneous placement of multiple fingers on the imaging surface without specific rolling movement.
- 3. Options 2 and 3 represent existing agency practice. Although Option 1 is now acceptable to the FBI agencies may need to implement Options 2 or 3 for transmission via the Office of Personnel Management.

For Options 1 and 2 the devices used for capture of the fingerprints **shall** have been certified by the FBI to conform to Appendix F of the FBI's Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification [EBTS, Appendix F]. For Option 3, a scan of the inked card **shall** be performed to effect conversion to electronic form. The scanner **shall** be certified by the FBI as being compliant with [EBTS, Appendix F]. The scanning is needed to produce fingerprints in the digital format described in Clause 3.6 and thereby Clause 3.7. The FBI specifications include width and height specifications for the imaging surface. The native scanning resolution of the device **shall** be 197 pixels per centimeter (500 pixels per inch) in both the horizontal and vertical directions. These specifications comply with the FBI submission requirements and with the Image Acquisition Setting Level 31 of the Finger Image-Based Data Interchange Format standard, INCITS 381 [FINGSTD].

For live-scan acquisition, the enrollment client software should display the images to the attending operator. The operator should repeat acquisition if the ridge structure is clear and well formed in the displayed images.

The procedure for the collection of fingerprints, presented in Table 3, **shall** be followed. The procedure **shall** employ the NIST Fingerprint Image Quality [NFIQ] algorithm to initiate any needed reacquisition of the images. An attending official **shall** be present at the time of fingerprint capture. The agency **shall** employ measures to ensure the quality of acquisition and guard against faulty presentation, whether malicious or unintentional. Such activity might be an integral function of the acquisition device or might be implemented by the attending official. In any case, the agency **shall** ensure that the applicant does not swap finger positions or hands, occlude fingers, or misalign or misplace the fingers. Particularly, because it is common during collection of multi-finger plain impressions for fingers o5 and 10 to not be long enough to reach the imaging platen, it is accepted practice for the hand be placed at an angle to the horizontal to ensure imaging of all four fingers. Although this is not needed with newer, large-platen, devices the official **shall** in all cases take care to image all fingers completely. The procedure requires segmentation of the multi-finger plain impressions; this operation may be assisted by the attending official.

Table 3 – Quality control procedure for acquisition of a full set of fingerprint images

Step	Action
1.	Attending official should inspect fingers and require absence of dirt, coatings, gels, and other foreign material.
2.	Official should ensure imaging surface of the sensor, or the card, is clean.
3.	Acquire fingerprints according to Option 1, 2, or 3 in Table 2. For Option 3, scan the inked card using [EFTS, Appendix F] certified scanner.
4.	Segment the multi-finger plain impression images into single-finger images. Automated segmentation is recommended. Attending official should inspect the boundaries of the automatic segmentation and correct any failures, perhaps via an interactive graphical user interface.
5.	Compute NFIQ value for thumbs and index fingers. If all have NFIQ values of 1, 2, or 3 (i.e., good quality) then go to step 8.
6.	Repeat steps 2-5 up to three more times.
7.	If after four acquisitions the index fingers and thumbs do not all have NFIQ values of 1, 2 or 3 then select that set, acquired in step 3 and segmented in step 4, for which the mean of the NFIQ values of the left index, right index, left thumb, and right thumb is minimum (i.e. of best quality). If all of the index finger and thumb quality values are unavailable (perhaps because of injury to one or more of those fingers) then use the last set from step 3 of those fingers that are available, without any application of NFIQ.
8.	Prepare and store the final records per Clauses 3.4, 3.6, and 3.7

Ordinarily, all ten fingerprints **shall** be imaged in this process; however, if one or more fingers are not available (for instance, because of amputation) then as many fingers as are available **shall** be imaged. When fewer than ten fingers

are collected, the FBI background transaction of Clause 3.4 requires (in field AMP 2.084 of an accompanying Type 2 record) the labeling of those fingers that are amputated or otherwise not imaged; see [EFTS, Appendix C].

# 3.4 Training of PIV fingerprint collection staff

Agencies shall apprise staff that the background check can be defeated by mutilation of the fingerprints e.g. either temporarily (e.g. by burns or abrasives) or permanently (e.g. by surgical means). In addition certain medications can cause loss of fingerprint ridge structure. It is recommended that collection of fingerprints from applicants with injuries to their fingers be deferred.

# 3.5 Monitoring overall enrollment quality

In order to track enrollment quality over time, a numerical summary of operational quality may be computed as a management indicator. If computed, this summary shall be computed from the NFIQ values of primary fingers of all PIV card applicants processed in each calendar month. If computed, the summary shall be computed using the procedures of NIST Interagency Report 7422 [NFIQ SUMMARY] which uses a simple formula to aggregate NFIQ values.

Managers can track this over time, collection sites or stations, over different populations (e.g. contractors vs. employees), across functions (PIV issuance vs. re-issuance), or even across fingers. Managers can use aggregated quality indicators to identify fingerprint collection problems. These may be due to changes in the physical environment or unintended changes in operating procedures.

# 3.6 Fingerprint image format for images retained by agencies

This clause specifies a common data format record for the retention of the fingerprint images collected in Clause 3.2. Specifically fingerprint images enrolled or otherwise retained by agencies **shall** be formatted according to the INCITS 381-2004 finger image based interchange format standard [FINGSTD]. This set **shall** include ten single-finger images. These **shall** be obtained by segmentation of the plain multi-finger images gathered in accordance with Options 1, 2 or 3 of Table 2, and the single plain thumb impressions from presentations 4 & 5 of Options 2 and 3. These images **shall** be placed into a single [FINGSTD] record. The record may also include the associated multi-finger plain impressions and the rolled images. This document ([800-76]) does not specify uses for any single-finger rolled images gathered according to Options 2 or 3 of Table 2. The record **shall** be wrapped in the CBEFF structure described in Clause 9. Agencies may encrypt this data per the provisions of Clause 9, Table 19, Note 2.

Table 4 gives a clause-by-clause profile of [FINGSTD]. The primary purpose of the Table is to give PIV specifications for those fields of [FINGSTD] that have optional content. Rows 1-10 give normative content. Row 11 requires the CBEFF structure of Clause 6. However, its FASC-N value (Table 19, Line 13) may be replaced by a field of all zeroes in this one exceptional case: Storage of PIV registration images before a FASC-N has been assigned. Such instances (including the digital signature) **shall** be regenerated once the FASC-N is known. Rows 12-27 give PIV specifications for the fields of the General Record Header of [FINGSTD, Table 2]. These are common to all images in the record. Similarly, Rows 28-36 provide specifications for the Finger Image Header Record in Table 4 of [FINGSTD]. The "PIV Conformance" column provides PIV specific practice and parameter defaults of the standard.

INCITS 381 is likely to be revised by the INCITS M1 committee. Such revisions are irrelevant to PIV; however implementations should respect the version number on Line 14 of Table 4.

To assist implementers, NIST has made [FINGSTD] sample data available<sup>2</sup>.

Table 4 – INCITS 381 profile for agency retention of fingerprint Images

	Clause title and/or field name	INCITS 381-2004		PIV Conformance		
	Comment of the commen		Value required	Values allowed	Informative Remarks	
1.	Byte and bit ordering (5.1)	NC		A	Big Endian MSB then LSB	
2.	Scan sequence (5.2)	NC		Α		
3.	Image acquisition reqs. (6)	NC		Level 31	Table 1	

<sup>2</sup> Fingerprint images conformant to the PIV specification are here http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/piv\_sample\_data.html and these were prepared using NIST software available from http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/incits.html

			Clause title and/or field name	INCITS 381	I-2004	PIV Conformance	
			(Numbers in parentheses are	Field or	Value		Informative Remarks
			[FINGSTD] clause numbers)	content	required	Values allowed	
4.			Pixel Aspect Ratio (6.1)	NC		Α	1:1
5.			Pixel Depth (6.2)	NC		Α	Level 31 →8
6.			Grayscale data (6.3)	NC		Α	Level 31 →1 byte per pixel
7.			Dynamic Range (6.4)	NC		Α	Level 31 →200 gray levels
8.			Scan resolution (6.5)	NC		Α	Level 31 →500 ppi
9.			Image resolution (6.6)	NC		197	Pixels per centimeter - no interpolation
10.			Fingerprint image location (6.7)	NC		Α	Slap placement info, centering
11.			CBEFF Header (7)	MF	MV	Patron Format PIV	Multi-field CBEFF Header, Sec. o
12.			General Record Header (7.1)	NC		Α	
13.			Format Identifier (7.1.1)	MF	MV	0x46495200	i.e. ASCII "FIR\o"
14.	1		Version Number (7.1.2)	MF	MV	0x30313000	i.e. ASCII "010\0"
15.	1		Record Length (7.1.3)	MF	MV	MIT	Size excluding CBEFF structure
16.	1		CBEFF Product Owner (7.1.4)	MF	MV	> 0	CBEFF PID.
17.	lat		CBEFF Product Identifier Type (7.1.4)	MF	MV	> 0	CBEFF PID.
18.	orn		Capture Device ID (7.1.5)	MF	MV	MIT	Vendor specified. See Note 1
19.	d f		Image Acquisition Level (7.1.6)	MF	MV	31	Settings Level 31
20.	Ö		Number of Images (7.1.7)	MF	MV	MIT	Denote by K, see lines 28-37, see Notes 2-4
21.	<u> </u>		Scale units (7.1.8)	MF	MV	0X02	Centimeters
22.	Finger image record format		Scan resolution (horz) (7.1.9)	MF	MV	197	
23.	i.E		Scan resolution (vert) (7.1.10)	MF	MV	197	Pixels per centimeter
24.	ger		Image resolution (horz) (7.1.11)	MF	MV	197	rixeis per centimeter
25.	Ë		Image resolution (vert) (7.1.12)	MF	MV	197	
26.			Pixel Depth (7.1.13)	MF	MV	8	Grayscale with 256 levels
27.			Image compression algorithm (7.1.14)	MF	MV	0 or 2	Uncompressed or WSQ 3.1
2/.				IVII	141.4	0 01 2	See Notes 5 and 6.
28.			Reserved (7.1.15)	MF	MV	0	Two bytes, see Note 12
29.	multi-finger		Finger data block length (7.2.1)	MF	MV	міт	
30.	ij		Finger position (7.2.2)	MF	MV	MIT	
31.	]≒		Count of views (7.2.3)	MF	MV	≥1	M views of this finger, see Note 7
32.			View number (7.2.4)	MF	MV	MIT	<u> </u>
33.	ts, or I	٧S	Finger image quality (7.2.5)	MF	MV	20,40,60,80,100	Transformed NFIQ. See Notes 8 and 9
34.	K fingerprints, or prints	finger views	Impression type (7.2.6)	MF	MV	0 or 2	See ANSI NIST ITL 1-2000
35.	jr.	ē	Horizontal line length (7.2.7)	MF	MV	MIT	C. N. I.
36.	ger	ing	Vertical line length (7.2.8)	MF	MV	MIT	See Note 10
37.	ij	Μ	Reserved (no clause)	MF	MV	0	See Note 11
38.	~		Finger image data (7.2.9)	MF	MV	MIT	Uncompressed or compressed WSQ Data
	OF TA	BLE					, , ,

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+	7		

Acron	ym	Meaning			
MF	mandatory field	[FINGSTD] mandates a field <b>shall</b> be present in the record			
MV	mandatory value	[FINGSTD] mandates a meaningful value for this field			
NC	normative content	[FINGSTD] gives normative practice for PIV. Such clauses do not define a field in the FIR.			
Α	as required by standard	For PIV, value or practice is as specified in [FINGSTD]			
MIT	mandatory at time of	For PIV, mandatory value that <b>shall</b> be determined at the time the record is instantiated and			
MILL	instantiation	shall follow the practice specified in [FINGSTD]			

#### **NORMATIVE NOTES:**

- 1. The Capture Device ID should indicate the hardware model. The CBEFF PID [FINGSTD, 7.1.4] should indicate the firmware or software version.
- 2. If certain fingers cannot be imaged, the value of this field **shall** be decremented accordingly.
- 3. The left and right four-finger images, and two-thumb, images may also be included. The value of this field **shall** be incremented accordingly.
- 4. For PIV enrollment sets, the number of images will ordinarily be thirteen (that is, the ten segmented images from the multi-finger plain impressions, and the three plain impressions themselves) or fourteen (if the plain thumb impressions were imaged separately).

- 5. Images **shall** either be uncompressed or compressed using an implementation of the Wavelet Scalar Quantization (WSQ) algorithm that has been certified by the FBI. As of February 2011, Version 3.1 of the WSQ algorithm **shall** be used. The FBI's current requirement for a 15:1 nominal compression ratio **shall** apply.
- 6. Compression should only be applied after the records required by clauses 3.4 and 3.7 have been prepared and transformed NFIQ values have been assigned.
- 7. The term view refers to the number of images of that particular finger. This value would exceed one if imaging has been repeated. Inclusion of more than one image of a finger can afford some benefit in a matching process. This document recommends that any additionally available images (say, from a PIV Card re-issuance procedure) with quality value 1 to 3 should be included in the record. In all cases the images shall be stored in order of capture date, with newest first.
- 8. Quality values **shall** be present. These **shall** be calculated from the NIST Fingerprint Image Quality (NFIQ) method described in [NFIQ] using the formula Q = 20\*(6 NFIQ). This scale reversal ensures that high quality values connote high predicted performance and consistency with the dictionary definition. The values are intended to be predictive of the relative performance of a minutia based fingerprint matching system. It is recommended that a user should be prompted to first attempt authentication using the finger with the highest quality, regardless of whether this is the primary or secondary finger.
- 9. The quality value **shall** be set to 254 (the [FINGSTD] code for undefined) if this record is not a single finger print (i.e., it is a multi-finger image, or a palm print) or if the NFIQ implementation fails.
- 10. There is no restriction on the image size. However non-background pixels of the target finger **shall** be retained (i.e. cropping of the image data is prohibited).
- 11. [FINGSTD, Table 4] refers to a single-byte field labeled "reserved", but there is no corresponding clause to formally define it. The M1 committee has undertaken to resolve this by inserting a new subclause to require inclusion of the "Reserved" field. This will appear in a revision of [FINGSTD]. In any case, PIV implementations **shall** include the single byte field, setting the value to o.
- 12. Line 27 indicates that the "Reserved" field **shall** have length 2 bytes. [FINGSTD, 7.1.15] indicates a length of 4 bytes which disagrees with the value in [FINGSTD, Table 2]. The INCITS M1 committee has indicated 2 bytes is the correct value. PIV implementations **shall** include the 2 byte field, setting the value to 0.

# 3.7 Fingerprint image specifications for background checks

PIV fingerprint images transmitted to the FBI as part of the background checking process **shall** be formatted according to the ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000 standard [FFSMT] and the CJIS-RS-0010 [EFTS] specification. Such records **shall** be prepared from, and contain, only those images collected as per specifications in Clause 3.1.

Table 5 enumerates the appropriate transaction formats for the three acquisition options of Clause 3.2. The FBI documentation [EFTS] should be consulted for definitive requirements.

Table 5 – Record types for background checks

Option	Transaction Data Format in [FFSMT]	Reference
1	Three Type 14 records (and see Note 1)	[EFTS, Appendix N]. See Note 2
2 or 3	Fourteen Type 4 records (and see Note 1)	Clause 3.1.1.4 "Federal Applicant User Fee" of [EFTS]

#### **NORMATIVE NOTES:**

1. All types of transactions with the FBI require both a Type 1 and Type 2 record to accompany the data; see [FFSMT, Table 2]. The Type 2 supports labeling of missing fingers.

The forthcoming revision of [FFMST], due in early 2007, adds new fields to the Type 14 record of [FFSMT] but does so in a backwards compatible way. But, in any case, [EFTS, Appendix N] **shall** be the definitive reference for the format of the images.

# 4. Fingerprint off-card authentication specifications

#### 484 **4.1 Scope**

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- This clause specifies how the PIV mandatory biometric elements specified in [FIPS] are to be generated and stored.
- This specification applies to templates stored within the PIV Card, and to [MINUSTD] templates otherwise retained by
- agencies. The templates constitute the enrollment biometrics for PIV authentication and as such are supported by a
- 488 high quality image acquisition specification, and a FBI-certified compression format. The specification of a
- 489 standardized template in this clause enables use of the PIV Card in a multi-vendor product environment.

# 490 **4.2 Source images**

- Two [MINUSTD] fingerprint templates **shall** be stored on the PIV Card; these are hereafter referred to as PIV Card
- templates. These **shall** be prepared from images of the primary and secondary fingers (as specified in [FIPS]). These
- 493 images shall be either
- those obtained by segmenting the initial plain impressions of the full set of fingerprints captured during PIV
   Registration and stored in row 8 of Table 3, or
- 496 Those collected and matched against the initial plain impressions.
- 497 Significant rotation of the multi-finger plain impressions (for example, that which can occur when four fingers are
- imaged using a narrow platen) shall be removed prior to, or as part of, the generation of the mandatory minutiae
- templates. The rotation angle **shall** be that which makes the inter-phalangeal creases approximately horizontal or,
- equivalently, the inter-finger spaces approximately vertical. This requirement supports interoperable fingerprint
- 501 matching.

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# 4.3 Card issuance

- 503 When a PIV Card is issued, one or more authentication attempts shall be executed per [FIPS, 5.3.1]. This shall entail
- capture of new live fingerprints of both the primary and secondary fingers, and matching of those with the images
- originally collected during initial registration. This binds the cardholder to the individual whose background was
- 506 checked. This authentication should use images collected using either a [EFTS/F] multi-finger fingerprint imaging
- device of clause 3.2, or a [SINGFING] device of Clause 6.2.
- The template matcher used during authentication attempts **shall** conform the performance specifications established
- in clause 4.5.3, and **shall** be configured with a threshold at least as high as that needed to achieve the minimum
- accuracy requirements of clause 4.6. If all biometric authentications fail during card issuance, then the PIV Card **shall**
- be populated with the standardized minutia record of clause 4.4 which
- has two empty views (i.e. there are zero minutiae such that Table 6, Line 31 shall be zero),
- has fingerprint qualities (Line 30) assigned 255 for temporarily unusable, or 254 for permanently unusable, fingerprints,
- 515 is digitally signed as usual using the properly populated CBEFF structure of clause 9, and
- Overrides the CEBFF quality values (Table 19, Line 11) with -1 indicating temporarily, and -2 permanently unusable fingerprints.
- 518 FIPS 201-2 requires use of clause 7 iris biometrics for PIV applicants for whom fingerprints are unavailable or unusable.
- 519 Authentication systems encountering such a card populated with empty minutia templates might attempt iris-based
- 520 authentication.

