Abstract. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) enables distrustful parties to jointly compute on their private inputs without disclosing anything besides the results. The cryptography community has known about practical and general-purpose implementations of MPC protocols, securely computing any function, for 30 years. Thanks to its immense impact on the field of cryptography, MPC continues to gain momentum. Despite its theoretical soundness, MPC implementations in software and/or hardware can be vulnerable to side-channel attacks and fault attacks. This is understudied in the literature, although many implementation frameworks are open-source, paving the way for further research in this matter. This talk will introduce a line of research devoted to this type of attack against MPC implementation frameworks, especially those implementing garbled circuits.
Joint work with Domenic Forte, Shahin Tajik, Mohammad Hashemi, and Dev Mehta.
Suggested readings: ia.cr/2023/001, ia.cr/2024/980, ia.cr/2024/072
Security and Privacy: cryptography