Abstract. Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a well-established area in applied cryptography with numerous applications and real-world deployments. PSI protocols enable parties to compute the intersection of their private datasets without revealing additional information. The case of an asymmetric PSI protocol presents several scalability challenges since one of the two sets is several order of magnitude larger than the other. Consequently, the community has shifted to scalable PSI designs that permit controlled disclosure in the form of cryptographic leakage. In this talk, we discuss security issues that we discovered (and fixed) in a recent asymmetric PSI protocol called “Might I Get Pwned” (MIGP). We will present the leakage issues of the original construction and demonstrate how an adversary can exploit this leakage with Deep Neural Networks to reconstruct encrypted credentials.
Joint work with: Dario Pasquini, Danilo Francati, Giuseppe Ateniese
WPEC 2024: NIST Workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography 2024. Virtual, 2024-Sep-24–26.
NIST Workshop on Privacy-Enhancing Cryptography 2024
Starts: September 24, 2024Virtual
Security and Privacy: cryptography