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We study the security of the underlying keyed-permutations of NIST LWC finalist TinyJAMBU. Our main findings are key-recovery attacks whose data and time complexities are close to the birthday bound 264. The attack idea works for all versions of TinyJAMBU permutations having different key sizes, irrespective of the number of rounds repeated in the permutations. Most notably, the attack complexity is only marginally increased even when the key size becomes larger. Concretely, for TinyJAMBU permutations of key sizes 128, 192, and 256 bits, the data/time complexities of our key-recovery attacks are about 265, 266, and 269.5, respectively. Our attacks are on the underlying permutations and not on the TinyJAMBU AEAD scheme; the TinyJAMBU mode of operation limits the applicability of our attacks. However, our results imply that TinyJAMBU’s underlying keyed-permutations cannot be expected to provide the same security levels as robust block ciphers of the corresponding block and key sizes. Furthermore, the provable security of TinyJAMBU AEAD scheme should be carefully revisited, where the underlying permutations have been assumed to be almost ideal.