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# 4.4 Minutia record

- PIV Card templates **shall** be a conformant instance of the INCITS 378-2004 [MINUSTD] minutiae template standard.
- That is, the minutiae from both the primary and secondary fingers **shall** reside within a single INCITS 378 record. This
- means that there will be one instance of the "General Record Header" [MINUSTD, 6.4], and two instances of the
- "Finger View Record" [MINUSTD, 6.5]. This record **shall** be wrapped in a single instance of the CBEFF structure
- specified in Clause 9 prior to storage on the PIV Card. The PIV Card templates **shall** not be encrypted.

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Table 6 is a profile of the generic [MINUSTD] standard. Its specifications **shall** apply to all minutiae templates placed on PIV Cards. These constraints are included to promote highly accurate and interoperable personal identity verification. This document recommends that the minutiae records should be prepared soon after the images are captured and before they are compressed for storage.

INCITS 378 is likely to be revised by the INCITS M1 committee. Such revisions are irrelevant to PIV; however implementations should respect the version number on Line 14 of Table 6.

To assist implementers, NIST has made [MINUSTD] sample data available<sup>3</sup>.

Table 6 – INCITS 378 profile for PIV Card templates

			Clause title and/or field name	INCITS 37	8 2004	PIV Conformance	
			(Numbers in parentheses are [MINUSTD]	Field or		Triv Comomiance	Informative Remarks
			clause numbers)	content	Value Required	Values Allowed	IIIIOIIIIduve Keilidiks
4					Required	Δ.	Defines fing armaint minuting
1.			Principle (5.1)	NC		Α	Defines fingerprint minutiae [MINUSTD, 5.2] defines minutiae type
2.			Minutia Type (5.2)			See Note 1	but contains no normative content
3.			Minutia Location : Coordinate System (5.3.1)	NC		Α	Minutia placement and angle are
4.			Minutia Location : Minutia Placement on a Ridge Ending (5.3.2)	NC		A	influential on accuracy and interoperability. Developers should
5.			Minutia Location : Minutia Placement on a Ridge Bifurcation (5.3.3)	NC		А	ensure the listed requirements are actually achieved by their minutia
6.			Minutia Location : Minutia Placement on Other Minutia Types (5.3.4)	NC		See Note 1	detection algorithms.
7.			Minutia Direction : Angle Conventions (5.4.1)	NC		Α	In addition, correct detection of true
8.			Minutia Direction : Angle of a Ridge Ending (5.4.2)	NC		А	minutiae, and correct suppression of false minutiae have been shown to
9.			Minutia Direction : Angle of a Ridge Bifurcation (5.4.3)	NC		А	influence interoperability [BAZIN, MANSFIELD].
10.			Byte Ordering (6.2)	NC		Α	Big Endian, unsigned integers
11.	1		Minutia Record Organization (6.3)	NC		A	
12.	1		CBEFF Record Header (6.4)	MF	MV	Patron format PIV	Multi-field CBEFF Header, Sec. o.
13.	1		Format Identifier (6.4.1)	MF	MV	0x464D5200	i.e. ASCII "FMR\o"
14.	er		Version Number (6.4.2)	MF	MV	0x20323000	i.e. ASCII " 20\0" which is INCITS 378- 2004. See Note 2
15.	ead		Record Length (6.4.3)	MF	MV	26 ≤ L ≤ 1574	This connotes a 2 byte field. See Note 3
16.	Ĭ		CBEFF Product Identifier Owner (6.4.4)	MF	MV	> 0	See Note 4
17.	0.0		CBEFF Product Identifier Type (6.4.4)	MF	MV	> 0	See Note 4
18.	al Record Header		Capture Equipment Compliance (6.4.5)	MF	MV	1000b	Sensor complies with EFTS, Appendix F per PIV Registration requirement
19.	eneral		Capture Equipment ID (6.4.6)	MF	MV	> 0	See Note 5
20.	Get		Size of Scanned Image in x direction (6.4.7)	MF	MV	MIT	
21.	1		Size of Scanned Image in y direction (6.4.8)	MF	MV	MIT	See Note 11
22.	1		X (horizontal) resolution (6.4.9)	MF	MV	197	
23.	1		Y (vertical) resolution (6.4.10)	MF	MV	197	Parent images conform to clause 4.2
24.	1		Number of Finger Views (6.4.11)	MF	MV	2	Once each for primary and secondary
25.			Reserved Byte (6.4.12)	MF	MV	0	
26.			Finger View Header (6.5.1)	NC		Α	
27.	1	e e	Finger Position (6.5.1.1)	MF	MV	MIT	
28.	1	View header	View Number (6.5.1.2)	MF	MV	0	See Note 10
29.	Ñ	ļ ų	Impression Type (6.5.1.3)	MF	MV	0 or 2	Plain live or non-live scan images.
30.	e. ≥	<u>•</u> .	Finger Quality (6.5.1.4)	MF	MV	20,40,60,80,100	See Note 6
31.	<u>ک</u>	>	Number of Minutiae (6.5.1.5)	MF	MV	0 ≤ M ≤ 128	M minutiae data records follow
32.	finger views		Minutiae Type (6.5.2.1)	MF	MV	01b, 10b, or 00b	See Note 1
33.	不完	M instances	Minutiae Position (6.5.2.2)	MF	MV	MIT	See Note 7
34.	1	ta ≥	Minutiae Angle (6.5.2.3)	MF	MV	MIT	See Note 8
35.		ins	Minutiae Quality (6.5.2.4)	MF	MV	MIT	This may be populated.
36.	1		Extended Data Block Length (6.6.1.1)	MF	MV	0	See Note o
	OF :	TABLE	LACENCE Data Block Length (0.0.1.1)	1411	1414	0	See Hote 0
,,	<u> </u>	.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,					

Minutiae records conformant to the PIV specification are here http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/piv\_sample\_data.html and these were prepared using NIST software available from http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/incits.html


Acron	ym	Meaning				
MF	mandatory field	[MINUSTD] requires a field <b>shall</b> be present in the FMR				
MV	mandatory value	[MINUSTD] requires a meaningful value for a field				
NC	normative content	[MINUSTD] gives normative practice for PIV. Such clauses do not define a field in the FMR.				
Α	as required	For PIV, value or practice is as normatively specified in [MINUSTD].				
MIT	mandatory at time of instantiation	For PIV, mandatory value that <b>shall</b> be determined at the time the record is instantiated and <b>shall</b> follow the practice specified in [MINUSTD]				

#### **NORMATIVE NOTES:**

- 1. [MINUSTD] requires that each stored minutia have a type associated with it. For PIV, the mandatory card templates **shall** contain minutiae of type ridge ending or ridge bifurcation. These types are defined in [MINUSTD, 5.3.{2,3}]. Other types of minutiae, such as trifurcations and crossovers, **shall** not be included in PIV Card templates. However, for those minutiae where it is not possible to reliably distinguish between a ridge ending and a bifurcation, the category of "other" **shall** be assigned and encoded using bit values oob. The angle and location for a minutia of type "other" should be the angle and location that would have applied to the corresponding ridge ending or bifurcation depending on which one the encoding algorithm determines to be the most likely for that particular minutiae. This is a common characteristic of "inked" impressions that exhibit ridge endings being converted to bifurcations and vice-versa due to over- or underinking in the image.
- 2. The second paragraph of [MINUSTD, 6.4.2] refers both to an ASCII space and "three ASCII numerals" mentioned in the first paragraph. The practice of using an ASCII space character as the first character of the version number **shall** be followed: "20\0" i.e. 0x20323000.
- 3. The length of the entire record **shall** fit within the container size limits specified in [800-73]. These limits apply to the entire CBEFF wrapped and signed entity, not just the [FINGSTD] record.
- 4. Both fields ("Owner" and "Type") of the CBEFF Product Identifier of [MINUSTD, Clause 6.4.4] **shall** be non-zero. The two most significant bytes **shall** identify the vendor, and the two least significant bytes **shall** identify the version number of that supplier's minutiae detection algorithm.
- 5. The Capture Equipment ID **shall** be reported. Its use may improve interoperability.
- 6. The quality value **shall** be that computed for the parent image using [NFIQ] and reported here as Q = 20\*(6 NFIQ). A value of "255" shall be assigned when fingerprints are temporarily unusable for matching. A value of "254" shall be assigned when the fingerprints are permanently unusable.
- 7. All coordinates and angles for minutiae **shall** be recorded with respect to the original finger image. They **shall** not be recorded with respect to any image processing sub-image(s) created during the template creation process.
- 8. Determination of the minutia direction can be extracted from each skeleton bifurcation. The three legs of every skeleton bifurcation must be examined and the endpoint of each leg determined. Figures 2A through 2C illustrate the three methods used for determining the end of a leg. The ending is established according to the event that occurs first:
  - The 32nd pixel see Figures 2A and 2B or
  - o The end of skeleton leg if greater than 10 pixels (legs shorter are not used) see Figure 2B or
  - o A second bifurcation is encountered before the 32nd pixel see Figure 2C.

The angle of the minutiae is determined by constructing three virtual rays originating at the bifurcation point and extending to the end of each leg. The smallest of the three angles formed by the rays is bisected to indicate the minutiae direction.

Figure 2 – Minutiae angle determination



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Extensive, refined and complete guidance on minutia detection and estimation is contained in INCITS 378:2009 clause 6. That standard is the revision of INCITS 378-2004 [MINUSTD]. While PIV still requires [MINUSTD] for PIV template formatting, the newer standard improves the semantic aspects associated with this note.

581 582 9. The mandatory value of zero codifies the specification that PIV card templates **shall** not include extended data.

583 584 10. Per [MINUSTD, 6.5.1.2] this view number field **shall** have value o for the primary finger and o for the secondary finger. The combination of view number and finger position uniquely identifies each template.

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11. [MINUSTD] does not specify how to report the image sizes in the header when two or more views are included in the record and these were derived from images of different sizes. For PIV, the width on Line 20 shall be the larger of the widths of the two input images. Similarly the height on Line 21 shall be the larger of the heights of the two input images.

# 4.5 Performance specifications for PIV compliance

#### 590 **4.5.1** Scope

- This clause establishes performance specifications for minutia template generators and minutia matching algorithms.
- These specifications apply to off-card comparison of templates. Separate specifications are advanced for on-card
- comparison in clause 5.11. These components **shall** perform according to two sets of specifications
- 594 interoperability specifications of clauses 4.5.3, and
- 595 the accuracy specifications of clause 4.5.4.

The interoperability criteria implement the core global interoperability objectives of HSPD-12 by populating the PIV

- 597 Card with interoperable enrollment templates. The accuracy specifications are intended to afford low operational
- error rates by assuring highly accurate matching in typical authentication scenarios.

# 4.5.2 Background

The intent of the [FIPS] specification of a globally interoperable biometric is to support cross-vendor and cross-agency

authentication of PIV Cards. The multi-vendor aspect introduces a source of variation in performance [MINEX]. To

602 support core algorithmic interoperability prior versions of this standard required

# 4.5.3 Minimum interoperability specification

The core cross-vendor interoperability specification is met by establishing requirements on template generators and

template matchers as described in the following two sub-clauses.

# 606 4.5.3.1 Conformance of template generators

A template generator is certified on the basis of the conformance of its output, its speed of computation, and on the

608 error rates observed when its templates are matched. A template generator **shall** be certified if:

- 1. it converts all input PIV representative enrollment images to Table 29 [MINUSTD] templates, and
  - 2. all templates are syntactically conformant to the Table 29 profile of [MINUSTD], and
- 611 3. it converts 90% of PIV representative enrollment images to templates in fewer than 1.3 seconds each, and
- 4. all certified matchers verify its output templates with FNMR less than or equal to 1% at a FMR of 1%.
- 613 4.5.3.2 Conformance of template matchers
- A template matcher is certified on the basis of its speed of computation, and on the error rates observed when it matches templates in interoperability tests. A template matcher **shall** be certified if:
  - 5. it compares all pairs of Table 29 [MINUSTD] templates to scalar scores, and
  - 6. it executes 90% of the clause D.4 template matches in fewer than 0.1 seconds<sup>4</sup> each, and
  - 7. it matches templates from all certified template generators, and the template generator accompanying the matcher, with FNMR less than or equal to 1% at a FMR of 1%.
  - 4.5.3.3 Test method
- The performance specifications shall be tested according to the test defined by Annex D. The Level 1 interoperability test embedded in NIST's MINEX III program<sup>5</sup> implements this test [MINEX-III].
- 623 4.5.4 Minimum accuracy specification
- The (1%,1%) interoperability criterion established in the clause 4.5.3.2 is designed to support low false rejection when
- templates can come from many sources (i.e. conformant template generators). As such the test does not imply
- 626 thresholds relevant to the operational minimum security requirements advanced later in clause 4.6.3. To support
- operational authentication of PIV Card templates against live samples a template generator and matcher-pair shall be
- 628 certified if

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- 1. it meets all the interoperability criteria of clauses 4.5.3.1 and 4.5.3.2, and
- 630 2. it matches single-finger templates with FNMR less than or equal to 2.0% when the FMR is at or below 0.01%.
- 631 4.5.4.1 Test method
- The performance specifications **shall** be tested according to the test defined by Annex D. The Level 2 accuracy test embedded in NIST's MINEX III program implements this test [MINEX-III].
- oss embedded if Nist 3 Mintex in program implements this test [Mintex
  - 4.6 Performance specifications for PIV operations
- 635 **4.6.1 Scope**
- The test of clause 4.5 is intended only to qualify components demonstrating core minutiae-based interoperable
- 637 accuracy. In particular, the error rate specification of clause 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 serves only to establish minutiae-
- 638 generation and matching competencies in a laboratory test. This subclause establishes biometric performance
- 639 parameters for components configured for use in operational PIV biometric authentication subsystems.
- These specifications depart from prior versions of this standard which did not establish error-rate specifications for fielded biometric systems. In this version, minimum security specifications are established.
- 642 **4.6.2** Background
- The fingerprint templates conform to [MINUSTD] as profiled in clause 3.4. The use cases given in [800-73, Appendix
- 644 C] detail how the templates and the PIV Card are used for interoperable authentication. Authentication may involve
- one or both of the PIV Card templates. These will be compared with newly acquired (i.e. live) fingerprint images of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This specification applies to a commercial-off-the-shelf PC procured in 2005 and equipped with a 2GHz processor and 512 MB of main memory. This specification **shall** be adjusted by the testing organization to reflect significant changes of the computational platform.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The MINEX III program, under the prior name *Ongoing MINEX* has continued since publication of NIST 800-76 in 2006.

- either or both of the primary and secondary fingers. The inclusion of the finger position in the [MINUSTD] header 646 allows the system to prompt the user for one or more specific fingers. 647
- Operational authentication performance is quantified in terms of both the false reject rate (FRR) and the false accept 648
- rate (FAR). In PIV, FRR is the proportion of legitimate cardholders incorrectly denied access; the latter would be the 649
- proportion of impostors incorrectly allowed access. The error rates depend on a number of factors including: the 650
- 651 environment, the number of attempts (i.e. finger placements on the sensor), the sensor itself, the quality of the PIV
- Card templates' parent images, the number of fingerprints invoked, and the familiarity of users with the process. The 652
- use of two fingers in all authentication transactions offers substantially improved performance over single-finger 653
- authentication. 654

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#### Minimum accuracy specification 4.6.3

The threshold for the minutia matching algorithm shall be set to achieve false match rates at or below the values

- given in Table 7. The threshold shall be calibrated in tests conformant to clause 4.5.3.36. The tabulated rates are zero-657
- effort match rates, meaning they apply to the comparison of single pairs of randomly selected templates from 658
- different persons. 659

660 PIV conformance to these specifications shall be supported by vendor attestation. Agencies could elect to conduct a biometric performance test to confirm the attestation. 661

#### Table 7 – Maximum permissible false match rates for off-card minutia comparison

PIV function	Maximum allowed FMR when two eyes are available and one or both eyes may be used	Maximum allowed FMR when two eyes are available and will always be used
PIV issuance, PIV re-issuance, PIV replacement	0.00006	0.00001
Unattended PIV physical access authentication	0.0005	0.00005
Unattended PIV logical access authentication	0.0002	0.00005

#### 663 This specification does not:

- Preclude agencies from establishing more stringent lower false match criteria. The false match criteria can always be met by setting a low (i.e. stringent) comparison threshold. However, the lower threshold implies elevated false rejection errors because the error-rate tradeoff.
- Establish a false rejection performance criterion how often genuine users are not able to successfully authenticate. The security objectives are the primary concern of this document. See

#### Further agency considerations 4.6.4

- Agencies are cautioned that false rejection performance is operationally vital in access control applications and is 670 achieved by using highly performing cameras, by correct control of the environment (e.g. humidity), adherence to 671 enrolment specifications, subject and operator instruction, and by use of highly performing recognition algorithms. 672 Agencies are therefore strongly encouraged to consider:
- 673
- Establishing a policy on how many times a subject can attempt to authenticate (three is typical) 674
- Establishing false rejection accuracy criteria against which tests and qualification procedures can be developed 675
- Referring to false rejection performance measures reported for algorithms conforming to the MINEX test and 676 calibration procedure. 677
- Conducting their own supplementary tests. These might be performance tests of single products or 678 interoperability tests, and might be used to estimate application-specific performance. 679
- 680 Requiring the use of multiple samples (e.g. two fingers),
- 681 Set operating thresholds to target lower (more stringent) false acceptance rates. This action would give moderately elevated rejection rates. 682
- 683 Using iris recognition as an authentication alternative.

<sup>6</sup> The Level 2 accuracy test embedded in NIST's MINEX III program estimates these thresholds [MINEX-III]

# 5. Fingerprint on-card comparison specifications

#### 5.1 Scope

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This clause gives specifications for the use of on-card comparison of fingerprint minutiae for PIV. This specification

includes enrollment data to be placed on the card, authentication data to be sent to the card, the interface

689 specifications to implement these actions, and certification information. This clause also specifies the data structure

for the storage of card parameters, and the procedure for preparation of on-card fingerprint minutiae templates from

691 off-card ones.

# 5.2 Background

NIST conducted two studies to support the use of on-card comparison in identity management applications.

- The Secure Biometric Match on Card<sup>7</sup> activity engaged commercial providers to execute fingerprint authentication over a contactless interface within a specific time limit. The study required privacy protection via secured communication protocols and integrity protection using cryptographic signatures computed from the biometric data. In addition, the card was authenticated to the reader. The activity has been published as NIST Interagency Report 7452 [SBMOC].
- The MINEX II evaluation was initiated to measure the core algorithmic speed and accuracy of fingerprint minutia matchers running on ISO/IEC 7816 smartcards. Conducted in phases, the test required card- and fingerprint matcher-provider teams to submit on-card comparison enabled cards. The latest results were reported in NIST Interagency Report 7477 [MINEX II].

# 5.3 Approach to the use of standards

704 The PIV specification for on-card matching leverages international standards. Specifically, PIV cards **shall** 

- 705 Be prepared and used by executing the commands of ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 [CARD-CMD],
- 706 embed the biometric data in the data structures defined in ISO/IEC 7816-11:2004 [CARD-BIO],
- 707 use the core three-byte-per-minutia format defined in both the ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011 standard<sup>8</sup>,
- 708 adopt certain defined constants from ISO/IEC 19785-3:2007.

