Computer Security Resource Center

Computer Security Resource Center

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Cryptographic Module Validation Program

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2007-2003 Notices

[11-30-2007] -- Non-Compliance update to Certificate #733

RNG (Cert. #216) changed to non-compliant. This RNG shall not be used for any services requiring the use of random bits.


[10-12-2007] -- Federal Register Notice
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Docket No. 070321067–7068–01

Public Draft of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3, a revision of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Public comment period has closed.


[07-13-2007] -- Federal Register Notice
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Docket No. 070321067–7068–01

Announcing Public Draft of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3, a revision of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Department of Commerce.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.


[05-21-2007] DES Transition Plan and SP 800-57 Transition Plan has ended on May 19, 2007.

The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) DES Transition Plan addresses the use of single key DES by Federal agencies, which are incorporated in cryptographic modules, validated to FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2. Single key DES has been an Approved security function since the inception of the CMVP and the signing of FIPS 140-1 on January 11, 1994. The DES transition plan was developed to allow Federal agencies and vendors to smoothly transition to the stronger Approved security functions, specifically AES and Triple-DES.

The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-57 Transition Plan addresses the use of a minimum of 80 bits of security strength used by Federal agencies, as incorporated in cryptographic modules validated to FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2. The SP 800-57 transition plan was developed to allow Federal agencies and vendors to smoothly transition to the use of a minimum of 80 bits of security strength.

CMVP Actions:

  • References to DES as an Approved Security Function has been removed from FIPS 140-2 Annex A.
  • All cryptographic module validation entries for DES as an Approved Security Function have been changed and DES has been moved as a non-Approved Security Function.
  • All cryptographic module validation entries for security methods less than 80-bits of security strength have been modified to indicate these methods are not Approved for use in a FIPS Approved mode of operations.
  • Referenced Security Policies or Certificate images have not been modified or updated. Vendors are encourage to provide updated Security Policies. Per FIPS 140-2 FAQ, certificate images are only provided representing initial validation and are not updated when validation changes occur.
  • As a result of the above changes, if a cryptographic module validation is no longer valid, this module entry will be marked as "Revoked" with a link to the transition plan document.

CAVP Actions:

  • The DES Algorithm Validation List has been archived and is still accessible for historical purposes only.
  • The Triple-DES Algorithm Validation List has been modified to only recognize those implementations that support keying option 1 (K1, K2, and K3 are independent) and keying option 2 (K1=K2, and K3 is independent). If an implementation previously tested supported only keying option 3 (which is equivalent to DES), it has been marked as no longer NIST-Approved.
  • The DSA Algorithm Validation List has been modified to only recognize those implementations that support 80-bits or more of security strength. This includes implementations that use a modulus size of 1024 bits. If an implementation previously tested did not support mod size of 1024 bits, it has been marked as no longer NIST-Approved.

[03-06-2006] SP 800-57 Transition Plan

The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-57 Transition Plan addresses the use of a minimum of 80 bits of security strength used by Federal agencies, as incorporated in cryptographic modules validated to FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2. The SP 800-57 transition plan was developed to allow Federal agencies and vendors to smoothly transition to the use of a minimum of 80 bits of security strength.

[09-20-2005] Key Establishment methods and Key Strength

NIST Special Publication 800-57, Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General, was published August, 2005. The CMVP is determining transition applicability to FIPS 140-2. Until this is determined, all new module validation certificates with key establishment schemes will include a caveat with the following text, IF the strength of the key establishment method does not equal the strength of the keys established per SP 800-57. For certificates issued prior to this notice, SP 800-57 Table 2 provides information regarding comparable key strengths.

Example caveat: RSA (key wrapping, key establishment methodology provides 80 bits of encryption strength);


[05-19-2005] Federal Register Notice

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Institute of Standards and Technology

Announcing Approval of the Withdrawal of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 46-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES); FIPS 74, Guidelines for Implementing and Using the NBS Data Encryption Standard; and FIPS 81, DES Modes of Operation​

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Commerce.


[05-19-2005] DES Transition Plan

The Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP) DES Transition Plan addresses the use of single key DES by Federal agencies, which are incorporated in cryptographic modules, validated to FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2. Single key DES has been an Approved security function since the inception of the CMVP and the signing of FIPS 140-1 on January 11, 1994. The DES transition plan was developed to allow Federal agencies and vendors to smoothly transition to the stronger Approved security functions, specifically AES and Triple-DES.


[02-09-2005] DES Testing and Algorithm Validation

The CMT laboratories shall no longer accept DES algorithm implementations for validation by the CAVP. As of today, February 9, 2005, the CAVP will no longer issue algorithm certificates for DES algorithm implementations not under contract for testing by the CMT laboratories at the time of receipt of this notice.


[01-12-2005] Federal Register Notice

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Institute of Standards and Technology

Announcing Development of Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-3, a revision of FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules

AGENCY: National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Commerce.

ACTION: Notice; request for comments.

[12-16-2003] AES MAC for OTAR for use in radios.

Effective December 12, 2003, the CMVP will recognize the use of AES MAC (CBC-MAC based on AES defined in Project 25 TIA-102.AACA-1) for the Digital Radio Over-the-Air Rekeying (OTAR) Protocol when operated in a FIPS Approved mode. Further details in CMVP FAQ.


[08-07-2003] With the passage of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, there is no longer a statutory provision to allow for agencies to waive mandatory Federal Information Processing Standards. For further information, please go to the CMVP FAQs Section 3.2.


[06-12-2003] -- CNSS Policy No. 15, Fact Sheet No. 1

National Policy on the Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to Protect National Security Systems and National Security Information, June 2003.


[02-10-2003] -- Development of Cryptographic Module Validation Program Management Processes:

The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) jointly manage the Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP). The CMVP validates commercial cryptographic modules to Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 and other cryptography based standards such as algorithms. Products validated as conforming to FIPS 140-1 or FIPS 140-2 are accepted by the Federal agencies of both countries for the protection of sensitive but unclassified information (Government of the United States) or designated information (Government of Canada).

In the CMVP, vendors of commercial cryptographic modules use independent, accredited Cryptographic Module Testing (CMT) laboratories to have their modules tested. Laboratories accredited by National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) perform cryptographic module compliance/conformance testing.

The CMVP Team has begun the process of reviewing and updating its CMVP management processes. The intent is to better define the policies and processes that govern the CMVP Team, the laboratories and the vendors.

The deliverable is the CMVP Management Manual that will refine the already existing policies and collate them in one document. The CMVP Team will also add new policies, processes and requirements that will affect present and new CMT laboratories, and the vendors of validated cryptographic modules. Amongst other things, new requirements will be added in the areas of:

  • CMT laboratory personnel
  • Communication between the CMVP, CMT laboratories, vendors and consulting firms

The first draft of the CMVP Management Manual is expected to be available for public review during the fall of 2003 and will be finalized during the winter of 2004.

[02-04-2002] -- FIPS PUB 140-2 Page v, Implementation Schedule:

"Agencies may retain and use FIPS 140-1 validated products that have been purchased before the end of the transition period." Clarification: Agencies may continue to purchase, retain and use FIPS 140-1 validated products after May 25, 2002.

 

Created October 11, 2016, Updated December 04, 2018