Source Title: Towards Trustworthy Elections: New Directions in Electronic Voting
Date Published: 2010
Author(s)
John Kelsey (NIST), Andrew Regenscheid (NIST), Tal Moran (Harvard SEAS Institute of Science), David Chaum
Editor(s)
David Chaum, Markus Jakobsson, Ronald Rivest, Peter Ryan, Josh Benaloh, Miroslaw Kutylowski, Ben Adida
In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three proposed end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Prêt-à-voter, and ThreeBallot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.
In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three proposed end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Prêt-à-voter, and ThreeBallot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which...
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In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three proposed end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Prêt-à-voter, and ThreeBallot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.
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Keywords
voting; end-to-end voting schemes; cryptographic voting schemes; coercion attacks
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