# 5.4 Data objects

#### 5.4.1 Biometric Information Template

Each submitted card shall be populated with Biometric Information Templates grouped under the BIT Group
 Template of Table 8 according to the requirements of [CARD-CMD, Tables 1 and 2]. The number of BITs shall be equal
 to the number of fingerprint minutia templates (tag 81 in the DO of Table 11). After card issuance, BITs shall be

714 treated as read-only data.

Table 8 – BIT group template and profile

Tag	Len.	Value				Allowed values			
7F61	Var.	BIT grou	up temį	plate					
		Tag	Len.	Value					
		02	1	14 (	(Numb	er of Bl	Ts in th	ne group, corresponding to number of fingers that follow)	
		7F60	Var.	Biom	etric In	format	ion Ter	mplate (BIT) for the first finger	
				Tag	Len.	Value			
				83	1	Refer	ence d	ata qualifier used by VERIFY	0, 1, 2, 3
				A1	Var.	Biome	etric He	eader Template (BHT) conforming to ISO/IEC 19785-3:2005	
						Tag	Len.	Value	
						81	1	biometric type (i.e modality, o8 = fingerprint)	08

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The preferred (and standardized) replacement for the trademarked term "match-on-card" is on-card comparison.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This second edition of the minutia standard was completed in January 2011 and is currently out for FDIS ballot. It will be formally published in the second half of 2011.

				82	1		etric si EC 197	See NOTE 2 below	
				87	2	CBEF	F BDB	format owner	0101 i.e. JTC1/SC37
				88	2	0x00	05 (CB	EFF BDB format type)	'00 05' See NOTE 1
				B1	Var.	Biom	etric n	natching algorithm parameters. ISO/IEC 19794-2 Table 14	
						Tag	ag Len. Value		
						81	Min. and max. numbers of minutiae, see ISO/IEC 19794-2 (subclause 8.3.3, Table 10)		See NOTE 3
						82	1		
						83	1	Feature handling indicator, see ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005 (Table 15)	
7F60	Var.	Biome	etric Info						

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NOTE 1 The 0x0005 value indicated one of two encodings of minutiae defined in the ISO standard. This one requires that the endings of ridges are reported at the point of the valley bifurcation (versus at the ridge tip itself). These are the semantics required by INCITS 378:2004. The on-card comparison templates **shall** be produced from the parent INCITS 378 templates.

NOTE 2 Which fingers are present is encoded using integers from Table 9. The finger position codes differ in the fingerprint standards and the smart-card standards. For all on-card comparison operations ISO/IEC 19785-3:2007 finger position codes **shall** be used (column B). For the PIV mandatory off-card templates, [MINUSTD] finger positions **shall** be used (column A). Card issuance processes **shall** transcode using the mapping of Table 9.

Table 9 – ISO/IEC 19794-2 and ISO/IEC 19785-3 finger position codes

Finger ID	ISO/IEC 19794-2:2	2011 + INCITS 378:2004	ISO/IEC 19785-3:2007		
Biometric subtype	Binary value	Hex Value	Binary value	Hex Value	
		A		В	
No information given	00000b	00	00000000b	00	
right thumb	00001b	01	00000101b	05	
right index	00010b	02	00001001b	09	
right middle	00011b	03	00001101b	0D	
right ring	00100b	04	00010001b	11	
right little	00101b	05	00010101b	15	
left thumb	00110b	06	00000110b	06	
left index	00111b	07	00001010b	0A	
left middle	01000b	08	00001110b	0E	
left ring	01001b	09	00010010b	12	
left little	01010b	0A	00010110b	16	

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NOTE 1 PIV readers involved in on-card and off-card authentication attempts will need to heed Table 9 to correctly prompt users for which finger to present.

NOTE 2 Note that the FDIS draft of ISO/IEC 19785-3:2007 erroneously set the six bit to 1. The final standard and the PIV specification require that bits 6, 7 and 8 **shall** be 0.

#### 5.4.2 Minutiae data for on-card comparison

This clause defines the data to be sent to be stored on card-based comparison implementations. It is included here because ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011 and its antecedents defined multiple variants<sup>9</sup>.

All PIV on-card comparison data in PIV **shall** conform to the ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011, clause 9 compact on-card comparison format. This format encodes each minutia point in 3 bytes. The [MINUSTD] record instances of Table 6

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Particularly the ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005 standard includes three encodings (record, card-normal, card-compact), has versions with and without headers, has variants differing in their minutia placement semantics, has presence of standardized extended data (zonal quality etc) and of non-standard, proprietary, extended data.

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**shall** be converted to the ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005 compact-card templates of Table 10. The conversion is non-trivial and **shall** proceed according to the steps of Figure 3.

PIV Cards' on-card comparison data **shall** not include a header<sup>10</sup>. In addition, standardized extended data (e.g. cores) **shall** be absent. Proprietary extended data **shall** be absent. Thus, N minutiae are encoded in exactly 3N bytes.

Table 10 – ISO/IEC 19794-2 profile for on-card comparison

#	Field name	Size (bits)	Values allowed	Units	Remark	
1.	X coordinate	8	[0,255]	Expressed in units of 0.1 mm	View data	
2.	Y coordinate	8	[0,255]	Expressed in units of 0.1 mm	S instances of the	
3.	Minutiae type	2			minutiae data would	
4.	Minutiae angle	6	[0,63]	Resolution is 5.625 degrees	be present	

These would be sent to the on-card biometric comparison implementations in the TLV format of Table 11. The cards would accept templates in that format.

Table 11 – Data object encapsulating ISO/IEC 19794-2 minutiae for on-card comparison

Гад	L	Value					Comment	Status
7F2E	L1	Biom	etric	data template				Mandatory
		Tag	L	Value				
		82		This tag <b>shall</b> not be presen	t		No proprietary data	Absent – None of
		90		This tag <b>shall</b> not be present	t		No need for constructed data	these tags shall be
		91		This tag shall not be presen	t		No ridge count data	present
		92		This tag <b>shall</b> not be presen	t		No cores	
		93		This tag <b>shall</b> not be presen	t		No deltas	
		94		This tag <b>shall</b> not be presen	t		No zonal quality	
		96		This tag shall not be presen	t			
		81	L2	Finger minutiae data from p	orimary fir	nger	Which finger is indicated in the first BIT	Optional
				Field Siz	ze (bits)	Valid Values		
				X coordinate 8		[0,255]	As in Table 10.	
				Y coordinate 8		[0,255]	The number of minutiae is L2/3	
				Minutiae type 2				
				Minutiae angle 6		[0,63]	-	
		95	1	Impression type 1 8			From swipe sensor	
		81	L2	Finger minutiae data from p	orimary fir	nger	Which finger is indicated in the second BIT	Mandatory if on-car
				X coordinate 8		[0,255]	As in Table 10.	comparison is
				Y coordinate 8		[0,255]	The number of minutiae is L2/3	enabled.
				Minutiae type 2				
				Minutiae angle 6		[0,63]		
		95	1	Impression type 1		0	From plain impression sensor	
		81	L2	Finger minutiae data from s	econdary	finger	Which finger is indicated in the first BIT	Optional
				X coordinate 8		[0,255]	As in Table 10.	
				Y coordinate 8		[0,255]	The number of minutiae is L2/3	
				Minutiae type 2				
				Minutiae angle 6		[0,63]		
		95	1	Impression type 1		8	From swipe sensor	
		81 L2 Finger minutiae data from secondary			econdary	finger	Which finger is indicated in the second BIT	Mandatory if on-car
				X coordinate 8		[0,255]	As in Table 10.	comparison is
				Y coordinate 8		[0,255]	The number of minutiae is L2/3	enabled.
				Minutiae type 2				
				Minutiae angle 6		[0,63]	<u> </u>	
		95	1	Impression type 1		0	From plain impression sensor	

<sup>745</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> There was confusion in the industry, during early adoption of the compact formats, over whether the card formats should include record or view headers. The ILO Seafarer's program specified the presence of headers – Other programs used the ISO/IEC 7816-11 fields for such information.

# 5.5 Presence of finger minutiae extracted from swipe-sensor outputs

- 747 The minutia data of Table 11 allows for the inclusion of minutia data extracted from swipe sensors. Because of motion
- of the finger across such sensors the minutiae can be systematically misplaced relative to a static plain impression. It
- is widely believed that comparison of plain and swipe minutia fields is more likely to produce genuine user failed
- authentication for genuine users than is plain-plain comparison and swipe-swipe comparison. The specification, as
- drafted, would allow a swipe sensor to be used in an authentication attempt. In such cases the card should
- 752 preferentially compare the submitted swipe data with the on-card swipe data.
- Swipe sensors shall not be used for authentication in PIV issuance and re-issuance processes. Swipe sensors may be
- used for other authentication.
- 755 Swipe sensor specifications appear in clause 6.3.
- 756 **EDITOR's NOTE:** The specifications are circulated for public comment. Unlike much of the other content NIST has
- 757 little empirical data on which to safely include swipe matching into PIV. Swipe is attractive on grounds of cost, and
- possibly on grounds of spoof resistance. NIST solicits input on swipe accuracy and viability, particularly regarding
- 759 interoperability with optically-derived templates,
- 760 operating with standardized minutia templates (vs. proprietary representations),
- 761 operational experiences,
- 762 liveness,

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- 763 how minutia standards might be revised,
- 764 whether these provisions should be allowed only after a certain date (sunrise).
- 765 All swipe-related specifications may be withdrawn in the next version of this draft.

#### 5.6 Minutia uniqueness

- A non-ISO requirement is for the minutia points to be unique. Template generators should output unique (x, y, and
- theta) tuples and the testing laboratory might implement checks to detect deviations from such behavior. This
- 769 requirement is instituted because non-uniqueness impedes some matching algorithms.

# 5.7 Preparation of the minutia templates

- All templates used in on-card comparison **shall** be prepared from the INCITS 378 templates required by clause 4. The process for this conversion **shall** follow the algorithm specified in this subclause.
- 773 The BITs of clause 5.4.1 **shall** be used to parameterize the production of templates that a reader, or other system,
- sends to the PIV card. This applies to both the reference templates stored on the card, and those produced during,
- for example, an authentication transaction.
- The BITs read from the card **shall** parameterize the conversion of templates sent to the card. As depicted in Figure 3, the conversion operation proceeds with a pruning operation (sec. 5.9.1), a sorting operation (sec. 5.9.2), and a re-
- encoding (conversion from 14 bit to 8 bit position coordinates, quantization of coordinates, and conversion of 8 bit to
- 779 6 bit minutia angle).




Figure 3 – Conversion of INCITS 378 to ISO/IEC 19794-2 card data

# 781 5.8 Number of minutiae

- 782 The number of minutiae stored on a PIV Card for on-card comparison **shall** not exceed 83 for any one finger.
- 783 The number of minutiae sent to a PIV Card for on-card comparison shall not exceed 83 for any one finger.
- NOTE 1 Leading commercial minutia detectors produce a median of 41 minutiae from plain impression images with
- the 5% and 95% quantiles being 24 and 61 respectively over four large operational single index finger datasets [2].
- 786 NOTE 2 A short-length APDU command constrains the maximum number of three-byte minutia to 83. Command
- 787 chaining [CARD-CMD] would ordinarily be used for larger templates, but the PIV limit of 83 reflects NOTE 1.
- 788 Because some templates will naturally contain o minutiae (i.e. the algorithm does not find any), the (off-card) client
- 789 shall respect the minimum number indicated by the card in its BIT structure. The client shall either terminate the
- 790 minutia-based authentication attempt or prompt for (re-)presentation of one of the enrolled fingers.

# 791 **5.9 Effect of the BIT**

- All reference and verification templates **shall** be parameterized by the BIT parameters, as follows. If,
- 793 the value indicated in the BIT for the minimum number of minutiae is  $0 \le N \le 83$ ,
- 794 the value indicated in the BIT for the maximum number of minutiae is N ≤ M ≤ 83,
- 795 the number of minutiae present in a verification template is K, then
- 796 the number of minutiae sent to the card, S, **shall** be

$$S = \begin{cases} M & \text{if} & K \ge M \\ K & \text{if} & K < M \\ K & \text{if} & K < N \end{cases}$$

- Note that the BIT parameter N is ignored. This is necessary because some input templates will inevitably have zero
- 798 minutiae. The comparison subsystem should execute successfully when either or both of the input templates
- 799 contains fewer than N minutiae. For all cards, N shall be  $\leq$  M.

#### 800 5.9.1 Minutiae removal mechanism

801 Minutiae shall be removed according to the specifications of [CARD-MIN, clause 9.3.2].

#### 802 **5.9.2 Sort order of minutiae**

- 803 The BIT associated with the on-card comparison algorithm shall indicate how minutiae must be sorted according to
- the options extended in [CARD-MIN, clause 9.4]. However, because single finger PIV images have widths of fewer
- than 500 pixels when scanned at 19.7 pixels mm<sup>-1</sup>, all possible minutiae coordinates **shall** be encoded in 8 bits, and the
- modulo sorting technique defined in [CARD-MIN] shall not be used.
- 807 NOTE Open-source INCITS 378 "C" code is maintained in <a href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/biomdi.html">http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/biomdi.html</a>. On-
- 808 card biometric comparison client software is here: http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/nigos/biomapp.html.

# 809 5.10 On-card comparison interface

810 PIV cards implementing on-card comparison **shall** support the interface requirements of Annex A.

#### 8<sub>11</sub> 5.11 Performance specifications for PIV compliance

#### 812 **5.11.1 Scope**

- 813 This clause establishes performance specifications for minutia template generators and minutia matching algorithms.
- 814 These specifications apply to on-card comparison of templates. Separate specifications are advanced for off-card
- comparison in clause 4.5. These components **shall** perform according to two sets of specifications
- 816 interoperability specifications of clauses 5.11.3, and
- 817 the accuracy specifications of clause 5.11.4.
- The interoperability criteria implement the core global interoperability objectives of HSPD-12 by populating the PIV
- 819 Card with interoperable enrollment templates and an associated on-card comparison algorithm. The accuracy

- 820 specifications are intended to afford low operational error rates by assuring highly accurate matching in typical
- 821 authentication scenarios.

#### 822 **5.11.2** Background

- NIST conducted tests of on-card comparison performance in its MINEX II program [MINEX-II]. Over four phases
- 824 conducted between 2007 and 2010, the program showed that up to five implementations might attain the PIV
- 825 interoperability specifications of clause 4.5.3.
- 826 In parallel, the sBMOC [SBMOC] demonstrated cryptographic protection of the template data, and transactional
- 827 durations below two seconds.

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# 5.11.3 Minimum interoperability specification

- 829 The core cross-vendor interoperability specification is met by establishing requirements on paired template
- 830 generators and on-card matchers as described in the following two sub-clauses.

#### 831 5.11.3.1 Conformance of on-card template generators

- 832 A template generator **shall** be certified if
  - 1. it conforms to the off-card template generator specifications of clause 4.5.3.1, and
  - 2. it converts all Table 29 [MINUSTD] instances to Table 10 [CARD-MIN] instances according to the specifications of clause 5.7.

# 836 5.11.3.2 Conformance of on-card template matchers

- A template matcher is certified on the basis of its speed of computation, and on the error rates observed when it matches templates in interoperability tests. A template matcher **shall** be certified
  - 1. if it conforms to the off-card template matcher specifications of clause 4.5.3.2 but operating with Table 10 [CARD-MIN] format templates, and
  - 2. it compares 90% of on-card genuine-user template comparisons (using the command of clause A.4.1) in fewer than 0.25 seconds, and
  - 3. when implemented on a functional modified PIV Card and in a software library, the two will produce identical output similarity scores<sup>11</sup>,
  - 4. it produces at least 512 unique integer scores when comparing many templates of different persons.

# 846 5.11.3.3 Test method

- The performance specifications shall be tested according to the test defined by Annex D modified to use [CARD-MIN]
- 848 templates. This test shall conform to the requirements of the ISO/IEC 19795-7 testing standard. The Level 1
- interoperability test embedded in NIST's MINEX IV program<sup>12</sup> implements this test [MINEX-IV].

# 850 5.11.4 Minimum accuracy specification

- The (1%,1%) interoperability criterion established in the clause 4.5.3.2 is designed to support low false rejection when
- 852 templates can come from many sources (i.e. conformant template generators). As such the test does not imply
- 853 thresholds relevant to the operational minimum security requirements advanced later in clause 4.6.3. To support
- operational authentication of PIV Card templates against live samples a template generator and matcher-pair shall be
- 855 certified if
- 5. it meets all the interoperability criteria of clauses 4.5.3.1 and 4.5.3.2, and
- 857 6. it matches single-finger templates with FNMR less than or equal to 2.0% when the FMR is at or below 0.01%.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This requirement implies a non-operational requirement: the Card must report similarity scores to a dedicated test application.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The MINEX IV program replaces the original MINEX II proof-of-concept evaluation which ran 2007-2011.

# 858 5.11.4.1 Test method

The performance specifications **shall** be tested according to the test defined by Annex D. The Level 2 accuracy test embedded in NIST's MINEX IV program implements this test [MINEX-IV].

# 5.12 Performance specifications for PIV operations

#### 862 **5.12.1 Scope**

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863 The tests of clause 5.11 are intended only to qualify components demonstrating core minutiae-based interoperable

accuracy. In particular, the error rate specification of clause 4.5.3 and 4.5.4 serves only to establish minutiae-

865 generation and matching competencies in a laboratory test. This subclause establishes minimum security

866 specifications and performance parameters for components configured and used in operational PIV biometric

867 authentication subsystems.

# 868 5.12.2 Minimum accuracy specification

The threshold for the minutia matching algorithm shall be set to achieve false match rates at or below the values

870 given in Table 12. The threshold **shall** be calibrated in tests conformant to clause 4.5.3.3<sup>13</sup>. The tabulated rates are

871 zero-effort match rates, meaning they apply to the comparison of single pairs of randomly selected templates from

872 different persons.

PIV conformance to these specifications **shall** be supported by vendor attestation. Agencies could elect to conduct a

874 biometric performance test to confirm the attestation.

# Table 12 – Maximum permissible false match rates for on-card minutia comparison

PIV function	Maximum allowed FMR when two eyes are	Maximum allowed FMR when two eyes are
	available and one or both eyes may be used	available and will always be used
Unattended PIV physical access authentication	0.0005	0.00005
Unattended PIV logical access authentication	0.0002	0.00005

#### 876 This specification does not:

 Preclude agencies from establishing more stringent lower false match criteria. The false match criteria can always be met by setting a low (i.e. stringent) comparison threshold. However, the lower threshold implies elevated false rejection errors because the error-rate tradeoff.

