Abstract: Anonymous credentials are poised for large-scale deployment worldwide. In the United States, verifiable digital credentials and mobile driver's licenses are increasingly being developed for privacy-preserving digital identity applications, while the European Union is moving toward the deployment of European Digital Identity Wallets at a scale of approximately 450 million potential users. A crucial challenge for these deployments is credential revocation. The main proposed privacy-preserving revocation systems use cryptographic accumulators. In the envisioned system, whenever a typically resource-constrained client presents their credential, they additionally prove in zero knowledge that their credential has not been revoked by issuing a non-membership proof with respect to the latest accumulator digest of revoked credentials. However, each revocation changes the accumulator state and can render existing non-membership witnesses stale. Thus, intermittently connected clients may need to process numerous missed updates before they can present their anonymous credentials. Computing and updating these non-membership proofs can be computationally intensive. Naively outsourcing these updates to a server, however, would forfeit the privacy guarantees of the anonymous credential system by revealing information about the credential being updated. In this presentation, we introduce new privacy-preserving delegation techniques for cryptographic accumulator (non-)membership proofs, enabling scalable and privacy-preserving anonymous credential deployments. In particular, we construct private proof-delegation protocols for RSA and bilinear accumulators in which the online client cost is constant in the number of missed accumulator updates.
Joint work: Botond Glasz, Alireza Kavousi, Istvan A. Seres, Bence Soóki-Tóth.
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Presented at WPEC 2026: NIST Workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography (3rd day; 2026-Oct-28)
WPEC 2026: NIST Workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography 2026
Starts: October 26, 2026Security and Privacy: cryptography, privacy