 Establish a false rejection performance criterion – how often genuine users are not able to successfully authenticate. The security objectives are the primary concern of this document. See

# 5.12.3 Further agency considerations

883 See clause 4.6.4.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The Level 2 accuracy test embedded in NIST's MINEX IV program estimates these thresholds [MINEX-III]

# 6. Sensor specifications for fingerprint capture

# 6.1 Scope

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912 913 This clause gives specifications for all fingerprint sensors used for capture of single finger images. These specifications are unrelated to those of clause 3 which govern ten-print enrollment. Table 13 specifies sensor usage.

# Table 13 – PIV use of plain-impression and swipe fingerprint sensors

PIV Fingerprint Sensor Class	Attended use for preparation of the PIV Card	Attended PIV processes	Unattended biometric authentication	Available for off-card authentication	Available for on- card authentication	Specifications
Plain impression sensors	Mandatory	Mandatory	Optional	Yes	Yes	6.2
Swipe sensors	Optional	Not allowed	Optional	No	Yes, with swipe- derived templates	6.3

# 6.2 Fingerprint acquisition specifications for plain impression sensors

Fingerprint sensors used for PIV authentication **shall** conform to the FBI's Image Quality Specifications For Single Finger Capture Devices [SINGFING]. The [SINGFING] specification establishes minimum sizes for the imaging platen and for the scanning resolution.

# 6.3 Fingerprint acquisition specifications for swipe sensors

- 902 A swipe sensor shall be certified if
- 903 It produces images of width corresponding to at least 9 millimeters
- 904 It produces, in conjunction with client-side software, a Table 4 [FINGSTD] instance but with Image Acquisition
  905 Level (Lines 3 and 19) of 30 or 31. This requires spatial sampling rates in both horizontal and vertical directions to
  906 be 197 pixels per centimeter (i.e. 500ppi).
- 907 The sensor passes a biometric performance test that
  - Is conducted in conformance to [PERF-ACS],
- 909 Reports three attempt FTE < 1%.
- 910 Reports three attempt FRR < 1% and FAR < 0.1% using only a PIV compliant template generator and matcher.
  - Retains Table 4 [FINGSTD] images to be used in offline comparisons and confirmation of the online results for which FMR against plain-impression derived templates shall be at or below 0.01%.

# Iris recognition specifications

#### 7.1 Scope

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This clause establishes specifications to support the use of iris images as defined in FIPS 201-2. The clause includes specifications

- for iris images stored on and off PIV Cards,
  - for iris capture devices, and
  - for components involved in automated recognition of PIV iris imagery.

The image specifications extend the format requirements of ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011 with image quality related properties. The capture device specifications concern imaging properties of the iris camera, and software interfaces around it. The recognition component is specified in terms of minimum authentication accuracy and processing speed.

Label	A	В	С
Example Image			
ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011	Image Type 1	Image Type 3	Image Type 7
Properties	Parent image, typically the output of a camera, and typically of size 640x480 pixels, not necessarily centered, but conformant to Image Type 1 of [ISOIRIS]. Images of this kind are not intended to be compressed.	of this kind can be losslessly	Cropped, masked and centered iris conformant to Image Type 7 of [ISOIRIS]. Images of this kind can be compressed to a few kilobytes.
PIV Role	Image captured from camera, retained for chain-of-trust authentication.	Prepared from (A), it may be retained as an alternative to (A). It will require less storage space.	Prepared from (A), it <b>shall</b> be stored on the PIV card.

#### Figure 4 – Image formats of ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011

This document makes no mention of an iris template. In iris recognition, templates are proprietary non-standardized mathematical encodings<sup>14</sup> of information extracted from the formally standardized images that are defined in this document.

#### 7.2 Background

Digital representations of rectilinear images of the human iris have been formally standardized as ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011. This standard, which replaces earlier editions, is a necessary component in an interoperable marketplace of iris cameras and iris recognition algorithms. For PIV, the standard is used because it includes specialized image formats that support compact storage<sup>15</sup> on ISO/IEC 7816 IC cards. The formats are shown in Figure 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The iris code is one such representation that has been widely described in the academic literature, and implemented still more widely. While it is known for its power, small size, and speed, other (commercial) template representations are actually larger than the specialized PIV Card images mandated in this document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The first generation of iris image standards included a polar-coordinate encoding of the iris. This format, intended to support compact size, was removed from second generation standards because of concerns that interoperability was sensitive to correct determination of the iris center. An alternative, replacement format, shown in Figure 4C, has been shown to offer accurate recognition and broad industry support [IREX].

# 7.3 Iris data Retention

# 7.4 Iris image specification for PIV cards

Iris images on PIV Cards **shall** conform to the requirements expressed in the Table 14 profile of the ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011 standard. Where required values and practice are not stated, the underlying requirements of the base standard **shall** apply. The profile defines a standard record that contains one or two specialized iris images each of size around 3 kilobytes. These images **shall** follow the semantic requirements of Image Type 7 images defined in the standard. The objective of these specifications is to afford maximum possible iris accuracy, low storage requirements, and corresponding fast read times. These requirements include centering and masking of the eyelid and sclera regions (an example is shown in Figure 4, column C). The masked regions can be very efficiently compressed. This affords small record sizes and, vitally, preservation of the iris texture.

Table 14 – ISO/IEC 19794-6 profile for iris images stored on PIV Cards

					197 94 0 profile for 1115 1	1
		Clause or field of ISO/IEC 19794-6		19794-6	PIV Conformance	Remarks
			Field	Value	Values Allowed	
1.		CBEFF Header	MF	MV	Patron format PIV	Multi-field CBEFF Header. Sec. o.
2.		Format identifier	MF	MV	0x49495200	IIR\o Four byte format identifier including null terminator.
3.		Version number	MF	MV	0x30323000	020\0 Second 19794-6 version - not the 2005 standard
4.	Header	Length of record	MF	MV	See NOTE 1	The length (in bytes) of the entire iris image data.
5.	Ę	Number of iris	MF	MV	1 or 2	Number of iris representations that follow. This <b>shall</b> be two,
Ш		representations			o?	either one of each eye, or two of one eye.
6.	General	Certification flag	MF	MV	0x00	
7.		Number of eyes	MF	MV	1 or 2	2 if left and right are known present, else
	Iris	represented				1 if left or right is known present.
						If camera does not estimate eye label automatically, these
						shall be manually assigned.
_	rese	entation 1: Data for the first				
8.		Representation Length	MF	MV		Bytes for this representation including the header + image
9.		Capture date and time	MF	MV	2011 onwards.	Capture start time in UTC
10.		Capture device	MF	MV	0x00	Unknown or Unspecified
Ш		technology identifier			0x01	CMOS/CCD
11.		Capture device vendor ID	MF	MV		Manufacturer ID
12.		Capture device type ID	MF	MV		Vendor assigned make model product ID.
13.		Quality block	MF	OIT		
14.		Representation number	MF	MIT	1 and then, optionally, 2	Representation sequence number
15.		Eye label	MF	MIT	1 or 2	Left, right. If camera does not estimate eye label
Ш						automatically, these <b>shall</b> be manually assigned.
16.		Image type	MF	MV	7	IMAGE_TYPE_CROPPED_AND_MASKED = $7 (07_{Hex})$ i.e. a
	Data					cropped and region-of-interest masked, centered, iris image
$\square$	Ö					with (0,6R 0,2R) margins. See NOTE 2
17.	+ Image	Image format	MF	MV	10 = 0x0A	Compression algorithm and encoding shall be JPEG 2000. The format <b>shall</b> not be PNG, RAW, or JPEG.
18.	<del>-</del>	Iris image properties bit	MF	MIT	Bits 1-2: 01 or 10	Horizontal + vertical orientation <b>shall</b> not be undefined
	jer	field		MIT	Bits 3-4: 01 or 10	
	eac			MV	Bits 5-6: 01	Scan type <b>shall</b> be progressive.
	H			MV	Bits 7-8: 01	Compression history <b>shall</b> be none; i.e. the cropped and
	tiol				Bit 1 is the least signif. bit.	masked image <b>shall</b> be prepared from an uncompressed
	ıta				Bit 8 is the most signif. bit.	parent image.
19.	esentation Header	Image width, W	MF	MIT	222 ≤ W ≤ 424	width in pixels, W
20.	Repre	Image height, H	MF	MIT	168 ≤ H ≤ 336	height in pixels, H
21.	Re	Bit depth	MF	MV	8	Bit depth in bits per pixel
22.		Range	MF	OIT		Required field, optionally populated.
23.		Roll angle of eye	MF	OIT	≤ 20	Camera or software should estimate roll angle. Rotation
24.		Roll angle uncertainty	MF	OIT	≤ 5	should only be applied if angle is > 20 deg.
25.		Iris centre, lowest X	MF	MV	W/2 for W odd, else	These values are redundant for Image type = 7 shall for which
26.		iris centre, highest X	MF	MV	W/2+1 for W even	image shall be exactly centered. The iris center <b>shall</b> be
27.		Iris centre, lowest Y	MF	MV	H/2 for H odd, else	estimated by the iris localization code, or if necessary by a
28.		Iris centre, highest Y	MF	MV	H/2+1 for H even	human inspector.
29.		Iris diameter, lowest	MF	MIT	D ≥ 140	These two fields are used to express a normative PIV
30.		Iris diameter, highest	MF	MIT	D ≤ 280	requirement that iris radius <b>shall</b> be no smaller than 70 pixels,
						and no larger than 140 pixels. See NOTE 3
31.		Image length	MF		1 approx 6KB	Size of the JPEG 2000 encoded image data, in bytes, is limited

				by container defined in NIST Special Pub 800-73, and the size of its CBEFF header and digital signature.	
Representation 2: Data for the second eye image follows					
Analogous to Representation 1, above.					

Acronym		Meaning			
MF	mandatory field	[IRISSTD] requires a field <b>shall</b> be present in the FAC			
MV	mandatory value	[IRISSTD] requires a meaningful value for a field			
OV	optional value	[IRISSTD] allows a meaningful value or allows 0 to be used to connote "unspecified"			
MIT	mandatory at time of	For PIV, mandatory value that <b>shall</b> be determined at the time the record is instantiated and <b>shall</b>			
/////	instantiation	follow the practice specified in [IRISSTD]			
OIT	optional at time of instantiation	For PIV, optional header value that may be determined at the time the record is instantiated			

NOTE 1 The entire record length plus the CBEFF header and CBEFF signature block length must be less than or equal to size specified in NIST Special Publ. 800-73-3. Two images of size about 3K, or one image of size about 6K, will fit in this container.

NOTE 2 The specification of a Type 7 image requires that the image captured from the camera has sufficient margin around the iris to support the strict (0.6R, 0.2R) margin requirements of Image Type 7. During enrollment, client capture software might usefully display the result with a prototypical overlay.

NOTE 3 If any captured iris has diameter outside of the range [140,280] pixels, see clause 7.8.1.1.4.

# 7.5 Iris image specification for iris images retained outside the PIV card

This document neither requires nor precludes agencies from retaining iris images. FIPS 201-2 does require use of iris imagery in cases where fingerprints cannot be captured satisfactorily. In addition, FIPS 201-2 indicates that iris image data may be available outside the PIV Card for authentication during PIV card re-issuance, replacement and chain-of-trust transactions. If agencies elect to retain images they **shall** be stored in the format specified in this clause. This clause establishes a profile of ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011 suited for retention of iris images outside the PIV Card. The format specification includes the [CBEFF] header of clause 9, and this requires integrity protection and allows for encryption of the image records.

This document neither requires nor precludes agencies from retaining iris templates. Iris templates are vendor-proprietary and not standardized. Nevertheless, if an agency elects to retain templates then they **shall** be embedded in the [CBEFF] header of clause 9. This requires integrity protection and allows for encryption of the records.

Retention of data supports, for example, detection of duplicate identities.

Table 15 – ISO/IEC 19794-6 profile for iris images stored outside PIV Cards

		Clause or field of ISO/IEC 19794-6	ISO/IEC 19794-6		PIV Conformance	Remarks
			Field	Value	Values Allowed	
1.		CBEFF Header (5.3)	MF	MV	Patron format PIV	Multi-field CBEFF Header. Sec. o.
2.		Format identifier	MF	MV	0x49495200	IIR\o Four byte format identifier including null terminator.
3.	e	Version number	MF	MV	0x30323000	020\0 Second 19794-6 version - not the 2005 standard
4.	eader	Length of record	MF	MV		The length (in bytes) of the entire iris image data.
5.	I	Number of iris	MF	MV	2	Number of iris representations that follow. This <b>shall</b> be two,
	eral	representations				preferably one of each eye, or two of one eye.
6.	Gene	Certification flag	MF	MV	0x00	Is certification information present in the representation
						headers?
7.	Iris	Number of eyes	MF	MV	1 or 2	2 if left and right are known present, else 1 if left or right is
		represented				known present.
Rep	rese	entation 1: Data for the first	eye imag	ge follows		
8.		Representation Length	MF	MV		Bytes for this representation including the header + image
9.	드	Capture date and time	MF	MV	2011 onwards.	Capture start time in UTC
10.	entation	Capture device	MF	MV	0x00	Unknown or Unspecified
	in it	technology identifier			0X01	CMOS/CCD
11.	ese.	Capture device vendor ID	MF	MV		Manufacturer ID
12.	Repr	Capture device type ID	MF	MV		Vendor assigned make model product ID.
13.	ď	Quality block	MF	OIT		
14.	<b>ļ.</b>	Representation number	MF	MIT	1 and then 2	Representation sequence number

15.	Eye label	MF	MIT	1 or 2	Left, right. If camera does not estimate eye label automatically, these <b>shall</b> be manually assigned.
16.	Image type	MF	MV	1 or 2	IMAGE_TYPE_UNCROPPED = 0x01 or IMAGE_TYPE_VGA = 0x02 i.e. 640 x 480 pixels See NOTE 1
17.	Image format	MF	MV	14 = 0x0E	Compression and encoding shall be PNG or RAW.
18.	Iris image properties bit field	MF	MIT MIT	Bits 1-2: 01 or 10 Bits 3-4: 01 or 10	Horizontal + vertical orientation <b>shall</b> not be undefined
			MV	Bits 5-6: 01	Scan type <b>shall</b> be progressive.
			MV	Bits 7-8: 01 Bit 1 is the least signif. bit. Bit 8 is the most signif. bit.	Compression history <b>shall</b> be none; i.e. the cropped and masked image <b>shall</b> be prepared from an uncompressed parent image.
19.	Image width, W	MF	MIT	>0	width in pixels, W
20.	Image height, H	MF	MIT	> 0	height in pixels, H
21.	Bit depth	MF	MV	8	Bit depth in bits per pixel
22.	Range	MF	OIT		Required field, optionally populated.
23.	Roll angle of eye	MF	OIT	≤ 20	Camera or software should estimate roll angle. Rotation
24.	Roll angle uncertainty	MF	OIT	≤ 5	should only be applied if angle is > 20 deg.
25.	Iris centre, lowest X	MF	MIT		These values are redundant for Image type = 3 for which image
26.	iris centre, highest X	MF	MIT		<b>shall</b> be exactly centered. The iris center <b>shall</b> be estimated by
27.	Iris centre, lowest Y	MF	MIT		the iris localization code, or if necessary by a human inspector.
28.	Iris centre, highest Y	MF	MIT		
29.	Iris diameter, lowest	MF	MIT	≥ 140	These two fields are used to express a normative PIV
30.	Iris diameter, highest	MF	MIT	≤ 280	requirement that iris radius <b>shall</b> be no smaller than 70 pixels, and no larger than 140 pixels. See NOTE 2
31.	Image length	MF	MIT		Size of the PNG encoded image data, in bytes, is limited by container defined in NIST Special Pub 800-73, and the size of its CBEFF header and digital signature.
	entation 2: Data for the sec		image foll	ows	
Analog	ous to Representation 1, ab	ove.			

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NOTE 1 The specification of unprocessed Type 1 or 2 image nevertheless requires that the margin around the iris exceeds or equals, respectively, the (0.6R, 0.2R) margin requirements. During enrollment, client capture software might usefully display the result with a prototypical overlay.

971 NOTE 2 If any captured iris has diameter outside of the range [140,280] pixels, see clause 7.8.1.1.4.

#### 7.6 Conformance of ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011 records

For the standard records of clauses 7.4 and 7.5, implementers may wish to download NIST developed and maintained open-source software for testing the syntactic correctness of the record. The software exists in two forms: One runs under a conformance testing architecture; the other runs as a standalone. They can run in single-instance or batch mode. NOTE: The tools do not yet check PIV specific parameters - definitive final versions that do will follow.

# 7.7 Iris image properties for enrollment

# 7.7.1 **Scope**

These sub-clauses regulate the appearance and properties of the iris images captured during the preparation of PIV Card iris images.

#### 7.7.2 Correct segmentation of the iris

For iris captures intended for population of the PIV Card, the client software **shall** display the captured image to the attending operator. The software **shall** overlay colored circular or elliptical approximations to the pupil-iris and iris-sclera boundaries. The attendant **shall** inspect the image to verify that the estimated boundaries correspond to the actual locations.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> From http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/biometrics/biocta download.cfm

### 987 7.7.3 Correct preparation of the cropped-and-masked PIV Card iris.

- 988 For iris captures intended for population of the PIV Card, the client software shall display the prepared image to the
- attending operator. The attendant **shall** inspect the image and determine that the iris is centered, and that the iris
- 990 itself is visible.
- 991 **7.7.4** Blur
- 992 For iris captures intended for population of the PIV Card, the client software shall display the captured image to the
- attending operator. The attendant **shall** inspect the image for evidence of blur; this will be apparent if the eye lashes
- 994 do not appear as crisp lines.

## 995 7.8 Performance specifications for PIV compliance

- The core cross-vendor interoperability specification is met by establishing requirements on iris cameras and on
- components preparing and matching [IRISSTD] records as described in sub-clauses 7.8.1.1, 7.8.1.2, and 7.8.1.3
- 998 7.8.1.1 Conformance of iris cameras
- 999 7.8.1.1.1 Scope
- 1000 The following sub-clauses support interoperable recognition of iris images. The sub-clauses of this clause regulate the
- iris camera interface, iris camera properties and, separately, image-specific properties.
- 1002 7.8.1.1.2 Number of eyes captured
- All PIV enrollment, re-issuance, and registration office operations shall be performed using cameras capable of
- imaging both eyes of the PIV applicant simultaneously, or each eye sequentially.
- 1005 PIV authentication attempts **shall** be performed using cameras capable of imaging one or two eyes of the PIV
- 1006 cardholder.
- 1007 **7.8.1.1.3** Rectilinear imaging and aspect ratio
- 1008 The output of the camera **shall** be a rectilinear image of the iris region. The digital representation of the iris **shall** have
- an aspect ratio between 0.98 and 1.02. This requires that the pixel pitch along the two axes of the sensor substrate
- 1010 **shall** be equal to within 4%.
- 1011 **7.8.1.1.4** Iris size
- All iris images prepared in PIV (for cards, for authentication and other purposes) shall have an iris radius between 70
- and 140 pixels. This should usually be achieved by appropriate optical design of the imaging system.
- 1014 If the camera or client software detects an iris of radius outside this range, re-capture of the PIV cardholder should be
- attempted at least two times. If the iris radius remains outside the range, a conformant image **shall** be prepared by
- re-sampling using an interpolation algorithm of cubic or higher order, e.g. bi-cubic interpolation.
- 1017 7.8.1.1.5 Spectral properties of the illuminant
- The iris camera shall use one or more dedicated infra-red illuminators. The spectrum shall be such that 95% of the
- power shall be between 720 and 870nm, and 35% of the power shall exist within each and every 100nm band in that
- interval. The spectral measurement **shall** be time-averaged over an interval comparable with the duration of an iris
- 1021 capture attempt.
- 1022 7.8.1.1.6 Safety of the illuminant
- 1023 The camera shall conform to the limits specified for infrared illumination given in [ICNIRP-LED, ICNIRP-BB] and the
- threshold limit values specified in [ACGIH].
- 7.8.1.1.7 Performance specifications for PIV cameras
- The camera shall support accurate recognition. An iris camera shall be certified if
- 1027 It produces, in conjunction with client-side software, both
- 1028 Conformant Table 14 [IRISSTD, Image Type 7] instances suitable for enrollment on PIV cards,

- Conformant Table 15 [IRISSTD, Image Type 1] instances suitable for use in an authentication transaction, 1029 It passes a biometric performance test that 1030 Is conducted in conformance to [PERF-ACS], 1031 Reports three attempt FTE < 1% 1032 П Reports three attempt FRR < 1% and FAR < 0.1% using only a PIV compliant [IRISSTD] generator and matcher. 1033 Retains all [IRISSTD] images to be used in offline comparisons and confirmation of the online results for 1034 which FMR shall be at or below 0.01%. 1035 It refuses to output images when presented with images of irises printed 1036 on three substrates including one IR-transparent one, 1037 at life-like sizes, and 1038 1039 with and without a prototypical facial surround, and collected in both 1040 visible light and printed in both color and in grayscale 1041 infra-red light and printed in grayscale 1042
- Users of this standard are cautioned that these camera specifications support 1:1 authentication. They are likely insufficient for 1:N identification applications and should not be used to qualify cameras for such.
- EDITOR'S NOTE 1 The requirement for the camera to pass a biometric performance test is instituted until such time as an imaging specifications and associated test methods are developed. Such an approach is used for ten-print fingerprint scanners [APP/F]. Only certain elements are currently available for iris cameras.
- 1048 EDITOR'S NOTE 2 A more detailed profile of [PERF-ACS] is under development.

## 7.8.1.2 Conformance of iris record generators

Production of the standard PIV records of clause 7.4 is a non-trivial task because it requires iris detection, and localization, and preparation of the Figure 4C image. A standard record generator **shall** be certified if:

- 1. it converts all input PIV representative captured images to Table 14 [IRISSTD] records, and
- 2. all records are syntactically conformant to [IRISSTD], and
  - 3. it converts 90% of PIV representative captured images to Table 14 [IRISSTD] records in fewer than 0.5 seconds<sup>17</sup> each, and
  - 4. all certified matchers verify its records with FNMR less than or equal to 1% at an FMR of 0.01%.

# 7.8.1.3 Conformance of iris image matchers

A recognition algorithm is certified on the basis of its speed of computation, and on the error rates observed when it matches records in interoperability tests. A recognition algorithm shall be certified if:

- 1. it compares all pairs of Table 29 [MINUSTD] templates to scalar scores, and
- 2. it executes 90% of its native template comparisons in fewer than 0.1 seconds<sup>4</sup> each, and
- it matches Table 14 [IRISSTD] records from all certified record generators with FNMR less than or equal to 1% at a FMR of 1%.

## 1064 7.8.1.4 Test methods

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The performance specifications of clauses 7.8.1.2 and 7.8.1.3 shall be tested in an offline test using sequestered image data. NIST's expects to establish the IREX IV program to implement this test.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> This specification applies to a commercial-off-the-shelf PC procured in 2005 and equipped with a 2GHz processor and 512 MB of main memory. This specification **shall** be adjusted by the testing organization to reflect significant changes of the computational platform.

## 7.9 Performance specifications for PIV operations

## 1068 **7.9.1** Iris capture interface

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For all PIV processes (initial enrollment, issuance, reissuance, and authentication), the iris camera or its client software shall implement the capture interface given in Annex B.

## 7.9.2 Iris recognition interface

For all PIV processes requiring iris recognition (e.g. authentication), the camera or its client software **shall** implement the recognition interface given in Annex C.

# 1074 **7.9.3** Iris recognition minimum accuracy requirements

FIPS 140 establishes minimum specifications for authentication for activation of crypto-modules. This clause defines analogous specifications for one-to-one iris recognition attempts.

# 7.9.4 Requirements

The threshold for the iris recognition algorithm **shall** be set to achieve false match rates at or below the values given in Table 16. These rates are zero-effort match rates, meaning they apply to the comparison of single pairs of randomly selected images from different persons.

#### Table 16 – Maximum permissible false match rates for iris comparison

PIV function	Maximum allowed FMR when only	Maximum allowed FMR when two	Maximum allowed FMR when two
	one eye is planned to be used	eyes are planned to be available	eyes are planned to be available
		and one or both eyes may be used	and will always be used
PIV issuance, PIV re-issuance	0.00003	0.00006	0.00001
PIV replacement	0.00003	0.00006	0.00001
PIV physical access authentication	0.0001	0.0004	0.00003
PIV logical access authentication	0.0001	0.0006	0.00003

This specification does not establish false rejection performance – how often genuine users are not able to successfully authenticate. The false match criteria can trivially be met by setting a low (i.e. stringent) comparison threshold. A lower threshold implies elevated false rejection errors. Agencies are cautioned that false rejection performance is operationally vital in access control applications and is achieved by using highly performing cameras, by correct control of the environment, adherence to enrolment specifications, subject and operator instruction, and by use of highly performing recognition algorithms. Agencies are therefore strongly encouraged to consider:

- 1089 Establishing a policy on how many times a subject can attempt to authenticate
- 1090 Establishing false rejection accuracy criteria against which tests and qualification procedures can be developed
- 1091 Referring to false rejection performance measures reported for algorithms passing the IREX test and calibration procedure.
- 1093 Consider requiring more stringent false match requirements

#### 7.9.5 Conformance

The false match rate requirements **shall** be confirmed as follows. Iris recognition algorithms **shall** be submitted to NIST's Iris Exchange (IREX) test and calibration program. That program shall provide the algorithm developer with a tabulation of FMR vs. threshold calibration. Thereafter, the algorithm provider or integrator **shall** provide signed attestation that:

- All components of the iris recognition software (including iris detection, template generation and recognition algorithm) are identical to those submitted to the IREX test and calibration procedure.
- The authentication threshold has been set to the value produced by the IREX FMR vs. threshold calibration

The IREX test measurements are obtained by running iris recognition algorithms on commodity PC hardware. The use of iris recognition algorithms on other platforms, such as wall mounted embedded processors, is allowed. The algorithm provider **shall** submit the same software to the IREX test wherever it is ultimately installed.

1105 NOTE The IREX program also produces measurements of false rejection performance.

# 8. Facial image specifications

#### 8.1 Scope

[FIPS, Clause 4.4.1] requires collection of a facial image from PIV applicants, and indicates that it may be used for generation of the printed image [FIPS, Clause 4.1.4.1] and for augmentation of human authentication of the card holder. The face specification in this document supports those activities, and establishes a storage format for retention of facial images. This document neither requires nor precludes agencies from retaining facial images. However, if an agency elects to retain them, then they **shall** be stored in the format specified here. As with other biometric elements, agencies may elect to store face data on the PIV card and use it for automated verification. Although this clause places no normative requirements on such agency-optional activities, it does specify an image suited for automated biometric enrollment and face recognition.

The face specification is has a very similar format, and is functionally identical to, the ISO/IEC 19794-5:2005 face image adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization for e-Passports. While [FIPS] does not allow automated face recognition for authentication, this specification is very well suited for such. However, note that two images are involved in one-to-one applications such as a physical access control authentication attempt:

- Enrollment image: The PIV image as specified here.
- Authentication image: Additional specification of the collection is typically necessary to address subject height variations and the illumination environment (see [BSI-FACE], for example).

## 8.2 Acquisition and format

This clause provides specifications for the retention of facial images. Facial images collected during PIV Registration **shall** be formatted such that they conform to INCITS 385-2004 [FACESTD]. In addition to establishing a format, [FACESTD] specifies how a face image should be acquired. This is done to improve image quality and, ultimately, performance. The images **shall** be embedded within the CBEFF structure defined in Clause 9. Because [FACESTD] is generic across applications it includes clauses that have either-or requirements. Table 17 is an application profile of [FACESTD] tailored for PIV. It gives concrete specifications for much of the generic content. Column 3 references the clauses of [FACESTD] and columns 4 and 5 give [FACESTD] requirements. For PIV, column 6 of Table 17 gives normative practice or value specifications. The table is not conformant with the Implementation Conformance Statement [ICS] standard. Particularly it extends the function of ICS but because it has the needed rows it may be useful in construction of a traditional ICS. Nevertheless the addition of a "values supported column" as specified in Clause 9.1 of [ICS] should be used by implementers for checking conformance to the specifications.

INCITS 385 is likely to be revised by the INCITS M1 committee. Such revisions are irrelevant to PIV; however implementations should respect the version number on Line 5 of Table 17.

Table 17 – INCITS 385 profile for PIV facial images

		Clause title and/or field name (Numbers in parentheses are	INCITS 385-2004		PIV Conformance	Informative Remarks
		[FACESTD] clause numbers)	Field or content	Value Required	Values Allowed	illioilliative neillaiks
1.		Byte Ordering (5.2.1)	NC		A	Big Endian
2.		Numeric Values (5.2.2)	NC		A	Unsigned Integers
3.	CBEFF			MV	Patron format PIV	Multi-field CBEFF Header. Sec. o.
4.		Format Identifier (5.4.1)	MF	MV	0x46414300	i.e. ASCII "FAC\o"
5.		Version Number (5.4.2)	MF	MV	0x30313000	i.e. ASCII "010\0"
6.	Facial Header	Record Length (5.4.3)	MF	MV	MIT	See Note 1
7.		Number of Facial Images (5.4.4)	MF	MV	≥1	One or more images ( $K \ge 1$ ). See Notes 2 and 3, and also line 20.
8.		Facial image Block Length (5.5.1)	MF	MV	MIT	
9.	Fasial lada Cinada	Number of Feature Points (5.5.2)	MF	MV	≥ 0	Positive, if features computed
10.	Facial Info. Single	Gender (5.5.3)	MF	OV	OIT	The sec fields as a substant with as a suite of the
	instance of subject- specific info.	Eye color (5.5.4)	MF	OV	OIT	These fields populated with meaningful values at agency discretion, otherwise o
12.	specific iiiio.	Hair color (5.5.5)	MF	OV	OIT	for unspecified.
13.		Feature Mask (5.5.6)	MF	OV	OIT	Tor unspecified.
14.		Expression (5.5.7)	MF	OV	1	Neutral

			(Numbers in parentheses are		INCITS 38	5-2004	PIV	
					Field or	Value	Conformance	Informative Remarks
		TFACESTIDI clause numbers)		content	Required	Values Allowed		
15.			Pose Angles (5.5	.8)	MF	OV	О	Unspecified = Frontal
16.			Pose Angle Unce	MF	OV	0	Attended operation so should be frontal.	
17.			MPEG4 Features (5.6.1)		NC		OIT	
18.	Featur	°A5	Center of Facial F		NC		OIT	
19.	Catui	<b>C3</b>		e Block Encoding	OF	ov	OIT	
_			(5.6.3)					
20.			Facial Image Typ		MF	MV	1	See Note 4.
21.			Image Data Type	(5.7.2)	MF	MV	O Or 1	See Note 5. Compression algorithm.
22.		In Co. Earth	Width (5.7.3)		MF	MV	MIT	See Note 7.
	image	Info. Each	Height (5.7.4) Image Color Spa	50 (5.7.5)	MF MF	MV MV	MIT 1	sRGB. See Note 8.
<u> </u>		-specific info.	Source Type (5.7		MF	MV	2 or 6	Digital still or digital video
25.	iiiiage	specific into:	Device Type (5.7	.0)	IVII	1010	2010	Digital Still of digital video
26.				device ID) (5.7.7)	MF	MV	MIT	
27.			Quality (5.7.8)	device 10) (3.7.7)	MF	MV	Α	[FACESTD] requires o (unspecified)
	Image	Data	Data Structure (5	5.8.1)	MF	MV	MIT	Compressed Data
				,,,,,,				
29.	9	Luk cuttana	Inheritance (6.1)		NC		A	
30.	Basic (clause	Inheritance	Image Data Enco	ding (6.2)	NC		А	See Note 5
31.	Clar		Image Data Com	pression (6.3)	NC		A	See Notes 5+6
32.	jc (		Facial Header (6.	4.1)	NC		A	Include 4 fields
33.	Bas	Format	Facial Information		NC		A	Include 9 fields
34.			Image Information	on (6.4.3)	NC		A	Include 8 fields
35.		Inheritance	Inheritance (7.1)		NC		Α	Inherits Basic
36.			Purpose (7.2.1)		NC		Α	frontal Annex A
37-			Pose (7.2.2)		NC		Frontal	+/- 5 degrees
38.			Expression (7.2.3)		NC		Neutral	
39.			Assistance in positioning face (7.2.4)		NC		A	Only the subject appears
40.			Shoulders (7.2.5)		NC		Α	Body + Face toward camera
41.		Scene	Backgrounds (7.2		NC		Annex A.4.3	Uniform
42.			Subject and scen		NC		A	Uniform
43.			Shadows over th	· /	NC		A	None
44.			Eye socket shado		NC NC		A	None Should be absent. Diffuse light.
45.	5		Hot spots (7.2.10		NC		A	5
46.	Frontal (clause 7)		Eye glasses (7.2.1 Eye patches (7.2.		NC		A	Subject's normal condition  Medical only
47· 48.	cla		Exposure (7.3.2)	12)	NC		A	No saturation
49.	) Je		Focus and Depth	of Field (7.2.2)	NC		A	In focus
50.	ont		Unnatural Color		NC		A	White balance
70.	늍	Photographic	Color or grayscal				A + no	
51.			enhancement (7.		NC		recompress	No post-processing
	1		· ·	of the camera lens			A + Follow	
52.			(7.3.6)		NC		Annex A.8	
53.				aspect ratio (7.4.2.1)			Α	1:1 pixels
54.			Geometry	origin (7.4.2.2)			Α	top left is 0,0
55.				Density (7.4.3.1)	NC		A	7 bits dynamic range in gray
56.		Digital	Color Profile	Color Sat (7.4.3.2)	NC		A	7 bits dynamic once in grayscale
57.			Color Fronie	Color space (7.4.3.3)	NC		24 bit RGB	Option a, reported in color space field
			1 1 1				above. See Note 8	
58.			Video Interlacing	(7.4.4)	NC	-	Α	Interlaced sensors are not permitted.
59.		Inheritance	Inheritance (8.1)		NC		A	Inherits Frontal + Basic
60.	se 8	Scene	Width of Head (8.3.4)		NC	-	A	Inherits Frontal + Basic
61.	aus				NC	-	A	Nose on vertical centerline
62.	[ C	Photographic			NC	-	A	Above horizontal centerline
63.	ntal	• •			NC		A	See Note 7
64.	Frontal (clause 8)	Digital	Length of Head (8.3.5)		NC	-	A	See Note 7
65.		Digital	Resolution (8.4.1)		NC		CC ≥ 240	See Note 7
66.	[ 교	Format	Inheritance (8.5.	<u>,                                      </u>	NC NC	-	A	
67.		 NDLE	Image Information	JII (0.5.2 <i>)</i>	INC		A	
EINL	OF TABLE							

Acron	ym	Meaning
FAC	Face Information Record	Facial header + facial info + repetition of (image info + image data)
MF	mandatory field	[FACESTD] requires a field <b>shall</b> be present in the FAC
OF	optional field	[FACESTD] allows a field to be present in record
MV	mandatory value	[FACESTD] requires a meaningful value for a field
OV	optional value	[FACESTD] allows a meaningful value or allows 0 to be used to connote "unspecified"
NC	normative content	[FACESTD] gives normative practice for PIV. Such clauses do not define a field in the FAC.
Α	as required	For PIV, value or practice is as specified in [FACESTD]
MIT	mandatory at time of	For PIV, mandatory value that <b>shall</b> be determined at the time the record is instantiated and <b>shall</b>
////	instantiation	follow the practice specified in [FACESTD]
OIT	optional at time of instantiation	For PIV, optional header value that may be determined at the time the record is instantiated

#### **NORMATIVE NOTES:**

- 1. If facial imagery is stored on the PIV Card, the length of the entire record **shall** fit within the container size limits specified in [800-73]. These limits apply to the entire CBEFF wrapped and signed entity, not just the [FACESTD] record. Key lengths and signing algorithms are specified in [800-78]. The size of the digital signature scales with the key length; it does not scale with the size of the biometric record.
- 2. More than one image may be stored in the record. It may be appropriate to store several images if appearance changes over time (beard, no beard, beard) and images are gathered at re-issuance. The most recent image **shall** appear first and serve as the default provided to applications.
- 3. When facial imagery is stored on the PIV Card, only one image shall be stored.
- 4. PIV facial images shall conform to the Full Frontal Image Type defined in Clause 8 of [FACESTD].
- 5. Facial image data **shall** be formatted in either of the compression formats enumerated in Clause 6.2 of [FACESTD]. Both whole-image and single-region-of-interest (ROI) compression are permitted. This document ([800-76]) recommends that newly collected facial image should be compressed using ISO/IEC 15444 (i.e. JPEG 2000). This applies when images will be input to automated face recognition products for authentication, and when images are stored on PIV Cards. In this latter case, ROI compression should be used. The older ISO/IEC 10918 standard (i.e. JPEG) should be used only for legacy images.
- 6. Facial images **shall** be compressed using a compression ratio no higher than 15:1. However, when facial images are stored on PIV Cards JPEG 2000 should be used with ROI compression. The innermost region should be centered on the face and compressed at no more than 24:1.
- 7. Face recognition performance is a function of the spatial resolution of the image. [FACESTD] does not specify a minimum resolution for the Full Frontal Image Type. For PIV, faces **shall** be acquired such that a 20 centimeter target placed on, and normal to, a camera's optical axis at a range of 1.5 meters **shall** be imaged with at least 240 pixels across it. This ensures that the width of the head (i.e. dimension CC in Figure 8 of [FACESTD]) **shall** have sufficient resolution for the printed face element of the PIV Card. This specification and Clause 8.3.4 of [FACESTD] implies that the image width **shall** exceed 420 pixels. This resolution specification **shall** be attained optically without digital interpolation. The distance from the camera to the subject should be greater than or equal to 1.5 meters (for distortion reasons discussed in [FACESTD, Annex A.8]). The size specification is a minimum: When images are to be used for automated face recognition higher resolution is likely to yield lower error rates.
- 8. Facial image data **shall** be converted to the sRGB color space if it is stored. As stated in Clause 7.4.3.3 of [FACESTD] this requires application of the color profile associated with the camera in use.

# 9. Common header for PIV biometric data

All PIV biometric data **shall** be embedded in a data structure conforming to Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework [CBEFF]. This specifies that all biometric data **shall** be digitally signed and uniformly encapsulated. This covers: the PIV Card fingerprints mandated by [FIPS]; any other biometric data agencies elect to place on PIV Cards; any biometric records that agencies elect to retain (including purely proprietary, or derivative, elements); and any biometric data retained by, or for, agencies or Registration Authorities. The [EBTS] data of clause 3.7 is exempt.

All such data **shall** be signed in the same manner as prescribed in [FIPS 201] and [800-73] for the mandatory biometric elements. The signature is present for integrity and **shall** be stored in the CBEFF signature block. The overall arrangement is depicted in Table 18.

Table 18 – CBEFF concatenation structure

CBEFF_HEADER	CBEFF_BIOMETRIC_RECORD	CBEFF_SIGNATURE_BLOCK
Clause 9	Clauses 3.4, 3.6, 7.4. 7.5 and 8.2	FIPS 201
INCITS 398 5.2.1	INCITS 398 5.2.2	INCITS 398 5.2.3

The CBEFF Header specified in Table 19 and its notes will be established by NIST as Patron Format "PIV". This format will be established as a formal Patron Format per the provisions of [CBEFF, 6.2]. It adds definitive data types and the FASC-N field mandated by [FIPS] to a subset of the fields given in Patron Format A [CBEFF, Annex A]. It exists independently of Patron Format A. All fields of the format are mandatory.

Table 19 – Patron format PIV specification

	Patron Format PIV Field (Numbers in	Length	PIV Data	PIV Conformance
	parentheses are [CBEFF] clauses)	Bytes	Туре	Required Value
1.	Patron Header Version (5.2.1.4)	1	UINT	0x03
2.	SBH Security Options (5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2)	1	Bitfield	See Note 2
3.	BDB Length	4	UINT	Length, in bytes, of the biometric data CBEFF_BIOMETRIC_RECORD
4.	SB Length	2	UINT	Length, in bytes, of the CBEFF_SIGNATURE_BLOCK. See Note 3
5.	BDB Format Owner (5.2.1.17)	2	UINT	Table 20, row "Biometric Format Owner" – which standards developer
6.	BDB Format Type (5.2.1.17)	2	UINT	Table 20, row "Biometric Format Type" – which standard
7.	Biometric Creation Date (5.2.1.10)	8		See Note 4 for data type
8.	Validity Period (5.2.1.11)	16		See Note 5 for data type
9.	Biometric Type (5.2.1.5)	3	UINT	Table 20, row "Biometric Type" – which modality
10.	Biometric Data Type (5.2.1.7)	1	Bitfield	Table 20, row "Biometric Data Type" – what degree of processing
11.	Biometric Data Quality (5.2.1.9)	1	SINT	[-2,100]. A value of -2 shall denote that assignment was not supported by the
				implementation; A value of -1 shall indicate that an attempt to compute a
				quality value failed. Values from 0 to 100 shall indicate an increased
				expectation that the sample will ultimately lead to a successful match.
12.	Creator (5.2.1.12)	18	Note 6	See Note 6 for data type
13.	FASC-N	25	Note 7	See Note 7 for data type
14.	Reserved for future use	4		0x0000000

## Table 20 - CBEFF content for specific modalities

Quantity	Fingerprint Images	Fingerprint Templates	Iris Images	Facial Images	Other modalities	
Clause	3.4	3.6		0	-	
Biometric Format	0x001B	0x001B	ox0101 i.e.	0x001B	For other biometric	
Owner	i.e. M1, the INCITS	i.e. M1, the INCITS Technical	ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC	i.e. M1, the INCITS	data on PIV Cards, or	
	Technical	Committee on Biometrics	37 Biometrics	Technical	retained by agencies,	
	Committee on			Committee on	this field shall be	
	Biometrics			Biometrics	assigned in accordance	
Biometric Format Type	0x0401	0X0201	ox0009	0x0501	with [CBEFF, 5.2.1.17].	
Biometric Type	0x0000 0008	0x0000 0008	0x0000 0002	0x0000 0010	0X0	
Biometric Data Type	boo1xxxxxx i.e. raw	b100xxxxx i.e. processed	bo10xxxxx i.e.	boo1xxxxx i.e.	[CBEFF, 5.2.1.7] has 3	
			Intermediate	raw	categories for the	
					degree biometric data	
					has been processed.	
Quality value	Quality value shall be	e Q = 20*(6 - NFIQ) where NFIQ is	See NOTE 8	The [FACESTD]		
	computed using the	method of [NFIQ].		zero value shall be		
				coded here as -2.		
	When multiple views or samples of a biometric are contained in the record the largest (i.e. best) value should be reported. For all biometric data, whether stored on a PIV Card or otherwise, the quality value shall be a signed into					
	between -2 and 100 p	per the text of INCITS 358.				

#### **NORMATIVE NOTES:**

- 1. Unsigned integers are denoted by UINT. Signed integers are denoted by SINT. Multi-byte integers **shall** be in Big Endian byte order.
- 2. The security options field has two acceptable values. The value boooo1101 indicates that the biometric data block is digitally signed but not encrypted; the value boooo1111 indicates the biometric data block is digitally signed and encrypted. For the mandatory [MINUSTD] elements on the PIV Card the value **shall** be boooo1101.
  - The fourth bit (mask oxo8) is set per prior versions of this document. The third bit (mask oxo4), which in each case is set, implements the [CBEFF, 5.2.1.2] requirement that digital signature is differentiated from message authentication code. The second bit (mask oxo2) indicates the use of encryption. The first bit (mask oxo1) indicates the use of a digital signature. See [FIPS, 800-78] for specifications on digital signatures.
- 3. The signature **shall** be computed over the concatenated CBEFF\_HEADER and CBEFF\_BIOMETRIC\_RECORD in Table 18. The CBEFF\_HEADER is given in Table 19. This includes the signature block length (on line 4) which may not be known before the signature is computed. This problem may be solved by conducting a two phase computation: First a dummy SB length value is inserted, the signature is computed, the signature length is written into the SB length field, and the signature recomputed.
- 4. This is the date that the biometric sample was acquired. For processed samples (e.g. templates) this data should be the date of acquisition of the parent sample. Creation Date **shall** be encoded in eight bytes using a binary representation of "YYYYMMDDhhmmssZ". Each pair of characters (for example, "DD") is coded in 8 bits as an unsigned integer. Thus 17:35:30 December 15, 2005 is represented as: 00010100 00000101 00001110 01011010 where the last byte is the binary representation of the ASCII character Z which is included to indicate that the time is represented in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The field "hh" **shall** code a 24 hour clock value.
  - When multiple samples (e.g. two single finger minutiae views) are included in one record (e.g. an INCITS 378 record) and the Creation Dates are different, the Creation Date shall be the earliest of the multiple views.
- 5. The Validity Period contains two dates each of which shall be coded according to Normative Note 4.
- 6. For PIV the Creator field has length 18 bytes of which the first K ≤ 17 bytes **shall** be printable ASCII characters, and the first of the remaining 18-K **shall** be a null terminator (zero).
- 7. This field **shall** contain the 25 bytes of the FASC-N component of the CHUID identifier, per [800-73, 1.8.{3,4}].
- 1216 8. Iris quality shall be set to 50 pending standardization of a quality metric, via ISO/IEC 29794-6.

# 10. Conformance to this specification

#### 1218 10.1 Conformance

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- 1219 Conformance to this specification will be achieved if an implementation and its associated data records conform to
- the normative ("shall") clauses of clauses 3 through 6. The following text summarizes these statements.

#### 1221 10.2 Conformance to PIV registration fingerprint acquisition specifications

- 1222 Conformance to Clause 3.2 requires the use of an [EFTS, Appendix F] certified scanner to collect a full set of
- fingerprint images and the application of a segmentation algorithm and the [NFIQ]-based quality assurance
- procedure. Images **shall** be conformant to this specification if:
- 1225 The acquisition procedures of 3.2 are followed. This may be tested by human observation.
- 1226 The images are conformant to [FINGSTD] as profiled by Table 4 and its normative notes.

#### 1227 10.3 Conformance of PIV Card fingerprint template records

- 1228 Conformance to Clause 3.4 is achieved by conformance to all the normative content of the clause. This includes
- production of records conformant to [MINUSTD] as profiled in Clause 3.4. Conformance **shall** be tested by inspection
- of the records and performing the test assertions of the "PIV Conformance" column of Table 6. Performance
- certification according to clause 4.5.3.1 is necessary.

# 1232 10.4 Conformance of PIV registration fingerprints retained by agencies

- 1233 Conformance to Clause 3.6 is achieved by conformance to all the normative content of the clause. This includes
- production of records conformant to [FINGSTD] as profiled in Clause 3.6. Conformance **shall** be tested by inspection
- of the records and performing the test assertions of the "PIV Conformance" column of Table 4. Quality values [NFIQ]
- shall be checked against the NIST reference implementation.

#### 10.5 Conformance of PIV background check records

- 1238 Conformance to Clause 3.7 is achieved by conformance to all the normative content of the clause. This necessitates
- conformance to the normative requirements of the FBI for background checks. These **shall** be tested by inspection of
- the transactions submitted to the FBI. This inspection may be performed either by capturing the transactions at the
- submitting agency or at the FBI.

#### 10.6 Conformance to PIV authentication fingerprint acquisition specifications

- 1243 Conformance to Clause 6.2 **shall** be achieved if certification according to [SINGFING] is achieved, and if the resolution
- and area specifications are met. The [SINGFING] certification process entails inspection of output images.

### 1245 10.7 Conformance of PIV facial image records

- 1246 Conformance to Clause 7 **shall** be achieved by conformance to all the normative content of the clause. This includes
- 1247 production of records conformant to [FACESTD] as profiled in Clause 8.2. Conformance shall be tested by inspection
- of records and performing the test assertions of the "PIV Conformance" column of Table 17.

## 1249 10.8 Conformance of CBEFF wrappers

- A PIV implementation will be conformant to clause 9 if all biometric data records, whether or not mandated by this
- document or [FIPS], are encapsulated in conformant CBEFF records. CBEFF records **shall** be conformant if:
- 1252 the fields of the Table 19 header are present;
- 1253 the fields of Table 19 contain the allowed values as governed by its normative notes;
- 1254 a digital signature conformant to [800-78] is present;
- 1255 the values are consistent with the enclosed biometric data and the trailing digital signature.
- An application that tests conformance of PIV biometric data **shall** be provided with appropriate keys to decrypt and
- 1257 check the digital signature.

# 11. References

1259

Citation	Document
800-73	NIST Special Publication 800-73-3, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification
800-78	NIST Special Publication 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification
ACGIH	Threshold Limit Values for Chemical Substances and Physical Agents & Biological Exposure Indices, 2007, ACGIH Worldwide www.acgih.org (American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists).  ANSI/IESNA RP-27.1-05 Recommended Practice for Photobiological Safety for Lamps and Lamp Systems, <a href="http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ANSI%2FIESNA+RP-27.1-05">http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ANSI%2FIESNA+RP-27.1-05</a>
APP/F	See EBTS entry below.
BAZIN	A. Bazin and T. Mansfield. An investigation of minutiae interoperability. In Proc. Fifth IEEE Workhop on Automated Identification Advanced Technologies, June 2007. AUTO-ID 2007, Alghero Italy.
BSI-FACE	Markus Nuppeney, Marco Breitenstein and Matthias Niesing, EasyPASS - Evaluation of face recognition performance in an operational automated border control system. BSI and Secunet, DE. http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/ibpc2010/pdfs/Nuppeney_Marcus_IBPC2010_EasyPASS_Talk_Website.pdf This presentation is accompanied by a supporting paper. http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/ibpc2010/pdfs/Nuppeney2_Marcus_IBPC2010_EasyPASS_Paper_final.pdf
CARD-CMD	ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005 Identification cards Integrated circuit cards Part 4: Organization, security and commands for interchange <a href="http://webstore.iec.ch/preview/info_isoiec7816-4%7Bed2.0%7Den.pdf">http://webstore.iec.ch/preview/info_isoiec7816-4%7Bed2.0%7Den.pdf</a>
CARD-BIO	ISO/IEC 7816-11:2004 Identification cards Integrated circuit cards Part 11: Personal verification through biometric methods <a href="http://webstore.iec.ch/preview/info_isoiec7816-11%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf">http://webstore.iec.ch/preview/info_isoiec7816-11%7Bed1.0%7Den.pdf</a>
CARD-MIN	ISO/IEC FDIS 19794-2:2011 Information technology Biometric data interchange formats Part 2: Finger minutiae data. This standard is NOT INCITS 378 and not ISO/IEC 19794-2:2005.
CBEFF	INCITS 398-2005, American National Standard for Information Technology - Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) <a href="http://webstore.ansi.org">http://webstore.ansi.org</a>
EBTS	AFIS-DOC-01078-9.1 CJIS-RS-0010 (V9.1) – Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification, Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, May 25, 2010. Linked from here <a href="https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/EBTS_v9-1_Final.pdf">https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/EBTS_v9-1_Final.pdf</a> Implementers should consult <a href="https://www.fbibiospecs.org/">https://www.fbibiospecs.org/</a> or request the full EFTS documentation, including Appendix N, from the FBI.
FFSMT	ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2007 – Data Format for the Interchange of Fingerprint, Facial, & Scar Mark & Tattoo (SMT) Information, NIST Special Publication 500-245, 2000. http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ansi_standard.cfm
FINGSTD	INCITS 381-2004, American National Standard for Information Technology - Finger Image-Based Data Interchange Format <a href="http://webstore.ansi.org">http://webstore.ansi.org</a>
FIPS	FIPS 201-2, Personal Identity Verification, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011.  FIPS 201-1 is currently the formal published standard. FIPS 201-2 was released as a draft March 8, 2011.  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsFIPS.html
MANSFIELD	T. Mansfield et al. Research report on minutiae interoperability tests. Technical report, Minutiae Template Interoperability Testing, 2007. <a href="http://www.mtitproject.com/DeliverableD62.pdf">http://www.mtitproject.com/DeliverableD62.pdf</a>
MINUSTD	INCITS 378-2004, American National Standard for Information Technology - Finger Minutiae Format for Data Interchange <a href="http://webstore.ansi.org">http://webstore.ansi.org</a>
FACESTD	INCITS 385-2004, American National Standard for Information Technology - Face Recognition Format for Data Interchange <a href="http://webstore.ansi.org">http://webstore.ansi.org</a>
ICS	Methods for Testing and Specification (MTS); Implementation Conformance Statement (ICS) Proforma style

Citation	Document
	guide. EG 201 058 V1.2.3 (1998-04)
ICNIRP-LED	ICNIRP Statement on Light-Emitting Diodes, Implications for Hazard Assessment <a href="http://www.icnirp.de/documents/led.pdf">http://www.icnirp.de/documents/led.pdf</a>
ICNIRP-BB	ICNIRP Statement on Light-Emitting Diodes, Guidelines on Limits of Exposure to Boadband Incoherent Optical Radiation, <a href="http://www.icnirp.de/documents/broadband.pdf">http://www.icnirp.de/documents/broadband.pdf</a>
IRISSTD	ISO/IEC 19794-6:2011 Information technology — Biometric data interchange formats — Part 6: Iris image data This document revises and replaces the 2005 iris standard.
ISOSWAP	ISO/IEC 19795:2005 Information Technology — Biometric Performance Testing and Reporting — Part 4: Interoperability Performance Testing
MINEX	P. Grother et al., Minutiae Interoperability Exchange Test, Evaluation Report: NISTIR 7296 <a href="http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ominex.cfm">http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/ominex.cfm</a>
MINEX II	P. Grother, W. Salamon, C. Watson, M. Indovina, and P. Flanagan, MINEX II Performance of Fingerprint Matchon-Card Algorithms Phase II / III / IV Report NIST Interagency Report 7477 (Revision I+II) <a href="http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/minexii.cfm">http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/minexii.cfm</a>
NFACS	IAFIS-DOC-07054-1.0, Criminal Justice Information Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, April 2004.
NFIQ	E. Tabassi and C. Wilson - NISTIR 7151 - Fingerprint Image Quality, NIST Interagency Report, August 2004 <a href="http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/bio_quality.cfm">http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/bio_quality.cfm</a>
NFIQ SUMMARY	E. Tabassi and P. Grother - NISTIR 7422 Quality Summarization - Recommendations on Biometric Quality Summarization across the Application Domain
SBMOC	D. Cooper, H. Dang, P. Lee, W. MacGregor, and K. Mehta. Secure Biometric Match-on-Card Feasibility Report. Technical report, National Institute of Standards and Technology, November 2007. Published as NIST Interagency Report 7452.
SINGFING	See "Personal Identity Verification (PIV): Image Quality Specifications For Single Finger Capture Devices". <a href="http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/piv/pivspec.pdf">http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis/piv/pivspec.pdf</a>
WSQ31	WSQ Gray-Scale Fingerprint Image Compression Specification, IAFIS-IC-0110(V3), October 4, 2010. https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/WSQ_Gray-scale_Specification_Version_3_1.pdf

#### A PIV ON-CARD COMPARISON INTERFACE

- 1263 EDITOR's NOTE 1 The interface description below may additionally need cryptographic specifications supporting
- 1264 confidentiality of transmitted finger minutia data.
- 1265 EDITOR'S NOTE 2 The interface specification properly resides in (a future revision) of NIST Special Publication [800-
- 1266 73-3]. It is included here because of it's logical proximity to the on-card data specifications. It is open for public
- 1267 comment.

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## 1268 **A.1 Scope**

- 1269 All cards **shall** be accessed using the mechanisms of this clause. This includes selection of the application, reading and
- use of the Biometric Information Template (BIT), installation of a reference template, verification, recovery of
- 1271 comparison scores, and retrieval of identifiers.

# A.1 Approach to the use of industry standards

- 1273 This interface uses commands from ISO/IEC 7816-4 [CARD CMD]. Particularly it uses odd INS values, indicating that the
- command data fields contain TLV objects. The interface also uses ISO/IEC 7816-11 [CARD BIO] for generic biometric
- requirements, and the ISO/IEC 19794-2:2011 on-card comparison format [CARD MIN] for the particular minutia
- information. In addition, the interface only defines new elements when existing standards are silent on a necessary
- 1277 functionality.

## A.2 Establish Communications

An Answer-to-Reset **shall** be obtained from the card to determine the transmission protocol (T=o, T=1 or T=CL).

#### A.2.1 Store enrolment template on the card

The template **shall** be placed on the card using the APDU of Table 21. It uses the PUT DATA instruction to overwrite

the existing reference template.

1283 Table 21 – Command APDU for storage of reference template

Command Parameter	Required Value	Meaning
CLA	0x00	
INS	0X24	PUT DATA
P1	0x01	New reference data is being added to the card
P2	0x00 0x01	Reference data qualifiers for primary and secondary fingers.
L <sub>c</sub> field		Length of command data field
Data field		Data Object in BER-TLV format to be stored (tag '7F 2E')
L <sub>e</sub> field	Absent	

Table 22 – Response APDU from storage of reference template

Response Parameter	Meaning
Data field	Empty
SW1-SW2	See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005

1285 1286

1287

- If the biometric reference is too long for a single command APDU, then command chaining **shall** be used to send the biometric reference to the card in subsequent APDUs.
- NOTE 1 Bit 5 of CLA set to 0 indicates that the command is the last or only command of a chain. Bit 5 of CLA set to 1 indicates that the command is not the last command of a chain.
- NOTE 2 ISO/IEC 7816-4 does not standardize an APDU for enrolment. PUT DATA is required here, but note that some implementations use '24' CHANGE REFERENCE DATA.

- NOTE 3 Operationally the process of putting the reference data on the card would ordinarily be accompanied by a
- writing the BIT to the card also. This would contain the biometric subtype information (for fingerprints, this is the
- finger position). Such data is not required here because no standard regulates the transmission of such data and
- because the test laboratory would usually only conduct comparisons of same-subtype templates (e.g. right index
- 1296 fingers).

1300 1301

1302

1303

1305

1306

1307 1308

1309

- NOTE 4 Operationally, putting reference data onto the card would generally be preceded by user authentication and
- establishment of a trusted channel to the card."

## A.3 Read of the BIT

The command of Table 23 **shall** be supported to allow retrieval of the BIT group template of Table 8 per the response of Table 24.

Table 23 – Command APDU for retrieval of biometric information template

Command Parameter	Required value	Meaning
CLS	0x00	
INS	oxCB	GET DATA
P1	0x3F	Retrieve from anywhere in the current Dedicated File (Application DF)
P <sub>2</sub>	oXFF	
L <sub>c</sub> field	0x04	
Data field	0X5C 0X02 0X7F61	Data Object identifier to be retrieved (group of BIT)
L <sub>e</sub> field		

Table 24 – Response APDU from retrieval of biometric information template

Response Parameter	Meaning	
Data field	Biometric Information Template	
SW1-SW2	See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005	

# 1304 A.4 Verification

#### A.4.1 APDU specifications

The fingerprint verification data **shall** be sent to the card using the VERIFY command of Table 25. The status code **shall** be returned per Table 26. The required comparison score is returned in a separate GET DATA command, see clause 7.7.2.

Table 25 – Command APDU for comparison of biometric templates

Command Parameter	Meaning	
CLA	00	
INS	21	VERIFY
P1	00	
P <sub>2</sub>	00, 01, 02 or 03	Reference data qualifier under tag 83 in the BITs of Table 8
L <sub>c</sub> field		Length of command data field
Data field		The template
L <sub>e</sub> field	Absent	

- 1311 If the biometric reference is too long for a single command APDU, then command chaining **shall** be used to send the biometric reference to the card in subsequent APDUs.
- NOTE 1 Bit 5 of CLA set to 0 indicates that the command is the last or only command of a chain. Bit 5 of CLA set to 1 indicates that the command is not the last command of a chain.
- NOTE 2 In ISO/IEC 7816-4 the use of command '21' requires verification data to be present (e.g. minutia template).
- 1316 The alternative INS = 20 allows verification data to be absent. Allow INS=20 for query of retry counter?

NOTE 3 Operationally sending biometric authentication data to the card would often be preceded by establishment of a trusted channel.

#### Table 26 – Response APDU from comparison of biometric templates

Response Parameter	Meaning	
Data field	Empty	
SW1-SW2	9000	Normal processing, or
	63CX	Verification failed, 'X' encodes the number of further allowed retries, or
	6300	Verification failed, no further retries allowed - See ISO/IEC 7816-4:2005

# A.4.2 Comparison scores

The on-card comparison algorithm **shall** internally support generation of a comparison score with precision of twobytes or more. This supports the targeting of specific false match mates in clause 5.12. The card **shall** not provide any mechanism for retrieval of the comparison scores from the card.

### A.4.3 Reading comparison subsystem identifier

Table 12 of ISO/IEC 7816-6:2004 provides a structure for application related data under constructed data element tag '6E'. This structure **shall** be readable using the APDU of Table 27 and Table 28. The value returned identifies the PIV Card's comparison algorithm. This algorithm shall be certified according to clause 5.11.3.2.

Table 27 – Command APDU for retrieval of Comparison subsystem identifier

Command Parameter	Meaning	
CLA	00	
INS	СВ	GET DATA
P1	3F	Retrieve from anywhere in the current Dedicated File (Application DF)
P2	FF	
L <sub>c</sub> field	03	length of command data field
Data field	5C	Data Object identifier to be retrieved (Application related data)
	01	
	6E	
L <sub>e</sub> field	00	

The response field **shall** contain a discretionary field, tag '73', containing the comparison subsystem identifier in tag '99'.

Table 28 – Response APDU for retrieval of Comparison subsystem identifier

Response Parameter	Meaning	Minimal response value
Data field		Four byte ISO/IEC 19785-3 (CBEFF) algorithm identifier
SW1-SW2	See ISO/IEC 7816-4	

1337 1338

#### **B** IRIS CAMERA CAPTURE INTERFACE

All iris cameras shall implement the iris interface below. The cameras may implement the facial capture interface.

```
1339
        #region File Information
        // IIrisCamera -- interface for iris cameras
1340
1341
        //
1342
        #endregion
1343
        #region Design description
1344
1345
        // This is a generic interface to iris image capture devices. The purpose for the
1346
        // interface is to enable ready integration of new iris cameras
1347
        //
1348
        // There are multiple means for obtaining images.
1349
1350
        //
        #endregion
1351
1352
        #region Gotchas
1353
        // In client servers -- be careful about the line end character.
1354
        // Windows wants to see a newline (\n)in the netstream/filestream/streamreader
1355
1356
        #endregion
1357
1358
        using System;
1359
1360
        using System.Collections.Generic;
        using System.Text;
1361
        using PIViris.Library;
1362
1363
        namespace PIViris.Library
1364
1365
             public interface IIrisCamera
1366
1367
1368
                 // Unless otherwise noted all strings have printable characters, spaces and tabs only
                 // All properties should return either a legal value or a sensible (e.g. blank string, NaN)
1369
                 // value if the value is not available (and set an error message). They should not crash
1370
                 // no matter the state of the object. If a property is set to a value that is not legal
1371
                 // for the object, the property should be set to the nearest legal value and an error message set.
1372
1373
                 // Interfaces CANNOT define constructors, since C# allows multiple interfaces, but only one
1374
                 // inheritance.
1375
1376
1377
                 // class names should be of the form IrisCamera Manufacturer ModelName
1378
1379
1380
                 // In implementing an IrisCamera class there should be two constructors:
                       IrisCamera_Manufacturer_ModelName() -- no parameters, will be default mode for camera
                 //
                       IrisCamera Manufacturer ModelName(string mode) -- where mode defines the startup configuration
                 //
1381
                 // for the camera -- e.g. Enroll, Verify, Identify, Monitor, Default,
1382
                 // an unknown mode should go to the default for the camera and set an error message
1383
1384
                 // mode Default should always be implemented. The internal storage of the modes should be uppercase.
1385
1386
                 #region Properties -- always available -- these should be available even if the camera is not opened.
                 bool cameraInitialized
1387
1388
                 {
                     get; // true if the camera is initialized and ready
1389
                 }
1390
                 string status
1391
                 {
1392
                     get; // implementation dependent status message, can be null
1393
                 }
1394
1395
                 string lastErrorMessage
1396
                     get; // most recent error messages, can be null, implementation dependent, clears error message
1397
1398
                          // error messages should stack, separated by newlines.
1399
1400
                 string diagnostics
1401
                 {
                     get; // most recent diagnostic message, can be null, implementation dependent, clears the message
1402
                          // diagnostics do not stack, subsequent diagnostics overwrite earlier ones.
1403
                 }
1404
```

```
1405
                int lastSDKErrorCode
1406
1407
                     get;
1408
                }
1409
1410
                string implementationVersion
1411
                     get; // the version of the implemenation, typically the CVS version of the implementation file
1412
1413
                }
1414
                string cameraSDKVersion
1415
                     get; // the version of the camera SDK on which the implementation is built
1416
1417
1418
                string cameraManufacturer
1419
1420
                     get; // may return null string
1421
                }
1422
                string cameraModel
1423
                 {
1424
                     get; // may return null string
1425
                }
1426
                string cameraSerialNumber
1427
                {
1428
                     get; // may return null string
1429
                }
1430
                string cameraOperatingMode
1431
                {
1432
                     get; // set by constructor only. implementation dependent, but must include Default
1433
                          // should likely use Enroll, Verify, Identify, Monitor, Diagnostic as appropriate
                }
1434
1435
1436
                string cameraAddress
1437
                {
1438
                     set; // implementation specific string that identifies the camera to the SDK, e.g. an IP address
1439
1440
1441
                Iris Lab. Library. Constants\_Types. Eye Designator\ camera Default Eye Selection
1442
1443
                     get; // instructs camera on which eye to to try for
1444
                     set; // if the camera does not have this capability, set does nothing, get gets either
1445
1446
1447
                bool canProvideIrisImages
1448
1449
                     get; // should be true for all iris devices with a rudimentary SDK
1450
1451
                bool canProvideFaceImages
1452
                 {
                     get; // true if the face functions are implemented
1453
1454
1455
                bool canAcquireAsynch
1456
                 {
                     get; // true if the image acquisition functions can run asynchronously
1457
1458
                          // false if the image acquisition functions are blocking
1459
1460
                bool canProvideControlPanel
1461
                {
1462
                     get; // true if an onscreen control panel is available
1463
1464
1465
                int recommendedMinimumTimeOutMS
1466
                {
1467
                     get; // recommended minimum timeout in MS
1468
                }
1469
1470
                int irisImageWidth
1471
                {
1472
                     get; // width of the image returned, in pixels, same as irisParameters function
1473
1474
                int irisImageHeight
1475
                {
1476
                     get; // height of the image returned, in pixels, same as irisParameters function
```

```
1477
1478
                int irisImageDepth
1479
                 {
1480
                     get; // depth of the image returned, in bits, same as irisParameters function
1481
1482
                bool irisImageIsColor
1483
                {
                     get; // true if iris image is NOT grayscale
1484
1485
                          // for all systems currently available this would be false
1486
                          // we have it here to allow for future
1487
                }
1488
1489
                int faceImageWidth
1490
                {
1491
                     get; // width of the image returned, in pixels, same as irisParameters function
1492
1493
                int faceImageHeight
1494
                {
1495
                     get; // height of the image returned, in pixels, same as irisParameters function
1496
1497
                int faceImageDepth
1498
                {
1499
                     get; // depth of the image returned, in bits, same as irisParameters function
1500
1501
                bool faceImageIsColor
1502
                {
1503
                     get; // true if face image is color
1504
                          // typically true
1505
                          // we may need to add a property that describes the type of color
1506
                          // for now, RGB, 24 bit is assumed
1507
1508
                System.Drawing.Imaging.ImageFormat faceImageFormat
1509
1510
                     get; // returns the format of the face image e.g bmp, iso, png, jpg
1511
                }
1512
1513
                bool irisParameters(out int width, out int height, out int depthInBits, out int
1514
        recommendedMinimumTimeOutMS);
1515
                // returns true on success
1516
                // provides the width, height of the output iris images
1517
                // provides the depth in bits of the pixels
1518
                // provides the recommended minimum timeout
1519
                // should work even if device is not yet opened
1520
1521
                bool faceParameters(out int width, out int height, out int depthInBits, out int
1522
        recommendedMinimumTimeOutMS);
1523
                // returns true on success, returns false if face not implemented
1524
                // provides the width, height of the output face images
1525
                // provides the depth in bits of the pixels
1526
                // provides the recommended minimum timeout
1527
                 // should work even if device is not yet opened
1528
                #endregion
1529
1530
1531
                 #region Properties - valid only when camera is open
                bool acquisitionComplete
1532
1533
                {
                     get; // true if an asynch image acquisition has completed
1534
1535
                          // false if the acquisition is not complete, not started or
                          // asynch is not implemented
1536
1537
                #endregion
1538
1539
                #region Methods
1540
1541
                bool open(); // initializes the device; returns true on success
1542
                bool reset(); // soft re-open; clears state to initialization state; returns true on success
1543
                bool close(); // closes device and releases resources; returns true on success
1544
1545
                bool showControlPanel(); // shows control panel if available, returns true on success
1546
1547
                // The prompt object should be an object that can resolve to the type of prompt
1548
                // specified by the IrisCameraPromptType variable.
```

```
1549
                 // Set routines return true on success, false on failure
1550
1551
1552
1553
1554
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
                 // If the camera does not implement a particular type of prompt or a particular type of event
                 //
                          the set routines should do nothing silently and return false
                 //
                          the get routines should return false or a null object
                 //
                 // If a particular type/event is supported by the camera but the prompt is not subject to change by the
                 // SDK, the set Prompt routine should do nothing quietly and the get Prompt routine should
                 // return a appropriate object if possible and null otherwise.
                 11
                 // Similarly, if a particular type/event is supported by the camera but cannot be enabled/disabled
1561
1562
                 // under program control the setEnable routine should do nothing quietly and the getEnable should
                 // always return true.
1563
                 bool setPrompt(IrisCameraPromptEvent e, IrisCameraPromptType t, Object prompt);
1564
                 bool setEnablePrompt(IrisCameraPromptEvent e, IrisCameraPromptType t, bool promptEnable);
1565
1566
1567
                 object getPrompt(IrisCameraPromptEvent e, IrisCameraPromptType t, Object prompt);
                 bool getEnablePrompt(IrisCameraPromptEvent e, IrisCameraPromptType t);
1568
1569
1570
                 bool acquireIrisImagesHalt(); // kill an ongoing acquisition -- as if device has timed out
1571
1572
                                                // returns true on successful kill of an ongoing acquire
                                                // silent return of false on attempted kill when nothing ongoing
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
                                                // should clear buffers of any previously acquired images so that
                                                // the next acquire is sure to get a clean image
                 bool acquireFaceImagesHalt(); // kill an ongoing acquisition -- as if device has timed out
                                                // returns true on successful kill of an ongoing acquire
                                                // silent return of false on attempted kill when nothing ongoing
1579
1580
                                                // should clear buffers of any previously acquired images so that
                                                // the next acquire is sure to get a clean image
1581
1582
                 bool acquireIrisImages(out byte[] pixels,
1583
                     out int nImages,
1584
1585
                     out double[] imageQuality,
                     out IrisLab.Library.Constants_Types.EyeDesignator[] whichEye,
1586
                     int timeOutInMS);
1587
                 bool acquireIrisImages(out System.Drawing.Bitmap[] images,
1588
                     out int nImages,
1589
1590
                     out double[] imageQuality,
                     out IrisLab.Library.Constants_Types.EyeDesignator[] whichEye,
1591
                     int timeOutInMS);
1592
1593
1594
                 bool acquireIrisImages(out byte[] pixels,
                     out int nImages,
1595
                     out double[] imageQuality,
1596
                     out IrisLab.Library.Constants_Types.EyeDesignator[] whichEye,
1597
                     int timeOutInMS, bool blocking);
1598
                 bool acquireIrisImages(out System.Drawing.Bitmap[] images,
1599
                     out int nImages,
1600
                     out double[] imageQuality,
1601
                     out IrisLab.Library.Constants_Types.EyeDesignator[] whichEye,
1602
                     int timeOutInMS, bool blocking);
1603
1604
                 // Description - acquireIrisImages
1605
                 // initiates an acquisition sequence -- system must be opened/initialized before this call
1606
                 // pixels: nImages worth of pixels in order frame, row, column
                 // images: nImages worth of bitmaps
1607
1608
                 // irisImageFilenames: an array of filenames -- not full paths -- that have been saved
1609
                                         in a well known shared directory
1610
                 // nImages: the number of images acquired, zero if no images
1611
                 // imageQuality: a floating point image quality metric for each of nImages
1612
                 // whichEye: [L,R,U] for left, right, unknown for each image
1613
                 // blocking: if true or absent, call is blocking.
1614
                               if false AND asynch acquisition is implemented the call will return
                 //
1615
                               immediately. Use acquisitionComplete to test a non-blocking call
                 //
                               Use blocking version to get images
1616
                 //
1617
                 //
1618
                 // returns true on success; returns false if an error occurs; if error occurs the
1619
                 // the error message and error code can be retrieved with errorMessage and errorCode
1620
                 // returns false with null arrays if not implemented
```

```
1622
1623
                bool acquireFaceImages(out System.Drawing.Bitmap[] images,
1624
                                       out int nImages.
                                       int timeOutInMS);
1625
1626
                // bool acquireFaceImages(out string[] faceImageFilenames,
1627
                //
                                         out int nImages,
1628
                                         int timeOutInMS);
                //
1629
                // bool acquireFaceImages(out byte[] pixels,
163ó
                         out int nImages,
                //
1631
                         int timeOutInMS);
                11
1632
1633
                bool acquireFaceImages(out System.Drawing.Bitmap[] images,
1634
                                      out int nImages,
1635
                                      int timeOutInMS, bool blocking);
1636
                // Description acquireFaceImages
1637
                // initiates an acquisition sequence -- system must be opened/initialized before this call
1638
                // the face images may have been acquired on the previous acquireIrisImages call
1639
                // faceImageFilenames: an array of filenames -- not full paths -- that have been saved
                                       in a well known shared directory
1640
                //
1641
                // pixels: nImages worth of pixels in order frame, row, column
1642
                // images: nImages worth of bitmaps
1643
                // nImages: number of images acquired. Zero if no image acquired
1644
                // timeOutInMS: timeout for both blocking and non-blocking calls
1645
                //
                                 blocking calls will return after the timeout
1646
                                 non-blocking calls will report completion and an error after timeout
                //
1647
                // blocking: if true or absent, call is blocking.
1648
                              if false AND asynch acquisition is implemented the call will return
                //
1649
                //
                              immediately. Use acquisitionComplete to test a non-blocking call
1650
                              Use blocking version to get images
                //
1651
                11
1652
                // returns true on success; returns false if an error occurs; if error occurs the
1653
                // the error message can be retrieved with errorMessage
1654
                // returns false with null arrays if not implemented
1655
1656
                string ToString(); // returns a camera description suitable for use in a combo box
1657
                #endregion
1658
            }
1659
        }
1660
1661
```

1664

1665

#### C IRIS RECOGNITION INTERFACE SPECIFICATION

All iris recognition implementations, including template generators and matchers, shall implement the interface of this Annex.

```
1666
         #region File Information
1667
         // ITemplateEngine -- interface for biometric template engines
1668
1669
         #endregion
167ó
1671
1672
         #region Design description
1673
         // This is a minimalist design that could, with little or no modification be used for face
1674
         // as well as iris.
1675
        //
1676
        // The principle methods are for generation/comparison and saving/loading of biometric templates
1677
         //
1678
        // The properties expose
1679
             version of the underlying SDK or library
1680
         //
             error codes and messages
1681
             native width and height of input images
         //
1682
             options for handling images that are not of native height and width
         //
1683
             options for handling templates
         //
1684
             diagnostics from template generation
         //
1685
             flags that indicate the capabilities (can...) of the implementation
         //
1686
         //
1687
         // This interface uses the BiometricsLibrary class to provide a minimalist image structure,
1688
         // BiometricsLibraryPixels, to hold images being processed.
1689
1690
         #endregion
1691
1692
         #region ToDo
1693
         // TODO: Add documentation on what to do with properties and methods that cannot be implemented
1694
         // TODO: Convert comments to ///
1695
         #endregion
1696
1697
         using System;
1698
         using System.Collections.Generic;
1699
         using System.Text;
1700
1701
         namespace PIViris.Library
1702
1703
             public interface ITemplateEngine
1704
1705
                 #region Properties
1706
                 // Readonly - returns information about the underlying SDK or library
1707
                 string SDKManufacturer
1708
                 {
1709
                     get;
1710
 1711
                 string SDKModel
 1712
                 {
 1713
                     get;
1714
1715
                 string SDKVersion
1716
                 {
1717
                     get;
1718
                 }
1719
1720
                 // Readonly - returns the version of the implemented class -- typically CVS version
1721
                 string implementationVersion
1722
                 {
1723
                     get;
1724
                 }
1725
1726
                 // Error messages stack up in a string; this retrieves the stack and clears it; readonly
1727
                 string lastErrorMessage
1728
                 {
1729
                     get;
```

```
1730
1731
                  // Returns last error code produced by the underlying SDK, zero if no error
1732
                  int lastSDKErrorCode
1733
                  {
1734
1735
                      get;
                  }
1736
1737
                  // Readonly -- the size image that the engine expects as a default
1738
1739
                  int imageWidthNative
1740
1741
                      get;
1742
                  int imageHeightNative
1743
                  {
1744
                      get;
1745
                  }
1746
1747
1748
1749
1750
                  // Readonly -- the dimensions of the template if it were represented as a bitmap
                  // return -1 if the template does not have dimensions
                  // return -1 if the template does not have a fixed size
                  // The size, width and height include the mask if it exists
1751
1752
                  int templateWidth
                  {
1753
                      get;
1754
1755
1756
1757
                  int templateHeight
                  {
                      get;
1758
1759
                  int templateSizeBytes
1760
1761
                  {
                      get;
1762
1763
                  bool templateHasMask
1764
                  {
1765
1766
1767
1768
                  // Readonly -- exposes the capabilities of the engine
1769
1770
1771
                  bool canComputeTemplate
                  {
                      get;
1772
1773
                  bool canCompareTemplates
1774
1775
                  {
                      get;
1776
1777
                  bool canProvideTemplateDiagnostics
1778
1779
1780
                  {
1781
                  bool canProvideTemplateDiagnosticImage
1782
1783
1784
1785
                  {
                  }
1786
                  // Read-write -- if given an ILLEGAL value for the engine, the value should be set to a legal default
1787
                  // silently -- just set the error message and code
1788
                  PIViris.Library.Constants_Types.imageConversionModeEnum imageConversionMode
1789
                  {
1790
                      set;
1791
1792
1793
                      get;
                  PIViris.Library.Constants_Types.matchScoreTypeEnum matchScoreType
1794
1795
                      set; // make sure to force to legal value for algorithm
1796
                      get;
1797
1798
                  int searchRange
1799
1800
                      set;
1801
                      get;
```

```
1802
                 }
1803
1804
                 // the quality and diagnostics are provided for the last generated template
1805
                 PIViris.Library.Constants Types.templateDiagnosticsType templateDiagnostics
1806
                 {
1807
                     get;
1808
1809
                 System.Drawing.Bitmap templateDiagnosticImage
1810
1811
                     get;
1812
                 }
1813
1814
                 double templateQuality // of the last computed template
1815
                 {
1816
                     get;
1817
                 }
1818
                 double matchQuality
                                         // of the last computed match
1819
                 {
182Ó
                     get;
1821
1822
                 double matchAngle
                                         // of the last computed match
1823
                 {
1824
                     get:
1825
                 }
1826
1827
                 #endregion
1828
1829
1830
                 #region Methods -- Generate templates
1831
                 // Bitmap wrapper for the other generate template methods. The width and height
1832
                 // are contained in bitmap parameter.
1833
                 bool generateTemplate(ref System.Drawing.Bitmap inputImage, out byte[] template);
1834
1835
                 // Byte array methods
1836
                 // These routines take a one dimensional pixel array and generate a one dimensional template;
1837
                 // the routines which accept width and height will convert the image to the native image
1838
                 // dimensions using the image conversion mode. If width/height are not supplied, native
1839
                 // width and height are assumed.
1840
                 bool generateTemplate(ref byte[] isoStandardRecord, out byte[] template);
1841
                 bool generateTemplate(ref byte[] pixels, out byte[] template, int width, int height); bool generateTemplate(ref byte[] pixels, out byte[] template, int width, int height, int locationX, int
1842
1843
         locationY);
1844
                 bool generateTemplate(ref byte[] pixels, out byte[] template);
1845
                 #endregion
1846
1847
1848
                 #region Methods -- Comparison Routines
1849
                 // compare two templates and report match score, see matchScore type
1850
                 // if more than one template size/type is possible, the comparison should
1851
                 // handle combinations of templates as gracefully as possible.
1852
                 double compareTemplates(ref byte[] template1, ref byte[] template2);
1853
                 #endregion
1854
1855
1856
                 #region Methods -- Save/Load Templates
1857
                 // save/load a template and return true on success
1858
                 // for files, one template in/out to file
1859
                 // for binary reader, next template in the stream
186ó
                 bool saveTemplate(string filename, ref byte[] template, bool enableOverwrite);
1861
                 bool loadTemplate(string filename, out byte[] template);
1862
                 bool loadTemplate(System.IO.BinaryReader bReader, out byte[] template);
1863
                 #endregion
1864
1865
1866
                 #region Methods -- Template Conversion Routines
1867
                 // Returns a bitmap
1868
                 System.Drawing.Bitmap templateToBitmap(byte[] byteTemplate);
1869
                 byte[] bitmapToTemplate(System.Drawing.Bitmap bitmapTemplate);
1870
                 #endregion
1871
1872
1873
                 #region Methods -- Other
```

```
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
                    void errorClear(); // clears the error message and error number to no error condition
                    // IMPORTANT NOTE:
                    // Implement the override to ToString for your implementation of ITemplateEngine as follows:
                    // public override string ToString()
                    // {
1881
1882
                    //
                             return m_implementationName;
                    // }
1883
1884
                    // Regression test -- example of how to run and also tests functionality
1885
                    // Generate templates, save/load templates, compare templates
                    bool regressionTest(string logfileName, string testDirectory); // returns true on successful completion bool regressionTest(string logfileName, string testDirectory, string imageFilename1, // to generate
1886
1887
1888
          templates 1,2,3
1889
                    #endregion
189ó
               }
1891
1892
          }
1893
```

# D Performance testing and certification procedures

#### D.1 Scope

1894

1895

1900

1914

1927

1928

1929 1930

1931 1932

1933

1934

1935 1936

This clause gives normative specifications for tests used to certify implementations that generate and/or match the mandatory minutia-based biometric elements specified by [FIPS], i.e. the two fingerprint minutiae templates placed on the PIV Card. That is, this clause regulates the test itself, and the testing laboratory, not the products under test, and the data specifications here should not be confused with those given in Clause 3 for fielded PIV implementations.

#### D.2 PIV authentication

The fingerprint templates conform to [MINUSTD] as profiled in clause 3.4. The use cases given in [800-73, Appendix C] detail how the templates and the PIV Card are used for interoperable authentication. Authentication may involve one or both of the PIV Card templates. These will be compared with newly acquired (i.e. live) fingerprint images of either or both of the primary and secondary fingers. The inclusion of the finger position in the [MINUSTD] header allows the system to prompt the user for one or more specific fingers.

1906 Authentication performance is quantified in terms of both the false reject rate (FRR) and the false accept rate (FAR). 1907 In PIV, FRR is the proportion of legitimate cardholders incorrectly denied access; the latter would be the proportion of impostors incorrectly allowed access. The error rates depend on a number of factors including: the environment, the 1908 1909 number of attempts (i.e. finger placements on the sensor), the sensor itself, the quality of the PIV Card templates' parent images, the number of fingerprints invoked, and the familiarity of users with the process. The use of two 1910 fingers in all authentication transactions offers substantially improved performance over single-finger authentication. 1911 The intent of the [FIPS] specification of an interoperable biometric is to support cross-vendor and cross-agency 1912 1913 authentication of PIV Cards. This plural aspect introduces a source of variation in performance.

## D.3 Test overview

- 1915 This clause specifies procedures for the certification of generators and matchers of [MINUSTD] templates.
- Interoperability testing requires exchange of templates between products, which **shall** therefore be tested as a group. Accordingly, the testing laboratory **shall** conduct a first round of testing to establish a primary group of interoperable template generators and matchers. Certification **shall** be determined quantitatively at the conclusion of the test. Thereafter certification requires interoperability with previously certified products.
- The certification procedure **shall** be conducted offline. This allows products to be certified using very large biometric data sets, in repeatable, deterministic and therefore auditable evaluations. Offline evaluation is needed to measure performance when template data is exchanged between all pairs of interoperable products. Large populations **shall** be used to quantify the effect of sample variance on performance. A template generator is logically a converter of images to templates. A template matcher logically compares one or two templates with one or two templates to produce a similarity score. Template generators and template matchers **shall** be certified separately. This aspect is instituted because:
  - 1. Template generation is procedurally, algorithmically and physically distinct from matching.
  - 2. Template generation is required by [FIPS], but matching is not.
  - 3. Fingerprint template interoperability is dependent on the quality of the PIV Card templates. The full benefits of an interoperable template will not be realized if a supplier is required to produce both a high performing generator and a high performing matcher.
  - 4. Once a template generator is certified and deployed, its templates will be in circulation. It is necessary for all matchers to be able to process these templates. Subsequent certification rounds will be complicated if generators and matchers are certified together.

Separate certification means that a supplier may submit one or more template generators and zero or more matchers for certification. Zero or more of the submitted products **shall** ultimately be certified.

This test design conforms to the provisions of the currently draft ISO/IEC 19795-4 [ISOSWAP] standard, as profiled by this document. One clause of that standard deals with blind testing. For PIV testing the template matcher **shall** not be able to discern the source of the enrollment templates.

#### D.3.1 Template generator

A template generator **shall** be certified as a software library. For PIV, a template generator is a library function that **shall** convert an image into a minutiae record. The input image represents a PIV enrollment plain impression. The output template represents a PIV Card template. A supplier's implementation, submitted for certification, **shall** satisfy the requirements of an application programming interface (API) specification to be published by the test organizer. The API specification will require the template generator to accept image data and produce [MINUSTD] templates conformant to Table 29. Where values or practices are not explicitly stated in Table 29, the specifications of clause 4.3 and Table 6 apply (e.g. on minutiae type). The CBEFF header and CBEFF signature **shall** not be included.

The testing laboratory **shall** input images to the generator. The template generator **shall** produce a conformant template regardless of the input. Such a template may contain zero minutiae. This provision transparently and correctly accounts for failures to enroll. In a deployed system, if quality assessment or image analysis algorithms made some determination that the input was unmatchable a failure to enroll might be declared. In an offline test such a determination **shall** result in at least a template containing zero minutiae. However, because in PIV other suppliers' matchers may be capable of handling even poor templates, it is recommended that a template generator submitted for testing should deprecate any internal quality acceptance mechanism, and attempt production of a viable template.

Table 29 – INCITS 378 specification for PIV Card template generator and matcher certification

#	Clause title and/or field name (Numbers in parentheses are [MINUSTD] clause numbers)	PIV Conformance Values Allowed	Informative Remarks
1.	Format Identifier (6.4.1)	0x464D5200	i.e. ASCII "FMR\o"
2.	Version Number (6.4.2)	0x20323000	i.e. ASCII " 20\0".
3.	Record Length (6.4.3)	26 ≤ L ≤ 800	26 byte header, max of 128 minutiae. See row 18.
4.	CBEFF Product Identifier Owner (6.4.4)	0	
5.	CBEFF Product Identifier Type (6.4.4)	0	
6.	Capture Equipment Compliance (6.4.5)	0	
7.	Capture Equipment ID (6.4.6)	0	
8.	Size of Scanned Image in x direction (6.4.7)	MIT	
9.	Size of Scanned Image in y direction (6.4.8)	MIT	
10.	X (horizontal) resolution (6.4.9)	197	Inherited directly from input data
11.	Y (vertical) resolution (6.4.10)	197	
12.	Number of Finger Views (6.4.11)	1	
13.	Reserved Byte (6.4.12)	0	
14.	Finger Position (6.5.1.1)	MIT	Inherited directly from input data
15.	View Number (6.5.1.2)	0	
16.	Impression Type (6.5.1.3)	0 or 2	Inherited directly from input data
17.	Finger Quality (6.5.1.4)	MIT	Inherited directly from input data
18.	Number of Minutiae (6.5.1.5)	0 ≤ M ≤ 128	M minutiae data records follow
19.	Minutiae Type (6.5.2.1)	01b, 10b, or 00b	See Note 1 below Table 6
20.	Minutiae Position (6.5.2.2)	MIT	See Note 7 below Table 6
21.	Minutiae Angle (6.5.2.3)	MIT	See Note 8 below Table 6
22.	Minutiae Quality (6.5.2.4)	MIT	This test specification previously required minutia quality values to be zero. This requirement no longer applies. It did not and does not apply to the PIV operational specification.
23.	Extended Data Block Length (6.6.1.1)	0	No bytes <b>shall</b> be included following this field.

mandatory at time of For PIV Certification, a mandatory value that <b>shall</b> be determined	
	l at the time the record
instantiation is instantiated and <b>shall</b> follow the practice specified in [FINGSTD]	)]

#### D.3.2 Template matcher

1959

1976

- 1960 A template matcher shall be certified as a software library. For PIV, a matcher is a software function that compares
- enrollment templates with authentication templates to produce a similarity score. The similarity score **shall** be an
- integer or real value quantity. The enrollment templates represent the PIV Card templates. The authentication
- 1963 templates represent those extracted from live authentication fingerprints. A supplier's implementation, submitted
- 1964 for certification, **shall** satisfy the API specification published by the test organizer.
- 1965 The API specification will support at a minimum the comparison of one authentication template (from an individual's
- 1966 primary or secondary fingers) with one enrollment template (from either the same or another individual's same
- 1967 finger). Both templates **shall** conform to the Table 12 profile of [MINUSTD].
- 1968 The test **shall** neither prescribe nor prohibit methods whereby fingers' material **shall** be employed in the core
- 1969 comparison. The only constraint is that all invocations of the matching function **shall** yield a similarity score regardless
- of the input templates. Larger scores **shall** be construed as indicating higher likelihood that the input data originate
- from the same person. A failure or refusal to compare the inputs **shall** in all cases result in the reporting of a score.
- 1972 This document recommends implementers report a low score in this case.
- 1973 The input [MINUSTD] enrollment templates **shall** be prepared by the test agent using software from a supplier. The
- input [MINUSTD] authentication templates **shall** be the output of the template generation software provided by the
- 1975 supplier of the matcher under test.

## D.4 Test procedure

- 1977 The testing laboratory **shall** publish a test specification document. This document **shall** establish deadlines for
- 1978 submission of products for certification.
- 1979 The supplier of a template generator **shall** submit a request for certification to the testing laboratory. The testing
- laboratory **shall** provide a set of image samples to these suppliers. The supplier **shall** submit templates from this data
- 1981 to the testing laboratory. The supplier **shall** submit the template generator to the testing laboratory. The testing
- laboratory **shall** execute it and check that it produces identical templates to those submitted by the supplier. The
- 1983 testing laboratory **shall** apply a conformance assessor to the templates. The testing laboratory **shall** report to the
- supplier whether identical templates were produced and whether the templates are conformant to the specifications
- in Table 29. This validation process may be iterative.
- 1986 The supplier of a template matcher **shall** submit a request for certification to the testing laboratory. The testing
- 1987 laboratory **shall** provide a set of samples to these suppliers. This set **shall** support debugging and **shall** consist of
- images representative of those collected in PIV registration. The supplier **shall** submit similarity scores from this data
- 1989 to the testing laboratory. The supplier **shall** submit the template matcher to the testing laboratory. The testing
- 1990 laboratory **shall** execute it and check that it produces identical scores to those submitted by the supplier. The testing
- 1991 laboratory **shall** report to the supplier the result of the check. This validation process may be iterative.
- The testing laboratory **shall** apply all template generators to the first biometric sample from each member of the test
- 1993 corpus. The testing laboratory **shall** invoke all template matchers to compare the resulting enrollment templates with
- second authentication templates from each member of the corpus. The authentication template **shall** be generated
- by the matcher supplier's generator (i.e. not by another supplier's generator). This **shall** be done for all pair wise
- combinations of template generators and template matchers. The result is a set of genuine similarity scores for each
- 1997 combination.
- 1998 The testing laboratory **shall** invoke all template matchers to compare enrollment templates with second
- authentication templates from members of a disjoint population. The authentication template shall, in all cases, be
- 2000 generated by the matcher supplier's generator. This shall be done for all pair wise combinations of template
- generators and template matchers. The result is a set of impostor similarity scores for each combination. The order
- in which genuine and impostor similarity scores are generated shall be randomized (i.e. it is not implied by the order
- of the last two paragraphs).
- The testing laboratory **shall** sum the similarity score obtained from matching of the image of a primary finger with
- that obtained from matching of the image of a secondary finger. This sum-rule fusion represents two-finger
- 2006 authentication.

# D.5 Determination of an interoperable group

The testing laboratory **shall** compute the detection error tradeoff characteristic (DET) for all pair wise combinations of the template generators and template matchers. The testing laboratory **shall** generate a rectangular interoperability matrix (see [ISOSWAP]). The matrix has rows corresponding to the generators and columns corresponding to the matchers. Each element of the interoperability matrix **shall** be the false reject rate at a fixed false accept rate. This value corresponds to one operating point on the DET. As described in clause D.3.1, the DET automatically includes the effect of failure to enroll and acquire.

An interoperable group of template generators and matchers **shall** be established as the largest subgroup of products submitted in an initial certification round for which all elements of the interoperability sub-matrix (i.e. FRR values) are less than or equal to 1% at a fixed 1% FAR operating point. The condition that all pair wise product combinations should be below this threshold is instituted because the PIV application is intolerant of non-interoperable pairs.